JUDGMENT : On mentioning of Mr. Anjani Kumar Pandey, who has been authorized by respondent no.1. Respondent nos. 2 to 5 are the children of Neimi Kachhap who is the wife of late Sukra Kachhap. The authorization letter has been produced by Mr. Pandey appearing in person and the same was taken on record. 2. This memo of appeal has been preferred being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned order dated 08.6.2013 passed in W.C.Case No.8 of 2012 passed by the learned Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Ranchi whereby he has been pleased to award a sum of Rs.6,12,360/-. 3. The respondent no.1 who is the wife of late Sukra Kachchap has filed the application before the Labour Court under the Workman Compensation Act, now Employees Compensation Act wherein it was stated that the deceased Sukra Kachchap was employed in National Horticulture Research Centre, Palandu. On 27.12.2010 an animal entered in the said farm therefore the deceased Sukra Kachchap was trying to oust that animal in the meantime a vehicle was coming rashly and negligently on the road which dashed the deceased Sukra Kachchap resulting his death on the spot. The post mortem examination on the dead body of Sukra Kachchap was conducted and in this background the said case was filed for compensation in terms of Employees Compensation Act 1923. 4. Mr. Manish Kumar, the learned counsel appearing for the appellant submits that the impugned order is perverse as it is not based on the materials on record. He submits that accident took place in course of duty has not been established. He submits that the learned Labour Court has failed to associate that the date of death of the deceased was neither arising out of nor in course of employment. He submits that if such a situation was there, the order is bad in law and to buttress his argument he relied in the case of Mackinnon Mackenzie and Co.(P) Ltd. v. Ibrahim Mahmmed Issak, (1969) 2 SCC 607 wherein at paragraph nos.5 and 6 it has been held as under: “5. To come within the Act the injury by accident must arise both out of and in the course of employment. To come within the Act the injury by accident must arise both out of and in the course of employment. The words “in the course of the employment” mean “in the course of the work which the workman is employed to do and which is incidental to it.” The words “arising out of employment” are understood to mean that “during the course of the employment, injury has resulted from some risk incidental to the duties of the service, which, unless engaged in the duty owing to the master, it is reasonable to believe the workman would not otherwise have suffered.” In other words there must be a causal relationship between the accident and the employment. The expression “arising out of employment” is again not confined to the mere nature of the employment. The expression applies to employment as such — to its nature, its conditions, its obligations and its incidents. If by reason of any of those factors the workman is brought within the zone of special danger the injury would be one which arises ‘out of employment’. To put it differently if the accident had occurred on account of a risk which is an incident of the employment, the claim for compensation must succeed, unless of course the workman has exposed himself to an added peril by his own imprudent act. In Lancashire and Yorkshire Railway Co. v. Highley [(1917) AC 352] Lord Sumner laid down the following test for determining whether an accident “arose out of the employment”: “There is, however, in my opinion, one test which is always at any rate applicable, because it arises upon the very words of the statute, and it is generally of some real assistance. It is this: Was it part of the injured person's employment to hazard, to suffer, or to do that which caused his injury? If yes, the accident arose out of his employment. If nay, it did not, because, what it was not part of the employment to hazard, to suffer, or to do, cannot well be the cause of an accident arising out of the employment. If yes, the accident arose out of his employment. If nay, it did not, because, what it was not part of the employment to hazard, to suffer, or to do, cannot well be the cause of an accident arising out of the employment. To ask if the cause of the workman was within the sphere of the employment, or was one of the ordinary risks of the employment, or reasonably incidental to the employment, or conversely, was an added peril and outside the sphere of the employment, are all different ways of asking whether it was a part of his employment, that the workman should have acted as he was acting, or should have been in the position in which he was, whereby in the course of that employment he sustained injury.” 6. In the case of death caused by accident the burden of proof rests upon the workman to prove that the accident arose out of employment as well as in the course of employment. But this does not mean that a workman who comes to Court for relief must necessarily prove it by direct evidence. Although the onus of proving that the injury by accident arose both out of and in the course of employment rests upon the applicant these essentials may be inferred when the facts proved justify the inference. On the one hand the Commissioner must not surmise, conjecture or guess; on the other hand, he may draw an inference from the proved facts so long as it is a legitimate inference. It is of course impossible to lay down any rule as to the degree of proof which is sufficient to justify an inference being drawn, but the evidence must be such as would induce a reasonable man to draw it. Lord Birkenhead, L.C., in Lancaster v. Blackwell Colliery Co. Ltd. [(1918) WC Rep 345] observed: “If the facts which are proved give rise to conflicting inferences of equal degrees of probability so that the choice between them is a mere matter of conjecture, then, of course, the applicant fails to prove his case, because it is plain that the onus in these matters is upon the applicant. Ltd. [(1918) WC Rep 345] observed: “If the facts which are proved give rise to conflicting inferences of equal degrees of probability so that the choice between them is a mere matter of conjecture, then, of course, the applicant fails to prove his case, because it is plain that the onus in these matters is upon the applicant. But where the known facts are not equally consistent, where there is ground for comparing and balancing probabilities as to their respective value, and where a reasonable man might hold that the more probable conclusion is that for which the applicant contends, then the Arbitrator is justified in drawing an inference in his favour.” 5. He further draws the attention of the Court to relevant paragraphs and the finding of the learned Labour Court and submits that the witnesses have not been able to prove that said deceased Sukra Kachchap was on duty on that day. He submits that although the finding is there to the effect that he was not on duty, however, the learned court has allowed the claim considering that the deceased was a government employee. 6. On the other hand, Mr. Pandey, appearing on behalf of respondent no.1 and others submits that it was the duty of the appellant to prove the case and he submits that the said Act is a beneficial legislation and if there are two interpretations are there, the interpretation which is in favour of the havenots has to be accepted. 7. In view of the submission of the learned counsels for the parties, the Court has gone through the impugned order and finds that by deciding the issue nos.3 and 4 the learned Labour Court has considered the statement of AW-1 namely Simon Kachchap and AW-2 namely Neimi Kachchap. Simon Kachchap has stated that his father was absent from duty from 24.12.2010 in view of paragraph no.7 of the order. AW-2 has stated that the alleged occurrence occurred near Gamon India gate and her husband died on the spot due to dashing by the vehicle. O.P.No.1 namely Yadunandan Pathak has stated that the deceased has performed his assigned duty up to 24.12.2010 and he was assumed to join the duty on 24.12.2010 at Farm-1 and 2 at gate no.’C’ and ‘D’ Block. His duty hour was for a period from 14.00 hours to 22.00 hours. O.P.No.1 namely Yadunandan Pathak has stated that the deceased has performed his assigned duty up to 24.12.2010 and he was assumed to join the duty on 24.12.2010 at Farm-1 and 2 at gate no.’C’ and ‘D’ Block. His duty hour was for a period from 14.00 hours to 22.00 hours. He has further stated that deceased Sukra Kachchap did not turn up for his duty, since no information was given to the office by any concerned or connected person of his family member and his work was done by another employee. The duty of the deceased was on 24.12.2010 but he did not turn up on his duty and there was no any leave application given by the deceased Sukra Kachchap. In this background, the learned Labour Court in paragraph no.12 has held that although the witnesses has stated that the deceased was not on his duty on the date of alleged occurrence, so that death of the deceased was not in course of his duty and in another paragraph no.15 he has held that the deceased Sukra Kachchap was a government employee and not a private workman, therefore, the claimants are entitled to get all the benefits which has been fixed by the government. Thus, it appears that the learned Labour Court’s finding is contradictory on the face of its record. Accordingly, the impugned order dated 08.6.2013 passed in W.C. Case No.8 of 2012 passed by the learned Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Ranchi is set aside. 8. The matter is remitted back to the learned Presiding Officer, Labour Court to examine this aspect of the matter and will pass fresh order in accordance with law as expeditiously as possible but not later than six months from the date of receipt/ production of a copy of this order. 9. This appeal is allowed and disposed of in the above terms. 10. Pending petition if any also stands disposed of. 11. Let the L.C.R be sent back to the learned court concerned forthwith.