ORDER : The petitioners pray for a Writ of Certiorari calling for records relating to the orders in petition No.176/MP/2019 dated 05.02.2020 passed by the 1st respondent holding that the 2nd respondent / NTPC has to pay safeguard duty and GST to the 3rd respondent and that the 2nd respondent is entitled to claim the said amount from the petitioner DISCOMs on back-to-back basis and quash the said order as illegal, arbitrary, discriminative and without jurisdiction and contrary to the provisions of the Electricity Act, 2003 and agreement entered into by the parties and pass such other order. 2. The factual matrix of the case in nut shell is thus: (a) The petitioners are the Southern and Eastern Power Distribution Companies (DISCOMs) of Andhra Pradesh. The 2nd respondent is the National Thermal Power Corporation Limited (NTPC) and the 3rd respondent is a private Solar Power Generating company, 1st respondent is the Central Electricity Regulatory Commission (CERC). Petitioners are constituted under the Companies Act and are wholly governed by the Government of A.P. They procure power form the State and Central generating stations and also from private generating stations to supply to the end consumers of the State of A.P. Pursuant to its power distribution policy, the petitioners entered into a Power Sale Agreement (PSA) with the 2nd respondent on 11.12.2017 for supply of 250 MW of solar power under Bundling Scheme i.e., Solar Power to be bundled with thermal power in the ratio of 2 : 1. The 2nd respondent would procure solar power from the Solar Power Developer (SPD) who will be selected through completive bidding process and after bundling with thermal power in the ratio of 2:1, the 2nd respondent will supply to the petitioners at the tariff that would be obtained in the bidding process for solar power and the total tariff of such bundling power shall be proportionate to the cost of such a bundled power. In the event, the thermal power cost is higher than the tariff of the solar power, the petitioners are at liberty to purchase only solar power and reject the thermal power component. In the event, the thermal power cost is higher than the tariff of the solar power, the petitioners are at liberty to purchase only solar power and reject the thermal power component. (b) While so, the 2nd respondent following bidding process, selected the 3rd respondent who is a SPD to supply solar power at a tariff of Rs.3,15 ps per unit from their 250 MW solar power plant proposed at Kadapa Ultra Mega Solar Park for 25 years from the date of commission of their project. The respondents 2 and 3 entered into a Power Purchasing Agreement (PPA) dated 07.02.2018 in this regard but the petitioners are not privy to the said agreement. The 3rd respondent with a delay of three months commissioned part capacity of 200 MW. (c) As per the PSA entered into by the petitioners and 2nd respondent, the disputes if any shall be referred to Appropriate Commission and further, the PSA shall come into force after the approval of Appropriate Commission. The phrase ‘Appropriate Commission’ has been defined in the PSA. As per PSA, the entire power of the SPD i.e., the 3rd respondent was agreed to be sold to the petitioners in Andhra Pradesh state. Due to all these facts, APERC alone is the appropriate Commission as per Section 86 of the Electricity Act, 2003 (for short ‘Act, 2003’). That is why, with the consent of 2nd respondent, the petitioners have submitted PSA to the APERC for approval with regard to the procurement of the power. Pending the proceedings before the APERC, the 3rd respondent commissioned the project with a part capacity of 200 MW on 03.05.2019 and with a delay of three months. (d) The APERC vide its common order dated 05.10.2019 granted approval to the procurement of 750 MW from NTPC, 250 MW from NTPC and 750 MW from SPCL with the conditions mentioned thereon. The SPDs filed O.P. No.368/2019 before appellate Tribunal for electricity at New Delhi and an interim stay was granted. (e) While so, the petitioner came to know that the 3rd respondent filed a petition No.176/MP/2019 dated 14.06.2019 against the 2nd respondent before the 1st respondent claiming entitlement of Safeguard Duty Tax (SDT) and GST on SDT for a total amount of nearly Rs.162.00 Cr. in addition to the tariff of Rs.3.15 ps per unit as quoted by the 3rd respondent. in addition to the tariff of Rs.3.15 ps per unit as quoted by the 3rd respondent. In the said petition, initially the petitioners were not made as parties. However, the CERC passed an order dated 22.08.2019 and directed to implead the present petitioners herein as respondents. Subsequently the 1st respondent issued notice dated 19.11.2019 to the petitioners for their appearance on 25.11.2019 and the petitioners received said notice only on 23.11.2019 and as such there was no sufficient time either to appear or to submit the reply on the scheduled date of hearing i.e., 25.11.2019. Consequently the 1st respondent reserved the matter for orders on 25.11.2019. As the matter was not reopened and opportunity was not given to the petitioners to file their reply, the petitioners herein filed W.P.No.750/2020 questioning the impleadment of petitioners in petition No.176/MP/2019 by the 1st respondent. However, during the pendency of the said writ petition, the 1st respondent herein passed the impugned order dated 05.02.2020 and held that the 3rd respondent herein is entitled to recover the SDT and GST on SDT from NTPC / 2nd respondent herein by producing the relevant documents and that the NTPC is liable to pay the said amount which is not conditional upon the payment to be made by the DISCOMs / petitioners herein to NTPC. It was further held that the NTPC is eligible to claim the said amount from the DISCOMs on back-to-back basis. The CERC dismissed the claim of the 3rd respondent herein relating to the carrying costs. Challenging the said order, the present writ petition is filed on the following main grounds: (a) Firstly that since the entire power is to be supplied to the AP DISCOMs and as per the terms of PSA dated 11.12.2017, APERC alone has jurisdiction to decide the dispute between the parties, but not CERC. (b) Secondly, the petitioners are not liable to pay the safeguard duty and GST to the 3rd respondent herein for the reason that there is no privity of contract between the petitioners and 3rd respondent and the petitioners are not parties to the PPA dated 07.02.2018. (c) Thirdly, the impugned order passed by the 1st respondent is illegal as the principles of natural justice were not followed and no opportunity was given to the petitioners to submit its reply and no opportunity of hearing was given to them. 3. (c) Thirdly, the impugned order passed by the 1st respondent is illegal as the principles of natural justice were not followed and no opportunity was given to the petitioners to submit its reply and no opportunity of hearing was given to them. 3. The 2nd respondent filed counter and opposed the writ petition inter alia contending thus: (a) As per the guidelines of the Ministry of New and Renewable Energy (MNRE), the NTPC was appointed as a nodal agency for the implementation of the State Specific Bundling Scheme and thereby facilitating purchase and sale of solar power under GOI’s National Solar Machine (NSM). Pursuant to thereof, NTPC entered into PSA with the petitioners on 11.12.2017 for supply of 250 MW of solar power under bundling scheme. Later, the 3rd respondent participated in the e-bidding process conducted by NTPC and was selected for and later the NTPC entered into a Power Purchase Agreement (PPA) dated 07.02.2018 with 3rd respondent on back-to-back basis. (b) While so, on 16.07.2018, the Director General of Trade Remedies (DGTR) recommended GOI for imposition of safeguard duty on solar panels/modules imported from certain countries including China and Malaysia. Accordingly, on 30.07.2018, the Ministry of Finance issued a notification bearing No.01/2018-customs(SG)(safeguard duty notification) imposing safeguard duty on the import of solar panels / modules for a period of two years at the rates specified therein. However, such duty was exempted on purchase from developing countries. Aggrieved by the imposition of safeguard duty, the 3rd respondent filed petition No.176/MP/2019 before CERC seeking compensation on account of increase in the capital cost of the project due to the change in law event. Upon hearing the parties, the CERC passed the impugned order dated 05.02.2020 and allowed the claim of the 3rd respondent holding that the imposition of safeguard duty in effect as change in law event qua Article 17 of PPA. The CERC directed the NTPC / 2nd respondent to compensate the 3rd respondent with a liberty to claim the same from the writ petitioners. In the light of the above background, the writ petition is not maintainable. (c) It is further contended that this Court has no territorial jurisdiction to entertain writ petition under Article 226 of Constitution of India for the reason that the Head Office of CERC is located at New Delhi and the impugned order was passed by CERC thereat. In the light of the above background, the writ petition is not maintainable. (c) It is further contended that this Court has no territorial jurisdiction to entertain writ petition under Article 226 of Constitution of India for the reason that the Head Office of CERC is located at New Delhi and the impugned order was passed by CERC thereat. As such this writ petition is not maintainable for want of territorial jurisdiction. (d) It is further contended that the writ petition is not maintainable also due to the availability of alternate efficacious remedy to the petitioners in the form of appeal under Section 111 of the Act, 2003 before the concerned Appellate Tribunal. (e) Finally it is contended that the NTPC is only an intermediary between the petitioners and 3rd respondent and in that view and also due to the back-to-back agreements i.e., PSA between petitioners and NTPC and PPA between NTPC and 3rd respondent, further, the petitioners being ultimate beneficiary of the bundled power, it has to bear the cost of safeguard duty and GST impacted on the 3rd respondent due to change in law. The 2nd respondent thus prayed to dismiss the writ petition. 4. The 3rd respondent filed stay vacate petition in I.A.No.3/2020, wherein it challenged the writ petition as follows: (a) The writ petition is not maintainable in view of availability of alternate efficacious remedy in the form of appeal before the Appellate Tribunal for electricity. In fact, in similar transactions, the petitioners filed appeal before the Appellate Tribunal. (b) The petitioners did not disclose the true facts to the effect that they filed appearance on 10.10.2020 before the CERC and in spite of having 45 days time, they did not file any objections against the claim petition. Therefore, it is not correct on the part of the petitioners to contend that they were not accorded enough time and opportunity to be heard. Similarly, in spite of knowing that the CERC has reserved the matter for orders, the petitioners did not choose to file a reopen petition, instead, filed WP No.750/2020 quashing the impleadment order. In the meanwhile, orders were passed by the CERC on 05.02.2020 and therefore, the WP. No.750/2020 became infructuous and was dismissed by this Court on 29.02.2020. Challenging the order of the CERC, the present writ petition is filed by the petitioners on 25.02.2020. In the meanwhile, orders were passed by the CERC on 05.02.2020 and therefore, the WP. No.750/2020 became infructuous and was dismissed by this Court on 29.02.2020. Challenging the order of the CERC, the present writ petition is filed by the petitioners on 25.02.2020. Hence, the writ petition is not maintainable under law. (c) It is further contended that, the transactions covered by PPA and PSA are a part of composite scheme under National Solar Machine and hence, the petitioners cannot claim that there is no privity of contract between petitioners and respondent No.3. If there is no such privity of contract, even the APERC also will not have jurisdiction to decide the issue. (d) Denying the contention of the petitioners that since the tariff was adopted by APERC, the jurisdiction to decide the present issue shall also vest with APERC and not with CERC, it is contended that the jurisdiction of CERC or SERC is not contingent upon the determination / adoption of tariff as per the scheme of Act, 2003. On the other hand, the CERC and APERC draw their powers under Section 79 & 86 of the Act, 2003 respectively. Section 86 of the Act limits the power of SERC to adjudicate upon issues involving generation, supply, transmission and wheeling of electricity within the State. Whereas, Section 79 allows the CERC to adjudicate upon issues relating to supply of electricity in more than one State, as well as of generating companies owned or controlled by the Central Government. In that view, CERC has jurisdiction to pass the impugned order because the NTPC is supplying the power to the petitioners by bundling the solar power with thermal power from NTPC’s coal based stations i.e., Central Government owned / controlled entity. The 3rd respondent thus prayed to dismiss the writ petition. 5. The writ petitioners filed rejoinder to the counter affidavit filed by the 3rd respondent as follows: (a) It is true that the petitioners received notice from CERC on 27.09.2019 regarding the impleadment of the petitioners in petition No.176/MP/2019. Thereafter, the petitioners engaged an advocate who filed vakalat on 09.10.2019. However, due to communication gap, the petitioners could not file counter against the impleadment of the petitioners as respondents therein. Subsequently the petitioners filed WP No.750/2020 questioning the impleadment of the petitioners as respondents in petition No.176/MP/2019. Thereafter, the petitioners engaged an advocate who filed vakalat on 09.10.2019. However, due to communication gap, the petitioners could not file counter against the impleadment of the petitioners as respondents therein. Subsequently the petitioners filed WP No.750/2020 questioning the impleadment of the petitioners as respondents in petition No.176/MP/2019. Meanwhile, the petitioners received another notice from CERC dated 23.11.2019 directing the petitioners to file their response on or before 25.11.2019. Due to paucity of time, the petitioners could not attend or file their response. The Hon’ble CERC reserved the orders on 25.11.2019 without giving any opportunity to the petitioners and passed orders on 05.02.2020. Therefore, the petitioners are constrained to file the present writ petition questioning the order dated 05.02.2020 of the CERC. (b) It is further submitted that as per the terms of PSA entered between petitioners and NTPC, the petitioners have the right to surrender the thermal power at any point of time during the tenure of PPA. Therefore, petitioners have no obligation to purchase bundled thermal power. In fact, the petitioners have already surrendered the bundled thermal power as per MOP notification dated 16.10.2020. In that view, APERC alone has the sole jurisdiction to decide the issue. (c) It is further submitted that PPA and PSA are two separate agreements and both were consented by APERC. There is no direct privity between petitioners and 3rd respondent. As such APERC alone has jurisdiction. Hence the order of CERC is beyond the jurisdiction and power. 6. Heard arguments of learned Advocate General representing Sri Y.Nagi Reddy, learned counsel for petitioners, Sri B.Ravi Teja, learned Standing Counsel for 2nd respondent, and Sri C.Prakash Reddy, learned Senior Counsel representing Sri Kilaru Nithin Krishna, learned counsel for 3rd respondent. 7. Fulminating the order dated 05.02.2020 of the 1st respondent, learned Advocate General firstly argued that the CERC has no jurisdiction to entertain the petition No.176/MP/2019 filed by the 3rd respondent. In expatiation he would argue, the AP Electricity Regulatory Commission (APERC) by exercising its jurisdiction under Section 86(1)(b) r/w Section 64(5) of Act, 2003, has adopted the tariff discovered in the bidding process and also approved the PSA/PPA between NTPC/2nd respondent and the petitioners by its order dated 05.10.2019. Thus, the first and initial approval of PPA and PSA along with tariff was made by the APERC in the process of public hearing. Thus, the first and initial approval of PPA and PSA along with tariff was made by the APERC in the process of public hearing. He would emphasize that when tariff has been adopted/determined by the State Commission, it alone will have jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the disputes between the licensees and generating companies as per section 86(f) of Electricity Act, 2003. He would further argue that the contention of the 3rd respondent that Section 64(5) would only apply to the tariff determined under section 62 but not the tariff adopted under section 63 is untenable since no such exception can be decipherable from section 64 of the Act. Learned Advocate General sought to argue that CERC will have jurisdiction under Section 79(f) to adjudicate upon the disputes involving generating companies or transmission licensees whose tariff is decided by it under section 79 (a) to (d). However, in the instant case, the CERC has neither decided the tariff nor approved the PSA. Therefore, the CERC has no jurisdiction to entertain the petition filed by 3rd respondent. He placed reliance on the decision of Hon’ble Apex Court in Energy watchdog and others vs. CERC, (2017) 14 SCC 80 . 8. Nextly, learned Advocate General argued that there is no privity of contract between the petitioners and 3rd respondent, inasmuch as, petitioners are not parties to the Power Purchase Agreement dated 05.02.2018 executed between respondents 2 and 3. The CERC, therefore, ought not to have held that the 2nd respondent can pay the safeguard duty and GST to the respondent No.3 and recover the same from petitioners. That apart, as per the clause No.8.1.1 in PSA dated 11.12.2017 which relates to “changein-law”, it is only if there is any increase or new tax is levied in respect of supply of power by NTPC to DISCOMs, the petitioners may have liability, but not in respect of taxes or duties levied towards goods imported by 3rd respondent. 9. Nextly, learned Advocate General argued that mere availability of alternative remedy is not a bar to file writ petition, particularly, when the impugned order passed by the CERC suffers the vices of lack of jurisdiction on one hand and non-observance of principles of natural justice i.e., not affording an opportunity to the petitioners to file counter to submit their arguments on the other. He would emphasize that in such circumstances this Court can exercise plenary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. He placed reliance on Whirlpool Corporation v. Registry of Trade Marks Limited, 1998 (8) SCC 1 , L.K.Verma v. HMT Limited, (2006) 2 SCC 269 . 10. Nextly, learned Advocate General argued that even if for arguments sake the CERC is admitted to have jurisdiction, however, on merits its order is unsustainable on facts and in law. He vivified that in the course of testing the validity of the claim of 3rd respondent herein, many factual and legal aspects would arise firstly, whether the 3rd respondent adopted cost effective and mitigative measures to secure solar panels because a party seeking compensatory costs on the strength of “change in law” clause is responsible to answer as to what mitigative measures have been adopted by it to reduce the burden of compensation on other party. The CERC has ignored this aspect. Secondly, the 3rd respondent is responsible to produce relevant records and documents showing the actual payment of safeguard duty and GST in the absence of which the 3rd respondent will not be entitled to the claim. However, the CERC did not insist upon the production of any of the details of supply contract but meekly accepted the contention of the 3rd respondent that the agreement between it and the foreign vendors is a confidential one. In fact, the CERC, has, in the case of ACME Rewa Solar Energy Private Limited v. Solar Energy Corporation of India Limited dated 02.05.2019, set up certain norms and standards for grant of benefit on account of “change in law” event. However, those standards were totally ignored by it in the instant case. Thirdly, the CERC did not take into account the conduct of the 3rd respondent in causing delay and not abiding by the time schedules for commissioning the plant. For instance, the RFS was on 27.10.2016, the PPA was on 02.07.2018 with effective date of 10.01.2018, schedule date of commencement was on 09.02.2019, the safeguard duty was imposed on 30.07.2018. From the aforesaid dates, it is clear that the safeguard duty was imposed 200 days after the process was started. Hence, in the absence of the details as regards the date of indent, date of purchase and date of receipt of the solar panels from China, 3rd respondent cannot lay any claim. From the aforesaid dates, it is clear that the safeguard duty was imposed 200 days after the process was started. Hence, in the absence of the details as regards the date of indent, date of purchase and date of receipt of the solar panels from China, 3rd respondent cannot lay any claim. However, the CERC without probing into the aspect as to whether solar panels were imported from China before or after the increase in the safeguard duty, simply allowed the claim. He would perore, in essence, the order of the CERC is bereft of verification of the pleadings, calling for relevant evidence and applying the rigour of standards set up by it in AKME’s case. Hence, the impugned order is not a judicial order. He thus prayed to allow the writ petition. 11. While refuting the above arguments of the learned Advocate General, Sri C.Prakash Reddy, learned Senior Counsel argued firstly that the impugned order of the CERC passed under Section 79(f) of the Act, 2003 is susceptible to appeal before the Appellate Tribunal under Section 111 of the said Act and in view of the availability of alternative efficacious remedy, the writ petition is not maintainable and is therefore liable to be dismissed in limini. He would further submit that in Arguendo, even if the impugned order was passed by the CERC without jurisdiction, the remedy against it is the statutory appeal but not the writ petition. He placed reliance on Chattisgarh State Electricity Board v. CERC and others (2010) 5 SCC 23 , Union of India v. Shri Kant Sharma, (2015) 6 SCC 773 , Cicily Kallarackal v. Vehicle Factory, (2012) 8 SCC 524 : MANU/SC/0672/2012 , Kanaiyalal Lalchand Sanchdev v. State of Maharashtra, (2011) 2 SCC 782 : MANU/SC/0103/2011, The Executive Engineer v. Seetaram Rice Mill, (2012) 2 SCC 108 : MANU/SC/1334/2011. (a) While admitting that in spite of the availability of alternative efficacious remedy this Court can entertain the writ petition, he would however submit that in such instances, as per the dictum laid down in Whirlpool Corporation’s case (supra), the writ petition can be entertained only (i) When there was infringement of fundamental right (or) (ii) where there has been violation of principles of natural justice (or) (iii) where the order or proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction (or) (iv) vires of an act has been challenged. (b) Learned Senior Counsel would point out that in the instant case grounds (i) and (iv) are admittedly not involved. Violation of principles of natural justice is concerned, in the rejoinder filed by the petitioners they admitted that Vakalat was filed before the CERC on 10.10.2019 and they had 45 days time to file their counter and due to some communication gap with their counsel they could not file the counter. In such scenario, violation of principles of natural justice does not arise. So far as jurisdiction of CERC is concerned, he would argue, under Section 79 of the Act the CERC has power to adjudicate upon the disputes involving generating companies or transmission licensees in regard to matters connected with clauses (a) to (d) of Section 79(1). Clause (b) obviously relates to the power of CERC to regulate the tariff of generating companies other than those owned by Central Government, if such generating companies enter into a composite scheme for generation and sale of electricity in more than one State. Referring to Section 79, he would thus argue that since in the instant case the composite scheme is involved i.e., generation and sale of electricity are being done in more than one State, the CERC has power to adjudicate the claim of 3rd respondent. He placed reliance on the decision of the Apex Court in Energy Watchdog v. CERC (supra), wherein the term ‘composite scheme’ has been explained. He thus argued that none of the grounds mentioned in Whirlpool Corporation’s case (supra) is satisfied and hence, the writ petition is not maintainable in view of availability of alternative remedy. Sri B. Ravi Teja, Learned Standing Counsel for the 2nd respondent also argued in similar lines and prayed for dismissal of the writ petition. 12. The points for determination are: (i) Whether the instant writ petition is not maintainable due to availability of alternative efficacious remedy of statutory appeal ? (ii) Whether this Court cannot entertain writ petition since the Authority i.e., Central Electricity Regulatory Commissioner (CERC) which passed the impugned order dated 05.02.2020 in petition No.176/MP/2019 is located beyond its territorial jurisdiction ? (iii) Whether the CERC has jurisdiction and authority to pass the impugned order dated 05.02.2020 in petition No.176/MP/2019 ? (iv) If Point No.3 is held affirmatively, whether the order dated 05.02.2020 passed by CERC is a valid one in other respects ? 13. (iii) Whether the CERC has jurisdiction and authority to pass the impugned order dated 05.02.2020 in petition No.176/MP/2019 ? (iv) If Point No.3 is held affirmatively, whether the order dated 05.02.2020 passed by CERC is a valid one in other respects ? 13. POINT No.1: This Court bestowed its anxious consideration to the respective arguments of the learned counsel as narrated supra. Needless to emphasize that as per Section-111 of the Act, 2003, any person aggrieved by an order made by the appropriate commission under this Act can prefer an appeal to the Appellate Tribunal for electricity. Section-2(49) of the Electricity Act provides an inclusive definition to the term ‘person’ which shall include any company or body corporate or association or body of individuals, whether incorporated or not or artificial juridical person. The writ petitioners being the statutory power distribution companies, fall within the definition of ‘person’ and hence entitled to take recourse of appeal before the Appellate Tribunal as per Section-111. To this extent there is no demur and petitioners also admit this fact. However, the grounds on which they invoked writ jurisdiction are firstly, the CERC has no jurisdictional authority to entertain the compensatory claim petition filed by the 3rd respondent and secondly, gross infraction of principles of natural justice is occasioned to the petitioners as the CERC has not afforded sufficient time to the petitioners to file counter and address arguments but ultimately saddled them with safeguard duty and GST without proper enquiry. (a) Of course, the ground of violation of principles of natural justice is concerned, on verifying the counters of respondents denying the violation of principles of natural justice, the petitioners filed rejoinder making some admissions as follows: “4. In reply to para Nos.5 to 7 & 8 (a, b &c), I submit that it is not correct to state that the Petitioners have misguided Hon’ble High Court. The APERC has the sole jurisdiction to decide the issue. It is true that Petitioners received notice from Hon’ble CERC on 27.09.2019 regarding impleadment of the Petitioners in proceedings before the CERC. The APERC has the sole jurisdiction to decide the issue. It is true that Petitioners received notice from Hon’ble CERC on 27.09.2019 regarding impleadment of the Petitioners in proceedings before the CERC. Thereafter Petitioners engaged the Advocate and Vakalathnama was filed on 09.10.2019, but due to communication gap, the Petitioners could not file the counter against impleadment of the Petitioners as Respondents, and thereafter the Petitioners have filed Writ Petition in W.P.No.750 of 2020 questioning the impleadment of the Petitioners as Respondents in the Miscellaneous Petition 176/MP/2019 before Hon’ble CERC. Meanwhile the Petitioners have received another notice from the Hon’ble CERC on dated 23.11.2019 asking the Petitioners to file their response on or before 25.11.2019. Due to paucity of time, the Petitioners could not attend or file their response. Hon’ble Commission reserved Orders on 25.11.2019 without giving any opportunity to the Petitioners and passed orders on dated 05.02.2020. Therefore the Petitioners are constrained to file the Writ Petition questioning the orders passed by the Hon’ble CERC dated 05.02.2020.” (b) From the above admission it is clear that the petitioners received notice from CERC on 27.09.2019 itself and on their instructions, their Advocate filed Vakalathnama on 09.10.2019. They further admitted that they also received another notice on 23.11.2019 intimating them to file their response on or before 25.11.2019 but they did not file their response. Their explanation is that due to communication gap between petitioners and their counsel, they could not file counter. (c) Be that as it may, as rightly argued by the respondents, the petitioners had admittedly 40 days time to file counter. Due to their internal reasons, the petitioners have not filed the counter. In this backdrop, they cannot attribute violation of principles of natural justice to the CERC. Learned Advocate General during the course of hearing of the writ petition, has fairly admitted that it is not a case of total violation of principles of natural justice on the part of the CERC but petitioners’ grievance is that they were deprived of sufficient further time to file their counter to demonstrate how the CERC lacks jurisdiction to entertain the claim petition of the 3rd respondent. In view of the above submission of learned Advocate General, the maintainability of the instant writ petition mainly hinges on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of CERC to entertain the claim petition and pass the impugned order. 14. In view of the above submission of learned Advocate General, the maintainability of the instant writ petition mainly hinges on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of CERC to entertain the claim petition and pass the impugned order. 14. The law on admissibility of writ petition in spite of availability of alternative efficacious remedy is no more res integra. (a) In Whirlpool’s case (supra) the Hon’ble Apex Court referring to its earlier judgments observed thus: “15. Under Article 226 of the Constitution, the High Court, having regard to the facts of the case, has discretion to entertain or not to entertain a writ petition. But the High Court has imposed upon itself certain restrictions one of which is that if an effective and efficacious remedy is available, the High Court would not normally exercise its jurisdiction. But the alternative remedy has been consistently held by this court not to operate as a bar in at least three contingencies, namely, where the Writ Petition has been filed for the enforcement of any of the Fundamental rights or where there has been a violation of the principle of natural justice or where the order or proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction or the vires of an Act is challenged.(emphasis supplied) There is a plethora of case law on this point but to cut down this circle of forensic whirlpool we would rely on some old decisions of the evolutionary era of the constitutional law as they still hold the field.” (b) In L.K. Verma’s case (supra) the Hon’ble Apex Court has observed that in a given case although the High Court may not entertain a writ petition on the ground of availability of an alternative remedy, but the said rule cannot be said to be of universal application. Despite the existence of an alternative remedy the writ Court may exercise judicial review in cases where the Court or the Tribunal lacks inherent jurisdiction or for enforcement of a fundamental right or if there has been a violation of principles of natural justice or where vires of the Act is in question. In such cases alternative remedy does not operate as a bar. In such cases alternative remedy does not operate as a bar. (c) Apart from the above, in Harbanslal Sahnia v. Indian Oil Corporation Ltd., (2003) 2 SCC 107 = MANU/SC/1199/2002 the Apex Court has held that suffice it to observe that the rule of exclusion of writ jurisdiction by availability of an alternative remedy is a rule of discretion and not one of compulsion. Apex Court further held that in appropriate cases, in spite of availability of alternative remedy, the High Court may still exercise its jurisdiction in at least three contingencies as narrated in Whirlpool Corporation’s case. (d) In Radha Krishan Industries v. State of Himachal Pradesh’s, AIR 2021 sc 2114 : MANU/SC/0293/2021 case the Apex Court considering several decisions on the aspect of alternative remedy, deduced the following principles: “27. The principles of law which emerge are that: (i) The power Under Article 226 of the Constitution to issue writs can be exercised not only for the enforcement of fundamental rights, but for any other purpose as well; (ii) The High Court has the discretion not to entertain a writ petition. One of the restrictions placed on the power of the High Court is where an effective alternate remedy is available to the aggrieved person; (iii) Exceptions to the Rule of alternate remedy arise where (a) the writ petition has been filed for the enforcement of a fundamental right protected by Part III of the Constitution; (b) there has been a violation of the principles of natural justice; (c) the order or proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction; or (d) the vires of a legislation is challenged; (iv) An alternate remedy by itself does not divest the High Court of its powers Under Article 226 of the Constitution in an appropriate case though ordinarily, a writ petition should not be entertained when an efficacious alternate remedy is provided by law; (v) When a right is created by a statute, which itself prescribes the remedy or procedure for enforcing the right or liability, resort must be had to that particular statutory remedy before invoking the discretionary remedy Under Article 226 of the Constitution. This Rule of exhaustion of statutory remedies is a Rule of policy, convenience and discretion; and (vi) In cases where there are disputed questions of fact, the High Court may decide to decline jurisdiction in a writ petition. This Rule of exhaustion of statutory remedies is a Rule of policy, convenience and discretion; and (vi) In cases where there are disputed questions of fact, the High Court may decide to decline jurisdiction in a writ petition. However, if the High Court is objectively of the view that the nature of the controversy requires the exercise of its writ jurisdiction, such a view would not readily be interfered with. 28. These principles have been consistently upheld by this Court in Seth Chand Ratan v. Pandit Durga Prasad MANU/SC/0256/2003 : (2003) 5 SCC 399 , Babubhai Muljibhai Patel v. Nandlal Khodidas Barot MANU/SC/0404/1974 : (1974) 2 SCC 706 and Rajasthan SEB v. Union of India MANU/SC/7628/2008 : (2008) 5 SCC 632 , among other decisions.” 15. From the above jurimetrical jurisprudence it is pellucidly clear that the exclusion of the writ jurisdiction on account of availability of alternative remedy is a self imposed discipline but not a statutory embargo. The discretion always vests with the Constitutional Court in that context. 16. I have gone through the decisions relied upon by the respondents on the contentious issue. (a) In Chattisgarh State Electricity Board’s case (supra) the Hon’ble Apex Court engaged with the question whether Section-5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 can be invoked by the Supreme Court to admit an appeal filed U/s 125 of the Electricity Act 2003 after more than 120 days from the date of communication of the decision/ order of the Appellate Tribunal for Electricity. In that context referring to the provisions of the Electricity Act, 2003 the Apex Court observed that the said Act is a self-contained comprehensive legislation, which not only regulates generation, transmission and distribution of electricity by public bodies but also encourages private sector’s participation in the process and ensures creation of special adjudicatory mechanism to deal with the grievance of any person aggrieved by an order made by an adjudicating officer under the Act. The Apex Court further held that in the light of the scheme of Act and other relevant decisions, Section-5 of the Limitation Act cannot be invoked by the Apex Court for entertaining an appeal. It must be noted that in the said decision the point as to the maintainability of writ petition, in spite of availability of alternative remedy was not an issue. It must be noted that in the said decision the point as to the maintainability of writ petition, in spite of availability of alternative remedy was not an issue. (b) In Shri Kant Sharma’s case (supra) the issue was whether the right of appeal U/s 30 of the Armed Forces Tribunal Act, 2007, against an order of Armed Forces Tribunal with the leave of the said tribunal U/s 31 of the Act or leave granted by the Supreme Court will bar the jurisdiction of the High Court Under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In that case, against the orders of Armed Forces Tribunal refusing reliefs in service matters, the aggrieved persons filed writ petitions in different High Courts. Some High Courts admitted writ petitions and some refused. Both parties filed appeals before the Supreme Court wherein the prime question was about the maintainability of the writ petitions against the orders of Armed Forces Tribunal in view of availability of remedy of the appeal to the Supreme Court provided U/s 30 of the Armed Forces Tribunal Act, particularly when there was no issue of jurisdiction of Armed Forces Tribunal. After narrating several its own judgments and provisions of Armed Forces Tribunal Act, 2007, Hon’ble Apex Court has drawn the anomalous situation that would occur on entertaining the writ petitions by the High Courts against the orders of the Tribunal and expostulated the said practice. It must be reiterated, in the said decision lack of the jurisdictional authority of Armed Forces Tribunal and invalidity of its order on that count was not an issue throughout. Ergo, in my view, the above decision will not advance the case of respondents. (c) In Cicily Kallarackal‘s case (supra) the question was when the judgment and order passed by National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (for short “Commission”) is amenable to appeal before the Supreme Court in view of the provisions of National Consumer Protection Act, 1986, whether the Kerala High Court could entertain the writ petition against the said order. The Apex Court dismissed the Special Leave Petitions in view of inordinate delay in filing. However, on point in issue the Apex Court made clear that the order of the Commission is incapable of being questioned under the writ jurisdiction of the High Court, as a statutory appeal in terms of Section 27A(1)(c) lies to the Apex Court. The Apex Court dismissed the Special Leave Petitions in view of inordinate delay in filing. However, on point in issue the Apex Court made clear that the order of the Commission is incapable of being questioned under the writ jurisdiction of the High Court, as a statutory appeal in terms of Section 27A(1)(c) lies to the Apex Court. It should be noted that in this case also, the jurisdictional authority of National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission to pass order was not an issue and on that ground the writ petition was not filed before the Kerala High Court. (d) In Kanaiyalal Lalchand Sanchdev’s case (supra) the Creditor-Bank filed CC No.223/M/2008 before the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate U/s 14 of the Securitization and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest (for short “SARFAESI”) Act for taking possession of the secured assets and learned Magistrate allowed the said application and directed the Assistant Registrar, Kurla Centre Courts, to take possession of the mortgaged properties. Pursuant thereof, the Assistant Registrar issued notice directing the appellants to handover the possession. When the said notice was challenged before the Bombay High Court in writ petition, the same was dismissed by the said Court directing the petitioner to avail the alternative remedy available U/s 17 of the Act. The Apex Court confirmed the said order. In this case also the jurisdiction of the learned Magistrate to pass order U/s 14 of the SARFAESI Act was not an issue. As such and in view of availability of alternative remedy U/s 17, the said order was passed. (e) In the Executive Engineer v. Seetaram Rice Mill’s case (supra) the Apex Court elucidated the principle as to what extent writ jurisdiction can be exercised where alternative remedy is available. Facts briefly are that the Executive Engineer of Appellant Electricity Corporation conducted check in the respondent’s rice mill and issued provisional assessment order on the ground of unauthorized use of electricity falling under Section 126 of the Electricity Act, 2003. The respondent without filing objections U/s 126(3) of the Act against the provisional assessment order, filed writ petition before High Court of Orissa questioning the jurisdiction and authority of the Executive Engineer to pass the impugned order. The High Court after enquiry allowed the writ petition and held that there was no unauthorized use of Electricity and the appellant had no jurisdiction to issue the impugned order. The High Court after enquiry allowed the writ petition and held that there was no unauthorized use of Electricity and the appellant had no jurisdiction to issue the impugned order. The Department preferred the appeal before the Supreme Court. The Apex Court observed that an appeal U/s 127 will lie only against the final order made U/s 126 but not against the provisional assessment order and as such the High Court was right in entertaining the writ petition. However, the Apex Court was of the view that the High Court failed to exercise the jurisdiction within the prescribed limitations of law having regard to the expertise involved in the subject issue. The Apex Court posed a question, “should the Court determine on merits of the case or should it preferably answer the preliminary issue or jurisdictional issue arising in the facts of the case and remit the matter for consideration on merits by the Competent Authority ?”. The Apex Court ultimately held thus: “57. In the present case, the High Court did not fall in error of jurisdiction in entertaining the writ petition but certainly failed to finally exercise the jurisdiction within the prescribed limitations of law for exercise of such jurisdiction. Keeping in view the functions and expertise of the specialized body constituted under the Act including the assessing officer, it would have been proper exercise of jurisdiction, if the High Court, upon entertaining and deciding the writ petition on a jurisdictional issue, would have remanded the matter to the competent authority for its adjudication on merits and in accordance with law. In the facts of the present case, the High Court should have answered the question of law relating to lack of jurisdiction and exercise of jurisdiction in futility without travelling into and determining the validity of the demand which squarely fell within the domain of the specialized authority. The High Court should have remanded the case to the assessing officer with a direction to the Respondent to file its objections including non-applicability of the tariff before the assessing authority and for determination in accordance with law.” (Emphasis Supplied) 17. Thus the decisions cited by respondents can be distinguished on facts, as in those cases, jurisdiction of the concerned authority which passed the impugned proceedings was not under challenge before the concerned High Court. Thus the decisions cited by respondents can be distinguished on facts, as in those cases, jurisdiction of the concerned authority which passed the impugned proceedings was not under challenge before the concerned High Court. However, in the instant case, the pivotal contention of the petitioners is that the CERC lacks jurisdiction to entertain the compensatory claim petition and adjudicate the same. The said contention is based on certain crucial and relevant facts which will be narrated presently in the Point No.iii infra. Suffice at this juncture to say that since the order of the CERC is impugned inter alia on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, the writ petition can be entertained by this Court. 18. POINT No.2: The respondents argued in vehemence that CERC is a statutory quasi judicial body originally created U/s 3 of the Electricity Regulatory Commission Act, 1998 (ERC Act, 1998) and later the said Act was repealed by the Electricity Act, 2003 and the constitution of CERC under ERC Act, 1998 was again recognized U/s 76 of the Electricity Act, 2003 and as per the notification dated 23.03.2016 issued by the CERC, its head office is located at New Delhi and the impugned order No.176/MP/2019 dated 05.02.2020 was passed at New Delhi and as such, this High Court whose territorial jurisdiction extends only throughout the territories of the State of Andhra Pradesh cannot exercise writ jurisdiction over the impugned order passed beyond its territorial jurisdiction. They relied upon the decisions in Union of India v. R. Thiyagarajan, (2020) 5 SCC 201 : MANU/SC/0355/2020, Durgesh Sharma v. Jayshree, (2008) 9 SCC 648 : MANU/SC/4197/2008 and Kusum Ingots and Alloys Ltd v. Union of India, AIR 2004 SC 2321 : MANU/SC/0430/2004. 19. In oppugnation, learned Advocate General would argue that the major part of cause of action has arisen in the State of Andhra Pradesh i.e., within the territorial jurisdiction of High Court of Andhra Pradesh. In expatiation, he would argue that as per PPA, the 3rd respondent agreed to set up Solar Power Project at Kadapa to generate and distribute 250 MW of current to the DISCOMs of Andhra Pradesh for their distribution to the industries in Andhra Pradesh. Further, the claim petition and impugned order are relating to the safeguard duty and GST over the solar modules which are to be installed in the Solar Park at Kadapa in Andhra Pradesh. Further, the claim petition and impugned order are relating to the safeguard duty and GST over the solar modules which are to be installed in the Solar Park at Kadapa in Andhra Pradesh. Above all, if the contention of the respondents is ultimately approved, the tax burden will be shifted on the petitioners as per the alleged back to back composite scheme and one of the composite agreements i.e., PSA was entered into by the DISCOMs and NTPC for sale of bundled electricity in the State of Andhra Pradesh. Thus on the basis of cause of action this High Court can exercise writ jurisdiction. He placed reliance on State of Telangana v. Md. Hayath Uddin, 2018((1) ALD 247. 20. In the context of extra territorial operation of writ jurisdiction, it is germane to refer to Article 226 of Constitution of India which is thus: “Article 226(1) Notwithstanding anything in article 32, every High Court shall have power, throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction, to issue to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases, any Government, or authority, including in appropriate cases, any Government, within those territories directions, orders or writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari, or any of them, for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III and for any other purpose. (2) The power conferred by clause (1) to issue directions, orders or writs to any Government, authority or person may also be exercised by any High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within which the cause of action, wholly or in part arises for the exercise of such power, notwithstanding that the seat of such Government or authority or the residence of such person is not within those territories.” (a) Clause (1) of Article 226 begins with a non-obstante clause “notwithstanding anything in Article 32” and provides that every High Court shall have power “throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction”, to issue to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases any Government “within those territories”, directions, orders or writs for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part-III or for any other purpose. (b) Be that as it may, Clause (2) of Article 226 says, the High Court may exercise its power conferred by Clause (1), if the cause of action, wholly or in part, had arisen within the territory over which it exercises jurisdiction, notwithstanding that the seat of such Government or authority or the residence of such person is not within such territory. (c) Thus on a plain reading of the above two clauses it becomes clear that a High Court can exercise the powers to issue directions, orders or writs for the enforcement of any of the fundamental rights conferred by Part-III of the Constitution or for any other purpose, “if the cause of action wholly or in part had arisen within the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction, notwithstanding that the seat of Government or authority or the residence of the person against whom the direction, order or writ is issued is not within the said territories”. (emphasis supplied). Therefore, the operability of writ jurisdiction can be said to be cause of action-centric in cases where the Government /Authority /Person who allegedly caused violation of fundamental rights located outside the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court. Since in the instant case, the Authority i.e., CERC which passed the impugned order is located outside the territorial jurisdiction of this High Court, it has to be seen whether the cause of action relating to this case has either wholly or partly arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of this High Court to bring the case of the petitioners within the mischief of Article 226(2) of the Constitution of India. 21. The “cause of action” oriented exercise of jurisdiction has been discussed by Apex Court in various decisions. (a) In Oil and Natural Gas Commission v. Utpal Kumar Basu, (1994) 4 SCC 711 it is observed thus: “7. xxx. 21. The “cause of action” oriented exercise of jurisdiction has been discussed by Apex Court in various decisions. (a) In Oil and Natural Gas Commission v. Utpal Kumar Basu, (1994) 4 SCC 711 it is observed thus: “7. xxx. On a plain reading of the aforesaid two clauses of Article 226 of the Constitution it becomes clear that a High Court can exercise the power to issue directions, orders or writs for the enforcement of any of the fundamental rights conferred by Part III of the Constitution or for any other purpose if the cause of action, wholly or in part, had arisen within the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction, notwithstanding that the seat of the Government or authority or the residence of the person against whom the direction, order or writ is issued is not within the said territories. (b) In Navinchandra N Majithia v. State of Maharashtra, (2000) 7 SCC 640 : MANU/SC/0549/2000 it was held thus: “17. From the provision in Clause (2) of Article 226 it is clear that the maintainability or otherwise of the writ petition in the High Court depends on whether the cause of action for filing the same arose, wholly or in part, within the territorial jurisdiction of that Court. 18. In legal parlance the expression 'cause of action" is generally understood to mean a situation or state of facts that entitles a party to maintain an action in a Court or a Tribunal, a group of operative facts giving rise to one or more bases for suing; a factual situation that entitles ...one person to obtain a remedy in Court from another person (Black's Law Dictionary). 19. In Stroud's Judicial Dictionary a 'cause of action' is stated to be the entire set of facts that gives rise to an enforceable claim; the phrase comprises every fact, which, if traversed, the plaintiff must prove in order to obtain judgment. In 'Words and Phrases' (fourth edition) the meaning attributed to the phrase 'cause of action' in common legal parlance is existence of those facts which give a party a right to judicial interference on his behalf.” (c) In Bloom Dekor Limited v. Subhash Himmatlal Desai and others, (1994) 6 SCC 322 : MANU/SC/0858/1994 : 1994 (6) SCC 322 ) it is observed thus: “28. By "cause of action" it is meant every fact, which, if traversed, it would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove in order to support his right to a judgment of the Court. (Cooke v. Gill (1873) 8 C.P.107. In other words, a bundle of facts which it is necessary for the plaintiff to prove in order to succeed in the suit.” (d) In Rajasthan High Court Advocates Association v. UoI, 2001(2) SCC 294 : MANU/SC/0827/2000 it observed thus: “17. The expression "cause of action" has acquired a judicially settled meaning. In the restricted sense, “cause of action” means the circumstances forming the infraction of the right or the immediate occasion for the action. In the wider sense, it means the necessary conditions for the maintenance of the suit, including not only the infraction of the right, but also the infraction coupled with the right itself. Compendiously the expression means every fact which it would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove, if traversed, in order to support his right to the judgment of the Court. Every fact, which is necessary to be proved, as distinguished from every piece of evidence which is necessary to prove each fact, comprises in 'cause of action'.” (e) In Kusum Ingots and Alloys Ltd’s case (supra) the Apex Court observed thus: “6. Cause of action implies a right to sue. The material facts which are imperative for the suitor to allege and prove constitutes the cause of action. Cause of action is not defined in any statute. It has, however, been judicially interpreted inter alia to mean that every fact which would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove, if traversed, in order to support his right to the judgment of the Court. Negatively put, it would mean that everything which, if not proved, gives the defendant an immediate right to judgment, would be part of cause of action. Its importance is beyond any doubt. For every action, there has to be a cause of action, if not, the plaint or the writ petition, as the case may be, shall be rejected summarily.” 22. While observing so the Apex Court held that in view of Clause 2 of Article 226, even if a part of cause of action arises outside the jurisdiction of the High Court, it would have jurisdiction to issue writ. While observing so the Apex Court held that in view of Clause 2 of Article 226, even if a part of cause of action arises outside the jurisdiction of the High Court, it would have jurisdiction to issue writ. However, the Apex Court reminded that if a small part of cause of action arises within the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court, it may not be considered to be a determinative factor by the High Court to decide the matter on merit and in appropriate cases it may refuse to entertain writ. 23. From the above jurisprudence enshrined with reference to Article 226(2), it is clear that a party can prefer a writ petition before a High Court within whose jurisdiction cause of action wholly or partly arises by availing forum conveniens. When case on hand is tested on the anvil of above law, it is clear that a major portion of cause of action has arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of this High Court. A perusal of PPA dated 07.02.2018 entered into by Respondents 2 and 3 would show that in Clause (c) it was covenanted that the 3rd respondent, upon issuance of LoI by the 2nd respondent, agreed to set up solar Power Project based on photo-voltaic technology of 250 MW capacity in the State of Andhra Pradesh. Further, the term “Power Project” has been defined as “Solar Power Generation facility of installed capacity of 250 MW, located at Kadapa Ultra Mega Solar Park in Kadapa District, Andhra Pradesh”. It is also mentioned in the PPA that NVVN on behalf of NTPC will purchase Solar Power from SPDs and sell it to DISCOMs (writ petitioners) after bundling it with thermal power allocated by MoP, GoI for this purpose. 24. Thus the PPA manifests that the 3rd respondent agreed to set up Solar Power Project at Kadapa in Andhra Pradesh. The case of the 3rd respondent before CERC is that pursuant to the PPA it procured Solar Power Panels, modules and other equipment, over which, due to change in law, safeguard duty and GST were imposed and to that extent the NTPC has to recoup the 3rd respondent. The plea of the 3rd respondent inter alia is that since the PSA and PPA are back to back agreements under composite scheme, the burden if any shall be imposed on the DISCOMs but not NTPC. The plea of the 3rd respondent inter alia is that since the PSA and PPA are back to back agreements under composite scheme, the burden if any shall be imposed on the DISCOMs but not NTPC. The writ petitioners deny the two agreements as back to back and form part of composite scheme. All these facts form part of cause of action. Most importantly if it is established that the 3rd respondent indeed incurred additional tax burden and the two agreements form part of composite scheme, the ultimate burden will be shifted to the writ petitioners. Therefore, in spite of the Authority i.e., CERC which passed the impugned order is located at New Delhi, most of the facts forming part of cause of action relating to the claim before CERC have arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of this High Court. Hence, in terms of Article 226(2) of the Constitution of India and relevant law thereof expounded by the Apex Court, this Court can entertain writ petition. 25. In State of Telangana v. Md. Hayath Uddin’s case (supra) cited by the petitioners, the facts are that aggrieved by the interim order passed by Principal Bench of National Green Tribunal (NGT), New Delhi restraining the government from carrying out any construction activities for the Kaleswaram Lift Irrigation Scheme in Telangana, the State of Telangana filed the writ petition before the Telangana and Andhra Pradesh High Court. Inter alia it was contended by the respondents that the High Court has no territorial jurisdiction to entertain writ petition. Dispelling the said contention it was observed by the DB of the High Court that Act, 2010 did not expressly exclude the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 though it excludes the jurisdiction of normal Civil Courts U/s 29 and even if the Act, 2010 had contained a specific provision excluding the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 and 227, the same would have been invalid in view of specific declaration made in the case of L. Chandrakumar v. UoI, 1997 (3) SCC 261 . The division bench thus negatived the contentions of lack of territorial jurisdiction and availability of alternative remedy and allowed the writ petition and set aside the order of Principal Bench, NGT, New Delhi on the ground that the said bench had lacked territorial jurisdiction. The division bench thus negatived the contentions of lack of territorial jurisdiction and availability of alternative remedy and allowed the writ petition and set aside the order of Principal Bench, NGT, New Delhi on the ground that the said bench had lacked territorial jurisdiction. The above decision applies to the instant case as in the instant case also though the Authority which passed impugned order is located outside the territorial jurisdiction of this Court, major part of cause of action and the impact of the order will be within the territorial jurisdiction of this High Court. 26. The decisions cited by respondents can be distinguished. (a) In Union of India v. R. Thiyagarajan’s case (supra) the Division Bench of Madras High Court while partly allowing the appeal of Union of India held that the respondent was only entitled to deputation allowance but not any special allowance as was held by learned single Judge of the said High Court. However, the division bench further went on and held that not only the respondent before the High Court but also all other persons of National Disaster Response Force (NDRF) would be entitled to the deputation allowance and Central Government shall pay the said amount. On appeal by the UoI, the Apex Court while carping the aforesaid judgment observed that the High Court exercises its jurisdiction only over the State(s) of which it is the High Court but it has no jurisdiction for the rest of the Country and it has virtually usurped the jurisdiction of other High Courts and it could not have passed such an order in respect of employees where pan India repercussions would be involved. It should be noted, present case is not an instance of usurpation of jurisdiction of other High Courts but assumption of jurisdiction on the basis of part of cause of action taking place within its territorial operation. (b) Durgesh Sharma’s case (supra) is altogether different one. In that case the question was whether a High Court can transfer suits/appeals/other proceedings from one Court subordinate to the said High Court to another Court which is subordinate to another High Court. The Apex Court while considering Section-23 and 25 of Civil Procedure Code held that the High Court has no such power of transfer in view of Section-25 and held thus: “The decisions taking a contrary view do not lay down correct law. The Apex Court while considering Section-23 and 25 of Civil Procedure Code held that the High Court has no such power of transfer in view of Section-25 and held thus: “The decisions taking a contrary view do not lay down correct law. We, therefore, overrule them. Even if such power was with a High Court earlier, it stood withdrawn with effect from January 01, 1977 in view of Section 25 of the Code as amended by Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1976.” In the light of above law, in my considered view, this Court can exercise its jurisdiction. This point is answered accordingly. 27. POINT Nos.3 & 4: The petitioners are questioning the jurisdiction of CERC to pass impugned order on the following grounds: (1) The entire Solar Power Project has to be established at Kadapa in Andhra Pradesh and 250 MW power has to be supplied after bundling with the energy of NTPC to the DISCOMs of Andhra Pradesh. (2) In terms of Section 64(5) of Electricity Act, 2003, the petitioners and NTPC submitted the PSA dated 11.12.2017 for approval after public hearing to the A.P. State Electricity Regulatory Commission (APERC) and the said Commission passed orders dated 05.10.2019 approving the procurement of the power as per the agreements. On the contrary, the CERC has not approved the PPA dated 07.02.2018 entered into by the respondents 2 and 3 and has not adopted the tariff. In that view, APERC alone has jurisdiction to entertain the claim petition of the 3rd respondent. (3) The CERC has not regulated the tariff in terms of Section 79(1)(b) of the Act, 2003 so as to adjudicate upon the disputes U/s 79(1)(f) of the Act, 2003. (4) The PPA and PSA do not form into a composite scheme for generation and sale of electricity in more than one State and therefore the CERC cannot exercise jurisdiction to adjudicate the dispute U/s 79(f). 28. The petitioners would alternatively argue that even assuming the CERC has jurisdiction, still its order is unsustainable on facts and in law on following grounds: (1) The CERC has not considered the aspect as to what cost effective and mitigative measures have been adopted by the 3rd respondent to reduce the burden of compensation on other party. 28. The petitioners would alternatively argue that even assuming the CERC has jurisdiction, still its order is unsustainable on facts and in law on following grounds: (1) The CERC has not considered the aspect as to what cost effective and mitigative measures have been adopted by the 3rd respondent to reduce the burden of compensation on other party. (2) The 3rd respondent has not produced agreement entered into with the Foreign Trader as to what understandings have been arrived at to meet change in law situation. The CERC has meekly approved the contention of the 3rd respondent that the agreement with Foreign vendor is a confidential one and hence need not be produced. (3) The 3rd respondent has not produced relevant records and documents showing actual payment of safeguard duty and GST except few sample documents and CERC did not insist upon the production of any details of supply contract. (4) The CERC has not followed the guidelines given by it in ACME’s case rigorously to consider the claim on account of change in law event. (5) There is no privity of contract between the petitioners and 3rd respondent, inasmuch as the petitioners are not signatories in PPA and therefore the PPA and PSA cannot be treated as back to back agreements under a composite scheme to transform the tax liability from NTPC to the petitioners. (6) The CERC did not take into account the conduct of the 3rd respondent in causing delay and not abiding by the time schedules for commissioning the plant. Admittedly the safeguard duty was imposed about 200 days after scheduled date for commencement of Solar Power Project. 29. The respondents have vehemently opposed the petitioners’ argument and they would contend that the generation and distribution of the power takes place in more than one State and therefore CERC alone has jurisdiction to entertain the claim petition in terms of Section 79(f). Their further contention is that both PSA and PPA are in the nature of back to back agreements, inasmuch as, reference was made about one document in other document and hence they shall form part of composite scheme and on that ground also the CERC alone can have jurisdiction. It is further argued that there are no factual or legal errors in the order impugned. 30. The above contentions raised by the petitioners involve certain factual and technical aspects besides legal issues. It is further argued that there are no factual or legal errors in the order impugned. 30. The above contentions raised by the petitioners involve certain factual and technical aspects besides legal issues. Be that as it may, a perusal of the impugned order in the light of above respective arguments shows that the order contain certain findings which effect the petitioners herein as well. The CERC, has held that PPA and PSA are inter-connected and inextricable link to each other and as such there is a privity between the claim petitioners and respondents i.e., DISCOMs before it. It ultimately held the NTPC is liable to pay the petitioner and is eligible to claim the same from the DISCOMs on back to back basis. Needless to say the petitioners are vehemently opposing the aforesaid findings. Be that as it may, the impugned order though a vivid and detailed one, however is an ex parte order so far as the writ petitioners are concerned who are the respondents 3 and 4 in the petition No.176/MP/2019. In Prakash Chander Manchanda v. Janki Manchanda, (1986) 4 SCC 699 Hon’ble Apex Court held that if on a date fixed in a suit or proceedings, one of the parties remain absent and for that party no evidence has been examined up to that date, the Court has no option but to dispose of the matter in accordance with Order XVII Rule 2 CPC, in any one of the modes prescribed under Order IX of the CPC. In the instant case the petitioners submission is that on receiving the notice, the petitioners’ counsel filed vakalath on 09.10.2019 and thereafter another notice was received on 23.11.2019 for the filing of their response on or before 25.11.2019 but due to the communication gap between the petitioners and their Advocate and due to paucity of time they could not file counter and in the meanwhile the matter was reserved and impugned order was passed. Having regard to the fact that crucial issues are involved in the matter and depending upon the result, the petitioners may have to pay heavy amount, learned CERC, in my view, ought to have afforded further reasonable time to the petitioners to submit their counter and to address arguments. Unfortunately, that was not done and the impugned order is silent as to the reason for not according further time. Unfortunately, that was not done and the impugned order is silent as to the reason for not according further time. In a matter of this nature which involves crucial factual and technical aspects, the principle in Executive Engineer v. Seetaram Rice Mill’s case (supra) suggests that matter needs to be remitted to concerned authority for consideration on merits. 31. In the result, without expressing any opinion on the merits of the respective contentions of the parties, this Writ Petition is allowed and the impugned order dated 05.02.2020 in petition No.176/MP/2019 passed by the 1st respondent is hereby set aside and matter is remitted back with a direction to the 1st respondent to afford sufficient opportunity to the petitioners herein to file their counters and hear all the parties and consider their submissions and pass an appropriate order afresh in accordance with governing law and rules without being influenced by its earlier findings in the impugned order. No costs. As a sequel, interlocutory applications pending, if any, shall stand closed.