JUDGMENT : G. Narendar, J. 1. We have heard the party-in-person and the learned Government Pleader. 2. The case facts shock us. The issue was considered by the Division Bench in the year 2006 in Writ Appeal No.1403 of 2003, which came to be disposed of on 22.08.2006 and which order of the Division Bench thereafter came to be affirmed by the Hon'ble Apex Court by its order, dated 21.04.2007 whereby, the Hon'ble Apex Court was pleased to reject the Civil Appeal Nos.121 & 123 of 2007. We failed to understand as to how the learned Single Judge in W.P.No.1831 of 2008 and the Division Bench in Writ Appeal No.516 of 2012 exercised jurisdiction after the "issue of eligibility" had attained finality at the hands of the Coordinate Bench vide judgment dated 22.08.2006 and thereafter also affirmed by the Hon'ble Apex Court by its judgment dated 21.04.2007. 3. In our opinion, the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench could not have sat in judgment over the finding rendered in by the earlier Coordinate Bench being a bench of equal strength. The subsequent Division Bench could not have exercised appellate jurisdiction over the orders of the Coordinate bench dated 22.08.2006. More so, in the light of the fact that the said judgment of the Division Bench had received its seal of approval at the hands of the Hon'ble Apex Court on 21.04.2007, whereby the Hon'ble Apex Court was pleased to reject the Civil Appeal No.121 & 123 of 2007 preferred by the petitioner in WP.No.1831 of 2008. 4. In the considered opinion of this Court, the learned Single Judge has failed to appreciate the issue in law. That apart, the issue of the eligibility of the appellant having been determined by the Division Bench on 22.08.2006 and the said finding having received the seal of approval at the hands of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the year 2007 in proceedings instituted by the very petitioner in W.P.No.1831 of 2008, the subsequent Benches of Coordinate strength could not have sat in appeal and rendered a finding contrary to the one recorded by the earlier Benches of equal strength and judicial propriety does not permit the same. That apart, we find that the Coordinate Bench has also not looked into the fact that the appellant herein has been appointed as a Librarian not on U.G.C. but on State scale. 5. That apart, we find that the Coordinate Bench has also not looked into the fact that the appellant herein has been appointed as a Librarian not on U.G.C. but on State scale. 5. Be that as it may, the issue of the petitioner's eligibility to be appointed to the post, having attained finality, the same could not have been looked into again by the subsequent Benches and the said proceedings are squarely hit by the principles of res judicata. It is to address such repetitive rounds of litigation and in order to put an end to endless litigation, the principles of res judicata came to be codified as a public policy. Yet we faced a new to the case which squarely demonstrates the lack of scruples with litigants, who tend to litigate over and over again even in respect of issues that have attained finality. 6. It is not the case of the parties, that the instant appellant has practiced a fraud. That apart the subsequent Coordinate Bench i.e. the Division Bench, which subsequently heard the matter ought to have shut the doors on the petitioner therein in view of the issue having attained finality at the hands of this Court in the earlier rounds of litigation and at the hands of the Hon'ble Apex Court. 7. The law with regard to the applicability of res judicata and issue estoppel has been analysed and settled by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of State of Karnataka and another Vs. All India Manufacturers Organization and others, (2006) 4 SCC 683 . The Hon'ble Apex Court has been pleased to observe in paragraph Nos.32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41 and 48 which reads as under : Res judicata 32. Res judicata is a doctrine based on the larger public interest and is founded on two grounds: one being the maxim nemo debet bis vexari pro una et eadem causa (no one ought to be twice vexed for one and the same cause [P. Ramanatha Aiyer: Advanced Law Lexicon, (Vol. 3, 3rd Edn., 2005) at p. 3170] ) and second, public policy that there ought to be an end to the same litigation [ Mulla: Code of Civil Procedure, (Vol. 1, 15th Edn., 1995) at p. 94]. 3, 3rd Edn., 2005) at p. 3170] ) and second, public policy that there ought to be an end to the same litigation [ Mulla: Code of Civil Procedure, (Vol. 1, 15th Edn., 1995) at p. 94]. It is well settled that Section 11 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (hereinafter “CPC”) is not the foundation of the principle of res judicata, but merely statutory recognition thereof and hence, the section is not to be considered exhaustive of the general principle of law [See Kalipada De v. Dwijapada Das, (1929-1930) 57 IA 24 : AIR 1930 PC 22 at p. 23]. The main purpose of the doctrine is that once a matter has been determined in a former proceeding, it should not be open to parties to re-agitate the matter again and again. Section 11 CPC recognises this principle and forbids a court from trying any suit or issue, which is res judicata, recognising both “cause of action estoppel” and “issue estoppel”. There are two issues that we need to consider, one, whether the doctrine of res judicata, as a matter of principle, can be applied to public interest litigations and second, whether the issues and findings in Somashekar Reddy [(1999) 1 KLD 500 : (2000) 1 Kant LJ 224 (DB)] constitute res judicata for the present litigation. 33. Explanation VI to Section 11 states: “Explanation VI.—Where persons litigate bona fide in respect of a public right or of a private right claimed in common for themselves and others, all persons interested in such right shall, for the purposes of this section, be deemed to claim under the persons so litigating.” 34. Explanation VI came up for consideration before this Court in Forward Construction Co. v. Prabhat Mandal (Regd.) [(1986) 1 SCC 100] (hereinafter “Forward Construction Co.”). This Court held that in view of Explanation VI, it could not be disputed that Section 11 applies to public interest litigation, as long as it is shown that the previous litigation was in public interest and not by way of private grievance. [Ibid., at pp. 112-13, (para 21)] Further, the previous litigation has to be a bona fide litigation in respect of a right which is common and is agitated in common with others. [Ibid.] 35. As a matter of fact, in a public interest litigation, the petitioner is not agitating his individual rights but represents the public at large. [Ibid., at pp. 112-13, (para 21)] Further, the previous litigation has to be a bona fide litigation in respect of a right which is common and is agitated in common with others. [Ibid.] 35. As a matter of fact, in a public interest litigation, the petitioner is not agitating his individual rights but represents the public at large. As long as the litigation is bona fide, a judgment in a previous public interest litigation would be a judgment in rem. It binds the public at large and bars any member of the public from coming forward before the court and raising any connected issue or an issue, which had been raised should have been raised on an earlier occasion by way of a public interest litigation. It cannot be doubted that the petitioner in Somashekar Reddy [(1999) 1 KLD 500 : (2000) 1 Kant LJ 224 (DB)] was acting bona fide. Further, we may note that, as a retired Chief Engineer, Somashekar Reddy had the special technical expertise to impugn the Project on the grounds that he did and so, he cannot be dismissed as a busybody. Thus, we are satisfied in principle that Somashekar Reddy [(1999) 1 KLD 500 : (2000) 1 Kant LJ 224 (DB)], as a public interest litigation, could bar the present litigation. 36. We will presently consider whether the issues and findings in Somashekar Reddy [(1999) 1 KLD 500 : (2000) 1 Kant LJ 224 (DB)] actually constitute res judicata for the present litigation. Section 11 CPC undoubtedly provides that only those matters that were “directly and substantially in issue” in the previous proceeding will constitute res judicata in the subsequent proceeding. Explanation III to Section 11 provides that for an issue to be res judicata it should have been raised by one party and expressly denied by the other: “Explanation III.—The matter above referred to must in the former suit have been alleged by one party and either denied or admitted, expressly or impliedly, by the other. 37. Further, Explanation IV to Section 11, states: “Explanation IV.—Any matter which might and ought to have been made ground of defence or attack in such former suit shall be deemed to have been a matter directly and substantially in issue in such suit.” 38. 37. Further, Explanation IV to Section 11, states: “Explanation IV.—Any matter which might and ought to have been made ground of defence or attack in such former suit shall be deemed to have been a matter directly and substantially in issue in such suit.” 38. The spirit behind Explanation IV is brought out in the pithy words of Wigram, V.C. in Henderson v. Henderson [(1843-60) All ER Rep 378 : (1843) 3 Hare 100 : 67 ER 313] as follows: (All ER pp. 381 I-382 A) “The plea of res judicata applies, except in special case (sic), not only to points upon which the court was actually required by the parties to form an opinion and pronounce a judgment, but to every point which properly belonged to the subject of litigation and which the parties, exercising reasonable diligence, might have brought forward at the time.” [Ibid., at pp. 381-82]. 39. In Greenhalgh v. Mallard [(1947) 2 All ER 255 (CA)] (hereinafter “Greenhalgh [(1947) 2 All ER 255 (CA)] ”), Somervell, L.J. observed thus: “I think that on the authorities to which I will refer it would be accurate to say that res judicata for this purpose is not confined to the issues which the court is actually asked to decide, but that it covers issues or facts which are so clearly part of the subject-matter of the litigation and so clearly could have been raised that it would be an abuse of the process of the court to allow a new proceeding to be started in respect of them.” [Ibid., at p. 257 H (emphasis supplied)] 40. The judgment in Greenhalgh [(1947) 2 All ER 255 (CA)] was approvingly referred to by this Court in State of U.P. v. Nawab Hussain [ (1977) 2 SCC 806 at p. 809, para 4 : 1977 SCC (L&S) 362]. Combining all these principles, a Constitution Bench of this Court in Direct Recruit Class II Engg. Officers' Assn. v. State of Maharashtra [ (1990) 2 SCC 715 : 1990 SCC (L&S) 339 : (1990) 13 ATC 348] expounded on the principle laid down in Forward Construction Co. Combining all these principles, a Constitution Bench of this Court in Direct Recruit Class II Engg. Officers' Assn. v. State of Maharashtra [ (1990) 2 SCC 715 : 1990 SCC (L&S) 339 : (1990) 13 ATC 348] expounded on the principle laid down in Forward Construction Co. [(1986) 1 SCC 100] by holding that: “[A]n adjudication is conclusive and final not only as to the actual matter determined but as to every other matter which the parties might and ought to have litigated and have had (sic) decided as incidental to or essentially connected with (sic) subject-matter of the litigation and every matter coming into the legitimate purview of the original action both in respect of the matters of claim and defence. Thus, the principle of constructive res judicata underlying Explanation IV of Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure was applied to writ case. We, accordingly hold that the writ case is fit to be dismissed on the ground of res judicata.” [Ibid., at p. 741, para 35, per L.M. Sharma, J.] 41. With these legal principles in mind, the question, therefore, arises as to what exactly was sought in Somashekar Reddy [(1999) 1 KLD 500 : (2000) 1 Kant LJ 224 (DB)], how it was decided by the High Court in the first round of litigation, and what has been sought in the present litigation arising at the instance of Mr. J.C. Madhuswamy and others. In order to show that the issue of excess land was “directly and substantially in issue” in Somashekar Reddy [(1999) 1 KLD 500 : (2000) 1 Kant LJ 224 (DB)] we will first examine the prayers of the parties, the cause of action, the averments of parties and the findings of the High Court in Somashekar Reddy [(1999) 1 KLD 500 : (2000) 1 Kant LJ 224 (DB)]. 48. The principle and philosophy behind Explanation IV, namely, to prevent “the abuse of the process of the court” (as stated in Greenhalgh [(1947) 2 All ER 255 (CA)] ) through reagitation of settled issues, provides yet another ground to reject the appellants' contentions. 48. The principle and philosophy behind Explanation IV, namely, to prevent “the abuse of the process of the court” (as stated in Greenhalgh [(1947) 2 All ER 255 (CA)] ) through reagitation of settled issues, provides yet another ground to reject the appellants' contentions. For instance, the High Court specifically records (vide para 29) of the impugned judgment that : “It is common case of the parties that the validity of the FWA had earlier been challenged in Somashekar Reddy case [(1999) 1 KLD 500 : (2000) 1 Kant LJ 224 (DB)] on all conceivable grounds including the one that land in excess of what is required for the Project had been acquired by the State Government.” 8. In that view of the matter, the subsequent order, in the considered opinion of this Court being hit by the principles of res judicata, stands vitiated and is non-est. The respondents are not bound by the observations rendered in the Writ Appeal while disposing the W.A.No.516 of 2012 and Writ Petition No.1831 of 2008. 9. In that view of the order, the order of the learned Single Judge warrants interference and accordingly, the order of the learned Single Judge is set-aside. It is made clear that the Writ Petition stands allowed. The appellant/petitioner shall be entitled for payment of terminal benefits as attached to the post of Librarian. The terminal benefits shall be calculated as per the State scale and the same shall be released to the appellant within a period of two (02) months from the date of receipt of the order. 10. Accordingly, these Writ Appeals stand ordered in the above terms. There shall be no orders as to cost. As a sequel thereto, the miscellaneous petitions, if any, pending in these Appeals shall stand closed.