ORDER : FARJAND ALI, J. 1. The jurisdiction of this court has been invoked by way of filing the instant third bail application under Section 439 CrPC at the instance of accused-petitioner. The requisite details of the matter are tabulated herein below: S.No. Particulars of the Case 1. FIR Number VIII(IO)11/NCB/JZU/2018 2. Concerned Police Station NDPS Control Bureau, Regional Unit, Jodhpur 3. District Jodhpur 4. Offences alleged in the FIR Sections 8/18, 8/25 & 8/29 of the NDPS Act 5. Offences added, if any - 6. Date of passing of impugned order 12.03.2024 2. His first and second bail applications being SBCRLMB Nos.8165/2022 & 9856/2022 were dismissed by this Court vide orders dated 26.05.2022 & 04.11.2023. Hence, the instant application for bail. 3. In nutshell the facts of the case are that on 18.07.2018 Ranjeet Kumar Barnwal, IO, NDPS, Jodhpur received as secret information on the basis of which on 19.07.2018 a White Swift Car bearing registration No.GJ08AJ5353 was intercepted. The said car was driven by Suresh Kumar and Naresh Kumar was sitting by his side. Upon conducting search, total 42.186 Kg opium was recovered from the bonat and bumper of the said car. Both Suresh Kumar and Naresh Kumar were apprehended and a case for under Section 8/18, 8/25 & 8/29 of the NDPS Act was registered against them. 4. It is contended on behalf of the accused-petitioner that the petitioner is arrested in this 02.12.2021 on the basis of statement of co-accused, however he was not present at the spot thus, no case for the alleged offences is made out against him and his incarceration is not warranted. There are no factors at play in the case at hand that may work against grant of bail to the accused-petitioner and he has been made an accused based on conjectures and surmises. 4. Contrary to the submissions of learned counsel for the petitioner, learned Public Prosecutor opposes the bail application and submits that the present case is not fit for enlargement of accused on bail. 5. Have considered the submissions made by both the parties and have perused the material available on record. 6. Perusal of the record revealing that the petitioner is behind the bars in this case since 02.12.2021. He has been accused on the basis of statement of principal accused and exchange of some calls between them. 5. Have considered the submissions made by both the parties and have perused the material available on record. 6. Perusal of the record revealing that the petitioner is behind the bars in this case since 02.12.2021. He has been accused on the basis of statement of principal accused and exchange of some calls between them. Neither the present petitioner was present at the spot nor any recovery has been affected from his possession. P.W. 5 Bhagwan Shahay Meena, stated in his statement that at the relevant point of time he was posted as Junior Intelligence Officer, NDPS Unit at Jodhpur, he specifically stated at page 3 of his statement that during investigation, he found nothing against the petitioner regarding illegal transportation of the alleged contraband. 7. If it is an information under Section 27 of the Evidence Act, something is required to be recovered or discovered in pursuance of the information supplied under Section 27 of the Evidence Act which distinctly relates to the commission of the crime. It is the admitted case of prosecution that in pursuance of the information furnished under Section 27 of the Evidence Act regarding the culpability of the petitioner, nothing new was disclosed, recovered or discovered. This court is of the view that at least there must be some corroborations or support to verify the confession made by the accused to the Police Officer while in lockup. 8. It has been held by Hon’ble the Supreme Court in the case of Mohd. Inayatullah Vs. State of Maharastra, reported in AIR 1976 SC 483 that in order to apply Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, only the components which are essential or were the cause of the discovery would be considered to be legal evidence. The relevant paragraph of the judgment reads as under:- “For the application of Section 27 the statement must be split into its components and to separate the admission portion. Only those components or portions which were the immediate cause of the discovery would be legal evidence and not the rest which must be excised and rejected.” 9. The relevant paragraph of the judgment reads as under:- “For the application of Section 27 the statement must be split into its components and to separate the admission portion. Only those components or portions which were the immediate cause of the discovery would be legal evidence and not the rest which must be excised and rejected.” 9. It can be manifested from a simple reading of Section 27 of the Evidence Act and the judgments referred above that only information in the form of confession received from disclosure made by an accused cannot be taken as reliable piece of evidence in isolation until there is a discovery or a recovery or another fact to corroborate the said information and prove its veracity. Precisely, it can be said that Section 27 of Evidence Act is an exception to Sections 24, 25 and 26 of Evidence Act, however, the exception limits its admissibility only upto what is envisaged in the statute itself and not beyond that. This Court is cognizant of the provisions contained in Section 37 of the NDPS Act but considering the submissions made by learned counsel for the accused-petitioner regarding him being made an accused only on the basis of statement of co-accused. 10. The present petitioner had been made accused in this case on the basis of confessional statement of the principal-accused and to connect the present petitioner to the alleged recovery, his CDR has also been placed on record. Efforts have also been made to connect the petitioner with the principal-accused on the strength of some calls exchanged in between them. However, no connecting evidence has been produced so as to add direct nexus between the petitioner and other persons from whom the contraband was recovered. Efforts have also been made to connect the petitioner with the principal-accused on the strength of some calls exchanged in between them. However, no connecting evidence has been produced so as to add direct nexus between the petitioner and other persons from whom the contraband was recovered. In the case at hand, nothing has been recovered from the present petitioner and no other legally admissible evidence that could connect the petitioner to the crime or to the other co-accused persons for that matter has come to the fore, thus, the disclosure statement of the co-accused in police custody on the basis of which the present petitioner has been made an accused in this case remains just illusory knowledge and does not become a fact proved as no fact has been discovered in consequence of the information disclosed by the co-accused, thus, it cannot be said with certainty that the accused can be roped in for commission of offence under Section 29 of the NDPS Act. 11. If it is an information under Section 27 of the Evidence Act, something is required to be recovered or discovered in pursuance of the information supplied under Section 27 of the Evidence Act which distinctly relates to the commission of the crime. It is the admitted case of prosecution that in pursuance of the information furnished under Section 27 of the Evidence Act regarding the culpability of the petitioner, nothing new was disclosed, recovered or discovered. This court is of the view that at least there must be some corroborations or support to verify the confession made by the accused to the Police Officer while in lockup. 12. It has been held by Hon’ble the Supreme Court in the case of Mohd. Inayatullah Vs. State of Maharastra, reported in AIR 1976 SC 483 that in order to apply Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, only the components which are essential or were the cause of the discovery would be considered to be legal evidence. The relevant paragraph of the judgment reads as under:- “For the application of Section 27 the statement must be split into its components and to separate the admission portion. Only those components or portions which were the immediate cause of the discovery would be legal evidence and not the rest which must be excised and rejected.” 13. The relevant paragraph of the judgment reads as under:- “For the application of Section 27 the statement must be split into its components and to separate the admission portion. Only those components or portions which were the immediate cause of the discovery would be legal evidence and not the rest which must be excised and rejected.” 13. It can be manifested from a simple reading of Section 27 of the Evidence Act and the judgments referred above that only information in the form of confession received from disclosure made by an accused cannot be taken as reliable piece of evidence in isolation until there is a discovery or a recovery or another fact to corroborate the said information and prove its veracity. Precisely, it can be said that Section 27 of Evidence Act is an exception to Sections 24, 25 and 26 of Evidence Act, however, the exception limits its admissibility only upto what is envisaged in the statute itself and not beyond that. This Court is cognizant of the provisions contained in Section 37 of the NDPS Act but considering the submissions made by learned counsel for the accused-petitioner regarding him being made an accused only on the basis of statement of co-accused, this court is of the opinion that it is a fit case for grant of bail to the accused petitioner. Be that as it may, no final observations and comments can be made at this stage, as the same may influence the course of trial. 14. Moving on to the impediments contained under Section 37 of the NDPS Act, it is considered relevant to refer to the recent ruling passed by Hon'ble the Supreme Court in Mohd Muslim @ Hussain V. State (NCT OF DELHI) Vs. State (NCT of Delhi) passed by Hon’ble the Supreme Court in Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No.915 of 2023 vide order dated 28.03.2023, wherein while discussing the parameters of Section 37 of the NDPS Act, it was held that the provision cannot be construed in a manner that would render the grant of bail impossible. The accused-appellant in the aforementioned case was directed to be enlarged on bail looking to the long period of incarceration. The paragraphs of Mohd. Muslim @ Hussain (supra) relevant to the present matter are reproduced below: “18. The accused-appellant in the aforementioned case was directed to be enlarged on bail looking to the long period of incarceration. The paragraphs of Mohd. Muslim @ Hussain (supra) relevant to the present matter are reproduced below: “18. The conditions which courts have to be cognizant of are that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is “not guilty of such offence” and that he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail. What is meant by “not guilty” when all the evidence is not before the court? It can only be a prima facie determination. That places the court’s discretion within a very narrow margin. Given the mandate of the general law on bails (Sections 436, 1 Special Leave Petition (CRL.) NO(S). 915 of 2023, decided on 28.03.2023. 437 and 439, CrPC) which classify offences based on their gravity, and instruct that certain serious crimes have to be dealt with differently while considering bail applications, the additional condition that the court should be satisfied that the accused (who is in law presumed to be innocent) is not guilty, has to be interpreted reasonably. Further the classification of offences under Special Acts (NDPS Act, etc.), which apply over and above the ordinary bail conditions required to be assessed by courts, require that the court records its satisfaction that the accused might not be guilty of the offence and that upon release, they are not likely to commit any offence. These two conditions have the effect of overshadowing other conditions. In cases where bail is sought, the court assesses the material on record such as the nature of the offence, likelihood of the accused co-operating with the investigation, not fleeing from justice: even in serious offences like murder, kidnapping, rape, etc. On the other hand, the court in these cases under such special Acts, have to address itself principally on two facts: likely guilt of the accused and the likelihood of them not committing any offence upon release. This court has generally upheld such conditions on the ground that liberty of such citizens have to - in cases when accused of offences enacted under special laws – be balanced against the public interest. 19. This court has generally upheld such conditions on the ground that liberty of such citizens have to - in cases when accused of offences enacted under special laws – be balanced against the public interest. 19. A plain and literal interpretation of the conditions under Section 37 (i.e., that Court should be satisfied that the accused is not guilty and would not commit any offence) would effectively exclude grant of bail altogether, resulting in punitive detention and unsanctioned preventive detention as well. Therefore, the only manner in which such special conditions as enacted under Section 37 can be considered within constitutional parameters is where the court is reasonably satisfied on a prima facie look at the material on record (whenever the bail application is made) that the accused is not guilty. Any other interpretation, would result in complete denial of the bail to a person accused of offences such as those enacted under Section 37 of the NDPS Act.” (Emphasis Supplied) 15. In Rabi Prakash Vs. State of Odisha passed in Special leave to Appeal (Crl.) No.(s) 4169/2023, Hon’ble the Apex Court has again passed an order dated 13th July, 2023 dealing this issue and has held that the provisional liberty(bail) overrides the prescribed impediment in the statute under Section 37 of the NDPS Act as liberty directly hits one of the most precious fundamental rights envisaged in the Constitution, that is, the right to life and personal liberty contained in Article 21. 16. At the stage of hearing of a bail plea pending trial, although this Court is not supposed to make any definite opinion or observation with regard to the discrepancy and legal defect appearing in the case of prosecution as the same may put a serious dent on the State’s case yet at the same time, this Court can not shut its eye towards the non-compliance of the mandatory provision, more than two and half years of incarceration pending trial, failure of compliance with the procedure of sampling and seizure and the serious issue of competence of seizure officer. In the case of Mohd. In the case of Mohd. Muslim @ Hussain (Supra) it has been propounded that at the stage of hearing a bail application under Section 439 Cr.P.C., although it is not possible to make a definite opinion that they are not guilty of the alleged crime but for the limited purpose for the justifiable disposal of the bail applications, a tentative opinion can be formed that the material brought on record is not sufficient enough to attract the embargo contained under Section 37 of the NDPS Act. Though specific arguments have not been conveyed but looking to the fact that the accused is in custody, this court feels that the accused are not supposed to establish a case in support of his innocence rather his detention is required to be justified at the instance of the prosecution, therefore, this court went deep into the facts of the case and the manner in which the entire proceedings have been undertaken. If other surrounding factors align in consonance with the statutory stipulations, the personal liberty of an individual can not encroached upon by keeping him behind the bars for an indefinite period of time pending trial. In view of the above, it is deemed suitable to grant the benefit of bail to the petitioner. 17. Accordingly, the instant third bail application under Section 439 Cr.P.C. is allowed and it is ordered that the accused-petitioner, named above, shall be enlarged on bail provided he furnishes a personal bond in the sum of Rs.50,000/- with two sureties of Rs.25,000/- each to the satisfaction of the learned trial Judge for his appearance before the court concerned on all the dates of hearing as and when called upon to do so.