JUDGMENT : 1. Heard Shri Vinod Kumar Mishra, learned counsel for the petitioner and Shri Virendra Prasad, learned Standing Counsel for the revenue. 2. The present petition has been filed against the order of the State Public Service Tribunal, Lucknow dated 23.10.2020 passed in Claim Petition No. 1945 of 2014 (Karamveer Singh v. State of U.P. and others). By that order of the Tribunal has dismissed the claim petition and thus confirmed the penalty order dated 12.8.2012, the appeal order dated 27.11.2012 and revisional order dated 12.3.2013. Thus, the penalty of dismissal from service of the petitioner-Constable in the civil police, has been confirmed. 3. Vide charge-sheet dated 1.6.2011, the petitioner was charged with the following misconduct: 4. Alongwith the charge-sheet list of 11 witnesses was disclosed. At the domestic inquiry, those witnesses were examined. However, other than Arvind Kumar Trivedi all witnesses disclosed that they learnt about the occurrence from third persons/other sources. The Circle Officer Arvind Kumar Mishra at whose residence the alleged misconduct was attributed to the petitioner, was not an eye-witness. He supported the charge-sheet on the strength of facts disclosed to him by Rakesh Kumar. In fact the said Circle Officer was not present at the time of occurrence. In his cross-examination Rakesh Kumar clearly stated that he did not remember the date of occurrence. 5. Glaringly, in his examination-in-chief in describing the occurrence Rakesh Kumar, clearly stated that he had run to catch hold of the delinquent as the latter was trying to climb on the stairs leading the residence of the Circle Officer. However, during his cross-examination, he admitted to be not on duty as he had suffered a fracture injury to his leg. The cross-examination statement of the said Rakesh Kumar Trivedi is very relevant. It is quoted as below: 6. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record, in the first place, it cannot be denied that charge levelled against the petitioner was vague. As has been quoted above, it did not specify the date or time of occurrence. Then the evidence led to prove such vague charge was one being that of the Constable-Rakesh Kumar. Besides clearly admitting that he did not remember the date of occurrence, the testimony of the said witness was rendered completely doubtful on the effective cross-examination made by the delinquent. Then the evidence led to prove such vague charge was one being that of the Constable-Rakesh Kumar. Besides clearly admitting that he did not remember the date of occurrence, the testimony of the said witness was rendered completely doubtful on the effective cross-examination made by the delinquent. According to the said witness he had run to catch hold of the delinquent as he was climbing the stairs, whereas during his cross-examination he admitted to be recovering from a fracture injury to his leg. Also, no explanation was offered to the delay in reporting the occurrence, after three months. 7. Here it may also be noted that the petitioner was not detained or restrained at the time of occurrence. He was described to have run away from the place of occurrence. Yet the complaint was first made on 25.3.2011 i.e. more than three months after the alleged occurrence in the month of “December, 2010” as disclosed by the solitary eye-witness Rakesh Kumar. There exists no explanation for the delay. The charge of the petitioner being inebriated was never even attempted to be proved. 8. Thus, vitally the charge levelled against the petitioner was wholly vague and such as may have remained incapable of being proven inasmuch as it did not disclose to the petitioner the date or time of occurrence. Unless, that vital disclosure has been first made, the petitioner may never have been expected to set up clear defence to the charge. In Surath Chandra Chakrabarty v. State of W.B. (1970) 3 SCC 548 , the Supreme Court considered the provision of Rule 55 of the Fundamental Rules and laid down not only it was important to give opportunity to the delinquent, during a domestic enquiry proceeding but that such enquiry must be founded on specific charge/s requiring that enquiry. That statutory prescription of Rule 55 of the Fundamental Rules was traced to and founded in the essential principles of natural justice, itself. Thus, it was observed: “5. The learned Judge found that the Enquiry Officer, S.K. Gupta, was biased against the appellant before he held the enquiry. That statutory prescription of Rule 55 of the Fundamental Rules was traced to and founded in the essential principles of natural justice, itself. Thus, it was observed: “5. The learned Judge found that the Enquiry Officer, S.K. Gupta, was biased against the appellant before he held the enquiry. It was further found that no particulars and other necessary details were given in the charges and they were vague resulting in non-compliance with Rule 55 of the Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules and the necessary particulars were not supplied in spite of the repeated objections of the appellant to the charges being vague and indefinite. In the opinion of the learned Judge the trial was vitiated for want of definite charges. It was held......The respondent filed an appeal to the Division Bench of the High Court. We do not consider that we need refer to all the points dealt with by the Division Bench. In our judgment the Division Bench was wholly in error in reversing the decision of the learned Single Judge on one of the crucial points, namely, non-compliance with Fundamental Rule 55 and complete vagueness and indefiniteness of the charges on which no proper enquiry could be held. It is incomprehensible how the details as to date, time, place and person etc. would not have made the charges more definite as appears to have been the opinion of the Division Bench. We are unable to agree that the details without which a delinquent servant cannot properly defend himself are a matter of evidence. In this connection reference may be made to Fundamental Rule 55 which provides, inter alia, that without prejudice to the provisions of the Public Servants Enquiry Act, 1850, no order of dismissal, removal or reduction shall be passed on a member of service unless he is informed in writing of the grounds on which it is proposed to take action and has been afforded an adequate opportunity of defending himself. The grounds on which it is proposed to take action have to be reduced to the form of a definite charge or charges which have to be communicated to the person charged together with a statement of the allegations on which each charge is based and any other circumstance which it is proposed to be taken into consideration in passing orders has also to be stated. This rule embodies a principle which is one of the basic contents of a reasonable or adequate opportunity for defending oneself. If a person is not told clearly and definitely what the allegations are on which the charges preferred against him are founded he cannot possibly, by projecting his own imagination, discover all the facts and circumstances that may be in the contemplation of the authorities to be established against him. By way of illustration............. 6. Now in the present case each charge was so bare that it was not capable of being intelligently understood and was not sufficiently definite to furnish materials to the appellant to defend himself. It is precisely for this reason that Fundamental Rule 55 provides, as stated before, that the charge should be accompanied by a statement of allegations. The whole object of furnishing the statement of allegations is to give all the necessary particulars and details which would satisfy the requirement of giving a reasonable opportunity to put up defence. The appellant repeatedly and at every stage brought it to the notice of the authorities concerned that he had not been supplied the statement of allegations and that the charges were extremely vague and indefinite. In spite of all this no one cared to inform him of the facts, circumstances and particulars relevant to the charges. Even if the Enquiry Officer had made a report against him the appellant could have been given a further opportunity at the stage of the second show-cause notice to adduce any further evidence if he so desired after he had been given the necessary particulars and material in the form of a statement of allegations which had never been supplied to him before. This could undoubtedly be done in view of the provisions of Article 311(2) of the Constitution as they existed at the material time. The entire proceedings show a complete disregard of Fundamental Rule 55 insofar as it lays down in almost mandatory terms that the charges must be accompanied by a statement of allegations. We have no manner of doubt that the appellant was denied a proper and reasonable opportunity of defending himself by reason of the charges being altogether vague and indefinite and the statement of allegations containing the material facts and particulars not having been supplied to him. We have no manner of doubt that the appellant was denied a proper and reasonable opportunity of defending himself by reason of the charges being altogether vague and indefinite and the statement of allegations containing the material facts and particulars not having been supplied to him. In this situation, for the above reason alone, the Trial Judge was fully justified in decreeing the suit.” (Emphasis supplied) 9. Next, in Anil Gilurker v. Bilaspur Raipur Kshetriya Gramin Bank, (2011) 14 SCC 379 , in the fact context of details of offending loan transactions sanctioned by the delinquent not disclosed to him in the charge-sheet issued during domestic enquiry proceedings, the same principle was applied and followed. Thus, it was observed: “11. A plain reading of the charges and the statement of imputations reproduced above would show that only vague allegations were made against the appellant that he had sanctioned loans to a large number of brick manufacturing units by committing irregularities, but did not disburse the entire loan amount to the borrowers and while a portion of the loan amount was deposited in the account of the borrowers, the balance was misappropriated by him and others. The details of the loan accounts or the names of the borrowers have not been mentioned in the charges. The amounts of loan which were sanctioned and the amounts which were actually disbursed to the borrowers and the amounts alleged to have been misappropriated by the appellant have not been mentioned. 12. We also find that alongwith the charge-sheet dated 31-1-1989 no statement of imputations giving the particulars of the loan accounts or the names of the borrowers, the amounts of loans sanctioned, disbursed and misappropriated were furnished to the appellant, and yet the disciplinary authority has called upon the appellant to submit his written defence statement in reply to the charges. We fail to appreciate how the appellant could have submitted his written statement in defence in respect of the charges and how a fair enquiry could be held unless he was furnished with the particulars of the loan accounts or the names of the borrowers, the amounts of loan sanctioned, the amounts actually disbursed and the amounts misappropriated were also furnished in the charge-sheet. 14. 14. This position of law has been reiterated in the recent case of Union of India v. Gyan Chand Chattar, (2009) 12 SCC 78 : (2010) 1 SCC (L&S) 129 and in Para 35 of the judgment as reported in SCC, this Court has observed that the law can be summarised that an enquiry is to be conducted against any person giving strict adherence to the statutory provisions and principles of natural justice and the charges should be specific, definite and giving details of the incident which formed the basis of charges and no enquiry can be sustained on vague charges.” (Emphasis supplied) 10. The law on the subject was again taken note of, summarised and reiterated in Anant R. Kulkarni v. Y.P. Education Society, (2013) 6 SCC 515 . It was then observed: “Enquiry-on vague charges 15. In Surath Chandra Chakrabarty v. State of W.B. (1970) 3 SCC 548 : AIR 1971 SC 752 this Court held, that it is not permissible to hold an enquiry on vague charges, as the same do not give a clear picture to the delinquent to make out an effective defence as he will be unaware of the exact nature of the allegations against him, and what kind of defence he should put up for rebuttal thereof. The Court observed as under: ......... 16. Where the charge-sheet is accompanied by the statement of facts and the allegations are not specific in the charge-sheet, but are crystal clear from the statement of facts, in such a situation, as both constitute the same document, it cannot be held that as the charges were not specific, definite and clear, the enquiry stood vitiated. Thus, nowhere should a delinquent be served a charge-sheet, without providing to him, a clear, specific and definite description of the charge against him. When statement of allegations are not served with the charge-sheet, the enquiry stands vitiated, as having been conducted in violation of the principles of natural justice. The evidence adduced should not be perfunctory; even if the delinquent does not take the defence of, or make a protest that the charges are vague, that does not save the enquiry from being vitiated, for the reason that there must be fair play in action, particularly in respect of an order involving adverse or penal consequences. What is required to be examined is whether the delinquent knew the nature of accusation. What is required to be examined is whether the delinquent knew the nature of accusation. The charges should be specific, definite and giving details of the incident which formed the basis of charges and no enquiry can be sustained on vague charges. [Vide State of A.P. v. S. Sree Rama Rao, AIR 1963 SC 1723 , Sawai Singh v. State of Rajasthan, (1986) 3 SCC 454 : 1986 SCC (L&S) 662 : AIR 1986 SC 995 , U.P. SRTC v. Ram Chandra Yadav, (2000) 9 SCC 327 : 2001 SCC (L&S) 79 : AIR 2000 SC 3596 , Union of India v. Gyan Chand Chattar, (2009) 12 SCC 78 : (2010) 1 SCC (L&S) 129 and Anil Gilurker v. Bilaspur Raipur Kshetriya Gramin Bank, (2011) 14 SCC 379 : (2012) 2 SCC (L&S) 926] 17. The purpose of holding an enquiry against any person is not only with a view to establish the charges levelled against him or to impose a penalty, but is also conducted with the object of such an enquiry recording the truth of the matter, and in that sense, the outcome of an enquiry may either result in establishing or vindicating his stand, and hence result in his exoneration. Therefore, fair action on the part of the authority concerned is a paramount necessity.” (Emphasis supplied) 11. Then, as noted above sufficient doubt continued to exist as to the occurrence, if at all. Amongst 11 witnesses produced, only one was an eye-witness. Even he could not remember the date of occurrence and even otherwise his testimony was doubtful. There was also gross delay of three months in the complaint lodged. Even as to past conduct, there is no noticeable misconduct or erring behaviour of the petitioner noted by the disciplinary authority in awarding the heaviest punishment of dismissal from service. 12. Insofar as the Tribunal is concerned, it has chosen to affirm the reasoning of the appeal authority without making any independent application of mind. It has only considered the last submission of the petitioner of disproportionate punishment offered. Since, the charge itself was vague and the evidence at the domestic inquiry itself as to the date and time of occurrence was vague and inconclusive, we are of the opinion that the stage to consider if punishment awarded was disproportionate had not arisen. If at all, it would remain grossly disproportionate to the largely unproven charge. 13. Since, the charge itself was vague and the evidence at the domestic inquiry itself as to the date and time of occurrence was vague and inconclusive, we are of the opinion that the stage to consider if punishment awarded was disproportionate had not arisen. If at all, it would remain grossly disproportionate to the largely unproven charge. 13. In normal circumstances we may have remitted the matter to the Tribunal. However, in the peculiar facts of this case, no useful purpose would be served in adopting that course. The petitioner has suffered enough for a period of 12 years since his dismissal. He would still be about 38 years of age. Accordingly, the order of Tribunal is set aside. 14. Let the petitioner be reinstated in service with 50% back wages. However, for all other purposes he may be treated to have remained on duty during the period of suspension/termination suffered by him. 15. Accordingly, the writ petition is allowed.