ORDER : 1. Issue RULE, returnable forthwith. Ms. Dhwani Tripathi, learned Assistant Government Pleader waives service of Rule for and on behalf of the respondent – State authorities. 2. With the consent of the learned advocates appearing for the respective parties, the present petitions are taken-up for final hearing. Since in all the group of matters, common question of law involved, with the consent of the learned advocates appearing for the respective parties, Special Civil Application No. 20361 of 2018 is treated as lead matter and facts are taken from the said Petition. 3. The brief facts leading to the filing of the present Petition reads thus: 3.1. The petitioner herein was granted lease since 2002-03, which came to be renewed from time to time from Sant Sarovar Dam to Koteshwar Mining work, which was being carried-out in proper manner as prescribed under the Rules, Regulations, Circulars and directions issued by the State Government as well as issued by the Competent Authority. The lease was allotted to the petitioner after maintaining the distance 1000 meters from the dam (upstream and downstream) 500 meters. From the canal, upstream and downstream and 200 meters from the bridge upstream and downstream. 3.2. By letter dated 14.06.2004, the Sardar Sarovar Narmada Nigam had put a ban in the area 500 meters from the siphon structure and at present also the ban is in force and there is no lease granted within the vicinity of 500 meters. The present petitioner – lease-holder was carrying on mining activity, from a distance of 500 meters from the siphon structure. The prohibition of sand mining within the said wisdom has been forced and till date there is no illegal mining done by the petitioner – lease- holder. Besides, the Narmada Nigam had put its security personnel 24 hours Nr. Narmada Canal, and therefore, the Representation made by the Corporation and the statement of Corporation as stated in news-article dated 09.02.2016 with respect to leakage in the siphon structure, due to illegal sand mining at Karai, is totally false. 3.3. It is the case of the petitioner that pursuant to the aforesaid, the Collector i.e. the respondent No.2 directed for detailed inquiry. 3.4. 3.3. It is the case of the petitioner that pursuant to the aforesaid, the Collector i.e. the respondent No.2 directed for detailed inquiry. 3.4. The petitioner applied for renewal of lease in the year 2014, the respondent authority had not renewed the lease of the petitioner, on the basis of article of the newspaper, and hence, the petitioner had filed a detailed representation on 31.03.2016. 3.5. It is the case of the petitioner that the State Government had issued the guidelines on the basis of the Public Interest Litigation filed before the Hon’ble High Court and in this regard, a Notification came to be issued 20.01.2014. 3.6. The Respondent No.2 – the Collector vide order dated 18.04.2016, after constituted a committee to assess the impact on various structures located in gorge portion of River-Sabarmati between Lekawada and Vasna Barrage (40 K.M.), due consultation with the lease-holder, comprising of the Chief Engineer of Narmada Nigam, who was Chairman of the Committee, Executive Engineer, Capital Project Division No.3, Director, Gujarat Police Academy, Karai, Superintendent Engineer, Design (Road and Building) Circle, Gandhinagar, Representative of Gujarat Energy Transmission Corporation and Geologist. The said Team submitted a fact based report, within two months, after site inspection and till then, there was suspension of mining in the said area from Santsarovar Dam to Vasna Barrage i.e. about 11 k.m. area. 3.7. Because of the aforesaid action on the part of respondent No.2, the petitioner and similarly situated persons approached this Court by preferring Special Civil Application No.9921 of 2016. By order dated 21.03.2017, the respondent authority was directed to decide the issue, in pursuance to the order dated 18.04.2016 passed by respondent No.2- District Collector, as expeditiously as possible, but not later than 31st May, 2017 and inform the decision to the petitioner, copy of the said order dated 21.03.2017 passed in Special Civil Application No. 9921 of 2016 is duly produced at Annexure-F. 3.8. The respondent No.2 by order dated 20.05.2017, rejected the renewal application. 3.9. The respondent No.2 by order dated 20.05.2017, rejected the renewal application. 3.9. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid action of rejecting the renewal application of the petitioner by order dated 20.05.2017 in No. 175/1277 to 1281, which is duly produced at Annexure-G passed by respondent No.2, as also the order dated 07.07.2017 confirming in Appeal No.RVZ/102017/329352/ 390/R- 290/Gandhinagar/Appeal, passed by the respondent no.1 duly produced at Annexure-K, the petitioner herein has approached this Hon’ble Court and has prayed for the following reliefs:- “(A) Your Lordships may be pleased to admit and allow this Special Civil Application. (B) Your Lordships may be pleased to issue a writ of mandamus or any other appropriate writ, order or direction by quashing and setting aside the orders passed by respondent no.2 dated 20/05/2017 at Annexure -G being ex-facie bad and illegal and further be pleased to quash and set aside the order dated 07/07/2017 passed by respondent no. 2 at Annexure-J and further be pleased to quash and set aside the orders passed by respondent no. 1 at Annexure-K and further be pleased to direct the respondents to allow the petitioner to carry out his respective lease work forthwith as the petitioner is following the rules and guidelines of the State Government. (C) Pending admission and hearing of the present petition, Your Lordships may be pleased to stay the orders passed by respondent no. 2 dated 20/05/2017 at Annexure -G being ex- facie bad and illegal and further be pleased to stay the order dated 07/07/2017 passed by respondent no. 2 at Annexure-J and further be pleased to stay the orders passed by respondent no. 1 at Annexure-K and further be pleased to direct the respondents to allow the petitioner to carry out their respective lease work forthwith as the petitioner is following the rules and guidelines of the State Government. (C) Any other relief which this Hon’ble Court may deem fit and proper in the interest of justice.” 4. Heard Mr. Yatin Oza, the learned senior counsel assisted by the Mr. H.J. Dholakia, learned advocate appearing for the petitioners and Ms. Dwani Tripathi, learned AGP appearing for the respondent – State. 5.1. Mr. Oza, the learned senior counsel submits that the submissions recorded in the order dated 25.11.2022 be considered as the written submissions on behalf of the petitioners. This Court deems it fit to reproduce the same. H.J. Dholakia, learned advocate appearing for the petitioners and Ms. Dwani Tripathi, learned AGP appearing for the respondent – State. 5.1. Mr. Oza, the learned senior counsel submits that the submissions recorded in the order dated 25.11.2022 be considered as the written submissions on behalf of the petitioners. This Court deems it fit to reproduce the same. “Mr Yatin N. Oza, learned senior advocate with Mr H.J. Dholakia, learned advocate appearing for the petitioner submitted that the order dated 20.5.2017 passed by the Collector, Gandhinagar, is bad inasmuch as, no show cause notice was issued before passing the order. It is submitted that alteast the petitioner, should know that on what ground, that the petitioner has faulted. In absence of issuance of any show cause notice, the order dated 20.5.2017, is bad in law. 2. Reliance is placed on the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Canara Bank vs. Debasis Das reported in (2003) 4 SCC 557 . It is submitted that the Apex Court has held and observed that “the adherence to principles of natural justice as recognized by all civilized States is of supreme importance when a quasi- judicial body embarks on determining disputes between the parties, or any administrative action involving civil consequences is in issue. These principles are well settled. The first and foremost principle is what is commonly known as audi alteram partem rule. It says that no one should be condemned unheard. Notice is the first limb of this principle. It must be precise and unambiguous. It should appraise the party determinatively of the case he has to meet. Time given for the purpose should be adequate so as to enable him to make his representation..”. 3. It is therefore, submitted that issuance of the show cause notice is sine qua non. Unless and until a specific and precise show cause notice is issued, the petitioner would not be able to meet the grounds which weighed with the authorities concerned for passing the order. 4. 3. It is therefore, submitted that issuance of the show cause notice is sine qua non. Unless and until a specific and precise show cause notice is issued, the petitioner would not be able to meet the grounds which weighed with the authorities concerned for passing the order. 4. It is next submitted that the Collector vide order dated 18.4.2016, has constituted a committee, comprised of Chief Engineer of Narmada Nigam, Executive Engineer, Patnagar Yojna Vibhag 3, Director, Gujarat Police Academy Karai, Superintendent Engineer Design (Road and Building) Circle Gandhinagar, representative of Gujarat Energy Transmission Corporation and Geologist; however, the committee, ought to have been constituted of Gujarat Engineering Research Institute (GERI) or Indian Bureau of Mines. While doing so, interim direction was also issued, directing the petitioner and the 23 lease holders not to undertake the mining activities. 5. It is submitted that the said order, so far as the appointment of the Committee is concerned, may be a final, otherwise, the said order was interim order which, thereafter, led to passing of the order dated 20.5.2017. It is submitted that the order of the Collector, is on the basis of the report of the Committee and it has not independently applied its mind. Going by the newspaper report, was not permitted inasmuch as, the newspaper report, cannot decide the merits or the fate of the lease holders. It is also submitted that the report of the Committee, is not binding on the Collector; however, accepting the report, as it is, that the order has been passed. Further, the order, is absolutely non- speaking order inasmuch as, no reasons can be discern out from the said order. Hearing and passing of the order, is not an empty formality which the Collector, ought to have taken recourse of. It is submitted that there is no allegation against the lease holders about the breach of the condition and therefore, under the circumstances, the order of the Collector, is illegal and bad.” 6.1. Mr. Dhwani Tripathi, learned AGP placed reliance on the affidavit-in-reply filed by the respondent – State and submits thus: 6.2. At the outset, Ms. Tripathi, learned AGP submits that the reasons for not granting the renewal of lease, as prayed for, by the petitioner, is that the said mining is adversely affecting the environment and protection of environment is also the duty of respondent - State authority. At the outset, Ms. Tripathi, learned AGP submits that the reasons for not granting the renewal of lease, as prayed for, by the petitioner, is that the said mining is adversely affecting the environment and protection of environment is also the duty of respondent - State authority. It is submitted that upon an article published in the local newspaper, the authority initiated an informal inquiry in the local area about the mining activities in the particular blocks. Upon the said inquiry, it came to the knowledge of the authorities that a detailed technical report was necessary to arrive at a conclusion. In view of the aforesaid, a further local inquiry committee was constituted to inspect such blocks and to give a detailed technical report qua the said blocks, which were affected due to the mining activities. 6.3. It is submitted that the committee was formed, comprising of various members from particular fields as per their expertise. The said committee after due inspection and considering the various aspects, gave a detailed technical report, in which it was opined that the mining activities pertaining to some specific area is seriously affecting the environment and the same should be stopped. Reliance was placed on the said report, which is duly attached as Annexure-B. 6.4. It is submitted that for the ordinary sand, excavation limit for mining activity is three meters as Gujarat Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 2017 (for short ‘the GMMCR 2017’) (EC) and as per the committee report, it was observed that for some of the blocks it was 4 to 4.5 meters were excavated and in some blocks it was 7 to 8 meters with respect to the data available from the year 1992. The mining was already carried out at the level of 5 to 7 meter, and hence, it was adversely affecting the environment. 6.5. It is submitted that it was found that from the exposed structure of some bridges on the river, that the mining activities are affecting the surroundings heavily and that the mining activity should be stopped with immediate effect. Reliance was placed on the photographs of the actual site duly produced at Annexure-R1. 6.6. It is submitted that reliance was placed on the Notification duly issued at Annexure-R2 dated 27.12.2012 with respect to the guidelines issued for restriction of excavation of the ordinary sand mineral. Reliance was placed on the photographs of the actual site duly produced at Annexure-R1. 6.6. It is submitted that reliance was placed on the Notification duly issued at Annexure-R2 dated 27.12.2012 with respect to the guidelines issued for restriction of excavation of the ordinary sand mineral. It was submitted that based on such report the leases were not renewed, to facilitate the State Government in bringing down the damage at mining level and to ensure that no further damage is done. 6.7. It is submitted that the action undertaken by the respondent authority is without any prejudice and is taken in a bona-fide manner, as such type of activity was also initiated in Tapi Basin, wherein, the mining activities were affecting the environment and from that area, mining activities were stopped. 6.8. After considering the report of the Committee, the Collector passed impugned order dated 20.05.2017 denying the renewal, and as a result, cancelled the lease. 6.9. Subsequently, Notification dated 07.07.2017 was published declaring the entire area of Santsarovar Gandhinagar to Koteshvar Gandhinagar district limit as ‘No Mining Zone’. 6.10. The learned AGP Ms. Tripathi, lastly submitted that the petitioner herein violated the permissible limit of mining in the past and the same has resulted into structural damage to electrical towers and base of 13 important bridges of the District. It was submitted that subsequent to the Notification dated 07.07.2017, no blocks have been allotted to anyone for mining in the said area, and the same falls under the ‘prohibited area’ - No Mining Zone. 6.11. The petitioner approached the revisional authority vide Revision Application dated 03.06.2017. The revisional authority by order dated 15.05.2018 upheld the order passed by the Collector and also held that as now the GMMCR Rules, 2017 are in force, a fresh lease can be granted, only by way of auction under Rule 29(1) of the Rules. Placing reliance on the aforesaid submissions, Ms. Tripathi, learned AGP submitted that, this Court may not interfere by exercising extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, in view of the fact that the government has declared the said zone as No Mining Zone, by virtue of Notification dated 07.07.2017. 7. POSITION OF LAW: 7.1. In the case of State of Rajasthan and others v/s. Sharwan Kumar Kumawat etc. 7. POSITION OF LAW: 7.1. In the case of State of Rajasthan and others v/s. Sharwan Kumar Kumawat etc. reported in 2023 SCC OnLine SC 898, wherein, the Hon’ble Apex Court observed in Para-17 to 21, which reads thus: 17. It is far too settled that there is no right vested over an application made which is pending seeking lease of a Government land or over the minerals beneath the soil in any type of land over which the Government has a vested right and regulatory control. In other words, a mere filing of an application ipso facto does not create any right. The power of the Government to amend, being an independent one, pending applications do not come in the way. For a right to be vested there has to be a statutory recognition. Such a right has to accrue and any decision will have to create the resultant injury. When a decision is taken by a competent authority in public interest by evolving a better process such as auction, a right, if any, to an applicant seeking lease over a Government land evaporates on its own. An applicant cannot have an exclusive right in seeking a grant of license of a mineral unless facilitated accordingly by a statute. State of Tamil Nadu v. Hind Stone & Others, (1981) 2 SCC 205 : - "13. Another submission of the learned counsel in connection with the consideration of applications for renewal was that applications made sixty days or more before the date of G.O.Ms No. 1312 (December 2, 1977) should be dealt with as if Rule 8-C had not come into force. It was also contended that even applications for grant of leases made long before the date of G.O.Ms No.1312 should be dealt with as if Rule 8-C had not come into force. The submission was that it was not open to the government to keep applications for the grant of leases and applications for renewal pending for a long time and then to reject them on the basis of Rule 8-C notwithstanding the fact that the applications had been made long prior to the date on which Rule 8-C came into force. The submission was that it was not open to the government to keep applications for the grant of leases and applications for renewal pending for a long time and then to reject them on the basis of Rule 8-C notwithstanding the fact that the applications had been made long prior to the date on which Rule 8-C came into force. While it is true that such applications should be dealt with within a reasonable time, it cannot on that account be said that the right to have an application disposed of in a reasonable time clothes an applicant for a lease with a right to have the application disposed of on the basis of the rules in force at the time of the making of the application. No one has a vested right to the grant or renewal of a lease and none can claim a vested right to have an application for the grant or renewal of a lease dealt with in a particular way, by applying particular provisions. In the absence of any vested rights in anyone, an application for a lease has necessarily to be dealt with according to the rules in force on the date of the disposal of the application despite the fact that there is a long delay since the making of the application. We are, therefore, unable to accept the submission of the learned counsel that applications for the grant of renewal of leases made long prior to the date of G.O.Ms No. 1312 should be dealt with as if Rule 8- C did not exist." (emphasis supplied) Fundamental Right 18. The question of applicants not having fundamental right in mining is no longer resintegra, Monnet Ispat & Energy Ltd. v. Union of India, (2012) 11 SCC 1 may shed some light, "No fundamental right in mining 133. The appellants have applied for mining leases in a land belonging to the Government of Jharkhand (erstwhile Bihar) and it is for iron ore which is a mineral included in Schedule I to the 1957 Act in respect of which no mining lease can be granted without the prior approval of the Central Government. It goes without saying that no person can claim any right in any land belonging to the Government or in any mines in any land belonging to the Government except under the 1957 Act and the 1960 Rules. It goes without saying that no person can claim any right in any land belonging to the Government or in any mines in any land belonging to the Government except under the 1957 Act and the 1960 Rules. No person has any fundamental right to claim that he should be granted mining lease or prospecting licence or permitted reconnaissance operation in any land belonging to the Government. It is apt to quote the following statement of O. Chinnappa Reddy, J. in Hind Stone [ (1981) 2 SCC 205 ] (SCC p. 213, para 6) albeit in the context of minor mineral, "6. ... The public interest which induced Parliament to make the declaration contained in Section 2 ... has naturally to be the paramount consideration in all matters concerning the regulation of mines and the development of minerals". He went on to say: (Hind Stone case [ (1981) 2 SCC 205 ], SCC p. 217, para 10) "10. ... The statute with which we are concerned, the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, is aimed ... at the conservation and the prudent and discriminating exploitation of minerals. Surely, in the case of a scarce mineral, to permit exploitation by the State or its agency and to prohibit exploitation by private agencies is the most effective method of conservation and prudent exploitation. If you want to conserve for the future, you must prohibit in the present." (emphasis supplied) Legitimate Expectation 19. Legitimate expectation is a weak and sober right as ordained by a statute. When the Government decides to introduce fair play by way of auction facilitating all eligible persons to contest on equal terms, certainly one cannot contend that he is entitled for a lease merely on the basis of a pending application. The right being not legal, apart from being non-existent, it can certainly not be enforceable. The principle of law on these aspects, as settled decades ago in State of T.N. v. Hind Stone (1981) 2 SCC 205 , is being reiterated from time to time. Monnet Ispat & Energy Ltd. (supra) : - "Principles of legitimate expectation 183. The right being not legal, apart from being non-existent, it can certainly not be enforceable. The principle of law on these aspects, as settled decades ago in State of T.N. v. Hind Stone (1981) 2 SCC 205 , is being reiterated from time to time. Monnet Ispat & Energy Ltd. (supra) : - "Principles of legitimate expectation 183. As there are parallels between the doctrines of promissory estoppel and legitimate expectation because both these doctrines are founded on the concept of fairness and arise out of natural justice, it is appropriate that the principles of legitimate expectation are also noticed here only to appreciate the case of the appellants founded on the basis of the doctrines of promissory estoppel and legitimate expectation. xxx xxx xxx 188. It is not necessary to multiply the decisions of this Court. Suffice it to observe that the following principles in relation to the doctrine of legitimate expectation are now well established: xxx xxx xxx 188.3. Where the decision of an authority is founded in public interest as per executive policy or law, the court would be reluctant to interfere with such decision by invoking the doctrine of legitimate expectation. The legitimate expectation doctrine cannot be invoked to fetter changes in administrative policy if it is in the public interest to do so. 188.4. The legitimate expectation is different from anticipation and an anticipation cannot amount to an assertable expectation. Such expectation should be justifiable, legitimate and protectable. 188.5. The protection of legitimate expectation does not require the fulfilment of the expectation where an overriding public interest requires otherwise. In other words, personal benefit must give way to public interest and the doctrine of legitimate expectation would not be invoked which could block public interest for private benefit." (emphasis supplied) 20. Kerala State Beverages (M AND M) Corporation Limited v. P.P. Suresh, (2019) 9 SCC 710 : - "B. Legitimate expectation 14. The main argument on behalf of the respondents was that the Government was bound by its promise and could not have resiled from it. They had an indefeasible legitimate expectation of continued employment, stemming from the Government Order dated 20-2-2002 which could not have been withdrawn. It was further submitted on behalf of the respondents that they were not given an opportunity before the benefit that was promised, was taken away. They had an indefeasible legitimate expectation of continued employment, stemming from the Government Order dated 20-2-2002 which could not have been withdrawn. It was further submitted on behalf of the respondents that they were not given an opportunity before the benefit that was promised, was taken away. To appreciate this contention of the respondents, it is necessary to understand the concept of legitimate expectation. 15. The principle of legitimate expectation has been recognised by this Court in Union of India v. Hindustan Development Corpn. [ (1993) 3 SCC 499 ] If the promise made by an authority is clear, unequivocal and unambiguous, a person can claim that the authority in all fairness should not act contrary to the promise. 16. M. Jagannadha Rao, J. elaborately elucidated on legitimate expectation in Punjab Communications Ltd, v. Union of India [ (1999) 4 SCC 727 ]. He referred (at SCC pp. 741-42, para 27) to the judgment in Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil Service [ 1985 AC 374 : (1984) 3 WLR 1174 : (1984) 3 AllER 935 (HL)] in which Lord Diplock had observed that for a legitimate expectation to arise, the decisions of the administrative authority must affect the person by depriving him of some benefit or advantage which, "27.,,, (i) he had in the past been permitted by the decision-maker to enjoy and which he can legitimately expect to be permitted to continue to do until there have been communicated to him some rational grounds for withdrawing it on which he has been given an opportunity to comment; or (ii) he has received assurance from the decision-maker that they will not be withdrawn without giving him first an opportunity of advancing reasons for contending that they should not be withdrawn." (AC p. 408)" 17. Rao, J. observed in this case, that the procedural part of legitimate expectation relates to a representation that a hearing or other appropriate procedure will be afforded before the decision is made. The substantive part of the principle is that if a representation is made that a benefit of a substantive nature will be granted or if the person is already in receipt of the benefit, that it will be continued and not be substantially varied, then the same could be enforced. 18. The substantive part of the principle is that if a representation is made that a benefit of a substantive nature will be granted or if the person is already in receipt of the benefit, that it will be continued and not be substantially varied, then the same could be enforced. 18. It has been held by R.V. Raveendran, J. in Ram Pravesh Singh v. State of Bihar [ (2006) 8 SCC 381 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 1986] that legitimate expectation is not a legal right. Not being a right, it is not enforceable as such. It may entitle an expectant: (SCC p. 391, para 15) "(a) to an opportunity to show cause before the expectation is dashed; or (b) to an explanation as to the cause for denial. In appropriate cases, the courts may grant a direction requiring the authority to follow the promised procedure or established practice." Substantive Legitimate Expectation 19. An expectation entertained by a person may not be found to be legitimate due to the existence of some countervailing consideration of policy or law. [H.W.R. Wade & C.F. Forsyth, Administrative Law (Eleventh Edn., Oxford University Press, 2014).] Administrative policies may change with changing circumstances, including changes in the political complexion of Governments. The liberty to make such changes is something that is inherent in our constitutional form of Government. Hughes v. Department of Health and Social Security, 1985 AC 776 , 788 : (1985) 2 WLR866 (HL)] 20. The decision-makers' freedom to change the policy in public interest cannot be fettered by applying the principle of substantive legitimate expectation. [Findlay/In re, 1985 AC 318 : (1984) 3 WLR 1159 : (1984) 3 All ER 801 (HL)] So long as the Government does not act in an arbitrary or in an unreasonable manner, the change in policy does not call for interference by judicial review on the ground of a legitimate expectation of an individual or a group of individuals being defeated." (emphasis supplied) Legal Malice 21. Though it is contended by the learned Advocates appearing for the Respondents that the impugned Rules have been brought forth only to nullify the effect of the judgments, as discussed, we do not think so. The Appellants have duly complied with the orders passed. Though it is contended by the learned Advocates appearing for the Respondents that the impugned Rules have been brought forth only to nullify the effect of the judgments, as discussed, we do not think so. The Appellants have duly complied with the orders passed. Even otherwise, law is quite settled that basis of a judgment can be removed and a decision of the court cannot be treated like a statute, particularly when power is available to act and it is accordingly exercised in public interest. In such view of the matter, we do not find any legal malice in the amendments. We wish to quote Kalabharati Advertising v. Hemant Vimalnath Narichania, (2010) 9 SCC 437 , "Legal malice 25. The State is under obligation to act fairly without ill will or malice in fact or in law. "Legal malice" or "malice in law" means something done without lawful excuse. It is an act done wrongfully and wilfully without reasonable or probable cause, and not necessarily an act done from ill feeling and spite. It is a deliberate act in disregard to the rights of others. Where malice is attributed to the State, it can never be a case of personal ill will or spite on the part of the State. It is an act which is taken with an oblique or indirect object. It means exercise of statutory power for "purposes foreign to those for which it is in law intended". It means conscious violation of the law to the prejudice of another, a depraved inclination on the part of the authority to disregard the rights of others, which intent is manifested by its injurious acts. (Vide ADM, Jabalpur v. Shivakant Shukla [ (1976) 2 SCC 521 : AIR 1976 SC 1207 ], S.R. Venkataraman v. Union of India [ (1979) 2 SCC 491 : 1979 SCC (L&S) 216 : AIR 1979 SC 49 ], State of A.P. v. Goverdhanlal Pitti [ (2003) 4 SCC 739 : AIR 2003 SC 1941 ], BPL Ltd. v. S.P. Gururaja [ (2003) 8 SCC 567 ] and W.B. SEB v. Dilip Kumar Ray [ (2007) 14 SCC 568 : (2009) 1 SCC (L&S) 860].)" 7.2. In the case of Sureshbhai Chhotubhai Salar v/s. State of Gujarat – Additional Chief Secretary, order dated 10.11.2016 in Letters Patent Appeal No. 625 of 2017, relevant paragraph-7 and 8 reads thus: “7. In the case of Sureshbhai Chhotubhai Salar v/s. State of Gujarat – Additional Chief Secretary, order dated 10.11.2016 in Letters Patent Appeal No. 625 of 2017, relevant paragraph-7 and 8 reads thus: “7. In our opinion, mere filing of an application either for the grant of lease or for the renewal of lease does not confer a vested right for the grant or renewal of lease. The application of the petitioner was submitted to the authority on 22.01.2009 and the same was rejected in accordance with the policy prevailing at the relevant time. It is the specific case of the respondent authority that the land in question is situated in the block and the petitioner has not placed any material on record controverting the said findings recorded by the respondent authority. Therefore, in absence of any such material on record, the order of the respondent authority cannot be set aside. Even otherwise also, now the Government has issued the Government Resolution dated 28.06.2016 by which the earlier Government Resolution dated 30.12.2013 has been modified and as per the new Government Resolution, all applications received prior to 31.03.2010 or subsequent to the said date, has to be considered and disposed of by way of public auction only. In view of the subsequent development also, now relief can be granted in favour of the petitioner. The right of consideration of lease has to be dealt with in accordance with the Rules. 8. In the recent decision of the Apex Court rendered in Sulekhan Singh’s case (supra), the facts were almost similar. In that case, mining lease were granted otherwise than by way of auction prior to Government Order dated 31.05.2012. However, there was a change of policy and it was decided to grant lease by way of E-tendering. On these facts, it was held that pendency of application does not create vested right for application being considered and that the prevailing Rules for E-tendering shall govern the lease process. Considering the facts of the present case and the principle rendered in Sulekhan Singh’s case (supra), we are of the opinion that the authorities below have not committed any error in rejecting the application of the petitioner.” 8. Considering the facts of the present case and the principle rendered in Sulekhan Singh’s case (supra), we are of the opinion that the authorities below have not committed any error in rejecting the application of the petitioner.” 8. Having heard the learned advocates appearing for the respective parties, following emerge for consideration of this Court: A. The petitioner herein was granted lease for excavation of ordinary sand from Sant Sarovar Dam to Koteshwar Mining work, since 2002-2003. The lease came to be renewed from time to time. When the petitioner applied for renewal on 24.08.2015, the respondent no.2 declined to renew the said lease, by order dated 20.05.2017 and resultantly, cancelled the petitioner’s lease, after following the principles of natural justice, which is duly produced at Annexure-G, Pg.45. B. The said order dated 20.05.2017 came to be passed, taking into consideration the said Report of the Special Committee dated 29.07.2016, the respondent no.2 rejecting the renewal application and cancelled the lease granted to the petitioner, the relevant part of the said order reads thus: “...Pursuant to the aforesaid Committee-Report, a Committee- Meeting, chaired by the Collector, was held vide the above read reference (6), wherein, consequent to a discussion on the Committee-Report with all the officers, the Committee agreed unanimously on the suggested reasons. Further, a permanent ban and holding of an in-person hearing were also recommended. Accordingly, the physical hearing was conducted, as per the above read reference (7) and (9), and the applicant was heard. At the time of hearing, Shri Jitendra Sadhvani, Learned Advocate for the applicants, submitted that the applicants have instituted SCA No. 9921/2016 and the present case may be proceeded with after an order of the Court. Thereafter, the Oral Order, at the above read Reference (8), came to be passed wherein it was directed to decide the issue till 31/05/2017. Thereafter, on examining the production from the mining lease, i.e. extractions, it was declared as 48,546 Metric Ton for the year 2015-16, which is in accordance with the environmental clearance (15,000 MT). Further, as per the recommendations of the Committee, as the large scale mining is being done with the use of latest machinery, natural restoration is not possible and the river-bed is lowered year by year, which causes damage to the structures situated in the river-bed and if mining activities continue in future, the damage is likely to increase. Further, as per the recommendations of the Committee, as the large scale mining is being done with the use of latest machinery, natural restoration is not possible and the river-bed is lowered year by year, which causes damage to the structures situated in the river-bed and if mining activities continue in future, the damage is likely to increase. Therefore, it is necessary that sand mining is banned in the entire area. Where a government waste land or a forest land is situated adjoining a river-bed, quarrying in river-bed poses danger of land-sliding and erosion of banks. Such erosion of forest land has been observed in the low-lying area of the Sant Sarovar Dam. Apart from these, with a view to stop causing of damage to the other structures and in view of the progressing development in the surroundings of the Sabarmati River, the following order is issued regarding renewal of quarry lease. -: ORDER:- With regard to the renewal application by the lease holder at the above read Reference (1), the lease is deemed continued till 18/04/2016 and on the basis of the recommendations in the Committee-Report at above read Reference (5) and (6), it is hereby ordered to reject the renewal and cancel the quarry lease as per the Gujarat Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 2010.” C. The petitioner preferred Revision Application on 03.06.2017, which came to be rejected by the Revisional Authority by an order dated 15.05.2018, upholding the order passed by the Collector and also that under Rules, 2017 i.e. GMMCR Rules, 2017, which came into effect from 24.05.2017, the minor minerals will be given through the public auction only and further held that the application before 24.05.2017 are held to be ineligible under Rule-29(1) of the Rules. It is apposite to refer to the said order passed by the competent authority, relevant Para-6 and 7 reads thus: “6. Observation:- (1) The quarry lease of sand mining by the applicant Hargovindbhai Somabhai Patel for the river-bed measuring 03- 75-50 Hector at Mauje Koteshwar, Taluka & District Gandhinagar Survey No. 2, 3, 8 and 152 was approved by the Collector for a period of 03 years, wherein the first contract-deed was executed on 30/04/2001. As it was to expire on 29/04/2004, the applicant gave the application for the first renewal on 10/09/2003, which was within the time limit. As it was to expire on 29/04/2004, the applicant gave the application for the first renewal on 10/09/2003, which was within the time limit. The renewal-deed/ contract with effect from 30/04/2004 came to be executed on 05/04/2005. As the quarry lease was about to expire on 29/04/2007, the applicant gave the second renewal application on 11/08/2006, which was within the time limit. The Renewal-deed therein came to be executed on 27/02/2009 and with effect from 23/04/2007. Again, when the quarry lease was about to expire on 29/04/2010, the applicant gave the application for third renewal on 15/10/2010. As it was beyond limitation, the delay was regularized by levying a fine of Rs.5000/- vide an order of the Collectorate. Thereafter, vide the order dated 31/01/2013 of the Collectorate, the quarry lease was renewed for a period of 3 years from 30/04/2010. The deed thereof remained pending due to administrative reasons. As the quarry lease was about to expire on 29/04/2013, the applicant gave the application for the fourth renewal on 26/04/2011. Thereafter, all the applications for renewal were deemed as rejected vide the order dated 20/05/2017 of the Collector, Gandhinagar and the quarry lease was terminated. Aggrieved with this order, the applicant preferred a Revision Application under Rule 50(1) of the Gujarat Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 2017 before this Department. (2) Sand mining/quarrying and its transportation in the Sabarmati River within the boundaries of Gandhinagar district, Sant Sarovar, Gandhinagar to Koteshwar, the river-bed and both the shores in the jurisdiction of Gandhinagar has been banned vide the Notification No. DC/VSHI/3654 to 3665/2017 dated 07/07/2017 of the Collector, Gandhinagar. Considering the same, it is ordered by the Collector, Gandhinagar that all the applications for renewal be deemed as rejected and the quarry lease is terminated. (3) Written submissions by the applicant and the para-wise remarks by the Collector, Gandhinagar have been taken into consideration. (4) The Gujarat Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 2017 came to be published vide Notification No. GU-2017-(21)-MCR-102017- MM-524-CHH dated 24/05/2017 of the Industries and Mines Department, which provide that minor minerals can be disposed through a public auction. An application received before 24/05/2017 is ineligible as per Rule 29(1) of these Rules. (5) The judgment dated 04/01/2016 of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sulekhan Singh and Company and Others Vs. An application received before 24/05/2017 is ineligible as per Rule 29(1) of these Rules. (5) The judgment dated 04/01/2016 of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sulekhan Singh and Company and Others Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others ( AIR 2016 SC 228 ) and para-10.3 of the Common CAV Judgment dated 29/04/2016 of the Hon’ble High Court of Gujarat in Special Civil Application No. 20552/2015, Rameshbhai Ukad Vasava Vs. State of Gujarat and Others have been relied on. Considering all the above mentioned details, the following order is issued. -:ORDER:- As the application under Rule 29(1) of the Gujarat Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 2017 has been held as ineligible, the Revision Application dated 03/06/2017 by the applicant Hargovindbhai Somabhai Oad is, hereby, rejected.” D. The respondent no.2 Collector vide order dated 18.04.2016 directed to form a team comprising of the Chief Engineer of Narmada Nigam, Executive Engineer, Pratapnagar Yojna Vibhag-3, Director, Gujarat Police Academy, Karai, Superintendent Engineer, Design (Road and Building) Circle, Gandhinagar, Representative of Gujarat Energy Transmission Corporation and Geologist, after due consultation with the lease- holders, in view of the aforesaid, it is not now open for the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner to contend that the aforesaid exercise was undertaken, in violation of principles of natural justice. E. Further, in the facts of the present case and in line with the ratio as laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court, as referred above, though the petitioner herein applied for renewal of lease in the year 2014, which came to be rejected by the competent authority by concurrent findings by order dated 20.05.2017 and 15.05.2018, more particularly, in light of the fact that by Notification dated 07.07.2017, the area in question is declared as ‘No Mining Zone’. 9. In the opinion of this Court, the report of the Committee is in the nature of the recommendations and the same though not binding to the Collector, it was open for the Collector to rely upon the report of the Committee and decline to renew the lease. While passing the impugned order dated 20.05.2017, the Collector taking into consideration the Committee’s Report that the mining activity resulted in damage to the environment, safeguarding the important infrastructure and in the large interest of the public, declined to renew the lease. While passing the impugned orders, both the competent authorities granted ample opportunity of hearing to the petitioner. While passing the impugned order dated 20.05.2017, the Collector taking into consideration the Committee’s Report that the mining activity resulted in damage to the environment, safeguarding the important infrastructure and in the large interest of the public, declined to renew the lease. While passing the impugned orders, both the competent authorities granted ample opportunity of hearing to the petitioner. The decision taken by the respondent authority is in the interest of public and subsequent to the order passed by the Collector, dated 20.05.2017, the respondent – State issued a Notification dated 07.07.2017, pg. 117, declaring the said area i.e. the entire area from Sant Sarovar, Gandhinagar to Koteshwar, Gandhinagar district limits as No Mining Zone. Before the Revisional Authority passed the order, the said area were already declared as No Mining Zone and the Rules, 2017 also came into force. Even otherwise also, by way of the said Notification dated 07.07.2017, the entire area is declared as No Mining Zone, and therefore, the question of renewal of lease does not arise. The GMMCR Rules, 2017 came into effect from 24.05.2017, and in view thereof, the petitioner is governed by the said Rules. 10. For the foregoing reasons, no interference is called for to exercise the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, and accordingly, all the aforesaid Petitions stand dismissed. Interim relief, if any, stands vacated. In view of the dismissal of the main petitions, pending Civil Application/s, if any, also stand/s disposed of, accordingly.