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2023 DIGILAW 968 (AP)

Aluri Thirupathi Rao v. Aluri Venkata Ramana

2023-07-04

B.S.BHANUMATHI

body2023
ORDER : This criminal petition, under Section 482 CrPC, is preferred by A1 & A2 to quash the proceedings in C.C.No.428 of 2018 on the file of the Court of I Additional Junior Civil Judge-cum-I Additional Judicial First Class Magistrate, Sattenapalli. 2. Heard Sri N. Sriram Murthy, learned counsel for the petitioners and Sri Kambampati Ramesh Babu, learned counsel for the 1st respondent/de facto complainant and the learned Assistant Public Prosecutor appearing for the 2nd respondent/State. 3. The facts leading to filing of this petition are briefly as follows: On 17.07.2017 on the complaint of the de facto complainant/ 1st respondent herein, a case in FIR No.112 of 2017 was registered by the Atchampet Police under Section 498A read with 34 IPC against six (6) accused persons. The 1st respondent complained that she was married to A1 on 21.08.2005 and at the time of her marriage, her parents (Lws 3 & 4) gave cash of Rs.1,00,000/-and gold ornaments worth Rs.10,00,000/-and that the couple have one daughter and one son after they set up their family in Thullur immediately after the marriage. She further stated that in April, 2015, A1 had given her Rs.40,000/-to give the amount to the parents of 1st respondent as she asked him stating that her parents needed that amount, but, before she gave the amount to her parents, one Subhani who is a Tailor in their village had taken the said amount stating that he needed it because of ill-health of his son who was hospitalized and promised to return the same within four (4) days, however, he failed to return the amount as promised. She further stated that at that time there cropped up disputes among the de facto complainant, her husband/A1 and her mother-in-law/ A2 in relation to the said amount and that taking advantage of the dispute, Aluri Ashok Kumar (A3) who is the son of her senior father-in-law, Nathani Srinadh (A4) who is the maternal uncle of A1, Nathani Sambasivarao (A5) and Kaka Chanti (A6) unnecessarily interfered in her family affairs and made baseless attributions against her and on 23.08.2015, A1, A2 and A4 beat her. It is also stated that she had informed the dispute to her maternal uncle, Narasimha Rao and so he had settled the dispute stating that he would make good the amount, if necessary, but even then again on 25.08.2015, at about 10 am, A1 to A5 beat the de facto complainant pushing her with hands and legs and telephoned to her maternal uncle, Narasimha Rao, and thereby, she returned to her maternal home. She further complained that she went to the matrimonial home many times along with her maternal uncle to join A1, but she was prevented from entering into the house stating that she had nothing to do there and asking her to stay at her maternal home only. 4. After investigation, police laid charge sheet against A1 and A2 only for the offence punishable under Section 498A read with 34 IPC and dropped the case against A3 to A6. 5. Having been aggrieved by the cognizance taken by the learned Magistrate against A1 and A2 for the offence under Section 498A read with 34 IPC, this petition is filed. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that the allegations made against the petitioners do not constitute the offence under Section 498A IPC since there is no complaint that the petitioners harassed the de facto complainant demanding any amount of dowry. Learned counsel for the petitioners placed reliance on the decisions in Onkar Nath Mishra and others v. State (NCT of Delhi) and Another, (2008) 2 Supreme Court Cases 561, State of Andhra Pradesh v. M. Madhusdudhan Rao, (2008) 15 Supreme Court cases 582, and Rajesh Sharma and others v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Another, (2018) 10 Supreme Court Cases 472. 7. According to the learned counsel, the explanation appended to Section 498A IPC requires that there must be demand for dowry to constitute ‘cruelty’ which is made punishable under Section 498A IPC. 8. On the other hand, learned counsel for the 1st respondent and 2nd the learned Assistant Public Prosecutor representing the respondent submitted that the word ‘cruelty’ which is defined in explanation has two separate limbs and a case falling under either of them is sufficient to constitute the offence punishable under Section 498A IPC and both should not be read together but they should be read disjunctively and not conjunctively and they are separated by the word ‘or’. In this regard, decision of the Supreme Court in case of Gopal v. State of Rajasthan, (2009) 2 SCR 423 has been cited. They further took support from the decisions cited by the learned counsel for the petitioners as well and submitted that even in those decisions, it is not a principle laid down that demand for dowry is an invariable element to constitute the requirement of ‘cruelty’ and therefore, either the type of willful conduct defined or the kind of harassment defined in the explanation would meet the requirement of the word ‘cruelty’ and both need not co-exist. 9. For the purpose of better appreciation, it is apropos to refer Section 498A IPC and it reads as under: 498A. Husband or relative of husband of a woman subjecting her to cruelty.—Whoever, being the husband or the relative of the husband of a woman, subjects such woman to cruelty shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years and shall also be liable to fine for a term which may extend to three years and shall also be liable to fine. Explanation.—For the purpose of this section, ‘cruelty’ means— (a) Any willful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health (whether mental or physical) of the woman; or (b) Harassment of the woman where such harassment is with a view to coercing her or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable security or is on account of failure by her or any person related to her to met such demand.’ As can be seen from the provision, the word ‘cruelty’ used in Section 498A IPC has been defined in the explanation which contained two separate limbs distinctly noted as (a) and (b) and they are separated by the word ‘or’. Clause (a) of explanation deals with willful conduct which is of such a nature defined therein would constitutes ‘cruelty’. Clause (b) of explanation deals with ‘harassment’ of the type defined therein which would constitute ‘cruelty’. Therefore, either the willful conduct mentioned in clause (a) or the ‘harassment’ mentioned in clause (b) of the explanation would constitute ‘cruelty’ within the meaning of Section 498A IPC. Clause (b) of explanation deals with ‘harassment’ of the type defined therein which would constitute ‘cruelty’. Therefore, either the willful conduct mentioned in clause (a) or the ‘harassment’ mentioned in clause (b) of the explanation would constitute ‘cruelty’ within the meaning of Section 498A IPC. It cannot be construed by any stretch of imagination that even the willful conduct and the harassment as dealt with in explanation (a) and (b) should be read together to examine whether ‘cruelty’ as required is made out. This view is fortified by the decisions relied on by both sides. (i) In Onkar Nath Mishra and Ors. vs. State (NCT of Delhi) and Ors (1 supra), it was held at paragraph No.17 as follows: “17. The term 'cruelty', which has been made punishable under Section 498A I.P.C. has been defined in the Explanation appended to the said Section, to mean: (i) any wilful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health whether mental or physical of the woman; or (ii) harassment of the woman where such harassment is with a view to coercing her or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable security or is on account of failure by her or any person related to her to meet such demand. Therefore, the consequences of 'cruelty', which are either likely to drive a woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury, danger to life, limb or health, whether mental or physical of the woman or the harassment of a woman, where such harassment is with a view to coercing her or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand are required to be established in order to bring home an offence under Section 498A I.P.C.” (underline is used by this Court to emphasize the word ‘or’) (ii) In State of Andhra Pradesh vs. M. Madhusudhan Rao (2 supra), it was held at paragraph Nos.17 & 18 as follows: ‘17. Thus, providing a new dimension to the concept of "cruelty", Clause (a) of Explanation to Section 498A I.P.C. postulates that any wilful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to drive a woman to commit suicide would constitute "cruelty". Thus, providing a new dimension to the concept of "cruelty", Clause (a) of Explanation to Section 498A I.P.C. postulates that any wilful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to drive a woman to commit suicide would constitute "cruelty". Such wilful conduct, which is likely to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health (whether mental or physical) of the woman would also amount to "cruelty". Clause (b) of the Explanation provides that harassment of the woman where such harassment is with a view to coercing her or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable security or is on account of failure by her or any person related to her to meet such demand, would also constitute "cruelty" for the purpose of Section 498A I.P.C. 18. It is plain that as per Clause (b) of the Explanation, which, according to learned Counsel for the State, is attracted in the instant case, every harassment does not amount to "cruelty" within the meaning of Section 498A I.P.C. The definition stipulates that the harassment has to be with a definite object of coercing the woman or any person related to her to meet an unlawful demand. In other words, for the purpose of Section 498A I.P.C. harassment simpliciter is not "cruelty" and it is only when harassment is committed for the purpose of coercing a woman or any other person related to her to meet an unlawful demand for property etc., that it amounts to "cruelty" punishable under Section 498A I.P.C.’ (underline is used by this Court to emphasize the words ‘would also’) The decision in para 18 on which the counsel for the petitioners laid reliance is dealing with clause (b) of the explanation to section 498A IPC. It does not mean that it is the only and wholly determining factor of the essential element of cruelty. (iii) In Rajesh Sharma and Ors. vs. State of U.P. and Ors (3 supra), it was held at paragraph No.14 as follows: ‘14. Section 498A was inserted in the statute with the laudable object of punishing cruelty at the hands of husband or his relatives against a wife particularly when such cruelty had potential to result in suicide or murder of a woman as mentioned in the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Act 46 of 1983. Section 498A was inserted in the statute with the laudable object of punishing cruelty at the hands of husband or his relatives against a wife particularly when such cruelty had potential to result in suicide or murder of a woman as mentioned in the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Act 46 of 1983. The expression 'cruelty' in Section 498A covers conduct which may drive the women to commit suicide or cause grave injury (mental or physical) or danger to life or harassment with a view to coerce her to meet unlawful demand1. It is a matter of serious concern that large number of cases continue to be filed under Section 498A alleging harassment of married women. We have already referred to some of the statistics from the Crime Records Bureau. This Court had earlier noticed the fact that most of such complaints are filed in the heat of the moment over trivial issues. Many of such complaints are not bona fide. At the time of fling of the complaint, implications and consequences are not visualized. At times such complaints lead to uncalled for harassment not only to the Accused but also to the complainant. Uncalled for arrest may ruin the chances of settlement. (underline is used by this Court to emphasize the word ‘or’) Section 498A IPC is worded in consonance with the statement of objects and reasons of the Act and it covers both forms of cruelty. (iv) In Gopal vs. State of Rajasthan (4 supra), it was held at paragraph No.9 as follows: ‘9. Section 498A IPC has two limbs. The first limb of Section 498A provides that whoever, being the husband or the relative of the husband of a woman, subjects such woman to cruelty shall be punished. `Cruelty' has been defined in clause (a) of the Explanation to the said Section as any willful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to drive to a woman to commit suicide. `Cruelty' has been defined in clause (a) of the Explanation to the said Section as any willful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to drive to a woman to commit suicide. When there is demand of dowry, the case comes under clause (b) of the Explanation to Section 498A.’ Even in the decisions cited by the learned counsel for the petitioners, it is nowhere stated that willful conduct mentioned in clause (a) would be treated as cruelty if only it is coupled with demand for dowry as described in clause (b), or that unlawful demand for any property/valuable security alone constitutes ‘cruelty’ within Section 498A IPC. As such, the contention of the petitioners on these lines is not acceptable. 10. The allegations of the de facto complainant are not regarding harassment of the accused demand for any property or valuable security. Further, the type of willful conduct within the scope of explanation (a) to Section 498A IPC is not made out from the allegations leveled against the petitioners. No other charge has been framed against the petitioners from the allegations. There is only allegation of beating of the de facto complainant by the named accused in relation to the amount which she took from A1 and gave to the tailor. 11. The allegation against A1 & A2 along with A3 on one occasion and A1 & A2 along with A3 to A5 on another occasion was complained. Though the allegation by the de facto complainant is the same against them, the case against the other accused was dropped and charge sheet was filed only against A1 & A2 and such an approach is prejudicial to the case of A1 & A2. 12. Under these circumstances, continuation of proceedings against the petitioners for the offence under Section 498A IPC is unsustainable and the same are liable to be quashed. 13. In the result, the Criminal Petition is allowed quashing the proceedings in C.C.No.428 of 2018 on the file of I Additional Judicial First Class Magistrate, Sattenapalli, as against the petitioners/A1 & A2. Pending miscellaneous petitions, if any, shall stand closed.