JUDGMENT : 1. This application is filed under section 5 of the Limitation Act praying to condone the delay of 333 days in filing the application for seeking leave to prefer an appeal and criminal appeal before this Court. 2. It is the case of the complainant that complainant is a co-operative bank, at present under liquidation has filed a complaint before the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Patan bearing criminal case No.2223/2010, wherein the learned Trial Court has passed a judgment and order of acquittal on the ground that the complainant fails to establish legally enforceable debt against which the application for seeking leave to prefer an appeal and appeal is filed alongwith an application seeking condonation of delay of 333 days. 3. It is considered by the learned Advocate in the application that after liquidation management of the respondent-bank was changed and some problems of funds arose, therefore the applicant could not approach to this Court in time. It is further contended in the application that delay is not deliberate or intentional, but in absence of the knowledge the delay has occurred in challenging the judgment and order of the acquittal dated 10-07-2018. 4. The aforesaid application was opposed by the respondent No.2 and has filed the affidavit stating that bank was in a liquidation way back from 19-12-2009 and applicant was represented by the Advocate before Lower Court and he was aware about the order passed by the learned Trial Court on 10-07-2018, when the order was pronounced in the open Court, endorsement of “Seen” and signature was made by the Advocate on that day. Learned Advocate submits that delay of each day is to be explained and merely sympathetically or on consideration of economic constraint or financial difficulty would not be a ground to condone the delay for a long period. It is contended by the respondent No.2 that on facts set forth in the application supported by the affidavit, no cause much less sufficient for not preferring the appeal within a prescribed period of limitation is explained and therefore application for condonation of delay may not be allowed. 5. Against the aforesaid reply, rejoinder was filed by the applicant wherein it is contended that Advocate of the applicant was facing some personal problems and therefore he did not appear before the learned Trial Court at the time of argument. 5. Against the aforesaid reply, rejoinder was filed by the applicant wherein it is contended that Advocate of the applicant was facing some personal problems and therefore he did not appear before the learned Trial Court at the time of argument. The proxy Advocate Ms.Mittal S.Sandesara had filed an application below Exh.114 for granting time to submit a written arguments on 03-07-2018 which was rejected by the learned Trial Court. Thereafter the proxy Advocate has filed an application before the learned Trial Court below Exh.115 on 07-07-2018 stating that revision application is preferred by the applicant before the learned Sessions Court against the order passed below Exh.112, which was also rejected by the learned Trial Court and pronounced the final judgment on 10-07-2018 in the presence of proxy Advocate. 5.1. An additional affidavit was filed by the learned Advocate for the applicant stating that the colleague of the pleader who was representing before the learned Trial Court has made an endorsement “Seen” on the judgment without knowledge of the learned advocate of the present applicant. It is further contended that applicant was not informed, because the learned advocate at the Trial Court stuck due to his personal reasons applicant was not informed in proper time. The required permission to approach before this Court by filing the caption appeal was obtained and thereafter the appeal was preferred. 5.2. One more affidavit is filed by the learned Advocate of the applicant, producing the documents of resolution which was passed by the appellant bank on 14-09-2010 wherein the power has been given to Jagdishbhai Joravarsingh Rana for initiating the proceedings against the loan defaulters which was the part of the criminal case No.2223 of 2010 below Exh.44. 5.3. Thereafter at page 26 one more affidavit is filed by the administrator stating that, by way of resolution No.57, the administrator was appointed on 19-04-2009 and bank went into liquidation. It is stated that administrator has taken charge of the bank on the same day i.e. on 19-04-2009. it is contended in the said affidavit that complaint under section 138 of the NI Act came to be filed through clerk of the applicant bank namely Shivpalsinh N.Jhala who was authorized pursuant to the resolution No.57 dated 14-09-2010. It is further stated that from the record it transpires that no endorsement or acknowledgment of the administrator is reflected below the said resolution. 5.4. It is further stated that from the record it transpires that no endorsement or acknowledgment of the administrator is reflected below the said resolution. 5.4. It is stated that resolution No.57 dated 14-09-2010 was passed under the supervision of the then administrator as his endorsement/acknowledgment made after resolution No.58. Three resolutions were passed on the same date and common endorsement/acknowledgment was done at the end of resolution No.58. It is stated by the administrator that since the appellant went into liquidation from 19-02-2009, the administrator had taken charge and thereafter all subsequent resolutions were passed under his supervision. It is stated that the then administrator by way of the resolution No.57 authorized the bank officer and clerk to conduct the legal proceedings and that fact is in knowledge of the administrator as well. 5.5. Further affidavit was filed by the administrator namely Shivpalsinh N.Jhala at page No.40 in compliance with the order dated 28-06-2023. Wherein, it is stated in para 2 that on 01-08-2019 by giving authority to Shri Jasvantbhai Gopalbhai Modh manager of the bank vide letter dated 01-08-2019, the appeal was preferred along-with the application for condonation of delay. 6. Learned advocate Mr.Joshi in the substance of all affidavit submits that, from the explanation offered, it was because of problems of economic constraints and due to lack of knowledge the appeal could not be preferred within time prescribed. Learned advocate Mr.Joshi submits that in view of above facts and circumstances delay which was caused be condoned in the interest of justice. 7. Having heard learned Advocate Mr.Joshi for Mr.P.B.Velani learned Advocate for the applicant and Ms.Mamta Vyas for respondent No.2 learned APP on behalf of the respondent No.1-State and considering the averments made in the application in support of prayer to condone the delay. 8. Additional affidavits were filed by the applicant, but there was no other grounds raised except these financial difficulties. 8. Additional affidavits were filed by the applicant, but there was no other grounds raised except these financial difficulties. As per the limitation Act, the appeal has to be presented by the aggrieved party within a prescribed period of limitation and in case where it is not presented within the limitation, it shall be accompanied by an application supported by affidavit setting forth the facts on which the appellant relies to satisfy the Court that, he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal within the prescribed period of limitation, so the satisfaction of the Court on the facts set forth in the application supported by the affidavit that appellant had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal in prescribed limitation is sine qua non for condonation of delay which has been caused in filing the appeal. Delay caused in filing of appeal cannot be condoned more so when there is a long delay of 333 days on the ground of consideration of economic constraints and financial difficulties of the applicant or merely on asking or desire. In the absence of specific, definite and clear facts pleaded in the application and supported by the affidavit by which the applicant was prevented from filing of the appeal within a prescribed period of limitation and how he has overcome to constraints and conditions, it is difficult for the Court to accept the case of the applicant for condonation of delay caused in preferring the appeal. 9. While considering the application of the applicant-appellant for condonation of delay caused in preferring the appeal, court has to keep in mind also that by not preferring the appeal by the aggrieved party in a limitation, a valuable right is approved to the opposite party, more so when the delay is considerable long period. Each day’s delay caused in preferring the appeal is required to be explained and on facts set forth the application supported by the affidavit the court is satisfied that no cause much less sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal within a prescribed period of limitation, delay is not required to be condoned. 10. At this stage section 3 of the limitation act is required to be reproduced which is referred hereunder: “3. 10. At this stage section 3 of the limitation act is required to be reproduced which is referred hereunder: “3. Bar of limitation.- (1) Subject to the provisions contained in sections 4 to 24 (inclusive), every suit instituted, appeal preferred, and application made after the prescribed period shall be dismissed, although limitation has not been set up as a defence.” 11. Section 3 of the Limitation Act in no uncertain terms lays down that no suit, appeal or application instituted, preferred or made after the period prescribed shall be entertained rather dismissed even though limitation has not been set up as a defence subject to the exceptions contained in Sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) of the Limitation Act. 12. Section 3 provides the appeal which is preferred after the expiry of the limitation is liable to be dismissed. This is the general law of limitation. The exceptions under section 5 which empowers the courts to admit an appeal even if it is preferred after the prescribed period provided the proposed appellant gives ‘sufficient cause’ for not preferring the appeal within the period prescribed. 13. The guidelines issued by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Pathapati Subba Reddy (Died) By Lrs And Vs Special Deputy Collector is reproduced hereunder: “14. It may also be important to point out that though on one hand, Section 5 of the Limitation Act is to be construed liberally, but on the other hand, Section 3 of the Limitation Act, being a substantive law of mandatory nature has to be interpreted in a strict sense. In Bhag Mal alias Ram Bux and Ors. vs. Munshi (Dead) by LRs. and Ors., it has been observed that different provisions of Limitation Act may require different construction, as for example, the court exercises its power in a given case liberally in condoning the delay in filing the appeal under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, however, the same may not be true while construing Section 3 of the Limitation Act. It, therefore, follows that though liberal interpretation has to be given in construing Section 5 of the Limitation Act but not in applying Section 3 of the Limitation Act, which has to be construed strictly. 15. It, therefore, follows that though liberal interpretation has to be given in construing Section 5 of the Limitation Act but not in applying Section 3 of the Limitation Act, which has to be construed strictly. 15. It is in the light of the public policy upon which law of limitation is based, the object behind the law of limitation and the mandatory and the directory nature of Section 3 and Section 5 of the Limitation Act that we have to examine and strike a balance between Section 3 and Section 5 of the Limitation Act in the matters of condoning the delay. 16. Generally, the courts have adopted a very liberal approach in construing the phrase ‘sufficient cause’ used in Section 5 of the Limitation Act in order to condone the delay to enable the courts to do substantial justice and to apply law in a meaningful manner which subserves the ends of justice. In Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag and Ors. vs. Katiji and Ors., this Court in advocating the liberal approach in condoning the delay for ‘sufiicient cause’ held that ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late; it is not necessary to explain every day’s delay in filing the appeal; and since sometimes refusal to condone delay may result in throwing out a meritorious matter, it is necessary in the interest of justice that cause of substantial justice should be allowed to prevail upon technical considerations and if the delay is not deliberate, it ought to be condoned. Notwithstanding the above, howsoever, liberal approach is adopted in condoning the delay, existence of ‘sufficient cause’ for not filing the appeal in time, is a condition precedent for exercising the discretionary power to condone the delay. The phrases ‘liberal approach’, ‘justice-oriented approach’ and cause for the advancement of ‘substantial justice’ cannot be employed to defeat the law of limitation so as to allow stale matters or as a matter of fact dead matters to be revived and re-opened by taking aid of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. 17. It must always be borne in mind that while construing ‘sufficient cause’ in deciding application under Section 5 of the Act, that on the expiry of the period of limitation prescribed for filing an appeal, substantive right in favour of a decree-holder accrues and this right ought not to be lightly disturbed. 17. It must always be borne in mind that while construing ‘sufficient cause’ in deciding application under Section 5 of the Act, that on the expiry of the period of limitation prescribed for filing an appeal, substantive right in favour of a decree-holder accrues and this right ought not to be lightly disturbed. The decree-holder treats the decree to be binding with the lapse of time and may proceed on such assumption creating new rights. 18. This Court as far back in 1962 in the case of Ramlal, Motilal And Chhotelal vs. Rewa Coalfields Ltd has emphasized that even after sufficient cause has been shown by a party for not filing an appeal within time, the said party is not entitled to the condonation of delay as excusing the delay is the discretionary jurisdiction vested with the court. The court, despite establishment of a ‘sufficient cause’ for various reasons, may refuse to condone the delay depending upon the bona fides of the party. 19. In Maqbul Ahmad and Ors. vs. Onkar Pratap Narain Singh and Ors., it had been held that the court cannot grant an exemption from limitation on equitable consideration or on the ground of hardship. The court has time and again repeated that when mandatory provision is not complied with and delay is not properly, satisfactorily and convincingly explained, it ought not to condone the delay on sympathetic grounds alone. 20. In this connection, a reference may be made to Brijesh Kumar and Ors. vs. State of Haryana and Ors. wherein while observing, as above, this Court further laid down that if some person has obtained a relief approaching the court just or immediately when the cause of action had arisen, other persons cannot take the benefit of the same by approaching the court at a belated stage simply on the ground of parity, equity, sympathy and compassion. 21. In Lanka Venkateswarlu vs. State of Andhra Pradesh & Ors., where the High Court, despite unsatisfactory explanation for the delay of 3703 days, had allowed the applications for condonation of delay, this Court held that the High Court failed to exercise its discretion in a reasonable and objective manner. High Court should have exercised the discretion in a systematic and an informed manner. The liberal approach in considering sufficiency of cause for delay should not be allowed to override substantial law of limitation. High Court should have exercised the discretion in a systematic and an informed manner. The liberal approach in considering sufficiency of cause for delay should not be allowed to override substantial law of limitation. The Court observed that the concepts such as ‘liberal approach’, ‘justice-oriented approach’ and ‘substantial justice’ cannot be employed to jettison the substantial law of limitation. 22. It has also been settled vide State of Jharkhand & Ors. vs. Ashok Kumar Chokhani & Ors., that the merits of the case cannot be considered while dealing with the application for condonation of delay in filing the appeal. 23. In Basawaraj and Anr. vs. Special Land Acquisition Officer, this Court held that the discretion to condone the delay has to be exercised judiciously based upon the facts and circumstances of each case. The expression ‘sufficient cause’ as occurring in Section 5 of the Limitation Act cannot be liberally interpreted if negligence, inaction or lack of bona fide is writ large. It was also observed that even though limitation may harshly affect rights of the parties but it has to be applied with all its rigour as prescribed under the statute as the courts have no choice but to apply the law as it stands and they have no power to condone the delay on equitable grounds. 24. It would be beneficial to quote paragraph 12 of the aforesaid decision which clinches the issue of the manner in which equilibrium has to be maintained between adopting liberal approach and in implementing the statute as it stands. Paragraph 12 reads as under: “12. It is a settled legal proposition that law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes. The Court has no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. “A result flowing from a statutory provision is never an evil. A Court has no power to ignore that provision to relieve what it considers a distress resulting from its operation." The statutory provision may cause hardship or inconvenience to a particular party but the court has no choice but to enforce it giving full effect to the same. The legal maxim dura lex sed lex which means "the law is hard but it is the law", stands attracted in such a situation. The legal maxim dura lex sed lex which means "the law is hard but it is the law", stands attracted in such a situation. It has consistently been held that, “inconvenience is not” a decisive factor to be considered while interpreting a statute.” 25. This Court in the same breath in the same very decision vide paragraph 15 went on to observe as under: “15. The law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that where a case has been presented in the court beyond limitation, the applicant has to explain the court as to what was the “sufficient cause” which means an adequate and enough reason which prevented him to approach the court within limitation. In case a party is found to be negligent, or for want of bona fide on his part in the facts and circumstances of the case, or found to have not acted diligently or remained inactive, there cannot be a justified ground to condone the delay. No court could be justified in condoning such an inordinate delay by imposing any condition whatsoever. The application is to be decided only within the parameters laid down by this Court in regard to the condonation of delay. In case there was no sufficient cause to prevent a litigant to approach the court on time condoning the delay without any justification, putting any condition whatsoever, amounts to passing an order in violation of the statutory provisions and it tantamounts to showing utter disregard to the legislature.” (emphasis supplied) 26. In case there was no sufficient cause to prevent a litigant to approach the court on time condoning the delay without any justification, putting any condition whatsoever, amounts to passing an order in violation of the statutory provisions and it tantamounts to showing utter disregard to the legislature.” (emphasis supplied) 26. On a harmonious consideration of the provisions of the law, as aforesaid, and the law laid down by this Court, it is evident that: (i) Law of limitation is based upon public policy that there should be an end to litigation by forfeiting the right to remedy rather than the right itself; (ii) A right or the remedy that has not been exercised or availed of for a long time must come to an end or cease to exist after a fixed period of time; (iii) The provisions of the Limitation Act have to be construed differently, such as Section 3 has to be construed in a strict sense whereas Section 5 has to be construed liberally; (iv) In order to advance substantial justice, though liberal approach, justice-oriented approach or cause of substantial justice may be kept in mind but the same cannot be used to defeat the substantial law of limitation contained in Section 3 of the Limitation Act; (v) Courts are empowered to exercise discretion to condone the delay if sufficient cause had been explained, but that exercise of power is discretionary in nature and may not be exercised even if sufficient cause is established for various factors such as, where there is inordinate delay, negligence and want of due diligence; (vi) Merely some persons obtained relief in similar matter, it does not mean that others are also entitled to the same benefit if the court is not satisfied with the cause shown for the delay in filing the appeal; (vii) Merits of the case are not required to be considered in condoning the delay; and (viii) Delay condonation application has to be decided on the parameters laid down for condoning the delay and condoning the delay for the reason that the conditions have been imposed, tantamounts to disregarding the statutory provision. 14. Keeping in mind the above ratio if the instant case is examined then it transpires that except mentioning the ground of financial difficulty and not having the knowledge, no other grounds were raised. Various affidavits were filed by the learned advocate for the applicant. 14. Keeping in mind the above ratio if the instant case is examined then it transpires that except mentioning the ground of financial difficulty and not having the knowledge, no other grounds were raised. Various affidavits were filed by the learned advocate for the applicant. the applicant has to explain the court as to what was the “sufficient cause” which means an adequate and enough reason which prevented him to approach the court within limitation. The application is to be decided within the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the above mentioned case. 15. Considering the explanation this Court is of the opinion that as no such explanation, much less, sufficient or satisfactory has been offered by the applicant before this Court for condoning the delay of 333 days in preferring the appeal before this Court, in view of the same, this Court deems it fit not to entertain this application and dismiss the present application. 16. Hence this application is dismissed