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2023 DIGILAW 98 (JHR)

Sahay Laung v. State of Bihar

2023-02-01

SUBHASH CHAND, SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD

body2023
JUDGMENT : Sujit Narayan Prasad, J. The instant appeal is against Judgment of conviction and Order of sentence dated 28.07.1994 and 02.08.1994 respectively passed by the Additional Judicial Commissioner, Khunti in Sessions Trial No. 527 of 1987/T.R. No. 144/1993, whereby and whereunder, the appellant, namely, Sahay Laung has been convicted under Section 302/34 and Section 201 of the Penal Code, 1860 and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for life for the commission of offence under Section 302/34 of the Penal Code, 1860 and further rigorous imprisonment for four years for the offence under Section 201 of the Penal Code, 1860 and both the sentences have been directed to run concurrently. 2. The prosecution story as per the F.I.R., in brief is that on 05.09.1985, the informant, namely, Munni (wife of the deceased) and her husband had gone to the house of her brother Mangru Munda in evening. The deceased, Bayar Ram Munda went out from there saying to return in a short while. But he never returned. Since then, she along with her brother and brother-in-law remained in search of the deceased but did not find him. On Monday, Sanha was lodged about missing of the deceased. In course of search, she learnt that Ishwar Das Lung, the brother in law of the deceased had taken him to his house on Thursday itself for taking dinner and since then he was missing. Ishwar Das told her that after taking dinner, the deceased had left his house in the night itself. One day prior to the F.I.R., the informant was told by the Mano Mundain at about 11 : 00 a.m. that one Shepherd told her about lying of one dead body at Ambapahar. Thereafter, she, along with Mukhia, Sarpanch, her brother, sister and brother-in-law went there and saw the dead body and identified the body as of her husband. A serious doubt has been cast against Ishwar Das Lung, the brother in law of the deceased and his friend Yakub Lung. An F.I.R. was instituted stating therein that calling the deceased in his house for dinner, Ishwar and his friend had murdered him after taking liquor. 3. It is also pertinent to mention here that the informant, namely, Munni (wife of the deceased) had gone along with the Mukhia, Sarpanch and Chaukidar of the Village to the Police Station to lodge the F.I.R. 4. 3. It is also pertinent to mention here that the informant, namely, Munni (wife of the deceased) had gone along with the Mukhia, Sarpanch and Chaukidar of the Village to the Police Station to lodge the F.I.R. 4. The case was registered as Karra P.S. Case No. 25 of 1985. 5. During investigation the police found the complicity of the present appellant and one another person namely Manmasi Lung in the said crime and accordingly, submitted charge-sheet against the accused persons in the Court of Judicial Magistrate First Class, Khunti thereafter, cognizance was taken and the case was committed to the Court of Session and the charge was framed against the accused persons for the commission of offence under Sections 302/34 and 201 of the Penal Code, 1860 and the accused persons pleading not guilty and claiming to be tried, they were put to trial. In course of trial, 11 witnesses were examined by the prosecution, including the Investigating Officer and the Doctor, who had conducted the postmortem. 6. The learned Court below after taking into consideration the corroborative piece of evidence which has been gathered in course of examination of the prosecution witnesses, has acquitted another accused person namely Manmasi Lung and has convicted the accused/appellant after finding charge proved beyond all reasonable doubts and thereafter, order of sentence was passed against the appellant to undergo rigorous imprisonment for life for the commission of offence under Section 302/34 of the Penal Code, 1860 and further rigorous imprisonment for four years for the offence under Section 201 of the Penal Code, 1860 and both the sentences have been directed to run concurrently, which is the subject matter of the instant appeal. 7. The instant appeal has been filed on the following grounds in assailing the impugned judgment of conviction and sentence:— (i) The judgment of conviction is based upon the extra judicial confession and the same has been said to be over-heard by Birsa Laung. 7. The instant appeal has been filed on the following grounds in assailing the impugned judgment of conviction and sentence:— (i) The judgment of conviction is based upon the extra judicial confession and the same has been said to be over-heard by Birsa Laung. The said confession has also been made before PW.2 namely Bhagirath Bhengra and he has stated in his testimony that the same has been confessed by the appellant before him and other villagers but according to the learned counsel, the person, namely, Birsa Laung before whom the alleged confession has been made by the appellant has not been examined by the prosecution and in such circumstances, it can be said that the alleged confession having not been corroborated by any cogent and reliable evidence, and in the absence of corroboration, the judgment of conviction cannot be said to be sustainable in the eyes of law and as such, requires interference; (ii) Further, it has been submitted that as per testimony of PW.4-wife of deceased, it is evident that Birsa Laung has told this witness about the confessional statement as made by the appellant before her going to the police station and in spite of knowing about the confessional statement this witness (PW.4) had not disclosed this fact in her fardbeyan before the police which causes serious dent in prosecution case and learned court below while ignoring the said fact, has passed the judgment of conviction against the appellant. (iii) Due to non-examination of the investigating officer, serious prejudice has been caused to the appellant but without taking into consideration the aforesaid aspect of the matter, the learned trial court has convicted the appellant in complete ignorance of the fact that the issue of extra judicial confession ought to have been corroborated by the investigating officer; (iv) It has been submitted that even the tangi said to have been recovered on the basis of the confession of appellant but it has not been sent for medical examination, as such, the chain said to have been completed for proving the complicity of the appellant could not be said to be proved. 8. Learned counsel for the appellant in the aforesaid backdrop, has submitted that the impugned judgment is not sustainable in the eyes of law. 9. Per contra, Mr. 8. Learned counsel for the appellant in the aforesaid backdrop, has submitted that the impugned judgment is not sustainable in the eyes of law. 9. Per contra, Mr. Saket Kumar, learned A.P.P. appearing for the State has defended the impugned judgment by taking the ground that the learned trial court after taking into consideration the testimony of the prosecution witnesses who all along have corroborated about the confessional statement which was being made by the appellant before the Birsa Laung, basis upon which tangi has been recovered, as such argument advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant regarding non-examination of said Birsa Laung is having no force. Further, the learned trial court has found the completion of chain in committing the murder of the deceased and hence, the conviction is based upon the said factual aspect which cannot be said to be improper. 10. Further, it has been submitted that merely because the investigating officer has not been examined or the tangi has not been sent for chemical examination, the entire prosecution will not be vitiated since the other witnesses deposed in course of their examination/cross-examination have fully supported the prosecution version and as such, the order impugned does not require any interference. 11. This Court having heard the grounds agitated on behalf of the parties and in order to scrutinize the legality and propriety of the impugned judgment of conviction/sentence, deems it fit and proper to refer the testimonies of the witnesses. 12. The prosecution altogether has examined 11 witnesses to prove the charged leveled against the appellant, i.e., P.W.1 Dr. Renu Bala, P.W.2 Bhagirath Bhengra, P.W. 3 Etwa Munda, the elder brother of the deceased, P.W.4 Munni (informant and wife of deceased), P.W.5 Sugna Munda, P.W.6 Ishwar Das Lang, P.W.7 Gandauwri Munda, P.W.8 Chamri Munda, P.W.9 Lal Mohan Munda, P.W.10 Mangru Munda and P.W.11 Shiv Mangal Ram (Constable). 13. Dr. Renu Bala has been examined as P.W.1 (Doctor) who had conducted the post-mortem and has found that the entire body was available except left lower limb and only the upper portion of left thigh was intact. The toes of the right foot were missing. The skin and muscle over head, face, neck front part of right arm and front part of right thigh were missing and male genital organ was intact. 14. The toes of the right foot were missing. The skin and muscle over head, face, neck front part of right arm and front part of right thigh were missing and male genital organ was intact. 14. P.W. 1 has given its opinion about the cause of death, and stated that cause of death is uncertain and time elapsed since death 1 to 3 weeks. 15. Bhagirath Bhengra has been examined as P.W.2 (Mukhia of the Gram Panchayat of the village) and has deposed that one Birsa, who was not in village since two months prior to his deposition, told him that accused Sahay and Manmasi Lung had murdered the deceased and had threatened him of dire consequences if he would disclose that fact to anyone. He has stated that in the night of Thursday since when the deceased was traceless, accused Manmasi had come to his house to enquire about him (deceased) and Etwa Ram (elder brother of the deceased) has told him that he was not in the house. He had also deposed that accused Sahay had confessed before Police in his presence and other villagers that he and Manmasi had murdered the deceased in the field of Puran Mahto by tying towel in the neck of the deceased and cutting him with tangi and then they took the dead body toe Ambapahar, where the dead body was found. He had also deposed that accused Sahay had taken them to the field of Puran Mahto to show them the place of murder. It has been stated that Sahay handed over a tangi to the Police in his presence near the house of Manmasi and that was seized. 16. In his cross-examination, he has stated that Sahay Laung was absconding, hence he was apprehended at Village Mango and then he handed over the tangi used in the murder to the Police after 10 days which was the day of his arrest by the Police. He had denied the suggestion that he has falsely implicated the accused persons in the case. 17. Etwa Munda has been examined as P.W.3 (elder brother of the deceased) and has also corroborated the statement of P.W.2, namely, Bhagirath Bhengra that in the night of Thursday, Manmasi has come to the house of the deceased to call him but the deceased was not there. 17. Etwa Munda has been examined as P.W.3 (elder brother of the deceased) and has also corroborated the statement of P.W.2, namely, Bhagirath Bhengra that in the night of Thursday, Manmasi has come to the house of the deceased to call him but the deceased was not there. He has also stated that Birsa had told them that Sahay and Manmasi had murdered the deceased and that fact was told to him by Sahay. He has also stated that Sahay had taken them to the field of Puran and showed them the place where he and Manmasi had murdered the deceased and then took to Ambapahar where Sahay and Manmasi had concealed the dead body. He has seen the body which was decomposed and maggots were also present and one leg was amputated. 18. In his cross-examination, he has stated that Manmasi had come to search of the deceased at about 8 : 00 p.m. Further, he has stated that Sahay Laung had taken them to the place where the dead body was concealed by Sahay and Manmasi. 19. Munni has been examined as P.W.4 (informant and wife of the deceased) and has deposed that Birsa had told her about the fact that these two accused persons had murdered her husband. 20. In examination-in-chief, she has stated that on Thursday, she along with her husband had gone to her brother's house in the evening and her husband went out from there asking them to take their meal as he would return after sometime. 21. In cross-examination, she has admitted that in her statement to the Police, she has stated that she had doubt against Ishwar Lung, the brother-in-law of the deceased and his friend Yakub that they might had murdered him after drinking liquor. Further, she had deposed that prior to her going to Police Station on Monday, Birsa had told her that Sahay and Manmasi had murdered his husband but she did not disclose this fact to the Police because Mukhia had asked her not to disclose otherwise there might occur some problem or disorder. 22. Sugna Munda has been examined as P.W.5 and has also corroborated the statement of P.Ws.3 and 4 that accused Sahay confessed to the Police in their presence that he and Manmasi had murdered the deceased. 22. Sugna Munda has been examined as P.W.5 and has also corroborated the statement of P.Ws.3 and 4 that accused Sahay confessed to the Police in their presence that he and Manmasi had murdered the deceased. He has stated that Sahay had shown him and others the place in the field of Puran Mahto where the deceased was murdered. It has been stated by him that Birsa had told him prior to accused Sahay about the murder of the deceased by both the accused persons but Sahay was out of Village from the date of his deposition in Court. 23. Ishwar Das Lang has been examined as P.W.6 (brother-in-law of the deceased) and has deposed that the deceased after taking supper in his house taken part in singing and then left his house prior to midnight. 24. In his cross-examination, he has stated that at the time of singing they had taken light liquor also. Further, he had deposed that his house is in the village of the deceased itself. He learnt about the murder of the deceased after a week from that day. However, he has stated that the deceased was missing from that night itself. 25. Gandauri Munda and Lal Mohan Munda have been examined as P.W.7 and P.W.9 respectively and have also deposed that accused Sahay had confessed to the Police in their presence and other villagers that he and Manmasi had murdered the deceased and had concealed the dead body at Ambapahar. 26. P.W.9, namely, Lal Mohan Munda has stated that Sahay had shown the place, which was the field of Puran Mahto where the deceased was murdered by them. 27. P.W.8, namely, Chamri Munda and P.W.10, namely, Mangra Munda are the tendered witnesses. 28. Shivmangal Ram has been examined as P.W.11 (Constable) and has stated that the Sub-Inspector, namely, C.N. Jha had prepared the inquest report but the said report was not prepared in his presence and he had worked with C.N. Jha, Sub-Inspector. 29. In this case, the investigating officer has not been examined. 30. The learned trial Court, on the basis of the aforesaid fact and the disclosure so made by the appellant before the prosecution witnesses, has convicted the appellant. 31. The issue has been raised on behalf of the appellant regarding non-corroboration of extra judicial confession and serious prejudice has been caused due to non-examination of the investigating officer. 30. The learned trial Court, on the basis of the aforesaid fact and the disclosure so made by the appellant before the prosecution witnesses, has convicted the appellant. 31. The issue has been raised on behalf of the appellant regarding non-corroboration of extra judicial confession and serious prejudice has been caused due to non-examination of the investigating officer. The tangi having not been sent for chemical examination and the informant (PW.4 & wife of deceased) in spite of knowing about the confessional statement had not disclosed this fact in her fardbeyan and Birsa Laung before whom the alleged confession was firstly made has not been examined. 32. This Court is now proceeding to examine the grounds basis upon which the impugned judgment has been said to suffer from infirmity. 33. Before proceeding to examine the aforesaid ground, this Court deems it fit and proper to consider the scope of evidentiary value of the extra-judicial confession. 34. It is settled proposition of law that extrajudicial confession, if true and voluntary, it can be relied upon by the Court to convict the accused for the commission of the crime alleged and despite inherent weakness of extrajudicial confession as an item of evidence, it cannot be ignored. But corroboration of such evidence is required only by way of abundant caution and it is not open to the Court trying the criminal case to start with a presumption that extra-judicial confession is always a weak type of evidence. It's strength would depend on the nature of the circumstances, the time when the confession is made and the credibility of the witnesses who speak for such a confession. However, before relying on the alleged confession, the Court has to be satisfied that it is voluntary and is not the result of inducement, threat or promise as envisaged under Section 24 of the Evidence Act or was brought about in suspicious circumstances to circumvent Sections 25 and 26 of the Evidence Act. Further, the Court is required to look into the surrounding circumstances to find out as to whether such confession is not inspired by any improper or collateral consideration or circumvention of law suggesting that it may not be true. 35. Further, the Court is required to look into the surrounding circumstances to find out as to whether such confession is not inspired by any improper or collateral consideration or circumvention of law suggesting that it may not be true. 35. Reference in this regard may be made to the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Gura Singh v. State of Rajasthan, (2001) 2 SCC 205 , wherein, it has been laid down at paragraph-6 which reads as under: “6. It is settled position of law that extrajudicial confession, if true and voluntary, it can be relied upon by the court to convict the accused for the commission of the crime alleged. Despite inherent weakness of extrajudicial confession as an item of evidence, it cannot be ignored when shown that such confession was made before a person who has no reason to state falsely and to whom it is made in the circumstances which tend to support the statement. Relying upon an earlier judgment in Rao Shiv Bahadur Singh v. State of Vindhya Pradesh [ AIR 1954 SC 322 : 1954 SCR 1098 : 1954 Cri LJ 910] this Court again in Maghar Singh v. State of Punjab [ (1975) 4 SCC 234 : 1975 SCC (Cri) 479 : AIR 1975 SC 1320 ] held that the evidence in the form of extrajudicial confession made by the accused to witnesses cannot be always termed to be a tainted evidence. Corroboration of such evidence is required only by way of abundant caution. If the court believes the witness before whom the confession is made and is satisfied that the confession was true and voluntarily made, then the conviction can be founded on such evidence alone. In Narayan Singh v. State of M.P. [ (1985) 4 SCC 26 : 1985 SCC (Cri) 460 : AIR 1985 SC 1678 ] this Court cautioned that it is not open to the court trying the criminal case to start with a presumption that extrajudicial confession is always a weak type of evidence. It would depend on the nature of the circumstances, the time when the confession is made and the credibility of the witnesses who speak for such a confession. The retraction of extrajudicial confession which is a usual phenomenon in criminal cases would by itself not weaken the case of the prosecution based upon such a confession. It would depend on the nature of the circumstances, the time when the confession is made and the credibility of the witnesses who speak for such a confession. The retraction of extrajudicial confession which is a usual phenomenon in criminal cases would by itself not weaken the case of the prosecution based upon such a confession. In Kishore Chand v. State of H.P. [ (1991) 1 SCC 286 : 1991 SCC (Cri) 172 : AIR 1990 SC 2140 ] this Court held that an unambiguous extrajudicial confession possesses high probative value force as it emanates from the person who committed the crime and is admissible in evidence provided it is free from suspicion and suggestion of any falsity. However, before relying on the alleged confession, the court has to be satisfied that it is voluntary and is not the result of inducement, threat or promise envisaged under Section 24 of the Evidence Act or was brought about in suspicious circumstances to circumvent Sections 25 and 26. The court is required to look into the surrounding circumstances to find out as to whether such confession is not inspired by any improper or collateral consideration or circumvention of law suggesting that it may not be true. All relevant circumstances such as the person to whom the confession is made, the time and place of making it, the circumstances in which it was made have to be scrutinised. To the same effect is the judgment in Baldev Raj v. State of Haryana [1991 Supp (1) SCC 14 : 1991 SCC (Cri) 659 : AIR 1991 SC 37 ]. After referring to the judgment in Piara Singh v. State of Punjab [ (1977) 4 SCC 452 : 1977 SCC (Cri) 614 : AIR 1977 SC 2274 ] this Court in Madan Gopal Kakkad v. Naval Dubey [ (1992) 3 SCC 204 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 598 : JT (1992) 3 SC 270] held that the extrajudicial confession which is not obtained by coercion, promise of favour or false hope and is plenary in character and voluntary in nature can be made the basis for conviction even without corroboration.” 36. In Vijay Shankar v. State of Haryana, (2015) 12 SCC 644 , wherein, the Hon'ble Apex Court has laid down at paragraphs-17, 18 and 19 which read as under: “17. In Vijay Shankar v. State of Haryana, (2015) 12 SCC 644 , wherein, the Hon'ble Apex Court has laid down at paragraphs-17, 18 and 19 which read as under: “17. Yet another circumstance relied upon by the prosecution is the extra-judicial confession allegedly made by the appellant to Budh Ram (PW 12). PW 12 has stated that he was a member of Gram Panchayat Dujana and on 19-3-1995, Vijay Shankar, the appellant came to his residence where Har Sarup Numberdar was also present. PW 12 stated that Vijay Shankar gave an extra-judicial confession of inflicting injuries to deceased Satish Kumar and requested PW 12 to save him. When PW 12 was only a member of Gram Panchayat and not a person of influence with the police, it is doubtful that the appellant Vijay Shankar had approached him making extra-judicial confession and requested him to save him. At this juncture, suggestion put to PW 10 during his cross examination is relevant to be noted. In the cross-examination of PW 10, it was suggested to him that he has let out his shop to Budh Ram Gujjar, brother of Badlu, on the condition that Budh Ram Gujjar will depose in the case and therefore PW 12 cannot be said to be an independent witness. 18. Principles in respect of evidentiary value and reliability of extrajudicial confession have been summarised by this Court in Sahadevan v. State of T.N., (2012) 6 SCC 403 : (2012) 3 SCC (Cri) 146, which reads as under : (SCC pp. 412-13, para 16) “(i) The extra-judicial confession is a weak evidence by itself. It has to be examined by the court with greater care and caution. (ii) It should be made voluntarily and should be truthful. (iii) It should inspire confidence. (iv) An extra-judicial confession attains greater credibility and evidentiary value if it is supported by a chain of cogent circumstances and is further corroborated by other prosecution evidence. (v) For an extra-judicial confession to be the basis of conviction, it should not suffer from any material discrepancies and inherent improbabilities. (vi) Such statement essentially has to be proved like any other fact and in accordance with law.” 19. Extra-judicial confession is a weak piece of evidence and the courts are to view it with greater care and caution. (v) For an extra-judicial confession to be the basis of conviction, it should not suffer from any material discrepancies and inherent improbabilities. (vi) Such statement essentially has to be proved like any other fact and in accordance with law.” 19. Extra-judicial confession is a weak piece of evidence and the courts are to view it with greater care and caution. For an extra-judicial confession to form the basis of conviction, it should not suffer from any material discrepancies and inherent improbabilities. In the case on hand, extra-judicial confession allegedly made to PW 12 does not inspire confidence and cannot form the basis for the conviction.” 37. This Court, in the backdrop of aforesaid judicial pronouncement is now proceeding to examine as to whether the basis of conviction, i.e., confession made by the appellant before P.W.2 & P.W.4 have at all been corroborated or not? 38. From perusal of testimonies of the witnesses, it is evident that one of the important witness in the instant case was Birsa Laung who had given information to all the witnesses about the murder of deceased by the appellant but reason best known to the prosecution that why Birsa Laung has not been examined and there is not any plausible explanation furnished by the prosecution in this regard. 39. Further, as per the deposition of Etwa Munda (P.W.3) elder brother of deceased was informed about the occurrence by Birsa on 06.09.1985 but he also did not report the matter to the police. 40. Further, it is pertinent to note here that P.W.4 in her fardbeyan had doubted about the Ishwar Lung (brother-in-law of deceased) and his friend Yakub that they might had murdered the deceased after eating and drinking (taking liquor) but the same Ishwar Lung has been examined as P.W. 6. 41. Therefore, the ground as has been agitated by the learned counsel for the appellant regarding the said confession not fully corroborated or the said confession cannot be said to free from any inducement or threat, according to the considered view of this Court, caused serious prejudice to the appellant in view of the position of law as has been referred hereinabove. 42. 42. The learned counsel for the appellant while assailing the impugned judgment has contended that as per testimony of PW.4, (informant & wife of deceased) she was already aware about the confessional statement as disclosed by the appellant before the Birsa Laung before going her to the police station and in spite of knowing about the confessional statement, she had not disclosed this fact in her fardbeyan which caused serious dent in prosecution case. 43. Upon such submission, the emphasis was given by the learned counsel for the appellant on the evidence of PW 4. From perusal of the testimony of P.W.4, she has stated in her cross-examination at para-6 that prior to her going to police station, Birsa had told her about the murder but she had disclosed this fact before the S.I. because Mukhiya (headman) has forbade her to do so. 44. Thus from the perusal of the aforesaid paragraph of the testimony of PW.4, it is amply clear that the she has already knew about the confessional statement before recording of Fardbeyan but she did not disclose this fact in the said fardbeyan and in such scenario, it amounts to vital omission and this omission itself creates doubt about the extra judicial confession as alleged to be made by the appellant. 45. Reference in this regard may be made to the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex court in State of Haryana v. Jagbir Singh, (2003) 11 SCC 261 wherein, at para 20 it has been held as under: “20. Great emphasis was laid by the learned counsel for the State on the evidence of PW 4, the Additional CJM that the accused had admitted that the signature was his. This statement is of no assistance. The witness has admitted that the statement was made before him by the accused in the presence of the police officials. The second circumstance is the alleged extra-judicial confession before PW 10. The High Court has analysed the evidence in great detail. It is on record that the accused Jagbir was being taken to various places and at different points of time he was being pressurized to make a statement. The second circumstance is the alleged extra-judicial confession before PW 10. The High Court has analysed the evidence in great detail. It is on record that the accused Jagbir was being taken to various places and at different points of time he was being pressurized to make a statement. Though the accused was claimed to have made the statement in the presence of a large number of persons, a combined reading of the evidence shows that nobody else speaks about the so-called extra-judicial confession, not even those who have been examined as PWs. Though PW 10 said that there were many persons who had heard it, no other person has stated about it. The statements of PWs 7 and 10 go to show that the accused was being interrogated by PWs and other villagers as well as his father and other relatives. Interrogation continued for about 3 days when allegedly Jagbir confessed his guilt. Though the first information report was lodged by PW 7 after knowing about the extra-judicial confession, there is no mention about this vital fact. In a given circumstance, omission to mention about the particular aspect may not render the prosecution version suspicious. But when circumstances in the present case are taken in their entirety the alleged extra-judicial confession is not believable. In order to make an extra-judicial confession a reliable evidence it has to be shown that the same was voluntary. The factual scenario as presented by the prosecution goes to show that the alleged extra-judicial confession cannot be termed to be voluntary even if it was said to have been made, as claimed. The High Court was right in discarding the alleged extra-judicial confession”. 46. The another ground has been taken by the learned counsel for the appellant that the investigating officer has not been examined in this case, as such, the issue of recovery of tangi in order to attract the provision of Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act cannot be said to have proved since the tangi which has been said to be recovered, has not been sent for chemical examination and why it has not been sent for medical examination, has not come on record since the investigating officer has not been examined. 47. 47. After going through the material available on record, this Court is of the considered view that there is force in the arguments of the learned counsel for the respondent that tangi which has been said to be recovered on the basis of alleged confession made by the accused/appellant has not been sent for chemical examination which caused serious prejudice to the appellant. Further, it is not on record that why the tangi which has been recovered and seized had not been sent for chemical examination. In such circumstances, the investigating officer would be the right person to answer the aforesaid question but reason best known to prosecution, the investigating officer has not been examined in the instant case and in such circumstances, it may be inferred that the ground of the prosecution case is not stand on its own leg. 48. Reference in this regard may be made to the Judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in State of U.P. v. Arun Kumar Gupta, (2003) 2 SCC 202 wherein, at paragraph-16 & 17, it has been held as under: “16.—Therefore, there is force in the arguments of the learned counsel for the respondent that these recoveries cannot be believed, more so in the background of the fact that the bloodstained knife and the bloodstained earth were not sent to the serologist. This Court in the case of Lakshmi Singh v. State of Bihar has stated that : (SCC p. 402, para 14) “14. To add to this another important circumstance is the omission on the part of the prosecution to send the bloodstained earth found at the place of occurrence for chemical examination which could have fixed the situs of the assault. In almost all criminal cases, the bloodstained earth found from the place of occurrence is invariably sent to the Chemical Examiner and his report along with the earth is produced in the court, and yet this is one exceptional case where this procedure was departed from for reasons best known to the prosecution. This also, therefore, shows that the defence version may be true. This also, therefore, shows that the defence version may be true. It is well settled that it is not necessary for the defence to prove its case with the same rigour as the prosecution is required to prove its case, and it is sufficient if the defence succeeds in throwing a reasonable doubt on the prosecution case which is sufficient to enable the court to reject the prosecution version.” 17. From the above decision of this Court, it is clear that in such circumstances when the prosecution fails to send the bloodstained material to the Chemical Examiner, a reasonable doubt arises as to the genuineness of the prosecution case in regard to the recovery of such material. It is also relevant to notice at this stage that the factum of recovery of the bloodstained earth was not put to the respondent when his statement was recorded under Section 313 CrPC.” 49. This Court has examined the factual aspect of the given case on the basis of the law settled regarding proving of charge in case of confessional evidence but herein, the due confession so made by the appellant having not been fully corroborated and investigating officer has not been examined and tangi which was used in commission of crime was recovered from the place of occurrence but not sent for medical examination, according to the considered view of this Court, cannot be said to have completion of chain showing the complicity of the appellant in commission of crime. 50. The position of law is well settled that the conviction can only be based on the basis of charge proved beyond all shadow of doubts whether in case of direct evidence or circumstantial evidence. 51. Reference in this regard may be made to the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Rang Bahadur Singh v. State of U.P., (2000) 3 SCC 454 , wherein, at paragraph-22 of the said judgment it has been held as under: “22. The amount of doubt which the Court would entertain regarding the complicity of the appellants in this case is much more than the level of reasonable doubt. We are aware that acquitting the accused in a case of this nature is not a matter of satisfaction for all concerned. The amount of doubt which the Court would entertain regarding the complicity of the appellants in this case is much more than the level of reasonable doubt. We are aware that acquitting the accused in a case of this nature is not a matter of satisfaction for all concerned. At the same time we remind ourselves of the time-tested rule that acquittal of a guilty person should be preferred to conviction of an innocent person. Unless the prosecution establishes the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt a conviction cannot be passed on the accused. A criminal court cannot afford to deprive liberty of the appellants, lifelong liberty, without having at least a reasonable level of certainty that the appellants were the real culprits. We really entertain doubt about the involvement of the appellants in the crime.” 52. In Sheila Sebastian v. R. Jawaharaj, (2018) 7 SCC 581 , wherein at paragraph-28 it has been laid down by the Apex Court which reads as under: “28. In this case at hand, the imposter has not been found or investigated into by the officer concerned. Nothing has been spilled on the relationship between the imposter and Respondent 1. Law is well settled with regard to the fact that however strong the suspicion may be, it cannot take the place of proof. Strong suspicion, coincidence, grave doubt cannot take the place of proof. Always a duty is cast upon the courts to ensure that suspicion does not take place of the legal proof. In this case, the trial court as well as the appellate court got carried away by the fact that accused is the beneficiary or the executant of the mortgage deed, where the prosecution miserably failed to prove the first transaction i.e. PoA as a fraudulent and forged transaction. The standard of proof in a criminal trial is proof beyond reasonable doubt because the right to personal liberty of a citizen can never be taken away by the standard of preponderance of probability.” (Emphasis Supplied) 53. The standard of proof in a criminal trial is proof beyond reasonable doubt because the right to personal liberty of a citizen can never be taken away by the standard of preponderance of probability.” (Emphasis Supplied) 53. This Court having discussed the fact in entirety as above and after going through the judgment of conviction of the learned trial court wherefrom, it is evident from the discussion made at page-11 of the impugned order that the learned trial court although has discussed the settled position about disclosure of confession made before the police and as such, the confession made before the police has been held to be inadmissible in law but the said inadmissibility has subsequently been considered to be admissible after considering the testimony of witnesses particularly PW.2 & P.W.4, basis upon which the appellant has been convicted. 54. This Court, in view of the aforesaid settled position of law and as per the discussion made hereinabove, is of the considered view that the finding given by the learned trial Court cannot be said to be just and proper, reason being that the confession so made has not been fully corroborated due to non-examination of Birsa Laung before whom the alleged confession was firstly made by the appellant. Further, the alleged confession having not been corroborated due to non-examination of the investigating officer and other incriminating article like tangi, as such, the element of doubt is there and doubt of complicity of the appellant in commission of offence was there but the learned trial court has failed to consider this aspect of the matter, therefore, the impugned judgment, according to the considered view of this Court, requires interference. 55. Accordingly, the instant appeal stands allowed. 56. In consequence thereof, the Judgment of conviction and Order of sentence dated 28.07.1994 and 02.08.1994 respectively passed by the Additional Judicial Commissioner, Khunti in Sessions Trial No. 527 of 1987/T.R. No. 144/1993, is hereby quashed and set aside. 57. The appellant is discharged from criminal liability. 58. Let the Lower Court Records be sent back to the Court concerned forthwith, along with the copy of this Judgment.