ORDER : 1. By way of present writ petition, challenge is made to award dated 12.08.2021, passed by Industrial Tribunal, Jaipur (for short “Tribunal”) in Case No. ITR No. 08/2013 whereby the respondent-workman was held entitle for grant of selection scale of 9, 18, and 27 years of service. 2. The facts of the case, as per learned counsel for the petitioner, are as follows. The respondent-workman was appointed on the post of Driver vide order dated 17.12.1986 and was granted the benefit of selection scale of nine years of service vide order dated 06.04.2004. Thereafter, in 2013, after approximately 11 years of grant of first selection scale, the respondent-workman approached the Tribunal by raising an industrial dispute seeking benefit of selection scale of 9, 18, and 27 years of service from the date of appointment. The Tribunal, vide impugned order dated 12.08.2021, erroneously allowed the case filed by the respondent-workman without considering the vital aspect of inordinate delay and the deplorable service record of the respondent-workman. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner has challenged the impugned order dated 12.08.2021, primarily, on the following grounds: 3.1. The first contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the respondent-workman cannot claim benefit of selection scale as a matter of right by merely being in service as the same is dependent upon the workman earning nine years of satisfactory service. Reliance in this regard is placed on judgment of principal seat of this Court in the case of Kailash Dan vs. RSRTC & Anr. (S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 3975/2006; decided on 06.11.2008). 3.2. The second contention of learned counsel for the petitioner is that respondent-workman had not explained the inordinate delay in filing the industrial dispute. It is contended that the Tribunal has misinterpreted and therefore wrongly relied on the Hon’ble Supreme Court judgment of Raghubir Singh vs. General Manager, Haryana Roadways: (2014) 10 SCC 301 to arrive at the wrongful conclusion that the workman can approach the Tribunal anytime. It is further contended that though the law of limitation does not apply to reference of industrial dispute, nevertheless the requirement to make the same within a reasonable time still persists. Reliance in this regard is placed on Hon’ble Supreme Court judgment of Bichitrananda Behera vs. State Of Orissa: AIR 2023 SC 5064 , Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation and Ors. Reliance in this regard is placed on Hon’ble Supreme Court judgment of Bichitrananda Behera vs. State Of Orissa: AIR 2023 SC 5064 , Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation and Ors. vs. Sadhu Singh: (2022) 5 SCC 634, and Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board, Sub-Division, Kota vs. Mohan Lal: (2013) 14 SCC 543 . 3.3. The third contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the Tribunal failed to consider the past service record of the respondent-workman which clearly revealed that the services of the respondent workman were not satisfactory. It is contended that the finding of the Tribunal to the effect that the petitioner-RSRTC did not provide record before the Tribunal, with regard to the cases which were pending against the respondent-workman, is also perverse as the said record was marked as Exhibit M-2 and was available with the Tribunal. 4. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent-workman submits that the power of judicial review exercised by the constitutional courts under Article 226 and Article 227 of the Constitution of India is well circumscribed by limits of correcting errors of law or procedural errors leading to manifest injustice or violation of principles of natural justice and it is not akin to adjudication of the case on merits as an appellate authority. It is contended that the Tribunal had duly considered each and every aspect and after careful consideration of the record along with the rival submissions, passed a well-reasoned speaking order and since there is no perversity in the impugned order, no interference is called for. On merits, learned counsel for the respondent-workman submits that the usage of the words ‘at any time’ in Section 10(1) of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 makes it absolutely clear that there is no limitation period for raising the industrial dispute as matters of salary and pension have a recurring cause of action. It is thus contended that the issue of delay was duly dealt with by the Tribunal and the Tribunal rightly held that workman cannot be denied relief only on ground of delay in raising industrial dispute and the Tribunal is empowered to mould the relief accordingly, which was done in the present case as the Tribunal did not grant interest on the due amount. Learned counsel for the respondent-workman further submits that no evidence whatsoever was led by the petitioner before the Tribunal to justify their action as to why the benefit of selection scale was deferred in the first place and therefore the Tribunal had rightly granted the benefit to the respondent-workman. Learned counsel for the respondent-workman has also relied on judgment of Co-ordinate Bench of Principal Seat of this Court in the case of Tara Chand vs. RSRTC & Anr. (S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 8810/2014; decided on 25.01.2017), which has been affirmed by both the Division Bench of this Court (in D.B. Special Appeal Writ No. 524/2018; decided on 02.12.2021) as well as the Hon’ble Supreme Court (in SLP Civil No. 10330/2022; decided on 13.07.2022). 5. Heard the arguments advanced by both the sides, scanned the record of the writ petition and considered the judgments cited at Bar. 6. In the case at hand, the respondent-workman was appointed on the post of Driver vide order dated 17.12.1986. Accordingly, the benefit of first selection scale became due after nine years, sometime in 2004-2005. The same was not done and neither was the non-grant of the benefit at the time was challenged by the respondent-workman. The benefit of first selection scale was only granted vide order dated 06.04.2004. This deferment was also not challenged immediately and was only challenged for the first time in 2013. The first issue that is to be decided by this Court is what effect, if any, would this delay have on the merits of the case. 7. To decide the first issue, recourse may be taken to Hon’ble Supreme Court judgment of Mohan Lal (supra), the relevant portion of which is reproduced as under: “19. We are clearly of the view that though the Limitation Act, 1963 is not applicable to the reference made under the ID Act but delay in raising industrial dispute is definitely an important circumstance which the Labour Court must keep in view at the time of exercise of discretion irrespective of whether or not such objection has been raised by the other side. The legal position laid down by this Court in Gitam Singh [Rajasthan Development Corpn. The legal position laid down by this Court in Gitam Singh [Rajasthan Development Corpn. v. Gitam Singh, (2013) 5 SCC 136 ] that before exercising its judicial discretion, the Labour Court has to keep in view all relevant factors including the mode and manner of appointment, nature of employment, length of service, the ground on which termination has been set aside and the delay in raising industrial dispute before grant of relief in an industrial dispute, must be invariably followed. 20. Now, if the facts of the present case are seen, the position that emerges is this: the workman worked as a work-charged employee for a period from 1-11-1984 to 17-2-1986 (in all he worked for 286 days during his employment). The services of the workman were terminated with effect from 18-2-1986. The workman raised the industrial dispute in 1992 i.e. after 6 years of termination. The Labour Court did not keep in view admitted delay of 6 years in raising the industrial dispute by the workman. The judicial discretion exercised by the Labour Court is, thus, flawed and unsustainable. The Division Bench of the High Court was clearly in error in restoring the award of the Labour Court whereby reinstatement was granted to the workman. Though, the compensation awarded by the Single Judge was too low and needed to be enhanced by the Division Bench but surely reinstatement of the workman in the facts and circumstances is not the appropriate relief.” Further, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sadhu Singh (supra), held as under: “6. We shall at the outset deal with the issue of limitation. The respondent was retired compulsorily from service on 4-1-2003. Original Civil Suit No. 41 of 2010 was instituted in 2010. The trial Judge as well as the first appellate court were of the view that the suit was not barred by limitation since the representation of the respondent for the grant of the three selection grades was rejected on 18-1-2010. The first appellate court, while concurring with the trial Judge also noted that the “final request” made by the respondent-plaintiff on 18-1-2010 was rejected and hence the suit was within limitation. 7. The respondent waited for seven long years after his retirement to pursue a claim for the grant of selection grade. The first appellate court, while concurring with the trial Judge also noted that the “final request” made by the respondent-plaintiff on 18-1-2010 was rejected and hence the suit was within limitation. 7. The respondent waited for seven long years after his retirement to pursue a claim for the grant of selection grade. This was clearly beyond the residuary period of limitation of three years provided in Article 137 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963. That apart, in the decision of this Court in State of Rajasthan v. Shankar Lal Parmar: (2011) 14 SCC 235 , the Court has considered the ambit of the scheme for selection grade. This Court has held thus: “6. Another important and relevant clause in the said order for our perusal is Clause 7, which is also reproduced hereinbelow: ‘7. Selection grades in terms of this order shall be granted only to those employees whose record of service is satisfactory. The record of service which makes one eligible for promotion on the basis of seniority shall be considered to be satisfactory for the purpose of grant of the selection grade.’ 7. Clause 7 makes it clear that only those employees would be entitled for grant of selection grades, whose service record has been satisfactory and are otherwise eligible for promotion on the basis of seniority but have not been able to get the same as there might not be any channel of promotion or for want of sanctioned posts in the cadre.” 8. The Court held that in terms of Clause 7, only those employees whose service record has been satisfactory would be entitled to be granted selection grade. In this context, the Court held: “17. Clause 7 further makes it clear that only those/such employees would be entitled to be granted selection grade whose service record has been satisfactory. This implicitly shows that the person who has an untainted, unblemished, clean and unpolluted record in service would be treated on a higher pedestal than those who have either tainted, blemished, unclean or polluted record. This obviously appears to be a reasonable classification and is under the ambit and touchstone of Article 14 of the Constitution. There is neither any ambiguity nor any doubt in the same.” 9. This obviously appears to be a reasonable classification and is under the ambit and touchstone of Article 14 of the Constitution. There is neither any ambiguity nor any doubt in the same.” 9. On the touchstone of the above principles, it is evident that the respondent had been subjected to several disciplinary proceedings and as many as 19 charge-sheets were issued against him which resulted in penalties of a varying nature. The service record of the respondent cannot be regarded as untainted or clean. 10. Ms Nidhi, learned counsel for the respondent submitted that some of the penalties which were imposed on the respondent were without cumulative effect. The consequence of the withholding of increments without cumulative effect is that after the period prescribed, the respondent would be entitled to restoration of the original pay scale or the original pay. However, this does not obviate the position that the imposition of the penalty itself indicates that the service record of the employee was not satisfactory. Another submission which has been urged is that the penalties were of a minor nature. Assuming that to be so, it is evident that for the grant of selection grade, the respondent did not fulfil the requirements of a clean record of service. The grant of the selection grade is not a matter of right and was subject to the terms and conditions which were stipulated. The respondent failed to fulfil these terms and conditions. 11. For the above reasons, we are of the view that both on the question of limitation as well as on merits, the respondent was not entitled to the relief which was sought. The suit instituted by the respondent seven years after he had demitted office was barred by limitation. That apart, the respondent failed to meet the basic requirements for the selection grade.” (emphasis supplied) Further, the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in Bichitrananda Behera (supra), after considering the erstwhile judgments of Union of India v. Tarsem Singh: (2008) 8 SCC 648 , Union of India v. N. Murugesan: (2022) 2 SCC 25 , and Chairman, State Bank of India v. M.J. James: (2022) 2 SCC 301 , concluded that delay and laches are vital in service matters, and can be seen as acquiescence. 8. 8. On consideration of above referred judgments, it is apparent that even in the absence of prescribed statutory limitation, the litigant is expected to approach the court within reasonable time. On the aspect of delay, it is pertinent to take note of the settled position of the law, insofar as it dictates that the doctrine of delay and laches must not be lightly brushed aside by the Courts. It is indispensable for a writ court to juxtapose the explanation offered by the defaulting party qua the delay, alongside the plausible acceptability of the same. The respondent-workman cannot get a premium upon his own default. Even if there is no limitation prescribed for making reference, that does not mean a license to the workman to file the legal proceedings at any time as per his choice. In absence of any prescribed limitation, it has to be a reasonable time within which the person has to approach the court. Reasonable time would obviously be as per the understanding of an ordinary person of ordinary prudence, as assisted by the general principles of law relating to limitation. The Tribunal therefore erroneously reached the conclusion that the workman can approach the Tribunal at any time as he may place, on account of an apparent misinterpretation of Hon’ble Supreme Court judgment of Raghubir Singh (supra), as the issue therein was different and the Court came to the conclusion that the delay and laches were not fatal for the case of the workman therein as there was no delay and laches on the part of the workman therein from the date of his acquittal in the criminal case. However, in the case in hand, there is no reason or explanation whatsoever supplied by the respondent-workman for the inordinate delay. Even the contention of the respondent-workman that since selection scale would form part of salary/pension, the same would have a recurring cause of action, is contrary to Hon’ble Supreme Court judgment of Sadhu Singh (supra) and therefore cannot be countenanced. In view thereof, the impugned order of the Tribunal is liable to be set aside solely on account of delay and laches. 9. Even otherwise, the impugned order is liable to be set aside for the following additional reasons: 9.1. In view thereof, the impugned order of the Tribunal is liable to be set aside solely on account of delay and laches. 9. Even otherwise, the impugned order is liable to be set aside for the following additional reasons: 9.1. Having perused the record of the writ petition and the record as received from the Tribunal, it is noted that the respondent-workman has had a deplorable service record and as many as 20 charge-sheets have been issued to the respondent-workman during the interregnum period. This fact was also presented before the Tribunal by the petitioner, as is apparent from the record, yet the Tribunal recorded the perverse finding that no evidence was presented by the petitioner. 9.2. Because as per Co-ordinate Bench judgment of Kailash Dan (supra) and Hon’ble Supreme Court judgment of Sadhu Singh (supra), clean record of service is a pre requisite for grant of Selection Scale and the same cannot be claimed as a matter of right. Since the respondent-workman does not possess this pre requisite, the petitioner had rightly deferred the benefit of Selection Scale. 9.3. Because the judgment of Tara Chand (supra), relied upon by learned counsel for the respondent-workman, is also of no help to the respondent-workman as the Division Bench of this Court had also recorded the finding that they would not have interfered if the case of the employer was that benefit of Selection Scale was denied due to unsatisfactory service of employee, a finding which rather support the case of the petitioner. The relevant extract of Division Bench order dated 02.12.2021 in D.B. SAW 524/2018 is reproduced as under: “According to the employer, if the employee did not have satisfactory service and on account of which his claim for grant of second pay up-gradation was denied, perhaps we would not interfere. However, to defer such benefit on the basis of penalty already imposed and suffered penalties that too by way of Circular, which was subsequently issued, would not be permissible.” 10. In view of the foregoing analysis, the impugned order dated 12.08.2021, being perverse and contrary to settled position of law, is hereby quashed and set aside. 11. The writ petition is, accordingly, allowed. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of. 12. Record of the Tribunal, attached with the writ petition, be sent back.