JUDGMENT : This appeal is filed by the Insurance Company on the ground that the claim petition is time barred and hence, the claim petition is not maintainable. 2. The factum of accident is not in dispute. 3. Heard the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the parties on both sides. Perused the records. 4. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the accident was occurred on 27.07.2010 and claim petition was filed on 07.02.2020. An amendment was made to the Motor Vehicles Act (for short, hereinafter referred to as ‘M.V. Act’) to Section 166 (3) prescribing period of limitations to prefer the claim petition within a period of six months from the date of the accident. Therefore, contended that the claim petition filed by the claimants is a time barred. But the Tribunal without considering this and allowed the claim petition. Hence, prays to allow the appeal by holding that the claim petition filed is time barred and set aside the judgment and award passed by the Tribunal. 5. On the hand the learned counsel for the respondents/claimants submitted that the amendment made to the Section 166 (3) of the M.V. Act, came into force on 01.04.2022 prescribing limitation of six months. But the accident was occurred on 27.07.2010 and the claim was filed on 07.02.2020. Therefore, as on the date of the accident what is the law prevail that is applicable and the amendment made to Section 166 (3) is having prospective effect only. Therefore, submitted the claim petition is maintainable. 6. The earlier M.V. Act, 1939 was repealed and M.V. Act, 1988 came into force. This M.V. Act, 1988 came into force with effect from 01.07.1989. Sub Section (3) of Section 166 of M.V. Act prescribes limitation of six months for preferring claim petition from the date of the accident when the Act was came into force on 01.07.1989. Subsequently, Sub Section (3) of Section 166 was substituted removing limitation period by way of amendment by Act, No.54 of 1994 with effect from 14.11.1994. Therefore, with effect from 14.11.1994 the limitation prescribing of six-month period for preferring claim petition from the date of the accident is removed. Therefore, with effect from 14.11.1994, there is no time limitation for preferring claim petition. Therefore, with effect from 14.11.1994 the limitation prescribing of six-month period for preferring claim petition from the date of the accident is removed. Therefore, with effect from 14.11.1994, there is no time limitation for preferring claim petition. Later on, the legislature in his wisdom re-introduced the Act No.32 of 2019 with effect from 01.04.2022 by bringing back the old provision of Section 166 (3) prescribing limitation period of six months. In the present case, the accident was occurred on 27.07.2010. The claim petition was filed on 07.02.2020. As on the date of the accident on 27.07.2010, there was no provision prescribing the limitation of six months for making claim within a period of six months. But the afore mentioned amendment by reintroducing the limitation period is by virtue of Act No.32 of 2019 is effective from 01.04.2022. Therefore, the learned counsel for the Insurance Company Smt. Preeti Shashank, argued that the claim petition is filed after more than 9 years from the date of accident. Therefore, argued the claim petition is time barred. 7. As discussed above, the old Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 was substituted and repealed by the new Motor Vehicles, Act, 1988, the limitation to prefer the claim petition is six months by virtue of Sub Section (3) of Section 166 of the M.V. Act. Later on, the said Sub Section (3) of Section 166 was removed and the legislature had intended not to prescribe any limitation period for preferring the claim petition. In this re-introduced provision of Sub-Section (3) of Section 166 on the M.V. Act, limitation period prescribed is with effect from 01.04.2022. In between this interregnum period there was no limitation to prefer appeal. In this interregnum period the accident was occurred on 27.07.2010. Therefore, the right accrued to the claimants to prefer claim petition is the time as on the date of the accident. Unless, the legislature has made that it is having retrospective effect explicitly then the claimants have right on the date of accident what the law prevails. Therefore, the right of the claimants is not taken away by re-introducing limitation clause in Sub-Section (3) to Section 166 by virtue of Act No.32 of 2019 with effect from 01.04.2022. Therefore, this limitation period prescribed is applicable for injury or death occurred in the road traffic accident by using motor vehicles on and after 01.04.2022. Therefore, the right of the claimants is not taken away by re-introducing limitation clause in Sub-Section (3) to Section 166 by virtue of Act No.32 of 2019 with effect from 01.04.2022. Therefore, this limitation period prescribed is applicable for injury or death occurred in the road traffic accident by using motor vehicles on and after 01.04.2022. As on the date of the accident, that is occurred on 27.07.2010, the claimant’s right to prefer claim petition without affecting limitation was still subsisting. 8. Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 promulgates the situation of a similar nature where by protecting right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired or accrued under any refilled enactment. It is well settled law that the provisions of new Act cannot entrench or takes away the right granted under the old Act. This view is fortified by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the judgment in the case of the State of Punjab and others vs. Bhajan Kaur and others, 2008 (3) KHC 823. It would be expedient to extract paragraph Nos.13, 16 and 17 of the above judgment. “13. No reason has been assigned as to why the 1988 Act should be held to be retrospective in character. The rights and liabilities of the parties are determined when cause of action for filing the claim petition arises. As indicated herein before, the liability under the Act is a statutory liability. The liability could, thus, be made retrospective only by reason of a statute or statutory rules. It was required to be so stated expressly by the Parliament. Applying the principles of interpretation of statute, the 1988 Act cannot be given retrospective effect, more particularly, when it came into force on or about 1.07.1989. 16. Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, therefore, inter alia saves a right accrued and/ or a liability incurred. It does not create a right. When Section 6 applies only an existing right is saved thereby. The existing right of a party has to be determined on the basis of the statute which was applicable and not under the new one. If a new Act confers a right, it does so with prospective effect when it comes into force, unless expressly stated otherwise. Section 140 of the 1988 Act does not contain any procedural provision so as to construe it to have retrospective effect. It cannot enlarge any right. If a new Act confers a right, it does so with prospective effect when it comes into force, unless expressly stated otherwise. Section 140 of the 1988 Act does not contain any procedural provision so as to construe it to have retrospective effect. It cannot enlarge any right. Rights of the parties are to be determined on the basis of the law as it then stood, viz., before the new Act come into force. 17. It is now well-settled that a change in the substantive law, as opposed to adjective law, would not affect the pending litigation unless the legislature has enacted otherwise, either expressly or by necessary implication.” 9. The rights and liabilities of parties are determined when cause of action for filing a claim petition arises. If the legislature in its wisdom has made of the provision as retrospective effect, then the situation would have been different. But the legislature has not made, the Act No.32 of 2019 is having retrospective effect. Therefore, it means the provision regarding prescribing limitation is only having prospective in nature. 10. Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 reads as follows: “6. Effect of repeal. —Where this Act, or any 1 [Central Act] or Regulation made after the commencement of this Act, repeals any enactment hitherto made or hereafter to be made, then, unless a different intention appears, the repeal shall not (a) revive anything not in force or existing at the time at which the repeal takes effect; or (b) affect the previous operation of any enactment so repealed or anything duly done or suffered thereunder; or (c) affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued or incurred under any enactment so repealed; or (d) affect any penalty, forfeiture or punishment incurred in respect of any offence committed against any enactment so repealed; or (e) affect any investigation, legal proceeding or remedy in respect of any such right, privilege, obligation, liability, penalty, forfeiture or punishment as aforesaid, and any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced, and any such penalty, forfeiture or punishment may be imposed as if the repealing Act or Regulation had not been passed.” 11. Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 therefore, saves right of parties accrued as on the date of the cause of action arises. Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 therefore, saves right of parties accrued as on the date of the cause of action arises. If any enactment is repealed, then on what date the cause of action arises, the statute is prevailing on that date is made applicable to the parties. Therefore, Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 protects right of parties, even though any amendment or repeal is made. Unless the legislature having different intention, which means making the provision as retrospective effect the rights of parties are not affected. But that is not found in the Act No.32 of 2019 effective from 01.04.2022. Therefore, the claimant’s right accrued to prefer the claim petition on the date of accident that is on 27.07.2010 and at that time, there was no limitation prescribed and this non-existence of limitation is saved by Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897. Therefore, this Court is of view that the applicability of the Act No.32 of 2019 that is re-introduction of the old provisions of Sub Section (3) of Section 166 would have prospective effect only and the limitation period of 6 months is applicable after introduction of the amendment with effect from 01.04.2022. To make it more clear if any accident occurred prior to 01.04.2022, the provisions of amendment to the Act prescribing time limitation is not applicable. This amendment made with effect from 01.04.2022 is applicable in case where the accident occurred subsequent to 01.04.2022. Therefore, the party’s right is governed by to prefer claim petition after 01.04.2022 if the accident occurs after 01.04.2022. 12. Therefore, for the aforesaid reasons, claim petition is very well maintainable. As the accident was occurred on 27.07.2010, in the present case, the claim petition is filed on 07.02.2020 that is prior to 01.04.2022 on which date the Act i.e. Act No.32 of 2019 came into force, therefore, governing principle is that, when the cause of action arises to the parties and on that day what the law prevails that right is accrued to the parties as per Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897. Therefore, the claim petition filed by the claimants, even after more than 9 years is maintainable and that is what correctly considered by the Tribunal and granted the compensation. 13. Therefore, the claim petition filed by the claimants, even after more than 9 years is maintainable and that is what correctly considered by the Tribunal and granted the compensation. 13. The another ground urged by the Insurance Company is that the quantum of compensation awarded is on excessive one holding that the claimants are major children of the deceased and were not dependants on the deceased. Therefore, the deduction of income towards personal and living expenses ought to have been 1/3rd but not 1/4th. What the loss of dependency pleaded and argued by the Insurance Company is exclusive dependency that means major children are excluded on the reason that they are not dependent on the income of the deceased. But the loss of dependency is always not exclusive dependency excluding the major children but where the dependency is mutual to each other, then the major children are also entitled for compensation under the head of loss of dependency. In the present case, the claimants are wife, three major children one among them is daughter. Even though these children are major, but by considering their profession as coolie, therefore, in family when all are living together all are contributing their coolie to the family for home making and thus all are mutually dependant on each other. Therefore, theory of law of dependants is to be assessed on two factors, dependants excluded and the dependants mutually dependant on each other in the family. In the present case, the major sons and daughter are married but considering their profession as coolie all are contributing to the family. Therefore, it is proved that all the claimants including deceased are mutually dependent on each other. Therefore, the size of family is to be considered for income towards personal and living expenses. Just because the claimants are major children is not a ground to say that the deduction to be made as 1/3rd only. Therefore, even though this is not discussed by the Tribunal but has correctly held parameter of deducting 1/4th income towards personal and living expenses and accordingly, determined compensation correctly which needs no interference. Therefore, the appeal filed by the Insurance Company is liable to be dismissed as devoid of merits. Accordingly, I proceed to pass the following: ORDER (i) The appeal filed by the Insurance Company is dismissed. (ii) The amount in deposit shall be transmitted to the Tribunal.