Mohit Kumar Shah, J. – The present writ petition has been filed for quashing the order of punishment dated 18.10.2022, passed by the Under Secretary to the Government, General Administration Department, Govt. of Bihar, Patna, whereby and whereunder punishment of stoppage of two increments with cumulative effect has been inflicted upon the petitioner. The petitioner has also prayed for quashing of the revisional order dated 06.01.2023, passed by the Under Secretary to the Government, General Administration Department, Government of Bihar, Patna, whereby and whereunder the revision petition filed by the petitioner has not only been dismissed but it has been additionally specified therein that the petitioner would not be entitled to any amount over and above the subsistence allowance already paid to him for the period of suspension i.e. 26.12.2017 to 21.04.2021. 2. The brief facts of the case, according to the petitioner, are that the petitioner was initially appointed in the year 2000 on the post of Deputy Collector after qualifying the 42nd examination held by the Bihar Public Service Commission, whereupon he has been working to the satisfaction of all concerned. 2. The brief facts of the case, according to the petitioner, are that the petitioner was initially appointed in the year 2000 on the post of Deputy Collector after qualifying the 42nd examination held by the Bihar Public Service Commission, whereupon he has been working to the satisfaction of all concerned. Nonetheless, an FIR bearing Vigilance P.S. Case No.82 of 2017 was instituted against the petitioner for the offences under Section 13(2) read with 13(1)(e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, on the allegation that he had acquired assets in his and his wife’s name worth Rs.77,85,546/-, which are disproportionate to his known sources of income, whereafter the petitioner was suspended on 26.12.2017 and vide letter dated 03.04.2018, chargesheet, containing Prapatra ‘Ka’ was served upon the petitioner inter alia levelling three allegations, which are reproduced herein below: – ^^1- iqfyl vèkh{kd] fuxjkuh foHkkx ¼vuos"k.k C;wjks½] fcgkj] iVuk ds Kkikad 3346 fnukad 22-11-2017 }kjk Jh nsosUnz dqekj nnZ ¼fcñizñlsñ½] dksfV Øekad 1103@11] rRdkyhu ftyk vkiwfrZ inkfèkdkjh] Hkkxyiqj ds fo:) 77]85]546@& ¼lRgÙkj yk[k ipklh gtkj ik¡p lkS fN;kfyl½ :i;s ds vizR;kuqikfrd èkuktZu ds vkjksi esa fuxjkuh Fkkuk dkaM la[;k 082@17 fnukad 31-10-2017 èkkjk& 13¼2½ lg&ifBr èkkjk&13¼1½¼bZ½ Hkzñfuñvfèkñ] 1988 ntZ gSA 2- Jh nnZ ds rRdkyhu inLFkkiu vofèk rd muds vk; ,oa O;; dh x.kuk ds vuqlkj mudh dqy lEifÙk 1]91]07]546@& :ñ vkadh x;h gSA Jh nnZ }kjk vftZr dh xbZ dqy jkf'k ¼1]91]07]546@& :ñ½ esa ls mudh vuqekfur cpr 1]13]22]000@& :ñ gSA bl izdkj Jh nnZ dh dqy lEifÙk eas muds Kkr oSèk lzksrksa ls dqy 77]85]546@& ¼lRgÙkj yk[k ipklh gtkj ik¡p lkS fN;kfyl½ :i;s dh vfèkd lEifÙk ikbZ xbZ gSA 3- Jh nnZ }kjk lefiZr o"kZ 2016&17 dh lEifÙk fooj.kh esa vius ,oa viuh iRuh ds uke ls [kjhnh xbZ vpy lEifÙk dk iw.kZ fooj.k ugha fn;k x;k gS tks uktk;t ,oa voSèk :i ls vftZr lEifÙk dks Nqikus dh ea'kk ls izsfjr gSA mi;qZDr ls Li"V gS fd Jh nnZ dk ;g ÑR; Hkz"V vkpj.k ,oa dnkpkj dk |ksrd gS rFkk fcgkj ljdkjh lsod vkpkj fu;ekoyh ds fu;e&3 ds laxr izkoèkkuksa dk mYya?ku gSA** 3. The petitioner is stated to have filed his reply to the aforesaid charges framed against him, whereupon the Inquiry Officer had conducted the departmental enquiry and submitted the inquiry report dated 28.03.2022, finding all the charges to have not been proved. The petitioner is stated to have filed his reply to the aforesaid charges framed against him, whereupon the Inquiry Officer had conducted the departmental enquiry and submitted the inquiry report dated 28.03.2022, finding all the charges to have not been proved. The Disciplinary Authority had then sought to differ from the opinion of the Inquiry Officer, particularly with regard to charge no.3 and had issued a 2nd show cause notice dated 10.06.2022, to which the petitioner had again filed his reply dated 22.06.2022. The Disciplinary Authority had then passed the impugned order of punishment dated 18.10.2022, inflicting the punishment of stoppage of two increments with cumulative effect, upon the petitioner. The petitioner had then filed a revision petition, however, the same has also stood rejected by the impugned order dated 06.01.2023, however, additionally it has been specified therein that the petitioner would not be entitled to any amount over and above the amount of subsistence allowance already paid to him for the period of suspension. During the interregnum period, the Vigilance Investigation Bureau had submitted a final form in the aforesaid Vigilance P.S. Case No.82 of 2017, on 04.02.2021, leading to the same being accepted by the learned Vigilance Court and dropping of the criminal proceedings vide order dated 24.02.2021. 4. The learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that a bare perusal of the allegations levelled against the petitioner vide charge-sheet dated 03.04.2018, as also upon perusal of the Inquiry Report dated 28.03.2022, and 2nd show cause notice dated 10.06.2022, would show that ultimately, the disciplinary authority has consciously taken a decision not to press charges nos.1 and 2, however, it has decided to punish the petitioner for charge no.3, which pertains to non-disclosure of the entire description of the immovable properties purchased by the petitioner and his wife, in the declaration of properties made for the year 2016-17. As regards the said charge no.3, the learned counsel for the petitioner has referred to the finding of the Inquiry Officer dated 28.03.2022, as contained in paragraph no.12.4 thereof, which is reproduced herein below: – ^^12-4 vopkj ;k dnkpkj ds ykaNuksa ds vfHkdFku dh rhljh dafMdk esa of.kZr vkjksi vkjksfir inkfèkdkjh }kjk lefiZr o"kZ 2016&17 dh lEifÙk fooj.kh esa vius ,oa viuh iRuh ds uke ls [kjhnh xbZ vpy lEifÙk dk iw.kZ fooj.k ugha nsus ls lacafèkr gSA vkjksfir inkfèkdkjh us lefiZr fd;k fd muds uke ls lEifÙk fooj.kh 2016&17 esa vacsMdj iFk iVuk fLFkr lkfndiqj ekStk esa jsflMsafl;y vikVZesaV dh [kjhnxh ,pñMhñ,iQñlhñ iVuk ls yksu ysdj Ø; djus dk rF; vafdr gSA mlds vykok nks vpy lEifÙk ;Fkk ekStk jkeiqj esa 59 fMfLey tehu vkSj x;k esa 16 dV~Bk tehu dks Hkh o"kZ 2016&17 dh lEifÙk fooj.kh esa fn[kyk;k x;k gSA fuxjkuh vUos"k.k C;wjks ds izkjafHkd xksiuh; tk¡p esa tehu ls lacafèkr vusdksa nLrkost dh fooj.kh n'kkZ;h x;h gS] ftls iRuh ds }kjk iwoZ esa gh fcØh dh tk pqdh gSA vkjksfir inkfèkdkjh us ;g Hkh lefiZr fd;k fd fcgkj ljdkjh lsod ¼vkpkj½ fu;ekoyh] 1976 ds lanHkZ esa eseks uacj 3@vkj-vkbZ-&108@76,&21734] fnukad 15-11-1976 ds vuqlkj ljdkjh lsod ds ifjokj dk dksbZ lnL; ;fn futh L=ksr ;k fojklr esa dksbZ lEifÙk vftZr djrk gS] rks bl rjg vftZr dh x;h lEifÙk ij fcgkj ljdkjh lsod ¼vkpkj½ fu;ekoyh] 1976 ds fu;e&19 ds mi&fue&2 ,oa 3 ykxw ugha gksxsa vkSj fu;e&19 ds vèkhu fn;s tkus okys lEifÙk lacaèkh fjiksVZ esa Hkh bl rjg dh lEifÙk dk mYys[k djuk vko';d ugha gSA izLrqrhdj.k inkfèkdkjh us bl lacaèk esa dqN Hkh lefiZr ugha fd;kA vkjksfir inkfèkdkjh us viuk ;k viuh iRuh dh lEifÙk;ksa dk iw.kZ fooj.k 2016&17 ds fy, lefiZr lEifÙk fooj.kh esa fd;k gS vkSj ;g Hkh lefiZr fd;k fd mudh iRuh futh L=kksr ,oa fojklr esa lEifÙk vftZr dh gS] blfy;s fcgkj ljdkjh lsod ¼vkpkj½ fu;ekoyh] 1976 ds fu;e&19 ds mi&fue&2 vkSj 3 ykxw ugha gksaxsA vkjksfir inkfèkdkjh usa Hkh tks rdZ fn;s gSa vkSj ftl ljdkjh i=k dk ftØ fd;k gS] mlds vuqlkj vkjksfir inkfèkdkjh ds fo:) ;g vkjksi izekf.kr izrhr ugha gksrk gSA** 5. The learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the inquiry report dated 28.03.2022, would show that the petitioner had submitted description/details of properties being possessed by him and his wife by way of declaration for the year 2016-17 and therein he had declared that he was holding one residential apartment at Ambedkar Path, which he had purchased by taking loan from HDFC Bank, Patna and apart from the same, description of two more properties situated at mauza Rampur at Gaya had also been mentioned, however, while issuance of 2nd show cause notice dated 10.06.2022, though the disciplinary authority has sought to differ from the aforesaid opinion of the Inquiry Officer, however, the disciplinary authority has not pointed out as to which immovable property has not been disclosed by the petitioner and on the contrary has levelled new charges, which were never a part of the chargesheet dated 03.04.2018, hence the 2nd show cause notice dated 10.06.2022 is perverse and illegal. The relevant portion of the 2nd Show Cause Notice dated 10.06.2022 is being reproduced herein below: – ^^mDr fu;ekoyh ds rgr lkekU; iz'kklu foHkkx ds i=kad 946, fnukad 24-01-2011 }kjk jkT; ljdkj ds lHkh inkfèkdkjh@dfeZ;ksa dks fofgr izi=k esa py ,oa vpy lEifÙk rFkk nkf;Roksa dh fooj.kh izR;sd o"kZ ds Qjojh ekg rd lkoZtfud fd;s tkus dk vkns'k fn;k x;k gSA miLFkkfir ekeys esa lapkyu inkfèkdkjh egksn; }kjk vkjksih ds dFku dks mYysf[kr djrs gq, vkjksi dks izekf.kr izrhr ugha gksrk crk;k x;k gSA vkjksih inkfèkdkjh dk dguk gS fd os viuk ;k viuh iRuh dh lEifÙk;ksa dk iw.kZ fooj.k 2016&17 ds fy;s lefiZr lEifÙk fooj.kh esa fd;k gS vkSj mudh iRuh tks lEifÙk futh L=ksr ,oa fojklr ls vftZr dh gS] mldk C;kSjk mlesa ugha fn;k x;k gSA bl izdkj vkids }kjk o"kZ 2016&17 esa viuh iRuh ds uke ij vk; ls de lEifÙk dk mYys[k fd;k x;k gS ,oa 'ks"k lEifÙk ds lacaèk esa mudh futh vftZr lEifÙk crk;k x;k gS] bldk vkèkkj Li"V ugha fd;k x;k gSA bl izdkj vkidk viuh iRuh ds lEifÙk ds lacaèk esa dFku xyr ea'kk dks n'kkZrk gSA bl lacaèk esa lapkyu inkfèkdkjh }kjk Li"V earO; ugha fn;k x;k gSA muds }kjk dsoy vkids rdZ ds vkèkkj ij vkjksi dks izekf.kr izrhr ughsa gksrk gS] crk;k tkuk rdZlaxr ugha gSA** 6. The learned counsel for the petitioner has further submitted that though the charge no.3 pertains to non-disclosure of the complete and full details of the immovable properties, being possessed by the petitioner and his wife, however, while issuing the aforesaid 2nd Show Cause Notice dated 10.06.2022, though the disciplinary authority has failed to enumerate such properties, which are alleged to have not been disclosed by the petitioner while submitting declaration of properties for the year 2016-17 but has instead levelled a new allegation to the effect that although for the year 2016-17, the petitioner had disclosed the details of the properties acquired by his wife less than her income, however, regarding the rest of the properties of his wife, it has been stated that the same are self-acquired properties of his wife, however, the basis for the same has not been explained. It is thus submitted that the disciplinary authority cannot at the stage of issuance of 2nd show cause notice refer to a new charge, which was never a part of the chargesheet dated 03.04.2018 containing Prapatra ‘Ka’, issued to the petitioner. It is also contended that Rule 19 of the Bihar Government Servants (Conduct) Rules, 1976 (hereinafter referred to as the “Rules, 1976”) has been clarified by the State Government vide memo dated 15.11.1976 and it has been postulated that a government servant is not required to declare the details of the properties acquired by members of the family either by personal sources or inheritance, in the asset/property declaration form. The relevant portion of the said State Government memo dated 15.11.1976 is being reproduced herein below: – ^^2- fcgkj ljdkjh lsod ¼vkpkj½ fu;ekoyh] 1976 ds fu;e&19 ds mi&fue&2 vkSj 3 rHkh ykxw gksaxs tc ljdkjh lsod ;k rks Loa; vius uke esa ;k vius ifjokj ds fdlh lnL; ds uke esa lEifÙk vftZr djsaA ljdkjh lsod ds ifjokj dk dksbZ lnL; ;fn futh L=kksr ;k fojklr es a (inheritance) dksbZ lEifÙk vftZr djrk gS rks ml rjg vftZr dh x;h lEifÙk ij fcgkj ljdkjh lsod ¼vkpkj½ fu;ekoyh] 1976 ds fu;e&19 ds mi&fue&2 ,oa 3 ykxw ugha gksaxs vkSj fu;e 19 ds vèkhu fn;s tkus okys lEifÙk lEcUèkh fjiksVZ esa Hkh] ftls lsod dks nkf[ky djuk gS] bl rjg dh lEifÙk dk mYys[k djuk vko';d ugha gSA** 7. Thus it is the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner is not obliged to disclose the details of properties acquired by his wife either from her personal sources or by way of inheritance, nonetheless he has voluntarily disclosed all the properties being held by him and his wife in a transparent manner. The learned counsel for the petitioner has next referred to the impugned order of punishment dated 18.10.2022, to submit that the same would depict that there is no evidence at all to show that charge no.3 has stood proved. In this regard, the learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon a judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of M.V. Bijlani vs. Union of India and Ors., reported in (2006) 5 SCC 88 to submit that the Hon’ble Apex Court has not only held that though the disciplinary proceedings are quasi-criminal/judicial in nature, there should be some evidence to prove the charge but has also held that although the charges in a departmental proceeding are not required to be proved like a criminal trial i.e. beyond all reasonable doubt, nonetheless, it has to be kept in mind that the enquiry officer performs a quasi-judicial function, who upon analysing the documents must arrive at a conclusion that there had been a preponderance of probability to prove the charges on the basis of materials on record and while doing so, he cannot take into consideration any irrelevant fact, he cannot refuse to consider the relevant facts, he cannot shift the burden of proof, he cannot reject the relevant testimony of the witnesses only on the basis of surmises and conjectures and he cannot enquire into the allegations with which the delinquent officer had not been charged with. At this juncture, it would be relevant to reproduce paragraph nos. 14, 20 and 23 to 26 of the aforesaid judgment rendered in the case of M.V. Bijlani (supra) herein below: – “14. From a perusal of the enquiry report, it appears to us that the disciplinary authorities proceeded on a wrong premise. The appellant was principally charged for nonmaintenance of ACE-8 Register. He was not charged for theft or misappropriation of 4000 kg of telegraph copper wire or misutilisation thereof. From a perusal of the enquiry report, it appears to us that the disciplinary authorities proceeded on a wrong premise. The appellant was principally charged for nonmaintenance of ACE-8 Register. He was not charged for theft or misappropriation of 4000 kg of telegraph copper wire or misutilisation thereof. If he was to be proceeded against for misutilisation or misappropriation of the said amount of copper wire, it was necessary for the disciplinary authority to frame appropriate charges in that behalf. Charges were said to have been framed after receipt of a report from CBI (Anti-Corruption Bureau). It was, therefore, expected that definite charges of misutilisation/misappropriation of copper wire by the appellant would have been framed. The appellant, therefore, should have been charged for defalcation or misutilisation of the stores he had handled if he was to be departmentally proceeded against on that basis. The second charge shows that he had merely failed to supervise the working of the line. There was no charge that he failed to account for the copper wire over which he had physical control. 20. The enquiry officer proceeded as if in the departmental proceedings the appellant was charged with misappropriation of property. The witnesses not only spoke of theft of copper wire, but also stated about the existence of muster roll diaries. According to one Daya Shankar, the work shown in the diaries was correct. According to him, apart from erection of 300 lb iron wire in Section Geedam-Bijapur, 150 lb was erected in the entire section. He stated that broken pieces of wire found were sent to Jagdalpur through SIT diary. According to him, the work of erecting copper wire started from 5-11- 1969 and continued up to March 1970. One Shri K.C. Sariya who was the successor of the appellant stated about the maintenance of the muster rolls and ACE-8 Register. According to him, stores pertaining to estimate were accounted for and ACE-8 sheets attached to estimate file. He further stated that ACE-8 sheets were in the estimate file. One Shri K.D. Shrivastava had stated that there was report of copper wire theft by one Shri Kashiram. 23. Evidently, the evidences recorded by the enquiry officer and inferences drawn by him were not commensurate with the charges. If it was a case of misutilisation or misappropriation, the appellant should have been told thereabout specifically. One Shri K.D. Shrivastava had stated that there was report of copper wire theft by one Shri Kashiram. 23. Evidently, the evidences recorded by the enquiry officer and inferences drawn by him were not commensurate with the charges. If it was a case of misutilisation or misappropriation, the appellant should have been told thereabout specifically. Such a serious charge could not have been enquired without framing appropriate charges. The charges are otherwise vague. We have noticed hereinbefore that the High Court also proceeded on the basis that the non-maintenance of diary amounted to misutilisation of copper wire. 24. Mr Verma, when questioned, submitted that the appellant might have utilised the same on unsanctioned works. If that be so, a specific charge to that effect should have been framed. 25. It is true that the jurisdiction of the court in judicial review is limited. Disciplinary proceedings, however, being quasi-criminal in nature, there should be some evidence to prove the charge. Although the charges in a departmental proceeding are not required to be proved like a criminal trial i.e. beyond all reasonable doubt, we cannot lose sight of the fact that the enquiry officer performs a quasi-judicial function, who upon analysing the documents must arrive at a conclusion that there had been a preponderance of probability to prove the charges on the basis of materials on record. While doing so, he cannot take into consideration any irrelevant fact. He cannot refuse to consider the relevant facts. He cannot shift the burden of proof. He cannot reject the relevant testimony of the witnesses only on the basis of surmises and conjectures. He cannot enquire into the allegations with which the delinquent officer had not been charged with. 26. The report of the enquiry officer suffers from the aforementioned vices. The orders of the disciplinary authority as also the Appellate Authority which are based on the said enquiry report, thus, cannot be sustained. We have also noticed the way in which the Tribunal has dealt with the matter. Upon its findings, the High Court also commented that it had not delved deep into the contentions raised by the appellant. The Tribunal also, thus, failed to discharge its functions properly.” (underlining mine) 8. The learned counsel for the petitioner has also relied upon a judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Allahabad Bank and Ors. Upon its findings, the High Court also commented that it had not delved deep into the contentions raised by the appellant. The Tribunal also, thus, failed to discharge its functions properly.” (underlining mine) 8. The learned counsel for the petitioner has also relied upon a judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Allahabad Bank and Ors. vs. Krishna Narayan Tewari, reported in (2017) 2 SCC 308 to contend that in a case where the disciplinary authority records a finding which is unsupported by any evidence, whatsoever or a finding which no reasonable person could have arrived at, the writ Court would be justified in examining the matter and granting relief in appropriate cases. Thus, it is submitted that the order of punishment dated 18.10.2022, being based on no evidence is fit to be set aside. 9. Per contra, the learned counsel for the respondent-State has submitted that there has been no irregularity in conduct of the departmental proceeding, hence this Court would not sit in appeal and re-appreciate the evidence. It is also submitted by referring to paragraphs no.30 and 31 of the counter affidavit, filed in the present case that if the petitioner had declared the properties of his wife then he should have declared the total properties, which were either in the name of the petitioner or his wife, however, the petitioner did not do so. It is also submitted that the disciplinary authority has carefully examined the explanation/representation submitted by the petitioner and it has been found that the petitioner has not mentioned his total assets in the property declaration form submitted for the year 2016-17, hence the punishments which have been imposed upon the petitioner are just, proper and legal. 10. I have heard the learned counsels for the parties and gone through the materials on record, from which this Court finds that though three charges had been levelled against the petitioner, however, the disciplinary authority has finally confined the departmental proceeding in question to charge no.3 inasmuch as the 2nd show cause notice dated 10.06.2022 has been issued to the petitioner, recording difference of opinion with the report of the Inquiry Officer only limited to charge no.3. Nonetheless, this Court finds that though charge no.3 pertains to non-disclosure of the complete and full details of the immovable properties acquired by him and his wife, in the asset declaration form for the year 2016-17, however, the disciplinary authority has instead mentioned an alien reason for differing with the opinion of the Inquiry Officer, inasmuch as it has now been alleged that though for the year 2016-17, the petitioner had disclosed the details of the properties acquired by his wife less than her income, however, regarding the rest of the properties of his wife, although it has been stated that the same are selfacquired properties of his wife, but the basis for the same has not been explained, which was/is admittedly not a part of the chargesheet dated 03.04.2018 containing Prapatra ‘Ka’. At this juncture, it may be mentioned that the disciplinary authority has also failed to specify the details of the properties in the 2nd show cause notice, which have not been disclosed by the petitioner/his wife and merely a bald allegation has been levelled without any evidence. Thus, this Court is of the view that by way of 2nd show cause notice dated 10.06.2022, no new charge could have been introduced save and accept the charges which have been framed vide the aforesaid chargesheet dated 03.4.2018, hence the 2nd show cause notice dated 10.06.2022 is held to be illegal and contrary to the Law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of M.V. Bijlani (supra). 11. 11. Now, coming to the order of punishment dated 18.10.2022, this Court finds that admittedly no detail/description of the immovable properties alleged to have been acquired by the petitioner and his wife save and accept the aforesaid three properties declared by the petitioner in the asset declaration form for the year 2016-17, has been mentioned either in the 2nd show cause notice dated 10.06.2022 or in the order of punishment dated 18.10.2022 and merely a bald statement, not supported by any evidence, whatsoever, has been made in the order of punishment dated 18.10.2022, to the effect that in the asset declaration form of the year 2016-17, the petitioner has not disclosed the income derived by his wife from the properties sold in the past, which should have also been mentioned in the asset and liability declaration form, a statement/allegation which does not form part of the charges levelled against the petitioner vide chargesheet dated 03.04.2018, apart from the fact that even Rule-19 of the Rules, 1976 does not provide for furnishing such details. In such view of the matter, this Court holds that the order of punishment dated 18.10.2022, being based on no evidence, is perverse, has taken into account extraneous materials, has levelled new allegations, again based on no evidence, which were never part of the chargesheet dated 03.04.2018 and in fact the same would further depict that the charges levelled vide the chargesheet dated 03.04.2018 have actually been abandoned, hence the order of punishment dated 18.10.2022 is not sustainable in the eyes of law, thus is accordingly quashed. Consequently, the revisional order dated 06.01.2023, passed by the Under Secretary, to the Government, General Administration Department, Government of Bihar, Patna has got no legs to stand, hence is also set aside. 12. The writ petition stands allowed.