JUDGMENT : 1. Rule. Learned APP waives service of rule on behalf of respondent – State and learned advocate Mr. Shah waives service of rule on behalf of respondent no.2. 2. By way of present petition under section 482 of Cr.P.C., the petitioner – Ranchhodbhai Bhikhabhai Rabari has prayed for following reliefs :- “(A) Hon’ble Court be pleased to issue appropriate writ, order or direction, quashing the impugned FIR being IC. R.No.169/2015 registered with Kadi Police Station. (B) Pending admission, hearing and final disposal of present petition, Hon’ble Court be pleased to stay further proceedings of FIR being I.C.R.No.169/2015 registered with Kadi Police Station and be further pleased to restrain IO, Kadi Police Station from acting in furtherance of the impugned FIR being I.C.R.No.169/2015 registered with Kadi Police Station.” 3. The facts which could be garnered from the pleadings are stated shortly as under :- 3.1. Respondent no.2 – Rasikbhai Bhagwandas Patel was owner and was in possession of land bearing survey no.467/2 paiki 1 ad-measuring 17503 sq.mtrs. at Mouje Jasalpur, District Kadi. Respondent no.2 has sold said land to Sureshkumar Ambalal Patel by registered sale deed. Unregistered deed for confirmation in nature of receipt was signed between seller and purchaser was also executed. Subsequently, another unregistered MOU was executed between Suresh Ambalal Patel, Sharbhai Laljibhai Rabari and Rabari Ranchhodbhai Bhikhabhai (petitioner) distributing share of each of signatory to the contract (Annexure -D). The petitioner later on came to know that land in question for which MOU was executed does not exist at all. According to the petitioner, they went to respondent no.2 and informed about the same. The petitioner claimed that respondent no.2 not only turned down his request but also threaten with false implication, if petitioner proceeds further. 3.2. In background of above facts garnered from the petition, perusal of the FIR indicates that FIR was filed by respondent no.2 alleging that present petitioner and another Mr. Manish Rabari on 11.09.2015 went to shop belonging to respondent no.2 in Gajjar Chambers and made altercation and ransacked shop along with three persons who were on bike standing outside of the shop, all came together. According to FIR, the petitioner and another Mr. Manish Rabari came into shop, Manish Rabari was holding small spade and the petitioner was holding Dhoka (wooden bat) and ransacked shop of the petitioner. At the relevant time on counter, Mr. Rohitbhai, Mr. According to FIR, the petitioner and another Mr. Manish Rabari came into shop, Manish Rabari was holding small spade and the petitioner was holding Dhoka (wooden bat) and ransacked shop of the petitioner. At the relevant time on counter, Mr. Rohitbhai, Mr. Nileshbhai and nephew of complainant viz. Milkeshbhai and Vishnubhai were present. It is alleged that present petitioner and Mr. Mainish Rabari after ransacking shop took away Rs.1 lac cash and gold ornaments of the petitioner of around 14 grams and as such the petitioner as well as Mr. Manish Rabari and three other persons have committed loot. 3.3. FIR came to be lodged with above allegations with Kadi Police Station being C.R.No.I-169 of 2015 against present petitioner as well as Mr. Mainsh Rabari and three unidentified persons for the offences punishable under sections 395 and 427 of IPC read with section 135 of Gujarat Police Act. 3.4. In background of above facts, present petitioner – Rachhodbhai Bhikhabhai Rabari invokes jurisdiction of this Court vested under section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code for quashment of FIR. 4. Heard learned advocate Mr. Tejas Barot for the petitioner/accused, Mr. Abhaykumar Shah for respondent no.2 – complainant and learned APP Mr.Ronak Raval for respondent – State. 5. Arguing for the petitioner, learned advocate Mr.Tejas Barot submits that civil dispute of land has been given clock of criminality by filing impugned FIR. He would further submit that respondent no.2 has played mischief with the petitioner in executing MOU for the land which is not in existence. He would further submit that in the present case, accused are charged with the alleged offence punishable under section 395 and 427 of IPC read with section 135 of the GP Act. Learned advocate Mr. Barot would took this Court to section 390 of IPC to submit that no ingredients of section 390 are established. Section 390 of IPC, according to his submission is defining robbery. Learned advocate Mr. Barot submits that expression “for that end” in section 390 is significant. He would submit that for proving robbery, prosecution even at the prima facie stage has to prove that hurt must be caused by the offender with express object of facilitating the committing of theft. He would further submit that in the present case, FIR is missing such intention on the part of the petitioner. He would submit that for proving robbery, prosecution even at the prima facie stage has to prove that hurt must be caused by the offender with express object of facilitating the committing of theft. He would further submit that in the present case, FIR is missing such intention on the part of the petitioner. He would further submit that it is not the case of the prosecution that offender i.e. present petitioner has caused hurt or attempted to cause hurt while committing theft or in order to commit theft. He would submit that since basic words forming offence of robbery is missing, the accused cannot be allowed to face trial under section 395 of IPC. He would further submit that in view of section 390 and 391 of IPC to attract offence of dacoity or robbery, persons present must be 5 or more. In the present case, baring Mr. Manish Rabari, Investigating Officer has failed to prove that who other three person were present on the spot of offence. Nothing is on record or stated in the charge sheet papers in this regard, so ingredients of section 391 of IPC is not satisfied. In this circumstances, the accused should not be allowed to face trial where prima facie ingredients of robbery and dacoity are missing on bare perusal of the FIR. 6. Learned advocate Mr. Tejas Barot would refer judgment delivered in Sessions Case No.48 of 2016 passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Mehesana whereby Mr. Manish Rabari has been convicted for the offence under section 427 of IPC, but has been acquitted from offence under section 395 of IPC. Learned advocate Mr. Barot would press into service observations of learned Sessions Judge in para 30 of the said judgment of Sessions Case to submit that even learned Sessions Judge has recorded that prosecution has failed to disclose name of three other persons who are said to be present on the spot. He would further submit that on such findings, learned Sessions Judge has acquitted the co-accused from the charges of offence under section 395 of IPC as ingredients of section 390 and 391 of IPC were not satisfied. Learned Barot would further submit that conviction of co-accused Mr. Manish Rabari under section 427 of IPC was also stayed by this Court in Criminal Appeal No.104 of 2022. Learned advocate Mr. Learned Barot would further submit that conviction of co-accused Mr. Manish Rabari under section 427 of IPC was also stayed by this Court in Criminal Appeal No.104 of 2022. Learned advocate Mr. Barot referred and relied on judgment of this Court in the case of Dharmendrabhai Nandubhai Patel v/s. State of Gujarat reported in (2011) 3 GLH 739 as well as judgment delivered in the case of Viralbhai Becharbhai Vaghani v/s. State of Gujarat reported in 2016 SCC Online Guj 2213 to contend that in absence of intention to cause hurt which is forming root part in the offence of robbery or dacoity, the petitioner cannot be forced to go and face trial. 6.1. Mr. Barot, learned advocate for the petitioners has also relied on following judgment in support of his submissions :- (1) Ram Lakhan v/s. State of UP [ (1983) 2 SCC 65 ] (2) Himatsing Shivsing v/s. State of Gujarat [1961 (0) AIJELHC204889 (3) Gulabaz Harunbhai Gatali v/s. State of Gujarat [2016 SCC Online Guj 6190] (4) Vineet Kumar and Ors. v/s. State of UP [ (2017) 13 SCC 369 ] (5) Sardar Trilok Singh v/s. Satya Deo Tripathi [ (1979) 4 SCC 396 ] 7. Upon above submissions, learned advocate Mr. Barot for the petitioner would submit to allow this petition and further submits that atleast charge under section 395 of IPC may be quashed qua present petitioner. 8. On the other hand, learned advocate Mr. Shah for respondent no.2 - complainant would submit that co-accused Mr. Manish Rabari has been convicted for the offence of ransacking shop of the complainant in Sessions Case No.48 of 2016 but benefit of doubt has been given for the offence punishable under section 395 to acquit inter-alia on the ground that three other persons who are unidentified in the FIR, all of them are not traced but that benefit of doubt has been granted only after trial. Learned advocate Mr. Shah submits that present accused cannot claim parity on the said observations until face trial. He would submit that entire investigation is completed. Charge sheet is filed against co-accused and that charge sheet is culminated into Sessions Case No.48 of 2016 and further culminated into conviction of co-accused so far as offence under section 427 of IPC. He would further submit that whether accused had intention to cause hurt while facilitating or committing robbery could be examined during trial. Charge sheet is filed against co-accused and that charge sheet is culminated into Sessions Case No.48 of 2016 and further culminated into conviction of co-accused so far as offence under section 427 of IPC. He would further submit that whether accused had intention to cause hurt while facilitating or committing robbery could be examined during trial. Intention which is essentially a mental process cannot be gathered on bare reading of FIR. It could be examined during trial by leading evidence. Thus, at this stage, complainant or prosecution should not be non suited on averment made in complaint as well as evidence of prosecution filed in form of charge sheet cannot be brushed aside at threshold. It can be examined during trial. These submissions were made at the instance of learned advocate Mr. Shah to dismiss the petition. 9. Learned APP Mr. Ronak Raval for the respondent – State pressed into service judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Central Bureau of Investigation v/s. Aryan Singh [2023 AIR (SC) 1987]. He would submit that this Court has limited power under section 482 of Cr.P.C. This Court cannot hold mini trial at threshold to eyewash evidence filed by the prosecution in form of charge sheet. He would further submit that what is to be considered before this Court at the time of exercising power under section 482 of Cr.P.C. is whether any sufficient material is available to proceed further against the accused for which accused is required to be tried or not. While summing up his submission, learned APP would submit that in the present case, Investigating Officer has filed charge sheet against co-accused and same set of evidence is also available against the present petitioner. Charge sheet filed against co-accused Mr. Manish Rabari has culminated into criminal case being Sessions Case No.48 of 2016 and further culminated in conviction so far as offence under section 427 of IPC. There is sufficient material available to allow trial to proceed further against present accused. He would also submit that whether there was intention to cause hurt or not would be gathered during trial and it can be assessed and examined during trial. Therefore, learned APP submits to dismiss this petition. 10. No other and further submissions are canvassed for both the sides. 11. The bone of contention by learned advocate Mr. He would also submit that whether there was intention to cause hurt or not would be gathered during trial and it can be assessed and examined during trial. Therefore, learned APP submits to dismiss this petition. 10. No other and further submissions are canvassed for both the sides. 11. The bone of contention by learned advocate Mr. Barot seeking to quell FIR qua offence under section 395 of IPC is that bare reading of FIR, it lacks intention of causing hurt which is essential ingredient to form offence punishable under section 395. To press this contention, expression “for that end” appearing in section 390 of IPC has been pinpointed. According to Black’s Law Dictionary, 9th Edition, intention means state of mind accompanying an act, especially a forbidden act. Intention is defined in Black’s Law Dictionary as “to have in mind a fixed purpose to reach a desired objective”. It can also be said that intention is plan to do something. What is coming from the interpretation of the word ‘intent’ or intention’ is that it is mental process. It cannot be seen physically. It has to be assessed and adjudicated on the basis of mental state of person which can be done during recording of evidence. 12. In case of Smt. Mathri v. State of Punjab, AIR 1964 SC 986 , the Apex Court has explained the concept of the word ‘intent’. The relevant observations are made by referring to the observations made in the earlier decision in the case of Bhagwant v. Kedari, I.L.R. 25 Bombay 202. They are as under:- “The word “intent” by its etymology, seems to have metaphorical allusion to archery, and implies “aim” and thus connotes not a casual or merely possible result foreseen perhaps as a not improbable incident, but not desired-but rather connotes the one object for which the effort is made-and thus has reference to what has been called the dominant motive, without which, the action would not have been taken.” 13. Following observations made by the Apex Court in the case of Basdev v. State of Pepsu, AIR 1956 SC 488 , at page 490 are material and relevant : “6. ... Of course, we have to distinguish between motive, intention and knowledge. Motive is something which prompts a man to form an intention and knowledge is an awareness of the consequences of the act. ... Of course, we have to distinguish between motive, intention and knowledge. Motive is something which prompts a man to form an intention and knowledge is an awareness of the consequences of the act. In many cases intention and knowledge merge into each other and mean the same thing more or less and intention can be presumed from knowledge. The demarcating line between knowledge and intention is no doubt thin but it is not difficult to perceive that they connote different things. Even in some English decisions, the three ideas are used interchangeably and this had led to a certain amount of confusion.” 14. Face reading of the FIR which is culminated into charge sheet against the co-accused Mr. Manish Rabari and further culminated into Sessions Case No.48 of 2016, whereby learned Sessions Judge has believed that shop of the complainant has been ransacked. In the background of this aspect, if we read FIR as it is, it alleges that petitioner herein entered into shop of the original complainant with wooden bat whereas co-accused entered into shop with small spade. It is also alleged that both the accused have broken glass doors and ransacked furniture and the persons who were present at the counter having frighten came in rear part of the shop. At that time, alleged robbery has taken place. The allegation of entering into shop with weapon like spade and wooden bat, reflects intention on the part of the accused. This Court is however not observing anything further as such allegations are not tested in trial qua present petitioner. What makes it clear on reading of FIR on its face is that petitioner and co-accused entered into shop with weapons and ransacked, doors were broken and later on it is found that gold ornaments and cash amount of Rs.1 lac has been robbed. Whether petitioner entered with a intention to commit hurt and robbery can be gathered only during trial. 15. At this stage, this Court refers section 390 of IPC, more particularly, first part which defines when theft is robbery reads as under :- “390. Robbery – In all robbery there is either theft or extortion. Whether petitioner entered with a intention to commit hurt and robbery can be gathered only during trial. 15. At this stage, this Court refers section 390 of IPC, more particularly, first part which defines when theft is robbery reads as under :- “390. Robbery – In all robbery there is either theft or extortion. When theft is robbery – Theft is “robbery” if, in order to the committing of the theft, or in committing the theft, or in carrying away or attempting to carry away property obtained by the theft, the offender, for that end, voluntarily causes or attempts to cause to any person death or hurt or wrongful restraint, or fear of instant death or of instant hurt, or of instant wrongful restraint.” 16. It signifies that even attempt to carry any property obtained by theft or in order to commit theft, the offender “for that end” cause hurt or attempt to cause any hurt, it is said that it is theft or robbery. 17. The attempt is sufficient. In the present case, FIR alleges that petitioner attempted to cause hurt as the accused entered shop with small spade and wooden bat. It is alleged that gold ornaments and cash amount of Rs.1 lac is looted. 18. In the case of State of Andhra Pradesh v/s. Goconda Linga swamy [ (2004) 6 SCC 522 ], the Apex Court discussed scope and ambit on the exercise of inherent powers under section 482 of Cr.P.C. In para 5, 7 and 8, it is observed as under :- “5. Exercise of power under Section 482 of the Code in a case of this nature is the exception and not the rule. The section does not confer any new powers on the High Court. It only saves the inherent power which the Court possessed before the enactment of the Code. It envisages three circumstances under which the inherent jurisdiction may be exercised, namely: (i) to give effect to an order under the Code, (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of court, and (iii) to otherwise secure the ends of justice. It is neither possible nor desirable to lay down any inflexible rule which would govern the exercise of inherent jurisdiction. No legislative enactment dealing with procedure can provide for all cases that may possibly arise. It is neither possible nor desirable to lay down any inflexible rule which would govern the exercise of inherent jurisdiction. No legislative enactment dealing with procedure can provide for all cases that may possibly arise. Courts, therefore, have inherent powers apart from express provisions of law which are necessary for proper discharge of functions and duties imposed upon them by law. That is the doctrine which finds expression in the section which merely recognises and preserves inherent powers of the High Courts. All courts, whether civil or criminal, possess in the absence of any express provision, as inherent in their constitution, all such powers as are necessary to do the right and to undo a wrong in course of administration of justice on the principle quando lex aliquid alique concedit, conceditur et id sine quo res ipsa esse non potest (when the law gives a person anything, it gives him that without which it cannot exist). While exercising powers under the section, the Court does not function as a court of appeal or revision. Inherent jurisdiction under the section though wide has to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution and only when such exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid down in the section itself. It is to be exercised ex debito justitiae to do real and substantial justice for the administration of which alone courts exist. Authority of the court exists for advancement of justice and if any attempt is made to abuse that authority so as to produce injustice, the court has power to prevent such abuse. It would be an abuse of the process of the court to allow any action which would result in injustice and prevent promotion of justice. In exercise of the powers court would be justified to quash any proceeding if it finds that initiation or continuance of it amounts to abuse of the process of court or quashing of these proceedings would otherwise serve the ends of justice. When no offence is disclosed by the complaint, the court may examine the question of fact. When a complaint is sought to be quashed, it is permissible to look into the materials to assess what the complainant has alleged and whether any offence is made out even if the allegations are accepted in toto. 7. When no offence is disclosed by the complaint, the court may examine the question of fact. When a complaint is sought to be quashed, it is permissible to look into the materials to assess what the complainant has alleged and whether any offence is made out even if the allegations are accepted in toto. 7. In dealing with the last category, it is important to bear in mind the distinction between a case where there is no legal evidence or where there is evidence which is clearly inconsistent with the accusations made, and a case where there is legal evidence which, on appreciation, may or may not support the accusations. When exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court would not ordinarily embark upon an enquiry whether the evidence in question is reliable or not or whether on a reasonable appreciation of it accusation would not be sustained. That is the function of the trial Judge. Judicial process, no doubt should not be an instrument of oppression, or, needless harassment. Court should be circumspect and judicious in exercising discretion and should take all relevant facts and circumstances into consideration before issuing process, lest it would be an instrument in the hands of a private complainant to unleash vendetta to harass any person needlessly. At the same time the section is not an instrument handed over to an accused to short-circuit a prosecution and bring about its sudden death….. 8. As noted above, the powers possessed by the High Court under Section 482 of the Code are very wide and the very plenitude of the power requires great caution in its exercise. Court must be careful to see that its decision in exercise of this power is based on sound principles. The inherent power should not be exercised to stifle a legitimate prosecution. High Court being the highest court of a State should normally refrain from giving a prima facie decision in a case where the entire facts are incomplete and hazy, more so when the evidence has not been collected and produced before the Court and the issues involved, whether factual or legal, are of magnitude and cannot be seen in their true perspective without sufficient material. Of course, no hard-and-fast rule can be laid down in regard to cases in which the High Court will exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction of quashing the proceeding at any stage. Of course, no hard-and-fast rule can be laid down in regard to cases in which the High Court will exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction of quashing the proceeding at any stage. [See Janata Dal v. H.S. Chowdhary [ (1992) 4 SCC 305 : 1993 SCC (Cri) 36 : AIR 1993 SC 892 ] and Raghubir Saran (Dr.) v. State of Bihar [ AIR 1964 SC 1 : (1964) 1 Cri LJ 1].] It would not be proper for the High Court to analyse the case of the complainant in the light of all probabilities in order to determine whether a conviction would be sustainable and on such premises, arrive at a conclusion that the proceedings are to be quashed. It would be erroneous to assess the material before it and conclude that the complaint cannot be proceeded with. In a proceeding instituted on complaint, exercise of the inherent powers to quash the proceedings is called for only in a case where the complaint does not disclose any offence or is frivolous, vexatious or oppressive. If the allegations set out in the complaint do not constitute the offence of which cognisance has been taken by the Magistrate, it is open to the High Court to quash the same in exercise of the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code. It is not, however, necessary that there should be meticulous analysis of the case before the trial to find out whether the case would end in conviction or acquittal. The complaint/FIR has to be read as a whole. If it appears that on consideration of the allegations in the light of the statement made on oath of the complainant or disclosed in the FIR that the ingredients of the offence or offences are disclosed and there is no material to show that the complaint/FIR is mala fide, frivolous or vexatious, in that event there would be no justification for interference by the High Court. When an information is lodged at the police station and an offence is registered, then the mala fides of the informant would be of secondary importance. It is the material collected during the investigation and evidence led in court which decides the fate of the accused person. The allegations of mala fides against the informant are of no consequence and cannot by themselves be the basis for quashing the proceeding.” 19. It is the material collected during the investigation and evidence led in court which decides the fate of the accused person. The allegations of mala fides against the informant are of no consequence and cannot by themselves be the basis for quashing the proceeding.” 19. In the case of Skoda Auto Volkswagen India Private Ltd. v/s. State of Uttar Pradesh [2020 SCC Online SC 958], the Apex Court in para 41 has held as under :- “41. It is needless to point out that ever since the decision of the Privy Council in King Emperor v. Khwaja Nazir Ahmed AIR 1945 PC 18 , the law is well settled that Courts would not thwart any investigation. It is only in cases where no cognizable offence or offence of any kind is disclosed in the first information report that the Court will not permit an investigation to go on. As cautioned by this Court in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, the power of quashing should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases. While examining a complaint, the quashing of which is sought, the Court cannot embark upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR or in the complaint. In S.M. Datta v. State of Gujarat (2001) 7 SCC 659 this Court again cautioned that criminal proceedings ought not to be scuttled at the initial stage. Quashing of a complaint should rather be an exception and a rarity than an ordinary rule. In S.M. Datta (supra), this Court held that if a perusal of the first information report leads to disclosure of an offence even broadly, law courts are barred from usurping the jurisdiction of the police, since the two organs of the State operate in two specific spheres of activities and one ought not to tread over the other sphere.” 20. In the case of M/s. Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. v/s. State of Maharashtra [ AIR 2021 SC 1918 ], the Apex court after revisiting series of judgment has set out final conclusion explaining powers under section 482 or Article 226 of the Constitution of India as under :- “23. In the case of M/s. Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. v/s. State of Maharashtra [ AIR 2021 SC 1918 ], the Apex court after revisiting series of judgment has set out final conclusion explaining powers under section 482 or Article 226 of the Constitution of India as under :- “23. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, our final conclusions on the principal/core issue, whether the High Court would be justified in passing an interim order of stay of investigation and/or “no coercive steps to be adopted”, during the pendency of the quashing petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C and/or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and in what circumstances and whether the High Court would be justified in passing the order of not to arrest the accused or “no coercive steps to be adopted” during the investigation or till the final report/chargesheet is filed under Section 173 Cr.P.C., while dismissing/disposing of/not entertaining/not quashing the criminal proceedings/complaint/FIR in exercise of powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and/or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, our final conclusions are as under: i) Police has the statutory right and duty under the relevant provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure contained in Chapter XIV of the Code to investigate into a cognizable offence; ii) Courts would not thwart any investigation into the cognizable offences; iii) It is only in cases where no cognizable offence or offence of any kind is disclosed in the first information report that the Court will not permit an investigation to go on; iv) The power of quashing should be exercised sparingly with circumspection, as it has been observed, in the ‘rarest of rare cases (not to be confused with the formation in the context of death penalty). v) While examining an FIR/complaint, quashing of which is sought, the court cannot embark upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR/complaint; vi) Criminal proceedings ought not to be scuttled at the initial stage; vii) Quashing of a complaint/FIR should be an exception rather than an ordinary rule; viii) Ordinarily, the courts are barred from usurping the jurisdiction of the police, since the two organs of the State operate in two specific spheres of activities and one ought not to tread over the other sphere; ix) The functions of the judiciary and the police are complementary, not overlapping; x) Save in exceptional cases where non-interference would result in miscarriage of justice, the Court and the judicial process should not interfere at the stage of investigation of offences; xi) Extraordinary and inherent powers of the Court do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the Court to act according to its whims or caprice; xii) The first information report is not an encyclopaedia which must disclose all facts and details relating to the offence reported. Therefore, when the investigation by the police is in progress, the court should not go into the merits of the allegations in the FIR. Police must be permitted to complete the investigation. It would be premature to pronounce the conclusion based on hazy facts that the complaint/FIR does not deserve to be investigated or that it amounts to abuse of process of law. After investigation, if the investigating officer finds that there is no substance in the application made by the complainant, the investigating officer may file an appropriate report/summary before the learned Magistrate which may be considered by the learned Magistrate in accordance with the known procedure; xiii) The power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is very wide, but conferment of wide power requires the court to be more cautious. It casts an onerous and more diligent duty on the court; xiv) However, at the same time, the court, if it thinks fit, regard being had to the parameters of quashing and the self-restraint imposed by law, more particularly the parameters laid down by this Court in the cases of R.P. Kapur (supra) and Bhajan Lal (supra), has the jurisdiction to quash the FIR/complaint; xv) When a prayer for quashing the FIR is made by the alleged accused and the court when it exercises the power under Section 482 Cr.P.C., only has to consider whether the allegations in the FIR disclose commission of a cognizable offence or not. The court is not required to consider on merits whether or not the merits of the allegations make out a cognizable offence and the court has to permit the investigating agency/police to investigate the allegations in the FIR; xvi) The aforesaid parameters would be applicable and/or the aforesaid aspects are required to be considered by the High Court while passing an interim order in a quashing petition in exercise of powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and/or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. However, an interim order of stay of investigation during the pendency of the quashing petition can be passed with circumspection. Such an interim order should not require to be passed routinely, casually and/or mechanically. Normally, when the investigation is in progress and the facts are hazy and the entire evidence/material is not before the High Court, the High Court should restrain itself from passing the interim order of not to arrest or “no coercive steps to be adopted” and the accused should be relegated to apply for anticipatory bail under Section 438 Cr.P.C. before the competent court. The High Court shall not and as such is not justified in passing the order of not to arrest and/or “no coercive steps” either during the investigation or till the investigation is completed and/or till the final report/chargesheet is filed under Section 173 Cr.P.C., while dismissing/disposing of the quashing petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and/or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. xvii) Even in a case where the High Court is prima facie of the opinion that an exceptional case is made out for grant of interim stay of further investigation, after considering the broad parameters while exercising the powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and/or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India referred to hereinabove, the High Court has to give brief reasons why such an interim order is warranted and/or is required to be passed so that it can demonstrate the application of mind by the Court and the higher forum can consider what was weighed with the High Court while passing such an interim order. xviii) Whenever an interim order is passed by the High Court of “no coercive steps to be adopted” within the aforesaid parameters, the High Court must clarify what does it mean by “no coercive steps to be adopted” as the term “no coercive steps to be adopted” can be said to be too vague and/or broad which can be misunderstood and/or misapplied.” 21. In the recent decision in the case of Central Bureau of Investigation v/s. Aryan Singh (supra), the Apex Court in para 4 has observed and held as under :- “4. Having gone through the impugned common judgment and order passed by the High Court quashing the criminal proceedings and discharging the accused, we are of the opinion that the High Court has exceeded in its jurisdiction in quashing the entire criminal proceedings in exercise of the limited powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and/or in exercise of the powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 4.1 From the impugned common judgment and order passed by the High Court, it appears that the High Court has dealt with the proceedings before it, as if, the High Court was conducting a mini trial and/or the High Court was considering the applications against the judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court on conclusion of trial. As per the cardinal principle of law, at the stage of discharge and/or quashing of the criminal proceedings, while exercising the powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C., the Court is not required to conduct the mini trial. The High Court in the common impugned judgment and order has observed that the charges against the accused are not proved. This is not the stage where the prosecution/investigating agency is/are required to prove the charges. The High Court in the common impugned judgment and order has observed that the charges against the accused are not proved. This is not the stage where the prosecution/investigating agency is/are required to prove the charges. The charges are required to be proved during the trial on the basis of the evidence led by the prosecution/investigating agency. Therefore, the High Court has materially erred in going in detail in the allegations and the material collected during the course of the investigation against the accused, at this stage. At the stage of discharge and/or while exercising the powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C., the Court has a very limited jurisdiction and is required to consider “whether any sufficient material is available to proceed further against the accused for which the accused is required to be tried or not”. 4.2 One another reason pointed by the High Court is that the initiation of the criminal proceedings/proceedings is malicious. At this stage, it is required to be noted that the investigation was handed over to the CBI pursuant to the directions issued by the High Court. That thereafter, on conclusion of the investigation, the accused persons have been chargesheeted. Therefore, the High Court has erred in observing at this stage that the initiation of the criminal proceedings/proceedings is malicious. Whether the criminal proceedings was/were malicious or not, is not required to be considered at this stage. The same is required to be considered at the conclusion of the trial. In any case, at this stage, what is required to be considered is a prima facie case and the material collected during the course of the investigation, which warranted the accused to be tried.” 22. Applying ratio laid down herein above to the case on hand, there are sufficient material, prima facie available to proceed further in the trial. At this stage on bare reading of FIR, it cannot be ascertain whether accused had intention to hurt or not while alleged robbery is made. This aspect can be assessed, examined and decided during trial. Learned advocate Mr. Tejas Barot has failed to point any material which permit this Court to thwart the FIR or investigation at threshold. 23. Learned advocate for the petitioner relied on decision in the case of Ram Lakhan (supra) and Dharmendrabhai Nandubhai Patel (supra). This aspect can be assessed, examined and decided during trial. Learned advocate Mr. Tejas Barot has failed to point any material which permit this Court to thwart the FIR or investigation at threshold. 23. Learned advocate for the petitioner relied on decision in the case of Ram Lakhan (supra) and Dharmendrabhai Nandubhai Patel (supra). In these cases, the Apex Court as well as this Court deals with the issue of intention and robbery after trial. So far as principle laid down in the case of Vineet Kumar (supra) and Sardar Trilok Singh (supra) are concerned, there is no cavil that if criminal proceedings are attended with mala fides and maliciously instituted with ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance due to personal grudge, they can be quashed. In the present case, learned advocate for the petitioner could not point out that what maliciously or ulterior motive was behind filing FIR or was filed to wreaking vengeance, more particularly, in the facts that learned Sessions Court has recorded finding with regard to the co-accused that he has ransacked shop belonging to complainant. It is to be noted that finding arrived in the Sessions Case and imposition of sentence qua co-accused has been challenged by way of Criminal Appeal No.104 of 2022 but finding arrived therein in the Sessions Case has not been suspended, what is suspended is sentence which is discernible from the order dated 19.01.2022 pressed into service by learned advocate for the petitioner. 24. In the case of Viralbhai Becharbhai Vaghani (supra), it was fact that files were taken away from the office and in that background of facts, this Court came to the conclusion that said facts are not meeting with the words “for that end”. Facts of the present case are different. In the present case, fact of ransacking shop has been decided successfully in Sessions Case qua co-accused. Said finding is not put to suspension. Only sentence is suspended. Thus, judgment of Viralbhai Vaghani (supra) is not helpful to the petitioner. 25. It was another limb of argument that in order to constitute offence under section 395 of IPC, 5 accused must be involved in the offence. Learned advocate Mr.Barot in this regard submitted that FIR discloses name of two persons only as accused. He would further submit that during investigation, prosecution has failed to find out three unnamed persons who are stated in the FIR. Learned advocate Mr.Barot in this regard submitted that FIR discloses name of two persons only as accused. He would further submit that during investigation, prosecution has failed to find out three unnamed persons who are stated in the FIR. This indicates non existence of three persons. Thus offence under section 395 of IPC is not made out and therefore, he requested to quash offence under section 395 of IPC. This Court is not impressed by such submission. FIR clearly indicates that there are 5 accused, 3 were unnamed as they were not known to the complainant, so requirement of offence under section 395 of IPC prima facie is made out. Learned advocate Mr.Barot for the petitioner referred to para 30 of the judgment delivered in Sessions Case in regard to co-accused to contend that after trial, learned Sessions Court has held that prosecution could not find out 3 other persons who are unnamed and therefore, ingredient of section 395 is not proved. Again this Court is not impressed by such submission. 3 accused persons who are unnamed are shown as absconding. At the stage of quashing of FIR, this Court cannot hold and believe that there were only 2 accused. FIR indicates act of robbery. It also indicates involvement of 3 other persons. However, during trial identity of 3 unknown persons does not disclose, but that does not mean that 5 persons were not involved and ingredients of dacoity as stated in section 391 is not made out. This aspect can be examined during trial. 26. What appears from above discussion, sufficient material exists to send the accused for trial. Whole reading of FIR, disclose ingredients of offence. The petitioner failed to point out that FIR is mala fide, frivolous or vexatious. Thus, no justification is called to interfere. 27. In view of above and for the reasons stated herein above, this petition for quashing of FIR fails and is accordingly dismissed. Rule is discharged. Interim relief, if any, granted earlier stands vacated.