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2023 DIGILAW 997 (ALL)

Chanda Devi v. State of U. P.

2023-04-12

CHANDRA KUMAR RAI

body2023
JUDGMENT : 1. Heard Mr. R.C. Singh, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Mr. Shailendra Kumar Pandey, learned counsel for the petitioner, learned Standing Counsel for the State respondents, Mr. Prashant Kumar Tripathi, learned counsel for respondent No.5 and Mr. Narsingh Pandey, learned Counsel for respondent No.12. 2. Brief facts of the case are that family pedigree in order to appreciate the controversy, will be relevant which is an under : Ganpat Dube Shobha Parmeshwara Rajpati Chanda Devi 3. The dispute pertains to old khata No.137 consisting of 16 plots total area 5 bigha, 1 biswa and 8 dhoor. Smt. Lakhpata was Zamidar/ proprietor of the land in dispute. Smt. Lakhpata transferred her entire right by registered sale deed dated 02.12.1918 in favour of Sri Ganpat Dube. It is also material that Smt.Lakhpata was Sir holder of the land in dispute. Smt. Lakhpata became ex-proprietary tenant by virtue of provisions contained under Section 10 of North Western Provinces Tenancy Act 1901 due to transfer made by Smt. Lakhpata to Sri Ganpat Dube, Smt. Lakhpata was not heard of from 1348 Fasli accordingly, Sri Ganpat Dube being Jamindar took entire property in his possession. By Virtue of Provisions contained under Section 18 of the U.P.Z.A. & L. R. Act, Sri Ganpat Dube became bhumidhar of the land in dispute after date of vesting. After death of Sri Ganpat Dube, his two widows namely Smt. Sharda and Smt. Parmeshwara succeeded to the property and their names were accordingly mutated in the revenue record. Smt. Parmeshwara had no issue therefore, her share was succeeded by Smt. Shobha. Smt. Rajpati Devi daughter of Smt. Shobha executed a will deed in favour of Chanda Devi, who is petitioner before this Court. Under the order of Amaldaramad dated 30.10.1970 passed by Supervisor/ Kannongo, name of Lalta, Rampadarth and Ramsukh sons of Kanahaiya were ordered to be mutated as heirs of Smt. Lakhpata. Since the succession was disputed as Supervisor/ Kannungo did not have jurisdiction to record the name of Lalta, Rampadarth and Ramsukh under Section 33-A of U.P.Land Revenue Act on the basis of P.A.-11 accordingly, Smt. Rajpati filed a suit being suit No.425 under Section 229-B of U.P.Z.A.& L. R. Act claiming declaration for her right and title in respect to the plot in dispute stating that the order of Amaldaramad dated 30.10.1970 is out come of fraud. During the pedency of the aforesaid suit, the village was brought under consolidation operation under Section 4 of the U.P.C.H. Act as such suit stood abated on 28.05.1979 in view of the provisions contained under Section 5 of the U.P.C.H. Act. In the Basic Year of Consolidation operation Lalta, Rampadarth and Ramsukh sons of Kanahaiya were recorded over the plots of khata No.137 New khata No.105. Against basic year entry Smt. Rajpati filed objection under Section 9-A (2) of the U.P.C.H. Act claiming exclusive right in the pots of Khata No.105 stating that she herself is cultivating two plots and remaining 14 plots has been given on Batai cultivation. The Consolidation Officer heard the aforementioned title objection filed by Smt. Rajpti and vide order dated 19.02.1982 decided the objection against Smt. Rajpati for 14 plots and decided in her favour for two plots which were in her personal cultivation. Against the order of Consolidation officer dated 19.02.1982 Smt. Rajpati filed appeal under Section 11 of the U.P.C.H. Act on 16.08.1982 along with prayer for condonation of delay supported with affidavit of appellant. Sri Janaki and Sri Jagai also filed their separate appeals against the order of Consolidation Officer dated 19.02.1982. All the three appeals were consolidated and heard together. The appellate court vide order dated 18.03.1983 allowed all three appeals setting aside the order of Consolidation Officer. Against the appellate order dated 18.03.1983, Rampadarth and others filed three separate revisions being revision Nos734, 733 and 732 under Section 48 of U.P.C.H. Act. All the three revisions were consolidated and heard together. The aforesaid revisions were allowed and matter was remanded to the appellate Court to decide the appeals afresh vide order dated 22.10.1984. In pursuance of the remand order dated 22.10.1984 appeals filed by Janki, Jagai and Rajpathi were renumbered as Appeal Nos.4, 6 and 5 respectively. All the three appeals were heard together and appellate court vide order dated 31.05.2004 decided the appeal whereby appeal No.4 filed by Janki, appeal No.5 filed by Smt. Rajpati were allowed and appeal No.6 filed by Jagai was dismissed. The appellate court while deciding the appeal vide order dated 31.05.2004 has taken into consideration the evidence on record as well as provisions of U.P.Z.A. and L.R.Act, 1950 and accepted the claim of the petitioner on the basis of provisions contained under the Act and rules framed thereunder. The appellate court while deciding the appeal vide order dated 31.05.2004 has taken into consideration the evidence on record as well as provisions of U.P.Z.A. and L.R.Act, 1950 and accepted the claim of the petitioner on the basis of provisions contained under the Act and rules framed thereunder. Against the order dated 31.05.2004 two revisions under 48 of U.P.C.H. Act were filed by Ram Shanker and others, who were consolidated and heard together. Revisional court vide order dated 16.03.2005 dismissed the revisions, hence Ram Shankar and others challenged the order of appellate court dated 31.05.2004 and revisional court dated 16.03.2005 through Writ-B No.44157 of 2005 before this Court which was allowed vide order dated 01.10.2010 quashing the orders dated 31.05.2004 and 16.03.2005 and remanded the matter before appellate Court to examine the delay condonation matter, possession of the parties and the revenue entry. In pursuance of the order of this Court dated 01.10.2010 Settlement Officer Consolidation has restored all the three appeals and after hearing the counsel for the parties dismissed all the three appeals filed by petitioner's predecessor in interest, Janki and Jagai on the ground of limitation vide order dated 04.06.2016. Petitioner filed recall application against the appellate order dated 04.06.2016 which was dismissed vide order dated 07.10.2016 accordingly petitioner filed two Separate revisions under Section 48 of U.P.C.H. Act against the order dated 04.06.2016 and 07.10.2016. One Jaglal has also filed his separate revision against the appellate order dated 04.06.2016. All the three revisions were consolidated and heard together. Revisional Court vide order dated 08.9.2021 dismissed all the three revisions hence this writ petition. 4. This Court vide order dated 19.11.2022 has entertained the writ petition and granted interim protection in the matter however on the recall application filed on behalf of respondent No.5 the earlier order dated 19.11.2022 was recalled vide order dated 13.02.2023 on the ground of opportunity of hearing. 5. In pursuance of the order dated 19.11.2022 notices were issued to the private respondents Nos. 5 to 15. Respondent No.5 has already put in his appearance before issuance of notice to the respondents through Mr. Prashant Kumar Tripathi Advocate. Respondent No.12 has put in appearance through Mr. Narshing Pancey Advocate after issuance of notice to the respondent. 6. As per office report dated 10.02.2023 service is sufficient upon respondent Nos.6 to 10 and 12 to 15. Respondent No.5 has already put in his appearance before issuance of notice to the respondents through Mr. Prashant Kumar Tripathi Advocate. Respondent No.12 has put in appearance through Mr. Narshing Pancey Advocate after issuance of notice to the respondent. 6. As per office report dated 10.02.2023 service is sufficient upon respondent Nos.6 to 10 and 12 to 15. Officer has also reported that respondent No.11 is dead. Petitioner has filed an application for amendment to amend the array of parties by mentioning deceased against the name of respondent No.11, who died issue-less and heirs are already on record of the writ petition. accordingly this Court vide order dated 28.03.2023 allowed the amendment application. 7. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner submitted that serious question of law has been raised in the title appeal under Section 11 (1) of U.P.C.H. Act, but the appeal has been dismissed on the ground of limitation. He further submitted that in appeal prayer has been made for condonation of delay along with separate affidavit of the appellant, but the appellate court has illegally dismissed the appeal on the ground of limitation. He further submitted that delay was not inordinate in filing the appeal rather the appeal was filed on 16.04.1982 against the order of Consolidation Officer dated 19.02.1982, as such dismissal of appeal on the ground of limitation is against the principle of law laid by this Court as well as Apex Court from time to time for taking liberal view in delay condonation matter. He further submitted that earlier the claim of the petitioner was allowed on merit by passing detailed order considering the provisions of law, as such the dismissal of the appeal after remand order passed by this Court on the ground of limitation only specially when the delay is not inordinate will be against the principle of law settled by Apex Court for deciding the matter on merit rather on technical ground. He further submitted that even on merit, petitioner is entitled to the right and title over the land in dispute as after date of vesting no right will accrue to Lakhpata as such Lalta, Rampadarth and Ramsukh will not get any right and petitioner will be entitled to the right and title over the land in dispute in view of the provisions contained under Section 18 of U.P.Z.A. & L. R. Act. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner placed reliance upon the judgment of this Court passed in Writ-B No.14670 of 1988 (Smt. Kalawati Vs. Deputy Director of Consolidation and others) in which this Court has affirmed the order condoning the delay in filing the appeal before Settlement Officer of Consolidation after following the judgement of the Apex court. 8. On the other hand, Mr. Prashant Kumar Tripathi, Counsel for respondent No.5 submitted that in pursuance of the remand order passed by this Court dated 01.10.2010 by which petitioner's writ petition was allowed and matter was remitted back before the appellate court to decide the appeal afresh considering the delay condonation matter and other points on merit, the appellate court has considered the delay condonation matter and rejected the appeal on the ground of limitation. He further submitted that no separate application under Section 5 of Limitation Act has been filed rather in the appeal itself the prayer has been made for condonation of delay, as such, delay in filing the appeal was rightly refused by the appellate court. He further submitted that sufficiency of cause and reality of cause are two different things. He further submitted that there can be liberal view in respect to the sufficiency of cause, but there cannot be liberal view in respect to the reality of the cause. He further submitted that petitioner has not filed separate application for condonation of delay as such, delay cannot be condoned whether the delay is inordinate or not. Mr. Prashant Kumar Tripathi, counsel for respondent No.5 placed reliance upon judgment of this Court, reported in 1988 ALJ 358 Kedar and others Vs. Assistant Director of Consolidation Banda and others in order to demonstrate that there can be no liberal view in respect to the reality of the cause in filing the delay condonation application. He next submitted that no interference is required against the impugned order and writ petition is liable to be dismissed. 9. I have considered the arguments advanced by the counsel for the parties and perused the record. 10. There is no dispute about the fact that proceeding arises out of title matter under Section 9-A (2) of U.P.C.H. Act. He next submitted that no interference is required against the impugned order and writ petition is liable to be dismissed. 9. I have considered the arguments advanced by the counsel for the parties and perused the record. 10. There is no dispute about the fact that proceeding arises out of title matter under Section 9-A (2) of U.P.C.H. Act. There is also no dispute about the fact that title appeal filed by the petitioner on 16.04.1982 against the order dated 19.02.1982 passed by Consolidation Officer has been dismissed by the appellate court on the ground of limitation only. There is also no dispute about the fact that revision filed by the petitioner against the order dismissing the petitioner's title appeal on the ground of limitation has been also dismissed. 11. There is also no dispute about the fact that revision filed by the petitioner against the order dismissing the petitioner's title appeal on the ground of limitation has been also dismissed. 11. In order to appreciate the controversy the perusal of the appeal under Section 11 (1) of U.P.C.H. Act filed by Smt. Rajpati taking specific grounds specially in paragraph No.10 of the memo of appeal with respect to condonation of delay supported by the affidavit of the appellant will be relevant which are as under : U;k;ky; ,l0 vks0 lh0 egksn; gjSa;k 1- jktifr nsoh csok jktsUnz lk0 e>ks0 rIik csyok i0 veksढk rg0 gjSa;k ftyk cLrhA cuke 1- jkelq[k]AAlk0 e>kSok nwcs 2- ykyrkA iq=x.k A rIik&csyok ijxuk veksढk rg0 gjSa;k 3- inkjFkA A ftyk&cLrh 4- xzke lHkk Á/kku A 5- ljdkj m0Á0 }kjk ftykf/kdkjh cLrh /kkjk&11 lh ,o ,DV vihy cujkth QSlyk Jheku lh0 vk0 egksn; foØe tksr ckcr okn la0 2486]2487]2488]2489]2490]2491]2492]2493]2494]2495 /kkjk 9 v ¼2½ ckcr ekS0 e>kSok cLrh rIik csyok ijxuk veksढk r0 gjSa;k ftyk cLrh jkelq[k cuke ykyrk rk0 QSlyk 19-02-1982 vihykUV fuEufyf[kr fuosnu djrk gS %& 1- ;g fd QSlyk vnkyr ekrgr f[kykQ dkuwu dkfct [kkfjth gSA 2- ;g fd vnkyr ekrgr us mDr o>ewyk fefly ij xkSj ugha Qjek;k gSA QSlyk blds f[kykQ lgh ugha gSA 3- ;g fd vnkyr ekrgr dk yhxy isij ds lgh ugha gSA 4- ;g fd vnkyr ekrgr esa lgh rudh gkl ugha dk;e fd;k gS vkSj ugha fVfMax gh lgh gSA 5- ;g fd ;g ckr c[kwch lkfcr gS fd vk0 fu0 igys y[keUrh nsoh oh;j dh Fkh ftlesa xuir ds gd esa cSukek fd;k vkSj xuir ds dkuwuh dks tk;t okfjl jktifr vihykfUV;k gh gSA 6- ;g fd jsLiksaMsUV drbZ y[kirh ds ukrh ugha gS vkSj uk gh y[kirh mldh ukuh gSA 7- ;g fd vnkyr eky }kjk ;g fu;r gks pqdk gS fd vihykfUV;k gh vk0fu0 dh ekfyd crkSj Hkwfe/kj o dkfct gSA 8- ;g fd dCtk Hkh vihykfUV;k gh vkfJr gS vkSj og fu;ekuqlkj gSA 9- ;g fd jsLiksUMsUV eks xyr la[;k o fcyk fdlh gd ds vk0fu0 ds QthZ &#2338a ls yM jgs gSA 10- ;g fd vkns'k fnukad 19-02-82 dh tkudkjh 23-02-82 dks gqbZ vkSj mlh fnu udy dh nj[okLr fn;k tks 05-03-82 dks feykA ok udy vius odhy dks vihy nkf[ky ds ckcr nsdj ?kj pyh x;h ysfdu Hkqy ls vihy vUnj fe;kn nkf[ky ugha gks ldhA tkucw>dj ugha fd;k gSA dkuwu fe;kn gLo nQk 5 dk Qk;nk feyuk t#jh gSA vr% vihy gktk nkf[ky mEehnokj gwWa fd dkuwu fe;kn gLo nQk 5 dk Qk;nk nsdj vih eatwj fd;k tk;sA vk0 fu0 dh Hkwfe/kj ?kksf"kr fd;k tkos rFkk Áfroknhx.k jsLiksUMsUV dk uke [kkfjt fd;k tkosA vihykUV 16-04-82 U;k;ky; ,l0 vks0 lh0 egksn; gjSa;k cLrhA V0ua0 lu 82 jktifr nsoh cuke jkelq[k c;ku gYQh feutkfuc Jherh jktirh 1- eSa cgyQ c;ku djrh gwWa vkSj dle [kkrh gwWa fd esjk uke jktirh esjs ifr dk uke jktsUnj lk0 e>kSok rIik csyok ijxuk veksढk rglhy gjSa;k ftyk cLrh dh fuoklh gwWaA 2- eSa cgyQ c;ku djrh gwWa vkSj dle [kkrh gwWa fd vkns'k fnukad 19-02-82 dh tkudkjh 23-02-82 dks gqbZ vkSj mlh fnu udy dh nj[kkLr fn;k tks 5-03-82 dks feyk udy vkSj vihy dk [kpkZ vius odhy dks nsdj ?kj pyh xbZ vkSj vkt tc rkfj[k irk yxkus vkbZ rc irk pyk fd odhy lkgc vihy nkf[ky djus ls Hkwy x;s blfy, vkt iqu% vihy nkf[ky fd;k tk jgk gS eSaus tkucw> dj dksbZ xyrh---- rlkgqyh ugha fd;k gwWa blfy, gj lwjr esa nQk&5 dkuwu fe;kn dk Qk;nk ikus dk eqlkgd gwWa 3- eSa cgyQk c;ku djrk gwWa vkSj dle [kkrk gwWa fd mijksDr dFku c;ku gYQh-----esjs Kku ls lR; gSA blesa dksbZ ckr fNikbZ ugha xbZ gSaA vkSj uk >wB gSa ijes'oj esjh enn djsaA ÁkFkhZ Jherh jkeirh Rk0 16-4-82 12. After perusal of the grounds of appeal specially paragraph No.10 of the grounds of appeal filed by the petitioner as well as affidavit filed in appeal as well as delay condonation matter, the dismissal of title appeal on the ground of limitation will be against the justice oriented approach of the Court. 13. It is also material that on the earlier occasion, the matter was decided in favour of the petitioner on merit although that orders have been set aside by this Court while allowing the writ petition filed by the contesting respondents, but the fact remains that interesting question of title is involved in the matter as such, dismissal of the petitioner's appeal which was filed within two months from the date of the order of Consolidation Officer, will be against the interest of justice. 14. Honble Apex Court in the case is reported in AIR 1987 S.C. 1353 Collector, Land Acquisition Anantnag and others Vs. Mst. Kantiji and others has held that matter should be adjudicated on merit in place of dismissal of the case on technical grounds. Paragraph No.3 of Judgment is relevant which is as follows : "3. The legislature has conferred the power to condone delay by enacting Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act of 1963 in order to enable the Courts to do substantial justice to parties by disposing of matters on 'merits'. The expression "sufficient cause" employed by the legislature is adequately elastic to enable the courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which sub-serves the ends of justice that being the life-purpose for the existence of the institution of Courts. It is common knowledge that this Court has been making a justifiably liberal approach in matters instituted in this Court. But the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other Courts in the hierarchy. And such a liberal approach is adopted on principle as it is realized that:- "Any appeal or any application, other than an application under any of the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 may be admitted after the prescribed period if the appellant or the applicant satisfies the court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period." 1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late. 2. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late. 2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties. 3. "Every day's delay must be explained" does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every second's delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner. 4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay. 5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk. 6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so. Making a justice-oriented approach from this perspective, there was sufficient cause for condoning the delay in the institution of the appeal. The fact that it was the 'State' which was seeking condonation and not a private party was altogether irrelevant. The doctrine of equality before law demands that all litigants, including the State as a litigant, are accorded the same treatment and the law is administered in an even handed manner. There is no warrant for according a step motherly treatment when the 'State' is the applicant praying for condonation of delay. In fact experience shows that on account of an impersonal machinery (no one in charge of the matter is directly hit or hurt by the judgment sought to be subjected to appeal) and the inherited bureaucratic methodology imbued with the note-making, file pushing and passing-on-the-buck ethos, delay on its part is less difficult to understand though more difficult to approve. In any event, the State which represents the collective cause of the community, does not deserve a litigant-non-grata status. In any event, the State which represents the collective cause of the community, does not deserve a litigant-non-grata status. The Courts therefore have to be informed with the spirit and philosophy of the provision in the course of the interpretation of the expression "sufficient cause". So also the same approach has to be evidenced in its application to matters at hand with the end in view to do even handed justice on merits in preference to the approach which scuttles a decision on merits. Turning to the facts of the matter giving rise to the present appeal, we are satisfied that sufficient cause exists for the delay. The order of the High Court dismissing the appeal before it as time barred, is therefore set aside. Delay is condoned. And the matter is remitted to the High Court. The High Court will now dispose of the appeal on merits after affording reasonable opportunity of hearing to both the sides." 15. Apex Court in the case reported in (2010) 12 SCC 159 Bhagmal and others Vs. Kunwar Lal and others has also considered the scope of delay condonation matter for setting aside the ex-parte decree. Paragraph Nos. 10, 11, 12 and 13 of the judgment of Apex Court rendered in Bhagmal (Supra) are relevant which are as under:- 10. This well considered order of the appellate Court came to be interfered with by the High Court solely on the ground that there was no application for condonation of delay made by the appellants/defendants before the Trial Court in support of their application under Order IX Rule 13 CPC. The High Court observed that the appellate Court had not recorded any finding on the question as to whether the filing of the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act was necessary or not and went on to decide the application on merits and, therefore, it had exceeded its jurisdiction. The High Court also commented on the fact that the ex-parte decree was decided on 19.4.1985, while the application for setting aside the ex-parte decree was filed on 8.7.1988 and that no application for condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act was filed. The High Court also commented on the fact that the ex-parte decree was decided on 19.4.1985, while the application for setting aside the ex-parte decree was filed on 8.7.1988 and that no application for condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act was filed. Relying on Article 123 of the Limitation Act, the High Court took the view that the application ought to have been filed within 30 days from the date of passing of the decree and since it was not so filed, at least a condonation of delay application should have been made under Section 5 of the Limitation Act and, therefore, in the absence of prayer for condonation of delay, the appellate Court could not have allowed the application under Order IX Rule 13. 11. In our opinion, the High Court was not justified in taking a hyper-technical view. We have seen all the orders. It is quite clear from the Trial Court's order that the Trial Court entertained the application on merits. The Trial Court undoubtedly has referred to the reply of the respondents to the effect that the application for setting aside the ex-parte decree was beyond the limitation. However, the view taken by the Trial Court was based more on the merits. In fact, it went on to record the finding that there was no compromise and the theory of compromise and delay on account of that was not acceptable. The Trial Court has more or the less based its findings regarding delay on the basis of the order sheets. That was not right as the order sheets nowhere bore the signatures of the parties. They were mechanically written mentioning "parties as before". Therefore, the Trial Court did not throw the application under Order IX Rule 13 merely on the basis of the fact that no application for condonation of delay was made. It went on to consider the delay aspect as well as the merits and even allowed the parties to lead evidence. 12. It is to be seen here that the question of delay was completely interlinked with the merits of the matter. The appellants/defendants had clearly pleaded that they did not earlier come to the Court on account of the fact that they did not know about the order passed by the Court proceeding ex-parte and also the ex-parte decree which was passed. The appellants/defendants had clearly pleaded that they did not earlier come to the Court on account of the fact that they did not know about the order passed by the Court proceeding ex-parte and also the ex-parte decree which was passed. It was further clearly pleaded that they came to know about the decree when they were served with the execution notice. This was nothing, but a justification made by the appellants/defendants for making the Order IX Rule 13 application at the time when it was actually made. This was also a valid explanation of the delay. The question of filing Order IX Rule 13 application was, in our opinion, rightly considered by the appellate Court on merits and the appellate Court was absolutely right in coming to the conclusion that appellants/defendants were fully justified in filing the application under Order IX Rule 13 CPC at the time when they actually filed it and the delay in filing the application was also fully explained on account of the fact that they never knew about the decree and the orders starting the ex-parte proceedings against them. If this was so, the Court had actually considered the reasons for the delay also. Under such circumstances, the High Court should not have taken the hyper-technical view that no separate application was filed under Section 5. 13. The application under Order IX Rule 13 CPC itself had all the ingredients of the application for condonation of delay in making that application. Procedure is after all handmaid of justice. Here was a party which bona fide believed the assurance given in the compromise panchnama that the respondent No.1/plaintiff would get his suit withdrawn or dismissed. The said compromise panchnama was made before the elders of the village. Writing was also effected, displaying that compromise. The witnesses were also examined. Under such circumstances, the non-attendance of the appellants/defendants, which was proved in the further proceedings, was quite justifiable. The appellants/defendants, when ultimately came to know about the decree, had moved the application within 30 days. In our opinion, that was sufficient. 16. Writing was also effected, displaying that compromise. The witnesses were also examined. Under such circumstances, the non-attendance of the appellants/defendants, which was proved in the further proceedings, was quite justifiable. The appellants/defendants, when ultimately came to know about the decree, had moved the application within 30 days. In our opinion, that was sufficient. 16. The judgment cited by the counsel for the petitioner rendered in Smt. Kalawati Devi (Supra) has also considered the judgment of Apex Court rendered in Collector, Land Acquisition Anantnag and others (Supra) & has held that matter should not be thrown on the ground of limitation rather adjudication should be made on merit as such the judgment cited by learned counsel for the petitioner will be applicable but judgment cited by learned counsel for the respondent No.5 will not be applicable in order to advance the cause of justice. 17. Considering the entire facts and circumstances of the case as well as ratio of law laid down by the apex court in the Collector, Land Acquisition Anantnag (Supra), the impugned appellate order dated 04.06.2016 as well as order dated 07.10.2016 passed by respondent No.3-Settlement Consolidation Officer Basti in the appeal Nos.447 (Rajpati Devi Vs. Ramsukh etc) as well as revisional order dated 08.09.2021 passed by respondent No.2-Deputy Director of Consolidation in revision No.30 and revision no. 37 are liable to be set aside and same are hereby set aside. Considering the explanation of delay in filing the appeals under Section-11 (1) of U.P.C.H. Act as well as ratio of law laid down by Apex Court delay in filing appeal against the order of Consolidation Officer dated 19.02.1982 is hereby condoned. 18. The writ petition stands allowed in part and matter is remitted back before the respondent No.3 Settlement Consolidation Officer Basti to decide the appeal Nos.447, 448 and 449 on merit after affording opportunity of hearing to the parties expeditiously preferably within a period of four months from the date of production of certified copy of this order without granting any unnecessary adjournment from either of the parties. 19. No order as to costs.