Research › Search › Judgment

Allahabad High Court · body

2024 DIGILAW 1039 (ALL)

Manoj Kumar Mishra v. State of U. P.

2024-04-10

J.J.MUNIR

body2024
JUDGMENT : Hon'ble J.J. Munir, J.-This writ petition is directed against an order of the Director of Education (Secondary), U.P., Lucknow dated January the 23rd, 2015, rejecting the petitioner's claim for grant of financial sanction to his appointment as an Assistant Teacher (Model Subjects) with the Maharshi Durwasa Sanskrit Uttar Madhyamik Vidyalaya, Kakra, Dubawal, Allahabad (now Prayagraj). 2. The Maharshi Durwasa Sanskrit Uttar Madhyamik Vidyalaya, Kakra, Dubawal, Prayagraj (for short, 'the Institution') is a recognized Sanskrit Madhyamik Vidyalaya, recognized by the Sampurnanand Sanskrit University Varanasi, Varanasi (for short, 'the University'). Earlier in the day, the Institution was not in receipt of grant-in-aid from the State. Grant-in-aid was extended to the Institution vide Government Order dated 12.8.2010. In consequence of extension of grant-in-aid, the provisions of the Uttar Pradesh High Schools and Intermediate Colleges (Payment of Salaries of Teachers and other Employees) Act, 1971 (for short, 'the Act of 1971') are applicable to the Institution. The petitioner says that he holds a Postgraduate Degree of M.A. in Hindi, besides a B.Ed. Degree. He was initially appointed as an Assistant Teacher (Modern) on 5.7.1993 and joined the Institution on 9.7.1993. He is functioning as an Assistant Teacher (Modern) with the Institution eversince. He was in receipt of salary paid by the Management out of their own resources. Upon extension of grant-in-aid to the Institution in terms of the Government Order dated 12.8.2010, the District Inspector of Schools, Prayagraj (for short, 'the DIOS') wrote a letter to the Manager/Principal of the Institution on 25.8.2010 to send up the list of teachers working with the Institution and other relevant papers. In deference to the aforesaid letter issued by the DIOS, the Managing Committee of the Institution sent a proposal with all relevant papers on 20.9.2010 to the DIOS for the payment of salary to the teachers and other employees of the Institution, including the petitioner. 3. Later on, the Principal of the Institution on account of some misplaced ill-will, as the petitioner says, in collusion with the Manager sent a salary bill to the Education Authorities, where in the petitioner's place, the name of the Principal's son, Pushpendra Mani Shukla was included in the list of teachers and the petitioner's omitted. Consequently, no salary bill relating to the petitioner was submitted to the DIOS nor payment made to him, or Pushpendra Mani Shukla. 4. Consequently, no salary bill relating to the petitioner was submitted to the DIOS nor payment made to him, or Pushpendra Mani Shukla. 4. The petitioner, upon coming to know of these developments, made a complaint to the Director of Education (Secondary), U.P., Lucknow, who directed the DIOS vide his letter dated 11.11.2010 to hold an inquiry and submit a report. The DIOS conducted an inquiry and submitted his report dated 30.12.2010 to the Director of Education. The DIOS in his report held that Manoj Kumar Mishra, the petitioner, joined service on 9.7.1993 and that he is regularly functioning in the Institution. The Director of Education vide his order dated 28.3.2012 granted approval to the petitioner's appointment with the Institution with a direction to pay him salary. At the same time, Pushpendra Mani Shukla's appointment was cancelled. The petitioner says that despite the order of the Director of Education dated 28.3.2012, the Manager did not send the petitioner's salary bill nor included the petitioner's name in the roll of teachers nor was the petitioner allowed to sign the attendance register. Consequently, the petitioner laid another complaint to the DIOS, who vide his letter dated 22.5.2012 allowed the petitioner to sign the attendance register. 5. The petitioner has urged that he was chasing his claim to realize his salary, but with little success in the face of the Manager and the Principal of the Institution joining hands. Left with no other option, the petitioner says, he instituted Writ-A No. 39479 of 2012 before this Court, seeking a direction for the payment of his salary. In the said writ petition, a counter-affidavit was filed on behalf of the State taking a stand that the Director's order dated 28.3.2012 passed in the petitioner's favour was subsequently cancelled. In consequence, the petitioner made an application for amendment in order to challenge the order cancelling the earlier order dated 28.3.2012 passed by the Director in his favour, without affording him an opportunity of hearing. 6. This Court vide judgment and order dated 6.9.2014 passed in Writ-A No. 39479 of 2012 allowed the petition and quashed the Director's orders cancelling his earlier order passed in the petitioner's favour. The matter was remitted to the Director to pass fresh orders after affording the petitioner opportunity. 7. 6. This Court vide judgment and order dated 6.9.2014 passed in Writ-A No. 39479 of 2012 allowed the petition and quashed the Director's orders cancelling his earlier order passed in the petitioner's favour. The matter was remitted to the Director to pass fresh orders after affording the petitioner opportunity. 7. The petitioner received a letter dated 5.10.2014 from the Director of Education, asking him to submit his explanation by 13.11.2014 and file documents in support of his claim. The petitioner responded alongwith the documents annexed to his reply dated 13.11.2014. The petitioner requested the Director for a personal hearing on 20.11.2014, but that was denied. Thus, without a personal hearing, the Director of Education proceeded to pass a fresh order dated 23.1.2015, rejecting the petitioner's claim. A perusal of the order dated 23.1.2015 shows that the Director of Education has rejected the petitioner's claim on ground that the statutes of the University (Pariniyamawali) provide that for the Shastri level recognized schools, for subjects of Kha Varg (Modern Subjects), the teachers in the relevant subjects must possess a 2nd Class Postgraduate Degree. The impugned order further records that the petitioner's educational qualifications show that he was the holder of an MA Degree (Hindi), earned in the 3rd Division. The conclusion, therefore, drawn was that the petitioner does not possess the prescribed educational qualifications for eligibility to be appointed an Assistant Teacher (Modern) with the Institution. It is on the foot of these findings, that by the impugned order, the Director of Education (Secondary), U.P., Lucknow declined to grant financial approval for payment of the petitioner's salary. 8. Aggrieved by the impugned order, this writ petition has been instituted. 9. On the 6th of April, 2015, notice of motion was issued to the respondents. A counter-affidavit dated 4th April, 2023 was filed on behalf of respondent Nos. 2 and 4, that is to say, the Director of Education (Secondary), U.P., Lucknow and the DIOS. The counter-affidavit has been sworn by the DIOS on behalf of both the respondents. A rejoinder-affidavit dated 17.4.2023 was filed on behalf of the petitioner. Affidavits having been exchanged as aforesaid, the matter came up before the Court on 12.10.2023. On the said date, it was admitted to hearing, which proceeded forthwith. Judgment was reserved. 10. Heard Mr. Anurag Tripathi, learned Counsel for the petitioner and Ms. A rejoinder-affidavit dated 17.4.2023 was filed on behalf of the petitioner. Affidavits having been exchanged as aforesaid, the matter came up before the Court on 12.10.2023. On the said date, it was admitted to hearing, which proceeded forthwith. Judgment was reserved. 10. Heard Mr. Anurag Tripathi, learned Counsel for the petitioner and Ms. Monika Arya, learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel on behalf of respondent Nos. 1, 2 and 4. No one appeared on behalf of respondent Nos. 3 and 5. 11. We have carefully considered the submissions advanced by learned Counsel for the parties and perused the record. 12. The learned Counsel for the parties have extensively addressed the Court on minute details of facts and the law applicable. 13. It does not appear to be in dispute for a fact that the petitioner was appointed an Assistant Teacher with the Institution way back on 5.7.1993 and has been teaching regularly eversince. The petitioner has annexed a photostat copy of the proceedings of the Selection Committee, relating to the assistant teacher's post with the Institution, in the subject of Hindi (Modern Subject). The minutes of the selection, that have been appended to the rejoinder-affidavit as Annexure RA-1, show that these are dated 25.6.1993. It is signed by the President of the Committee of Management, the Manager and the Principal, besides two experts, Ramjeet Mishra and Dakshini Swami. The proceedings show that five candidates appeared, out of whom the petitioner and one Ashok Kumar Giri were found suitable. The Selection Committee having been held in this case on 25.6.1993, the process of selection must have commenced substantially earlier. The petitioner has asserted without proof in the rejoinder that he applied pursuant to an advertisement issued on 20.6.1993. There is no record of the advertisement. However, there is a record of the minutes of the selection, which the respondent Authorities have not come forward to contradict or deny through a supplementary pleading. We think that they would have denied it by filing a supplementary counter-affidavit, because the date of the Selection Committee, wherein the petitioner claims to be selected, is so material to the issue. 14. The Management of the Institution, who are respondent No. 5 to the petition, too were issued notice and the office report dated 15.3.2023 would show that neither acknowledgment nor unserved notice has been received in the office. 14. The Management of the Institution, who are respondent No. 5 to the petition, too were issued notice and the office report dated 15.3.2023 would show that neither acknowledgment nor unserved notice has been received in the office. The service of notice must, therefore, be deemed sufficient on the Management, but the Management have not come forward to contest the petition. The Management would be the best authority to certify and/or deny the veracity of the minutes of the selection dated 25.6.1993, wherein the petitioner claims to be selected. The fact, that the Management have not come forward at all to deny the petitioner's claim, shows that they have not much to say. In the circumstances, there is no material for this Court forthcoming either from the Management or the Education Authorities, who have all the official resources at their command to dispel the genuineness of the minutes of the selection dated 25.6.1993, if these were false record, but they have not done so. It is not that the Education Authorities, in particular the Director of Education and the DIOS, are not aware about the contents of the documents annexed as Annexure RA-1 to the rejoinder-affidavit. A copy of the rejoinder was served upon them on 17.4.2023, whereas this petition was heard more than six months later on 12.10.2023. Therefore, the Authorities, if no one else, had all the time to verify the genuineness of the minutes of the selection relied upon by the petitioner. It is, therefore, both safe and legitimate to assume that the minutes of the selection dated 25.6.1993 are true and genuine record, fit to be accepted according to their apparent tenor. 15. Now, there are two points involved, upon the determination of which, the validity of the petitioner's appointment depends. 16. The first is if the petitioner, according to the ordinance framed by the University on 28.6.1993, in exercise of powers under Section 31 (1) and 51 (2) of the Uttar Pradesh State Universities Act, 1973 (for short, 'the Universities Act') read with Statute 11/14, was qualified to be appointed an Assistant Teacher (Modern Subject) on 5.7.1993. There are two aspects to this point. The first is if the ordinance dated 28.6.1993 would at all apply to the petitioner's appointment as an Assistant Teacher with the Institution made on 5.7.1993. There are two aspects to this point. The first is if the ordinance dated 28.6.1993 would at all apply to the petitioner's appointment as an Assistant Teacher with the Institution made on 5.7.1993. The other is if it does apply, is the petitioner, going by the post to which he has been appointed and the category of the institution, as laid down in the ordinance dated 28.6.1993, holds the essential qualifications prescribed for appointment as an Assistant Teacher (Modern Subject) in the Institution. 17. The other point is if the petitioner's qualifications are to be judged valid, according to the provisions of the Uttar Pradesh Board of Secondary Sanskrit Education Act, 2000 read with the Uttar Pradesh Board of Secondary Sanskrit Education (Appointment and Conditions of Service of Heads of Institution, Teachers and Other Employees of the Institutions) Regulations, 2009 (for short, 'the Act of 2000' and 'the Rules of 2009', respectively). 18. So far as the first point is concerned, we have already remarked that the selection process leading to the petitioner's appointment commenced before 25th June, 1993, because on the 25th of June, 1993, the Selection Committee met, where the petitioner alongwith another teacher was selected. The petitioner was appointed to the Institution and functioned without disturbance until grant-in-aid was extended to the Institution vide Government Order dated 12.8.2010. The first limb of the point under consideration is if the ordinance framed by the University dated 28.6.1993, prescribing essential qualifications for appointment of a teacher in a Modern Subject to a Shastri Level College, would apply to the petitioner. We do not think, it would. 19. The petitioner has relied on a Government Order dated 24.11.1978, which, according to him, govern the qualifications for appointment of an assistant teacher to the Institution on the date he was appointed. A perusal of the said Government Order shows that it has been issued in supersession of the earlier Government Order dated 14th February, 1975, relating to educational qualifications for teachers in Sanskrit Schools appointed to teach Modern Subjects. The orders seems to suggest that there were some difficulties in finding teachers, qualified in modern subjects, teaching in Sanskrit Schools at the relevant time, and, therefore, a decision was taken that in place of the qualifications prescribed in Schedule A to the Government Order dated 14th February, 1975 at Sr. The orders seems to suggest that there were some difficulties in finding teachers, qualified in modern subjects, teaching in Sanskrit Schools at the relevant time, and, therefore, a decision was taken that in place of the qualifications prescribed in Schedule A to the Government Order dated 14th February, 1975 at Sr. No. 3 of Column 3, the minimum qualification 'Shastri' would stand substituted by B.A. or equivalent. It must, however, be noticed that this Government Order relates to Sanskrit Schools of Category-IV. What those categories are, have been detailed by the petitioner in Paragraph No. 32 of the writ petition. These categories have not been denied for a fact in Paragraph No. 27 of the counter-affidavit, and, must, therefore, deemed to be admitted by the respondents. 20. But, this issue being about a class of institution, we might not have gone by an admission based on non-traverse, if it had been of any consequence. The matter is of no consequence because the respondents have not come up with anything to say about the qualifications prescribed for the appointment of an Assistant Teacher (Modern Subject) in a Sanskrit Institution of the Shastri Level, at the time the petitioner was appointed, except that these qualifications would be governed by the University's ordinance dated 28.6.1993 or by the Act of 2000 and the Rules of 2009, framed thereunder. If, therefore, the ordinance dated 28.6.1993 framed by the University did not govern the qualifications of an assistant teacher at the time the petitioner was appointed, there is no reason not to accept what the petitioner claims on the basis of the Government Order dated 24.11.1978, issued in the name of the Governor by a Secretary to the Government in the Department of Education, which is directly relevant to the issue of qualifications. 21. Now, in this case, we have found that the process of selection was initiated prior to 25.6.1993, because that was the date on which the Selection Committee met. The University's ordinance, on which the respondents depend, was issued on 28.6.1993, some three days after the Selection Committee selected the petitioner. No doubt, it was in force on 5.7.1993, when the appointment letter was issued to the petitioner. But, that is of no relevance. The process of selection had commenced much before the ordinance dated 28.6.1993 was issued by the University and was over by 25.6.1993. No doubt, it was in force on 5.7.1993, when the appointment letter was issued to the petitioner. But, that is of no relevance. The process of selection had commenced much before the ordinance dated 28.6.1993 was issued by the University and was over by 25.6.1993. The appointment, done after the ordinance, would not be affected at all by its terms. The qualifications, as prescribed on the date when the process of recruitment commenced with the issue of advertisement and the holding of selections, would alone be relevant to see the validity of the prescribed qualifications. Any subsequent change to the qualifications or new qualifications brought about even before the process of recruitment, fructified into an appointment, would not affect it. The petitioner is the holder of an M.A. Degree in Hindi and a B.Ed. The Government Order shows that the qualification under the Government Order dated 24.11.1978 for an assistant teacher in a Sanskrit Institution, teaching a modern subject, was B.A. or equivalent. The petitioner would, therefore, certainly be qualified going by the educational qualifications that were in force at the time when the process of recruitment commenced, that led to his appointment. 22. The aforesaid principle is well-settled, as evident from what was laid down by the Supreme Court in Gopal Krushna Rath v. M.A.A. Baig (Dead) by LRs and others, (1999) 1 SCC 544 , where it has been observed: ''6. When the selection process has actually commenced and the last date for inviting applications is over, any subsequent change in the requirements regarding qualifications by the University Grants Commission will not affect the process of selection which has already commenced. Otherwise it would involve issuing a fresh advertisement with the new qualifications. In the case of P. Mahendran v. State of Karnataka [ (1990) 1 SCC 411 : 1990 SCC (L&S) 163 : (1990) 12 ATC 727] this Court has observed: (SCC p. 416, para 5) ''5. Otherwise it would involve issuing a fresh advertisement with the new qualifications. In the case of P. Mahendran v. State of Karnataka [ (1990) 1 SCC 411 : 1990 SCC (L&S) 163 : (1990) 12 ATC 727] this Court has observed: (SCC p. 416, para 5) ''5. It is well-settled rule of construction that every statute or statutory rule is prospective unless it is expressly or by necessary implication made to have retrospective effect.'' The Court further observed that: ''Since the amending Rules were not retrospective, it could not adversely affect the right of those candidates who were qualified for selection and appointment on the date they applied for the post, moreover as the process of selection had already commenced when the amending Rules came into force, the amended Rules could not affect the existing rights of those candidates who were being considered for selection as they possessed the requisite qualifications prescribed by the Rules before its amendment.'' 7. In the present case, therefore, the appellant possessed the necessary qualifications as advertised on the last date of receiving applications. These qualifications were in accordance with the Rules/guidelines then in force. ….......'' 23. It may be added that there is no case that the ordinance dated 28.6.1993 had retrospective operation. In the absence of it being expressed in the ordinance that it was retrospective or the inference is a necessary implication, no retrospective effect to the ordinance dated 28.6.1993, can be inferred. 24. For the principle that after the selection process has commenced, a subsequent amendment to the law or rules would not affect the ongoing process of recruitment or selection, reference may be made to the Full Bench decision of this Court in Santosh Kumar Singh v. State of U.P. and others, 2015(7) ADJ 179 (FB). In Santosh Kumar Singh (supra), their Lordships of the Full Bench have held: ''8. The decision in A.A. Calton, ( (1983) 3 SCC 33 : AIR 1983 SC 1143 ) (supra) is, therefore, an authority for the proposition that once a process of selection has been initiated, a subsequent amend ment of the law by which the power to make an appointment has specifically been taken away from a statutory authority-in that case from the Director-would have no application to a pending selection process which must be governed by the law as it stood when the se lection process was initiated. Undoubtedly, the Legislature does have the power to make a law with retrospective effect but unless the law is made expressly retrospective or retrospective by necessary implication, the position of law as it stood when the selection process was initiated, would govern the selection. 9. In certain other contexts, the Supreme Court has held, for instance, that a selection process has to be governed by the Rules and Government Orders in existence on the date on which the process is initiated. In N.T. Devin Katti v. Karnataka Public Service Commission [ (1990) 3 SCC 157 : ( AIR 1990 SC 1233 )], the Supreme Court held as follows: ''…Where proceedings are initiated for selection by issuing advertisement, the selection should normally be regulated by the then existing rules and Government orders and any amendment of the rules or the Government order pending the selection should not affect the validity of the selection made by the selecting authority or the Public Service Commission unless the amended Rules or the amended Government orders, issued in exercise of its statutory power either by express provision or by necessary intendment indicate the amended Rules shall be applicable to the pending selections. See P. Mahendran v. State of Karnataka [ (1990) 1 SCC 411 : JT (1989) 4 SC 459 : ( AIR 1990 SC 405 )].'' 10. In State of Bihar v. Mithilesh Kumar [ (2010) 13 SCC 467 ], the Supreme Court held that a change in the norms of recruitment could be applied prospectively and could not affect those who have been selected for being recommended for appointment after following the norms which were in place at the time when the selection process was commenced. The submission to the contrary was based on the decision in Shankarsan Dash v. Union of India [ (1991) 3 SCC 47 : AIR 1991 SC 1612 .] to the effect that mere inclusion in a select panel did not confer indefeasible right to appointment. The Supreme Court explained the position in law as follows: ''The decisions which have been cited on behalf of the respondent have clearly explained the law with regard to the applicability of the rules which are amended and/or altered during the selection process. The Supreme Court explained the position in law as follows: ''The decisions which have been cited on behalf of the respondent have clearly explained the law with regard to the applicability of the rules which are amended and/or altered during the selection process. They all say in one voice that the norms or rules as existing on the date when the process of selection begins will control such selection and any alteration to such norms would not affect the continuing process, unless specifically the same were given retrospective effect…While a person may not acquire an indefeasible right to appointment merely on the basis of selection, in the instant case the fact situation is different since the claim of the respondent to be appointed had been negated by a change in policy after the selection process had begun.'' 11. In a subsequent decision in Government of Andhra Pradesh v. Sri. Sevadas Vidyamandir High School [ (2011) 9 SCC 613 ], the Supreme Court held that a ban on recruitment to grant-in-aid posts had been issued after the school in question had been permitted by the State to fill up vacant posts. The Supreme Court held that in these circumstances, the State could not contend that the process of rationalization which was introduced subsequently, would also apply to private aided schools, where the process of recruitment had already been commenced pursuant to the approval granted earlier. 12. The judgment in A.A. Calton, ( (1983) 3 SCC 33 : AIR 1983 SC 1143 ) (supra) has been recently followed in a decision of the Supreme Court in Kulwant Singh v. Daya Ram [ (2015) 3 SCC 177 : ( AIR 2014 SC 3083 )] in the context of the principle that vacancies which had occurred prior to an amendment of rules would be governed by the unamended rules and not by the amended rules where the amended rules are not made retrospective either expressly or by implication.'' 25. The Supreme Court in Anil Kishore Pandit v. State of Bihar and others, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 332, a very recent decision, has honed the principle about the non-retrospective operation of changed qualifications or rules to an ongoing selection process. The rule was refined to say that not every change would be ineffective. Only those changes would be ineffective that adversely affect a vested right. The rule was refined to say that not every change would be ineffective. Only those changes would be ineffective that adversely affect a vested right. A candidate, who has a right on the date of the advertisement or commencement of the selection process, by a change to the rules about qualifications etc., cannot be deprived of the right to be considered that he had when the process commenced. In Anil Kishore Pandit (supra), it has been observed: ''8. It is settled law that it is not open for an employer to change the qualifications prescribed in the advertisement midstream, during the course of the ongoing selection process. Any such action would be hit by the vice of arbitrariness as it would tantamount to denial of an opportunity to those candidates who are eligible in terms of the advertisement but would stand disqualified on the basis of a change in the eligibility criteria after the same is announced by the employer. Having applied for appointment in accordance with the terms prescribed in the advertisement, a candidate acquires a vested right to be considered in accordance with the said advertisement. This consideration may not necessarily fructify into an appointment but certainly entitles the candidate to be considered for selection in accordance with the rules as they existed on the date of the advertisement. To put it differently, the right of a candidate for being considered in terms of the advertisement stands crystalized on the date of the publication of the advertisement. Any subsequent amendment to the advertisement during the course of the selection process unless retrospective, cannot be a ground to disqualify a candidate from the zone of consideration. 9. In the above context, this Court in N.T. Devin Katti v. Karnataka Public Service Commission, (1990) 3 SCC 157 , has held as under: ''11. ….. Lest there be any confusion, we would like to make it clear that a candidate on making application for a post pursuant to an advertisement does not acquire any vested right of selection, but if he is eligible and is otherwise qualified in accordance with the relevant rules and the terms contained in the advertisement, he does acquire a vested right of being considered for selection is accordance with the rules as they existed on the date of advertisement. He cannot be deprived of that limited right on the amendment of rules during the pendency of selection unless the amended rules are retrospective in nature''. 10. A similar view has been expressed in Mohd. Sohrab Khan v. Aligarh Muslim University, (2009) 4 SCC 555 , where this Court did not approve the change of the criteria/qualification in the selection process by the Selection Committee constituted for filling up the post Lecturer in Chemistry in the respondent-University and observed as follows: ''25. We are not disputing the fact that in the matter of selection of candidates, opinion of the Selection Committee should be final, but at the same time, the Selection Committee cannot act arbitrarily and cannot change the criteria/qualification in the selection process during its midstream. Merajuddin Ahmad did not possess a degree in Pure Chemistry and therefore, it was rightly held by the High Court that he did not possess the minimum qualification required for filling up the post of Lecturer in Chemistry, for Pure Chemistry and Industrial Chemistry are two different subjects. xxxxxxxxx 27. The Selection Committee during the stage of selection, which is midway could not have changed the essential qualification laid down in the advertisement and at that stage held that a Master's degree-holder in Industrial Chemistry would be better suited for manning the said post without there being any specific advertisement in that regard. The very fact that the University is now manning the said post by having a person from the discipline of Pure Chemistry also leads to the conclusion that the said post at that stage when it was advertised was meant to be filled up by a person belonging to Pure Chemistry stream. 11. Quoting the aforesaid decision in Zonal Manager, Bank of India, Zonal Office, Kochi v. Aarya K. Babu, (2019) 8 SCC 587 , this Court made the following pertinent observations: ''14. If the above decision in Mohd. Sohrab Khan case [Mohd. 11. Quoting the aforesaid decision in Zonal Manager, Bank of India, Zonal Office, Kochi v. Aarya K. Babu, (2019) 8 SCC 587 , this Court made the following pertinent observations: ''14. If the above decision in Mohd. Sohrab Khan case [Mohd. Sohrab Khan v. Aligarh Muslim University], is kept in perspective it is clear that while examining the correctness of the action of the employer what would be sacrosanct will be the qualification criteria published in the notification, since if any change made to the qualification criteria midstream is accepted by the Court so as to benefit only the petitioners before it, without making it open to all the qualified persons, it would amount to causing injustice to the others who possess such qualification but had not applied being honest to themselves as knowingly they did not possess the qualification sought for in the notification though they otherwise held another degree. Therefore, if there is any change in qualification/criteria after the notification is issued but before the completion of the selection process and the employer/recruiting agency seeks to adopt the change it will be incumbent on the employer to issue a corrigendum incorporating the changes to the notification and invite applications from those qualified as per the changed criteria and consider the same alongwith the applications received in response to the initial notification. The same principle will hold good when a consideration is made by the Court.'' 12. Coming back to the case at hand, we are inclined to agree with the submissions made by learned counsel for the appellant. In the first instance, the respondents ought not to have issued a subsequent communication after having issued a public advertisement fixing the cut off date for reckoning the age of candidates, as on 01st January, 2011. The initial decision taken by the respondents was sought to be overturned later on, merely on the basis of an internal discussion within the department and it was decided that a fresh notice be issued changing the date that was initially fixed as 01st January, 2011 to 1st November, 2011. This was done without following the due process as prescribed, of issuing a pubic advertisement, etc. Nor was the earlier advertisement recalled. In the meantime, going by the earlier advertisement issued by the respondent, the appellant had already applied. As per the said advertisement, his age was within the permissible range. This was done without following the due process as prescribed, of issuing a pubic advertisement, etc. Nor was the earlier advertisement recalled. In the meantime, going by the earlier advertisement issued by the respondent, the appellant had already applied. As per the said advertisement, his age was within the permissible range. Not only that, he was high up in the selection list and was even appointed to the post of Amin on 27th June, 2015. 26. It is, therefore, evident on the basis of unwavering principle that the petitioner, who had faced his Selection Committee and recommended on 25.6.1993, could not have his right to be selected and appointed, adversely affected by the ordinance issued by the University on 28.6.1993, prescribing some other qualifications. It is, accordingly, held. 27. The second limb of the first point, that is to say, if under the ordinance dated 28.6.1993 for a Shastri Level Institution, the petitioner was qualified to be appointed, does not require to be decided in view of our findings on the first aspect of this point, which is sufficient to clinch the issue. The second limb and the question that it gives rise to is, therefore, left open to be decided in some appropriate case. 28. The second point, which has been canvassed by the learned Counsel for parties is if the validity of the petitioner's appointment made way back on 5.7.1993, is to be judged by the qualifications prescribed under the Act of 2000 and the Rules of 2009. While the learned Counsel for the petitioner would submit that there is absolutely no scope for invocation of the qualifications prescribed under the Act of 2000 and the Rules of 2009 for an Assistant Teacher in a Shastri Level College, teaching a modern subject, to be the standard by which the petitioner's validity of appointment is judged, the learned Counsel for the respondents submit that those are minimum standards, in the absence of which the petitioner's appointment, even if made in the Institution was unaided, can no longer be recognized or approved for the payment of salary borne on State grant. In short, the petitioner's appointment, made at whatever point of time, has to conform to the qualifications prescribed for the post under the Act of 2000 and the Rules of 2009. In short, the petitioner's appointment, made at whatever point of time, has to conform to the qualifications prescribed for the post under the Act of 2000 and the Rules of 2009. For a principle, the qualifications for a post are to be judged by the contemporary rules as to eligibility etc. that are in force when the vacancy arises, or for the most part when the process of selection is initiated. 29. Here, the vacancy arose sometime before the month of June, 1993 and the process of selection commenced with an advertisement on 20.6.1993. The petitioner faced selections for the post on 25.6.1993, leading to the issue of an appointment letter dated 5.7.1993. He joined the Institution on 9.7.1993. The validity of the petitioner's appointment, vis-a-vis his qualifications, cannot be judged with reference to the Act of 2000 or the Rules of 2009 read with Chapter II, Schedule Ka of the said Rules, prescribing qualifications for an assistant teacher with the Institution, where the petitioner is employed. It is too well-settled for a principle that qualification in terms of a statute or statutory rule, prescribed much later in the day, after a candidate is selected or appointed, cannot govern his eligibility or the validity of his appointment. Even an amended Rule cannot affect the validity of an appointment to a post where the vacancy occurred before the amendment. Here, is a case where not only the vacancy occurred decades before the Act of 2000 or the Rules of 2009 came into force, but the petitioner has served the Institution for all this time, continuously paid by the Management out of their own resources. There is, therefore, no justification at all to judge the validity of the petitioner's appointment on the basis of qualifications prescribed for the post of an Assistant Teacher under the Act of 2000 or the Rules of 2009, framed under the said Act. This contention urged on behalf of the respondents is only stated to be rejected. In support of the said principle, reference may be made to Kulwant Singh and others v. Daya Ram and others, (2015) 3 SCC 177 . In Kulwant Singh (supra), taking note of the settled principle, it was held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court: ''39. This contention urged on behalf of the respondents is only stated to be rejected. In support of the said principle, reference may be made to Kulwant Singh and others v. Daya Ram and others, (2015) 3 SCC 177 . In Kulwant Singh (supra), taking note of the settled principle, it was held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court: ''39. In P. Ganeshwar Rao [P. Ganeshwar Rao v. State of A.P., 1988 Supp SCC 740 : 1989 SCC (L&S) 123 : (1988) 8 ATC 957] the Court reproduced a passage from Y.V. Rangaiah [Y.V. Rangaiah v. J. Sreenivasa Rao, (1983) 3 SCC 284 : 1983 SCC (L&S) 382 : AIR 1983 SC 852 ] and observed that it appositely applied to the facts of the said case. The question that emerged for consideration in the said case was whether the amendment made on 28-4-1980 to the Special Rules in the said case applied only to the vacancies that arose after the date on which the amendment came into force or whether it applied to the vacancies which had arisen before the said date also. Interpreting the Rule the Court observed that the amendment on 28-4-1980 did not apply to the vacancies that had arisen prior to the date of amendment. The ratio of the said decision is that the vacancies that had arisen after the amendment would be governed by the amended Rule and the vacancies that had arisen prior to the amendment would be governed by the unamended Rule. 40. In R. Dayal [State of Rajasthan v. R. Dayal, (1997) 10 SCC 419 : 1997 SCC (L&S) 1631] the Court was considering the effect of Rule 24-A of the Rajasthan Service of Engineers (Building and Roads Branch) Rules, 1954 (as amended). It pertained to the vacancies which were filled up prior to the amended Rule. Question arose whether the vacancies were prepared to be filled up under the amended Rule or unamended Rule. On behalf of the respondents therein reliance was placed on Y.V. Rangaiah [Y.V. Rangaiah v. J. Sreenivasa Rao, (1983) 3 SCC 284 : 1983 SCC (L&S) 382 : AIR 1983 SC 852 ]. The Court, appreciating the factual scenario and the rule position, came to hold as follows: (R. Dayal case [State of Rajasthan v. R. Dayal, (1997) 10 SCC 419 : 1997 SCC (L&S) 1631], SCC p. 422, para 8) ''8. The Court, appreciating the factual scenario and the rule position, came to hold as follows: (R. Dayal case [State of Rajasthan v. R. Dayal, (1997) 10 SCC 419 : 1997 SCC (L&S) 1631], SCC p. 422, para 8) ''8. … But the question is whether selection would be made, in the case of appointment to the vacancies which admittedly arose after the amendment of the Rules came into force, according to the amended Rules or in terms of Rule 9 read with Rules 23 and 24-A, as mentioned hereinbefore. This Court has considered the similar question in para 9 of the judgment above-cited. This Court has specifically laid that the vacancies which occurred prior to the amendment of the Rules would be governed by the original Rules and not by the amended Rules. Accordingly, this Court had held that the posts which fell vacant prior to the amendment of the Rules would be governed by the original Rules and not the amended Rules. As a necessary corollary, the vacancies that arose subsequent to the amendment of the Rules are required to be filled in in accordance with the law existing as on the date when the vacancies arose.'' 41. In B.L. Gupta [B.L. Gupta v. MCD, (1998) 9 SCC 223 : 1998 SCC (L&S) 532] the Court reiterated the principle stated in Y.V. Rangaiah [Y.V. Rangaiah v. J. Sreenivasa Rao, (1983) 3 SCC 284 : 1983 SCC (L&S) 382 : AIR 1983 SC 852 ], P. Ganeshwar Rao [P. Ganeshwar Rao v. State of A.P., 1988 Supp SCC 740 : 1989 SCC (L&S) 123 : (1988) 8 ATC 957] and A.A. Calton v. Director of Education [ (1983) 3 SCC 33 : 1983 SCC (L&S) 356] wherein it had been held that the vacancies which had occurred prior to the amendment of rules were governed by the old rules and not by the amended rules. In Arjun Singh Rathore [Arjun Singh Rathore v. B.N. Chaturvedi, (2007) 11 SCC 605 : (2008) 2 SCC (L&S) 387] the views stated in Y.V. Rangaiah [Y.V. Rangaiah v. J. Sreenivasa Rao, (1983) 3 SCC 284 : 1983 SCC (L&S) 382 : AIR 1983 SC 852 ] and R. Dayal [State of Rajasthan v. R. Dayal, (1997) 10 SCC 419 : 1997 SCC (L&S) 1631] were reiterated.'' 30. This is more or less the principle, on which we have decided the first point involved in this petition, relating to validity of the petitioner's appointment with reference to the University's ordinance, that came into force after the process of selection relating to the petitioner's appointment that had already commenced. 31. This then being the position of the law, the order passed by the Director of Education (Secondary), U.P., Lucknow, denying sanction of salary to the petitioner, is patently flawed. There is ample evidence on record and no one has seriously disputed the fact before this Court that the petitioner was selected and appointed to the Institution as an Assistant Teacher (Modern Subject) way back on 5.7.1993 and paid salary by the Management out of their own resources before the Institution was extended grant-in-aid. The fact that the DIOS in his report dated 30.12.2010, submitted to the Director of Education (Secondary), mentions the petitioner's name at Sr. No. 4 of the list of teachers with particulars of their date of appointment, their qualifications etc., lends credence to the petitioner's pre-existing appointment with the Institution at the time it was taken on grant-in-aid in terms of the Government Order dated 12.8.2010. The list, included in the report of the DIOS, shows that the petitioner's name finds place at Sr. No. 4 at Page No. 43 of the Paper Book. The date of the petitioner's appointment shown is 9.7.1993, which bears reference to his date of joining the Institution. In fact, three teachers are shown to have joined on that date. The petitioner's qualifications are mentioned in the last column of this tabular list. The entire cause of action in this writ petition appears to have arisen because the then Principal of the Institution wanted to displace the petitioner, and instead introduce his son, Pushpendra Mani Shukla, as a teacher in the Institution, without any basis to his appointment. There is an assertion in this regard in Paragraph No. 10 of the writ petition, which respondent Nos. 2 and 4, though Authorities of the Education Department, have not all denied. All that respondent Nos. There is an assertion in this regard in Paragraph No. 10 of the writ petition, which respondent Nos. 2 and 4, though Authorities of the Education Department, have not all denied. All that respondent Nos. 2 and 4 have said to the very serious allegation against the Principal introducing his son surreptitiously in the list of teachers, without any basis for his appointment, is that contents of Paragraph No. 10 of the writ petition are related to the Manager and the Principal of the Institution and need no reply. The Manager despite service has not appeared in the matter and disputed the assertion in Paragraph No. 10 of the writ petition. 32. This Court cannot also lose sight of the fact that in Paragraph No. 11 of the writ petition, it is averred that upon the petitioner's complaint made to the Director of Education in regard to the Principal introducing his son as a teacher in the Institution without basis, omitting the petitioner's name, the DIOS held an inquiry and submitted his report dated 30.12.2010 to the Director with a finding that the petitioner was teaching with the Institution, joining it on 9.7.1993 and that he is regularly functioning. This assertion in Paragraph No. 11, for a fact, has not been denied by the respondents in Paragraph No. 18 of the counter-affidavit. Rather, approval of payment of salary to the petitioner on the basis of the DIOS's report dated 30.12.2010, granted by the Director of Education on 28.3.2012, is stated to have been cancelled vide an order also dated 28.3.2012 passed by the Director of Education (Secondary), U.P., Lucknow, on ground that the petitioner did not possess qualifications mentioned in Appendix Ka to the Rules of 2009 framed under the Act of 2000. There is no rebuttal of the fact that the petitioner was appointed to the Institution way back on 5.7.1993, which he joined on 9.7.1993 and has been functioning eversince, as reported by the DIOS in his report dated 30.12.2010, submitted to the Director of Education. 33. This Court is convinced that the petitioner has been deliberately deprived of his lawful appointment as an Assistant Teacher with the Institution, because of the Manager and the Principal's temptation to accommodate some person of their choice, said to be the Principal's son, after the Institution was extended Government grant-in-aid. 33. This Court is convinced that the petitioner has been deliberately deprived of his lawful appointment as an Assistant Teacher with the Institution, because of the Manager and the Principal's temptation to accommodate some person of their choice, said to be the Principal's son, after the Institution was extended Government grant-in-aid. As it happens, matters were entirely different until the Institution was not in receipt of grant-in-aid. Nobody doubted the petitioner's appointment or his right to continue as a Teacher with the Institution before it was aided. They should not be allowed to question it later on. 34. In the circumstances, this Court finds the impugned order passed by the Director of Education (Secondary), U.P., Lucknow to be utterly flawed, which ought to be undone. 35. In the result, this petition succeeds and is allowed with costs of Rs. 20,000/-. The impugned order dated 23.1.2015 passed by the Director of Education (Secondary), U.P., Lucknow is hereby quashed. A mandamus is issued to the Director of Education (Secondary), U.P., Lucknow, the DIOS and the Manager of the Institution, to ensure immediate payment of the entire salary due to the petitioner together with current salary. He would be permitted to function as an Assistant Teacher with the Institution in accordance with his appointment as an Assistant Teacher (Modern Subjects) with the Institution and paid his salary regularly. The arrears of salary shall be caused to be paid by the Director of Education (Secondary), U.P., Lucknow, the DIOS and the Manager of the Institution within a period of two months of the date of receipt of a copy of this order. It is further ordered that the arrears of salary will carry simple interest @ 6% per annum from the date of relative accrual of each month's salary until the date of actual payment, if the salary is not paid within two months as directed. The costs of Rs. 20,000/- shall be paid to the petitioner by the Manager of the Institution by crediting it to his account separately.