JUDGMENT : Sandeep N. Bhatt, J. 1. The present petitions are filed by the petitioner – original plaintiff by challenging the impugned order dated 04.03.2024 passed application below Exh.151 in Special Civil Suit No.02 of 2009 by the learned 2nd Addl. Senior Civil Judge, Gandhidham in Special Civil Application No.7050 of 2024, and the impugned order dated 01.04.2024 passed application below Exh.156 in Special Civil Suit No.02 of 2009 by the learned 2nd Addl. Senior Civil Judge, Gandhidham in Special Civil Application No.7076 of 2024, as well as the impugned order dated 18.03.2024 passed application below Exh.154 in Special Civil Suit No.02 of 2009 by the learned 2nd Addl. Senior Civil Judge, Gandhidham in Special Civil Application No.7134 of 2024, whereby the said applications were filed for issuance of witness summons to Sub-Registrar, Gandhidhar, which were rejected. 2. Since the issues involved in the present petitions are identical in nature, for the sake of convenience and brevity, Special Civil Application No.7050 of 2024 is considered as leading matter. 3. Brief facts of the case are as such that the dispute pertains to land situated at open Plot No.162, Ward No. 6/A, Industrial Area, Gandhidham Sq. admeasuring 868.95 meters. It is the case of the petitioner - original plaintiff that the petitioner has filed Special Civil Suit No.02 of 2009 before the Principal Senior Civil Judge, Gandhidham- Kutch praying for declaration that the defendants may not take away the possession of the suit plot illegally from the petitioner. Further, the petitioner also prayed that the power of attorney dated 20.05.1997 in favour of defendant No.2 is illegal and ought to be cancelled and that based on such false power of attorney. Registered Lease No.6947 dated 21.11.2006 is also cancelled. The petitioner further prayed that registered sale deed no.3924 based on false power of attorney of mother of def no.1, executed by Def No.2 in favour of Def No.3 is also illegal and false and that registered sale deed No.991 dated 20.02.2008 executed by Def No.3 in favor of Def No.4 is also illegal and void. The petitioner also prayed that both the entries of the said registered sale deeds are directed to be cancelled by the Def No.7. In the same way, the petitioner prayed that def No.5 be directed to remove name of def no.3 and 4 from the suit land and to enter the name of the petitioner. The petitioner also prayed that both the entries of the said registered sale deeds are directed to be cancelled by the Def No.7. In the same way, the petitioner prayed that def No.5 be directed to remove name of def no.3 and 4 from the suit land and to enter the name of the petitioner. The petitioner also prayed for the def no.3 initiate appropriate action against the defendants for their illegal acts and a declaration that the defendants have no right, title or interest in the suit properties. The petitioner also prayed for that the a declaration that defendant No.4 may not illegally snatch the possession of the suit property from the plaintiff. It is further the case of the petitioner in this petition that the defendant no.5 filed their written statement below Exh.18/B and their list of documents. It is further the case of the petitioner in this petition that the defendant no.7 filed their written statement below Exh.22/B on 29.01.2009. On 03.03.2009, the defendant no.4 also filed their written statement below Exh.27/B. On 31.12.2009, the defendant no.1 filed written statement below Exh.31/B. In the suit issues came to be framed below Exh.66 on 01.01.2021. In the suit, the witness of the defendant no.7 also filed examination in chief below Exh.83 on 30.09.2021. Thereafter, the petitioner preferred application below Exh.86 to reopen the right of the petitioner - original plaintiff to lead evidence, which came to be allowed. Thereafter, the petitioner – original plaintiff also filed list of original documents below Exh.90. Thereafter, the petitioner plaintiff tendered his examination in chief below Exh.91 on 25.11.2021. Thereafter, the original plaintiff came to be cross examined on 03.03.2022 and 05.03.2022. Thereafter, witness of the plaintiff being one Sanjaybhai also tendered his examination in chief and was thereafter cross examined below Exh.144 on 05.12.2023. Furthermore, on behalf petitioner, another- witness Jayeshbhai Bhanushali- being witness no.3 also tendered his examination in chief on 22.01.2024 and was cross examined below Exh.149 on 29.01.2024. Thereafter, on 29.01.2024, the petitioner-plaintiff gave an application below Exh.151 for issuance of witness summons to the Sub-Registrar, Gandhidham. The petitioner also prayed to issue necessary summons to the abovementioned witness with the necessary documents as mentioned therein. Vide impugned order dated 04.03.2024, the application below Exh.151 for issuance of witness summons to the Sub Registrar Gandhidham came to be rejected. The petitioner also prayed to issue necessary summons to the abovementioned witness with the necessary documents as mentioned therein. Vide impugned order dated 04.03.2024, the application below Exh.151 for issuance of witness summons to the Sub Registrar Gandhidham came to be rejected. It is further the case of the petitioner in this petition that on 18.03.2024, petitioner-plaintiff gave the an application below Exh.154 for issuance of witness summons to the Fire Department of Deendayal Port Trust (previously known as Kandla Port Trust), Gandhidham. On the same very 18.03.2024, it came to be rejected without any just cause. Thereafter, on 01.04.2024, the petitioner gave an application below Exh.156 for issuance of witness summons to the Manager (land), The Sindhu Resettlement Adepur. Corporation Ltd, and on the very same day, i.e., 01.04.2024, it also came to be rejected. Thereafter, the Ld. Court has also closed the right of petitioner to lead evidence. Hence the present petition has been preferred. 4. Heard Mr. Jamshed Kavina, the learned counsel with Mr. S.P. Majmudar, the learned counsel for the petitioner in respective petition. 5.1 Mr. Jamshed Kavina, the learned counsel with Mr. S.P. Majmudar, the learned counsel for the petitioner, has drawn my attention to the impugned order passed below Exh.151. He has also submitted that it indicates that the plaintiff had filed the impugned application, which was opposed by defendant No. 4 by filing an objection below Exh.152. Additionally, he has submitted that that defendant No. 4 contended that the application was filed to allow the examination of certain witnesses with necessary documents. The learned counsel for the defendant in the trial court argued that the plaintiff was attempting to fill a lacuna in the suit filed in the year 2009 and sufficient opportunities were granted to the plaintiff to examine the witnesses. The plaintiff had already examined two witnesses, and it appeared that the plaintiff was now prolonging the case for one reason and another. By pointing out these submissions, Mr. Kavina has submitted that on 19.01.2009, the suit was filed with a request for urgency, and on 03.01.2015, the application below Exh.5 was to be disposed of because the plaintiff's counsel was not progressing with the case. He has also submitted that issues were framed on 01.01.2021 (below Exh.66) after defendant No.1 filed a written statement on 31.12.2009 and defendants Nos.5 and 7 filed theirs 29.01.2009. He has also submitted that issues were framed on 01.01.2021 (below Exh.66) after defendant No.1 filed a written statement on 31.12.2009 and defendants Nos.5 and 7 filed theirs 29.01.2009. 5.2 Furthermore, he has submitted that after framing the issues in the year 2021 below Exh.66, the witnesses of defendant No.7 has also filed examination-in-chief on 30.09.2021. Thereafter, the petitioner referred an application to reopen the right of the petitioner –original plaintiff to lead the evidence by application dated 21.10.2021. That application is allowed by order dated 18.11.2021. Furthermore, he has submitted that on 25.11.2021, list of original documents is also filed by the plaintiff at Exh.90. Thereafter, the examination-in-chief of the plaintiff was tendered at Exh.91 on 25.11.2021. Thereafter, the plaintiff was cross-examined on 03.03.2022 and 05.03.2023. Thereafter, the plaintiff has filed list of documents below Exh.92 submitting certified copies of documents. Furthermore, additional list of documents is filed at Exh.95 by the plaintiff submitting original documents. Thereafter, the defendant No.4 also filed a list of documents in the said suit below Exh.129. Thereafter, witness of the plaintiff being one Sanjaybhai also tendered his examination-in-chief and was thereafter cross examined below Exh.144 on 05.12.2023. Furthermore, on behalf of the plaintiff- petitioner, another witness Jayeshbhai Bhanushali being witness no.3 also tendered his examination-in-chief on 22.01.2024 and was thereafter cross examined on 29.01.2024 below Exh.149. Thereafter, on 29.01.2024, the petitioner-plaintiff gave an application below Exh.151 for issuance of witness summons to the Sub-Registrar Gandhidham. The petitioner also prayed to issue necessary summons to the abovementioned witness with the necessary documents as were mentioned therein. Furthermore, he has submitted that vide the impugned order dated 04.03.2024, the application below Exh.151 for issuance of witness summons to the Sub Registrar Gandhidham came to be rejected. Thereafter, on 18.03.2024, the petitioner – original plaintiff gave an application below Exh.154 for issuance of witness summons to the Fire Department of Deendayal Port Trust (previously known as Kandla Trust), Gandhidham. Furthermore, on the very same day, i.e., 18.03.2024, the application below Exh.154 came to be rejected. Thereafter, on 01.04.2024, the petitioner gave an application below Exh.156 for issuance of witness summons to the Manager, The Sindhu Resettlement Corporation Ltd, Adepur. That application below Exh.156 also came to be rejected vide order dated 01.04.2024 in Special Civil Suit No.02 of 2009, which is pending before the trial court. Thereafter, on 01.04.2024, the petitioner gave an application below Exh.156 for issuance of witness summons to the Manager, The Sindhu Resettlement Corporation Ltd, Adepur. That application below Exh.156 also came to be rejected vide order dated 01.04.2024 in Special Civil Suit No.02 of 2009, which is pending before the trial court. Hence, the present captioned three petitions are filed for challenging above-mentioned three different order below Exh.151, 156, 154 in Special Civil Suit No.02 of 2009. 5.3 Furthermore, he has submitted that the trail court has wrongly considered the aspect that in view of above- mentioned chronology of events, the petitioner is neither having any mala fade intention nor remained negligent in pursuing the proceeding. Even then, the reason best know to the concerned trial court, the trial court has referred to the earlier order passed below Exh.86, whereby pursuant to that order, the evidence, which is required to be led, is to be completed on or before 18.02.2022, and has observed that thereafter, after that period is over, the application below Exh.151 is produced after almost 11 months. Hence, the trial court has considered this aspect and has dismissed the impugned applications below Exh.151, 156, 154, which is highly erroneous and on hyper-technical ground, which are otherwise not justifying the reasons given in the order that the basis of order is that earlier order passed below Exh.86 application, whereby the proceeding is required to be completed within stipulated period of time, otherwise, the order will not remain in operation. Furthermore, he has submitted that by considering subsequent developments, the impugned orders in respective petitions passed the trial court are highly technical, perverse, capricious, unjust and improper. In support of his submissions, he has relied on the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in the cases of (i) Bharat Heavy Electricals Limited vs. Ineos Steyrolution Ltd. reported in 2019 (0) AIJEL-HC 241593, more particularly, paragraphs 16 is relevant (ii) Bhavesh Nareshchandra Amin vs. Dilipbhai Bhaktiprasad Doshi reported in 2023 (0) AIJEL-HC 244913, more particularly, paragraphs 18 to 19.2 and 20.1 are relevant. Furthermore, he has submitted that even the trial court could have imposed some cost if the trail court found that the plaintiff has not abide by the directions given by the trial court in earlier order below Exh.86 application. Furthermore, he has submitted that even the trial court could have imposed some cost if the trail court found that the plaintiff has not abide by the directions given by the trial court in earlier order below Exh.86 application. Furthermore, he has referred to the provisions of Order 16 Rule 1 of the C.P.C. and has submitted that the trail court may grant such prayers as prayed before the trail court in the larger interest of justice with a view to coming to the correct conclusion. Furthermore, he has submitted that even the defendant has also referred to the certain averments in his written statement and therefore, the witness, which is sought to be examined by the present petitioner, is material. Hence, he has submitted that in view of the above, the present petition is required to be allowed by exercising the power under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 6.1 I have considered the submissions made at the bar by the learned counsel for the petitioner. I have perused the materials available on the record. It is fruitful to refer the provisions of Order XVI Rule 1 of the C.P.C., as under: “1. List of witnesses and summons to witnesses.—(1) On or before such date as the Court may appoint, and not later than fifteen days after the date on which the issues are settled, the parties shall present in Court a list of witnesses whom they propose to call either to give evidence or to produce documents and obtain summonses to such persons for their attendance in Court. (2) A party desirous of obtaining any summons for the attendance of any person shall file in Court an application stating therein the purpose for which the witness is proposed to be summoned. (3) The Court may, for reasons to be recorded, permit a party to call, whether by summoning through Court or otherwise, any witness, other than those whose names appear in the list referred to in sub-rule (1), if such party shows sufficient cause for the omission to mention the name of such witness in the said list. (3) The Court may, for reasons to be recorded, permit a party to call, whether by summoning through Court or otherwise, any witness, other than those whose names appear in the list referred to in sub-rule (1), if such party shows sufficient cause for the omission to mention the name of such witness in the said list. (4) Subject to the provisions of sub-rule (2), summonses referred to in this rule may be obtained by the parties on an application to the Court or to such officer as may be appointed by the Court in this behalf within five days of presenting the list of witnesses under sub-rule (1). 1A. Production of witnesses without summons.—A Subject to the provisions of sub-rule (3) of rule 1, any party to the suit may, without applying for summons under rule 1, bring any witness to give evidence or to produce documents.” 6.2 There is no dispute that normally, the Court should allow the application even after imposing some cost. 6.3.1 It is fruitful to refer the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the cases of Kokkanda B. Poondacha And Ors vs K.D. Ganapathi And Anr. reported in (2011) 12 SCC 600 , more particularly, paragraphs 8 to 11 and 16 to 19 are relevant, as under: “8. In Surya Dev Rai's case (supra), the two Judge Bench, after detailed analysis of the various precedents on the scope of the High Court's powers under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution culled out nine propositions including the following:- "38(2) Interlocutory orders, passed by the courts subordinate to the High Court, against which remedy of revision has been excluded by CPC Amendment Act 46 of 1999 are nevertheless open to challenge in, and continue to be subject to, certiorari and supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court. (3) Certiorari, under Article 226 of the Constitution, is issued for correcting gross errors of jurisdiction i.e. when a subordinate court is found to have acted (i) without jurisdiction - by assuming jurisdiction where there exists none, or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction - by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified, and thereby occasioning failure of justice. (4) Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is exercised for keeping the subordinate courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. When the subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction. (5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied: (I) the error is manifest and apparent on the face of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law, and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby." 9. In Shalini Shyam Shetty vs. Rajendra Shankar Patil (supra), the Court again examined the scope of the High Court's power under Article 227 of the Constitution and laid down the following proposition: "Article 227 can be invoked by the High Court suo motu as a custodian of justice. An improper and a frequent exercise of this power will be counterproductive and will divest this extraordinary power of its strength and vitality. The power is discretionary and has to be exercised very sparingly on equitable principle. This reserve and exceptional power of judicial intervention is not to be exercised just for grant of relief in individual cases but should be directed for promotion of public confidence in the administration in the larger public interest whereas Article 226 is meant for protection of individual grievances. Therefore, the power under Article 227 may be unfettered but its exercise is subject to high degree of judicial discipline. The object of superintendence under Article 227, both administrative and judicial, is to maintain efficiency, smooth and orderly functioning of the entire machinery of justice in such a way as it does not bring it into any disrepute. Therefore, the power under Article 227 may be unfettered but its exercise is subject to high degree of judicial discipline. The object of superintendence under Article 227, both administrative and judicial, is to maintain efficiency, smooth and orderly functioning of the entire machinery of justice in such a way as it does not bring it into any disrepute. The power of interference under Article 227 is to be kept to the minimum to ensure that the wheel of justice does not come to a halt and the fountain of justice remains pure and unpolluted in order to maintain public confidence in the functioning of the tribunals and courts subordinate to the High Court." 10. The learned Single Judge of the High Court totally ignored the principles and parameters laid down by this Court for exercise of power under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution qua an interlocutory order passed by the Subordinate Court and set aside the order of the trial Court without assigning any tangible reason. 11. The next question which needs consideration is whether a litigant filing the list of witnesses is bound to indicate, howsoever briefly, the relevance of the witness to the subject matter of the suit etc., and, in any case, one party to the proceedings cannot cite the advocate representing the other side as a witness and thereby deprive the latter of the services of the advocate without disclosing as to how his testimony is relevant to the issues arising in the case. In Mange Ram vs. Brij Mohan (supra), this Court interpreted Order XVI Rule 1 (1),(2) and (3) CPC and observed: "If the requirements of these provisions are conjointly read and properly analysed, it clearly transpires that the obligation to supply the list as well as the gist of the evidence of each witness whose name is entered in the list has to be carried out in respect of those witnesses for procuring whose attendance the party needs the assistance of the court." 16. If the prayer made by the respondents for being allowed to cite Shri N. Ravindranath Kamath as a witness is critically scrutinised in the backdrop of the above noted statement on the duties of an advocate towards his client, we have no hesitation to hold that the same was not only misconceived but was mischievous ex-facie. If the prayer made by the respondents for being allowed to cite Shri N. Ravindranath Kamath as a witness is critically scrutinised in the backdrop of the above noted statement on the duties of an advocate towards his client, we have no hesitation to hold that the same was not only misconceived but was mischievous ex-facie. Neither in the written statement nor the additional written statement filed by them before the trial Court, the respondents had attributed any role to Shri N. Ravindranath Kamath in relation to the subject matter of the suit. The concerned advocate was engaged by the plaintiffs-appellants in 1996 i.e. almost 11 years prior to the filing of application by the respondents under Order XVI Rule 1(1) and (2) read with Section 151 CPC. During this long interregnum, the respondents never objected to the appearance of Shri N. Ravindranath Kamath as an advocate of the appellants by pointing out that he was interested in the subject matter of the suit. Notwithstanding this, the respondents cited him as a witness in the list filed along with the application. The sole purpose of doing this was to create a situation in which the advocate would have been forced to withdraw from the case. 17. Luckily for the appellants, the trial Court could see the game plan of the respondents and frustrated their design by partly dismissing the application. The learned Single Judge ignored that the respondents had included the name of Shri N. Ravindranath Kamath in the list of witnesses proposed to be summoned by them with an oblique motive of boarding him out of the case and passed the impugned order by recording one line observation that the respondents were not required to give reasons for summoning the particular person as a witness. 18. We may add that if the parties to the litigation are allowed to file list of witnesses without indicating the purpose for summoning the particular person(s) as witness(es), the unscrupulous litigants may create a situation where the cases may be prolonged for years together. Such litigants may include the name of the advocate representing the other side as a witness and if the Court casually accepts the list of witnesses, the other side will be deprived of the services of the advocate. Such litigants may include the name of the advocate representing the other side as a witness and if the Court casually accepts the list of witnesses, the other side will be deprived of the services of the advocate. Therefore, it would be a prudent exercise of discretion by the Court to insists that the party filing the list of witnesses should briefly indicate the purpose of summoning the particular person as a witness. 19. In the result, the appeal is allowed, the impugned order is set aside and the one passed by the trial Court is restored. The respondents shall pay cost of Rs.50,000/- to the appellants.” 6.3.2 It is fruitful to refer the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in the cases of Bharat Heavy Electricals Limited (supra), more particularly, paragraphs 16 is relevant, as under: “16 A reading of the aforenoted authorities leads us to lay down the following propositions. (1) Under Order 16, Rule 1, C.P.C. it is the right of the party at any stage of the suit to make an application to the Court seeking that summons be issued to a witness either to give evidence or to produce documents. (2) The Court is not entitled to refuse such an application on the ground that it might cause delay in the trial of the suit on the adjourned date of the suit. (3) If the summons is not served by the adjourned date of the suit the party who filed the application to issue the summons would take the risk. (4) If an application for adjournment is made at the instance of the party who applied under Order 16, Rule 1, Civil P. C. it is for the Court to consider whether or not an adjournment should be granted. (5) The Court may not refuse to order an application under Order 16, Rule 1, Civil P. C. on the ground that the evidence, if produced, may not be of any help to the applicant. (5) The Court may not refuse to order an application under Order 16, Rule 1, Civil P. C. on the ground that the evidence, if produced, may not be of any help to the applicant. (6) Though Order 16, Rule 1, C.P.C. does not in terms impose any restrictions on the Court, the Court in the exercise of its inherent jurisdiction may refuse to issue summons in an application made under Order 16, Rule 1, C.P. in those cases where it is satisfied that the application filed was not bona fide or was vexatious or granting the application would result in an abuse of process of the Court. Except in these three above contingencies the application must almost always be ordered.” 6.3.3 It is fruitful to refer the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in the cases of Bhavesh Nareshchandra Amin (supra), more particularly, paragraphs, 15, 18 to 19.2 and 20.1 are relevant. “15. This Court in Bharat heavy Electrical Limited (supra), after analyzing earlier decisions of other High Courts, had laid down certain propositions as regards Order 16 Rule 1 of CPC. The said propositions, finding place an paragraph no. 16 and wheres such paragraph being relevant for the present purpose, is quoted hereinbelow for benefit: "16. A reading of the aforenoted authorities leads us to lay down the following propositions: (1) Under Order, Rule 1, C.P.C it is the right of the party at any stage of the suit to make an application to the Court seeking that summons be issued to a witness either to give evidence or to produce documents. (2) The Court is not entitled to refuse such an application on the ground that it might cause delay in the trial of the suit on the adjourned date of the suit. (3) If the summons is not served by the adjourned date of the suit the party who filed the application to issue the summons would take the risk. (4) If an application for adjournment is made at the `instance of the party who applied under Order 16, Rule 1, C.P.C. it is for the the Court to consider whether or not an adjournment should be granted. (5) The Court may not refuse to order an application under Order 16, Rule 1, Civil P.C. on the ground that the evidence, if produced, may not be of any help to the document. (5) The Court may not refuse to order an application under Order 16, Rule 1, Civil P.C. on the ground that the evidence, if produced, may not be of any help to the document. (6) Though Order 16, Rule 1, C.P.C. does not in terms impose any restrictions on the Court, the Court in the exercise of its inherent jurisdiction may refuse to issue summons in an application made under Order 16, Rule 1, C.P.C in those cases where it is satisfied that the application filed was not bonafide or was vexatious or granting the application would result in an abuse of process of the Court. Except in these three above contingencies the application must almost always be ordered. 15.1 The propositions of law laid down by the Hon'ble Division Bench of this Court, could be summed up more particularly having regard to the fact scenario inasmuch as that an application for witness summons under Order 16 Rule 1, C.P.C is a right of a party and such an application could be made at any stage of the suit. The Court would not refuse such an application on the ground that the same might delay the trial and whereas in case summons is issued, the same is at the risk of the party who filed the application to ensure service whereas it would be the discretion of the Court to refuse adjournment even if summons is not served. At the stage of application for issuance of witness summons, the Court is not empowered to reject the same while coming to a conclusion that the evidence which is sought to be produced may not help to the petitioner. Most importantly it has been held by the Hon'ble Division Bench that application for witness summons could be refused on three counts namely (1) where application is not bonafide; (2) where application was vexatious and (3) where grant of application would result in abuse of process of the Court. It would be pertinent to mention here that the Hon'ble Division Bench has further clarified the issue by observing that apart from an application for issuance of witness summons being rejected on any of the contingencies mentioned hereinabove, the application should always be allowed. 18. It would be pertinent to mention here that the Hon'ble Division Bench has further clarified the issue by observing that apart from an application for issuance of witness summons being rejected on any of the contingencies mentioned hereinabove, the application should always be allowed. 18. In the considered opinion of this Court none of the above aspects as raised by the learned Advocates for the respondents would be relevant for holding that the application was an abuse of the process of the Court. To elaborate insofar as the application being moved without any reasons, it would appear that the said contention had been neither raised by the respondents before the learned Civil Court nor the learned Civil Court had considered the said objection as one of the grounds for rejecting the application Exh. 86. In any case in the considered opinion of this Court, the petitioner has made out sufficient cause for delayed preferring of the appeal, when it has been submitted by the learned Advocate for the petitioner that the cause to prefer such an application had arisen only after the order passed by the learned Civil Court rejecting application for production of documents including the FSL report in question had been confirmed upto the Hon'ble Supreme Court. In view of the said circumstances, in the considered opinion of this Court non-stating of sufficient cause as per Order 16 Rule 1 (2) of CPC would not be fatal to the said application under Exh. 86. In the considered opinion of this Court, more particularly having regard to the law laid down by the Hon'ble Division Bench of this Court in case of Bharat Heavy Electricals Limited (supra), it would appear that an application for issuance of the witness summons can be made at any stage of the suit and whereas the same is the right of a party and except in case where the Court finds that the application was either not bonafide or vexatious or grant of the application would result in an abuse of the process of the Court, the same would have to be granted. Thus it would appear unless the application falls under the above three categories, only on account of the fact that sufficient cause is not shown, would not render the application liable to be dismissed. Thus it would appear unless the application falls under the above three categories, only on account of the fact that sufficient cause is not shown, would not render the application liable to be dismissed. At the cost of reiteration, in the instant case, since this Court is of the opinion that learned Advocate for the petitioner has been able to make out sufficient cause as noted hereinabove, the submission of learned Advocate for the respondents that the application ought to have been rejected as he did not show the sufficient cause, cannot be countenanced. Under such circumstances in the considered opinion of this Court, application below Exh. 86 for issuance of witness summons could not be termed as an abuse of the process of the Court as warranting its rejection. 19. As regards the issue of the said application having been moved belatedly, in the considered opinion of this Court, the fact of such an application for issuance of witness summons being the right of a party to apply at any stage, the aspect of belatedness would pale into insignificance. Furthermore, it would also be relevant to mention that the Hon'ble Division Bench of this Court has also inter alia observed that an application for grant of witness summons would not be refused on the ground that such an application might delay trial of the suit. Under such circumstances, the aspect of the application being filed belatedly, would not be an aspect, which would have any bearing on the maintainability of such an application. 19.1 Insofar as the issue of the application being filed inspite of a direction of this Court vide order dated 11.03.2022 directing the learned Trial Court to preferably decide the civil suits within a period of six months and also containing a direction to parties to co-operate for disposal, yet such an application being preferred. In the considered opinion of this Court, while the order in question using the word "preferably", denoting the intent of the Court that as far as possible the suits are to be decided within the time frame of six months yet the time frame is not be treated as being mandatory. Furthermore in the considered opinion of this Court even if such a direction was mandatory in nature, yet such a direction would not preclude any of the parties from exercising any legal remedies available to them. Furthermore in the considered opinion of this Court even if such a direction was mandatory in nature, yet such a direction would not preclude any of the parties from exercising any legal remedies available to them. In the considered opinion of this Court, a mandatory direction for deciding the litigation within a specific period of time, would not have the effect of obliterating the legal remedies which a party has or could avail of, for redressal of any grievance or for grant of any positive remedy. Thus a party availing a remedy available under the law, would not and cannot be termed as an abuse of the process of the Court inspite of such remedy being availed of during existence of an order directing the litigation to be decided within a specific time frame. 19.2 Insofar as the aspect of the application for witness summons inter alia for production of the FSL report having been preferred inspite of an earlier application preferred for production of the said document being rejected upto the Hon'ble Supreme Court and therefore, the said application being an abuse of the process of the Court, would also be an argument, which would not help the cause of the respondents herein. It would be pertinent to note here that application for production of document more particularly for production of the report of the FSL, had been rejected more particularly on the ground of such document not being the original or certified copy. Upon such application being rejected, more particularly since the law does not prohibit an application for issuance of witness summons, for production of a document after the application for production of the said document had been rejected on the ground of the document not being its original, therefore, the petitioner could have rightfully applied for issuance of witness summons for production and whereas the fact of the application for production having been rejected would not act as estoppel against such application. Furthermore, as noted hereinabove, since rejection was on the ground that the document sought to be produced was not the original, would be an additional ground in support of the case of the petitioner for moving such an application. Furthermore, as noted hereinabove, since rejection was on the ground that the document sought to be produced was not the original, would be an additional ground in support of the case of the petitioner for moving such an application. Again it would be relevant to mention here that the earlier application for production had been rejected also on the count that the application for production was belated and whereas since an application for issuance of witness summons could be moved at any stage, therefore also moving of such application post rejection of application for production of document, could not be termed as an abuse of the process of the Court more particularly since the petitioner was availing a remedy which was available to him under the law.” 6.4 Furthermore, considering the observation made in the aforesaid order, whereby the Court has observed that when the court finds that the application filed was not bonafide or was vexatious or granting such application would result in an abuse of process of the Court, in that circumstances, the court may refuse the grant such application. Considering the facts of the present case, while allowing earlier application below Exh.86 in the year 2021, the trial court has specifically imposed the condition that such evidence should be completed within three months’ period. That part is not stricto senso complied with, even thereafter, the trial court has given opportunities by showing some grace to the plaintiff and subsequently, the plaintiff has examined two or three witnesses and has also produced some documentary evidences by way of various lists of documents. Thereafter, it seems that the plaintiff has filed one application after another though the Court has directed earlier to complete the proceeding within stipulated period of time. This tactics is required to be deprecated. The amendment, which is carried out in Civil Procedure Code by way of Amendment Act in the year 1999 and 2001, is with a prime objective that the proceeding of trial should not be unnecessarily delayed and any party to the suit proceeding should not take any undue advantage of the process of law. Merely some liberty is granted to the petitioner at the relevant point of time, and pursuant to that, the petitioner has not abide by the time limit as per direction given by the trial court by way of order passed below Exh.86 application. Merely some liberty is granted to the petitioner at the relevant point of time, and pursuant to that, the petitioner has not abide by the time limit as per direction given by the trial court by way of order passed below Exh.86 application. Thereafter also, the trial court has shown grace by permitting him to lead the evidence of two or three witnesses. Thereafter, the petitioner remained going on by filing one application after another for summoning witness, though the applications are rejected by the trial court with a view to prolong the hearing of the suit proceeding, which amounts to certainly abuse of process of law. The conduct of the parties are also required to decide such application. 6.5 At this stage, it is required to refer the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Garments Craft vs. Prakash Chand Goel reported in (2022) 4 SCC 181 , more particularly, paragraph Nos.15 to 17 are relevant, wherein it was held that High Courts while exercising powers under Article 227 does not act as an appellate authority and cannot re-appreciate evidence and the jurisdiction exercised under Article 227 is in nature of correctional jurisdiction to set aside grave dereliction of duty or flagrant abuse of process of law and High Court cannot substitute its own view on merits. The aforesaid relevant paragraphs are as follows: “15. Having heard the counsel for the parties, we are clearly of the view that the impugned order is contrary to law and cannot be sustained for several reasons, but primarily for deviation from the limited jurisdiction exercised by the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. The High Court exercising supervisory jurisdiction does not act as a court of first appeal to reappreciate, reweigh the evidence or facts upon which the determination under challenge is based. Supervisory jurisdiction is not to correct every error of fact or even a legal flaw when the final finding is justified or can be supported. The High Court is not to substitute its own decision on facts and conclusion, for that of the inferior court or tribunal.1 The jurisdiction exercised is in the nature of correctional jurisdiction to set right grave dereliction of duty or flagrant abuse, violation of fundamental principles of law or justice. The High Court is not to substitute its own decision on facts and conclusion, for that of the inferior court or tribunal.1 The jurisdiction exercised is in the nature of correctional jurisdiction to set right grave dereliction of duty or flagrant abuse, violation of fundamental principles of law or justice. The power under Article 227 is exercised sparingly in appropriate cases, like when there is no evidence at all to justify, or the finding is so perverse that no reasonable person can possibly come to such a conclusion that the court or tribunal has come to. It is axiomatic that such discretionary relief must be exercised to ensure there is no miscarriage of justice. 16. Explaining the scope of jurisdiction under Article 227, this Court in Estralla Rubber v. Dass Estate (P) Ltd., (2001) 8 SCC 97 has observed:- “6. The scope and ambit of exercise of power and jurisdiction by a High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is examined and explained in a number of decisions of this Court. The exercise of power under this article involves a duty on the High Court to keep inferior courts and tribunals within the bounds of their authority and to see that they do the duty expected or required of them in a legal manner. The High Court is not vested with any unlimited prerogative to correct all kinds of hardship or wrong decisions made within the limits of the jurisdiction of the subordinate courts or tribunals. Exercise of this power and interfering with the orders of the courts or tribunals is restricted to cases of serious dereliction of duty and flagrant violation of fundamental principles of law or justice, where if the High Court does not interfere, a grave injustice remains uncorrected. It is also well settled that the High Court while acting under this article cannot exercise its power as an appellate court or substitute its own judgment in place of that of the subordinate court to correct an error, which is not apparent on the face of the record. The High Court can set aside or ignore the findings of facts of an inferior court or tribunal, if there is no evidence at all to justify or the finding is so perverse, that no reasonable person can possibly come to such a conclusion, which the court or tribunal has come to.” 17. The High Court can set aside or ignore the findings of facts of an inferior court or tribunal, if there is no evidence at all to justify or the finding is so perverse, that no reasonable person can possibly come to such a conclusion, which the court or tribunal has come to.” 17. The factum that the counsel for the appellant had applied for the certified copy would show that the counsel for the appellant was aware that the ex- parte decree had been passed on the account of failure to lead defence evidence. This would not, however, be a good ground and reason to set aside and substitute the opinion formed by the trial court that the appellant being incarcerated was unable to lead evidence and another chance should be given to the appellant to lead defence evidence. The discretion exercised by the trial court in granting relief, did not suffer from an error apparent on the face of the record or was not a finding so perverse that it was unsupported by evidence to justify it. There could be some justification for the respondent to argue that the appellant was possibly aware of the ex-parte decree and therefore the submission that the appellant came to know of the ex-parte decree only on release from jail on 6th May 2017 is incorrect, but this would not affect the factually correct explanation of the appellant that he was incarcerated and could not attend the civil suit proceedings from 6th October 2015 to 6th May 2017. If it was felt that the application for setting aside the exparte decree was filed belatedly, the court could have given an opportunity to the appellant to file an application for condonation of delay and costs could have been imposed. The facts as known, equally apply as grounds for condonation of delay. It is always important to take a holistic and overall view and not get influenced by aspects which can be explained. The facts as known, equally apply as grounds for condonation of delay. It is always important to take a holistic and overall view and not get influenced by aspects which can be explained. Thus, the reasoned decision of the trial court on elaborate consideration of the relevant facts did not warrant interference in exercise of the supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution.” 6.6 In view of above and in totality of the facts and circumstances of the case, I am of the opinion that the trial court can in best possible manner assess the conduct of the parties on the basis of the materials available on the record. It cannot be said that the impugned orders are not in consonance with the law, particularly, by keeping in mind the direction given by the trial court below Exh.86 application, whereby the process of the evidence by the plaintiff should be completed within three months, otherwise that application will become no-nest. Hence, considering that aspect also, I found no perversity, arbitrariness or capriciousness in the findings of the trial court. On the contrary, I found that the trial court has rightly come to the conclusion that one application after another are filed by the plaintiff, which are required to be rejected as the plaintiff has not abide by the direction given by the trial court below Exh.86 application. Hence, no apparent error of law or irregularity is found in the impugned orders passed by the trail court, which warrants any interfere under Article 227 of the Constitution of India as the learned trial Judge has exercised his discretion in very judicious manner. Hence, the present petition are found merits less and are required to be dismissed. 7. As a result, the present captioned petitions are dismissed with no order as to costs.