ORDER : 1. By way of this petition, the petitioner has prayed for the following reliefs; “18.The petitioner, therefore, prays that this Hon’ble Court be pleased to issue writ of mandamus or a writ in the nature of mandamus or a writ of certiorari or a writ in the nature of certiorari or any other appropriate writ, direction or order and be pleased to; A. Quash and set aside the Impugned Rulings passed by the Learned Arbitral Tribunal including: i) the ruling on 10 February 2024 insofar as the Learned Arbitral Tribunal disallowed a question whereby RI-W2 was asked to produce a document which RI-W2 had referred to in his previous answers at Annexure-F ii) the ruling on 26 February 2024 insofar as the Learned Arbitral Tribunal disallowed a question on the ground that the document was not produced by RI-W2 iii) the ruling on 26 February 2024 insofar as the Learned Arbitral Tribunal disallowed a question for being of an omnibus nature iii) the ruling on 26 February 2024 insofar as the Learned Arbitral Tribunal disallowed a question holding it to be not relevant: and B. Pass an appropriate order directing the Learned Arbitral Tribunal to recall RI-W2 so that the wrongly disallowed questions may be posed to him; C. Pending hearing and final disposal of this petition, the arbitral proceedings may kindly be ordered to be stayed; D. any other and further relief deemed just and proper be granted in the interest of justice; E. to provide for the cost of this petition.” 2. The brief facts giving rise to the present petition are as under; It is the case of the petitioner, as narrated by the learned Sr. Advocate, Mr. Soparkar, that on 20.01.2004, Respondent No.1-the Board of Trustees of Kandla Port floated a tender, inviting applications for the project at Kandla Port Trust for the development of a container terminal at Berth Nos. 11 and 12, i.e. terminals, and licensing out the operation, management and maintenance of the terminal on a build, operate and transfer basis. 2.1 on 23.06.2006. Respondent No.4 – Kandla Container Terminal Private Limited and Respondent No.1 entered into a license agreement, whereby, Respondent No.4 was granted a license for the period of 30 years to carry out the project, on the terms and conditions set out in the License Agreement. 2.1 on 23.06.2006. Respondent No.4 – Kandla Container Terminal Private Limited and Respondent No.1 entered into a license agreement, whereby, Respondent No.4 was granted a license for the period of 30 years to carry out the project, on the terms and conditions set out in the License Agreement. 2.2 Pursuant to the execution of the aforesaid License Agreement, it appears that some disputes arose between Respondent No.1 and Respondent No.4 and therefore, as per the order passed by the Coordinate Bench of this Court in Petition under the Arbitration Act No. 52 of 2013, the sole arbitrator was appointed, so as to adjudicate the disputes and differences between Respondent No.1 and Respondent No.4. 2.3 The arbitration proceedings commenced on 21.01.2014 and the parties completed their pleadings and also adduced evidence by way of affidavits, in lieu of examination-in-chief. The cross-examination of the witnesses of Respondent Nos. 2, 3 and 4 has already been completed, whereas, the cross-examination of the witness of Respondent No.1 is underway. 2.4 In the aforesaid background of facts, the present petition is filed against certain rulings given by the Arbitration Tribunal during the course of cross-examination of the second witness of Respondent No.1 by the learned Advocate for the petitioner. 2.5 The petitioner is a company, incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956, which was formerly known as ABG Heavey Industries Limited, whereas, Respondent No.1 is a body, incorporated under the provisions of the Major Port Trust Act, 1963, and Respondent No. 2-Axis Bank and Respondent No. 3- UCO Bank are the lenders, who have provided financial assistance to Respondent No.4 for the aforesaid project. Respondent No.4 is the license agreement holder and which is a wholly owned subsidiary of the present petitioner. 2.6 It is the case of the petitioner that it is not a party to the arbitration agreement and therefore, the petitioner was not joined as a party in the arbitration proceedings, initially. However, pursuant to an application moved by Respondent No.1 in the arbitration proceedings, the petitioner was impleaded as party in the arbitration proceedings, pursuant to the order dated 12.07.2019, passed by the Arbitral Tribunal. However, pursuant to an application moved by Respondent No.1 in the arbitration proceedings, the petitioner was impleaded as party in the arbitration proceedings, pursuant to the order dated 12.07.2019, passed by the Arbitral Tribunal. However, petitioner challenged the order dated 12.07.2019 before this Court, by way of filing Special Civil Application No. 14146 of 2019 and ultimately, the aforesaid petition came to be dismissed by this Court vide CAV judgment dated 18.05.2020, on the limited ground that the implead order cannot be challenged by invoking the provisions of Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. It was also observed that it shall be open for both the side to raise all the contentions, on merits, before an appropriate forum in an appropriate proceedings. It is, further, the case of the petitioner that its application, filed under Section 16 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (in brief, ‘Act of 1996’), also came to be rejected. 2.7 By way of this petition, the petitioner has challenged certain rulings given by the learned Arbitral Tribunal, during the course of cross-examination of the second witness of Respondent No.1, namely Captain T. Srinivas (R1-W2) by the learned Counsel for the petitioner. 2.8 The rulings made by the Arbitral Tribunal, which are subject- matter of challenge before this Court, reads thus; “First Impugned Ruling: Insofar as the Learned Arbitral Tribunal disallowed a question whereby R1-W2 was asked to produce a document which R1-W2 himself has referred to in his previous answers; Second Impugned Ruling: Insofar as the Learned Arbitral disallowed a question on the ground that the document was not produced by R1-W2; Third Impugned Ruling: Insofar as the Learned Arbitral disallowed a question for being of an ‘Omnibus’ nature; Second Impugned Ruling: Insofar as the Learned Arbitral disallowed a question holding it to be not relevant” 2.9 Hence, the present petition. 3. Heard, learned Sr. Advocate, Mr. Soparkar, appearing with learned Advocate, Mr. 3. Heard, learned Sr. Advocate, Mr. Soparkar, appearing with learned Advocate, Mr. Dave, for the petitioner, who submitted that the petitioner has challenged the aforesaid rulings on the following grounds; (1) By way of the impugned order, the Arbitral Tribunal has erroneously disallowed questions, which are very material for deciding the matter in controversy in the arbitration proceedings and which go to the root of the dispute; (2) So far as the first impugned ruling is concerned, the learned Arbitral Tribunal disallowed question No. 179, whereby, R1-W-2 was asked to produce a document, which he had referred to in his previous answers and thereby, the learned Arbitral Tribunal failed to appreciate the fact that the said question emanated from R1-W2’s own testimony and was put to him in view of his answers to the immediately preceding questions. It was submitted that the petitioner’s basis for seeking the production of the said document is founded on these changed circumstances and therefore, it is entirely different from the basis, on which Respondent No.4 had sought production of the same, by way of an application for production of documents. (3) Insofar as the second impugned ruling is concerned, the learned Arbitral Tribunal disallowed question No. 206, whereby, R1-W2 was asked to confirm, which part of the admiralty chart he had referred to, while answering question No. 148 and thereby, the learned Arbitral Tribunal erred in holding that the said question could not be allowed, as the concerned document was not produced by the said witness, i.e. R1- W2. (4) It was submitted that the learned Arbitral Tribunal failed to appreciate the fact that, though, the concerned document may not have been produced by R1-W2, but, since he had referred the same in his previous answer, it was imperative, in order to effectively cross-examine the said witness, that the learned Arbitral Tribunal ought to have allowed the learned Counsel for the petitioner to follow the said line of questioning. (5) It was, further, submitted that, though, the document, which was referred to by R1-W2 was different from the document he was shown, the Arbitral Tribunal failed to appreciate the fact that the petitioner has a right to confront R1-W2 with regard to the documents, which are not on the record, since, it is well settled that no limitation can be placed on the documents with which a witness can be confronted, during the course of his or her cross-examination. (6) It was also submitted that it is a trite law that, during the course of cross-examination, any document can be produced and a witness can be confronted with the same and therefore, if, the petitioner is prevented from confronting R1-W2 with regard to the said document, it will defeat the whole purpose of cross- examination of R1-W2. 3.1 In support of his submissions, learned Sr. Advocate, Mr. Soparkar, placed reliance on the observations made by the Division Bench of this Court at Paragraphs-7, 8, 9(12), 34, 39, 41 and 53-56 in the case of ‘Narmada Clean-Tech & Another Vs. Indian Council of Arbitration’, Dated: 30.07.2020, rendered in Letters Patent Appeal No. 308 of 2020 and the allied civil application, wherein, the Division Bench has taken a view that a petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, against an interim order passed in the arbitral proceedings, is very much maintainable. 3.2 Learned Sr. Advocate, Mr. Soparkar, next placed reliance on the decision of the Apex Court in the case of ‘Surendar Kumar Singhal Vs. Arun Khumar Bhalotia’, reported in 2021 SCC Online Del 3708 and more particularly, the observations made at Paragraphs-18-20, 25 thereof and submitted that in exceptional circumstances, the interference under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India is permissible, even in respect of an interim order passed during an arbitral proceedings. 3.3 Learned Sr. Advocate, Mr. Soparkar, also invited the attention of this Court to the observations made by the Bombay High Court, at Paragraphs- 12 to 15, in the case of ‘Nitin VS. Monesh’, Dated: 05.02.2024, rendered in Writ Petition No. 6714 of 2023 and submitted that a writ-petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India is maintainable, against an order passed by an Arbitration Tribunal, however, only in exceptional circumstances, as held in the case of ‘Surendar Kumar Singhal’ (Supra). Monesh’, Dated: 05.02.2024, rendered in Writ Petition No. 6714 of 2023 and submitted that a writ-petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India is maintainable, against an order passed by an Arbitration Tribunal, however, only in exceptional circumstances, as held in the case of ‘Surendar Kumar Singhal’ (Supra). 3.4 By relying on the observations made by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of ‘Mohammed Abdul Wahid Vs. Nilofer’, reported in 2023/INSC/1075, more particularly the observations made at Paragraphs- 5.3, 7(b) and 26-31 thereof, learned Sr. Advocate, Mr. Soparkar, submitted that save and except the cross- examination part of a civil suit, at no other point, shall such confrontation be allowed, without such document having accompanied the plaint or written statement filed before the court. 3.5 Lastly, learned Sr. Advocate, Mr. Soparkar, placed reliance on the observations made by the Apex Court at Paragraphs- 13 and 14 in the case of ‘Bipin Shantilal Panchal Vs. State of Gujarat’, reported in (2001) 3 SCC 1 , wherein, the Apex Court has held that the principles laid down, in respect of admissibility of an evidence, are required to be followed strictly. 4. On perusal of the material on record, I find that, earlier, when the present petitioner challenged its impleadment, as one of the Respondents in the ongoing arbitration proceedings vide order dated 12.07.2019, by way of filing Special Civil Application No. 14146 of 2019, the Coordinate Bench of this Court dismissed the said petition vide CAV judgment dated 18.05.2020 by holding that the interim order in an arbitration proceedings cannot be challenged by invoking the extra-ordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. In the CAV judgment dated 18.05.2020, without entering into the merits of the matter, the Coordinate Bench of this Court kept all the rights and contentions of the parties open, by observing that it shall be open for both the sides to raise all the contentions on merits, before the appropriate forum, in an appropriate proceedings, and at an appropriate time and in accordance with law. In the petition, in Paragraph-4.3, there is a reference about order dated 18.05.2020, passed in SCA 14146 of 2019. However, it is silent about whether that CAV judgment was further carried in appeal or not. In the petition, in Paragraph-4.3, there is a reference about order dated 18.05.2020, passed in SCA 14146 of 2019. However, it is silent about whether that CAV judgment was further carried in appeal or not. Upon perusal of record, as I could not find anything to indicate that the above CAV judgment was further challenged, I have a reason to believe that it has attained finality. 4.1 The Coordinate Bench of this Court, further, observed as under at Paragraphs- 8 to 10 of the CAV judgment dated 18.05.2020; “8. The issue is no more res integra as in case of GTPL Hathway Ltd. v. Strategic Marketing Pvt. Ltd in Special Civil Application No.4524/2019 rendered on 20.04.2020 this Court has held as under: “14.In view of aforesaid conspectus of law, and considering the provisions of the Act, 1996, the order passed by the Arbitration Tribunal during the course of Arbitration cannot be challenged by the petitioner under Articles 226 and/or 227 of the Constitution of India when the constitution bench of the Apex Court in case of M/s. S.B.P. and Co. v. M/s. Patel Engineering Ltd. and Anr. (supra) has disapproved the stand that any order passed by the Arbitral Tribunal is capable of being corrected by the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India and has categorically held that such intervention by the High Court is not permissible. The Apex Court in case of M/s. Deep Industries Limited v. Oil and Natural Gas Corporation (supra) has held that it is also important to notice that the seven Judge Bench has referred to the object of the Act being that of minimizing judicial intervention and that this important object should always be kept in the forefront when a 227 petition is being disposed of against proceedings that are decided under the Act,1996 and that the policy of the Act is speedy disposal of arbitration cases as the Act,1996 is 'self contained' Code and deals with all the cases. 15. In view of aforesaid settled legal proposition, considering the policy, object and the provisions of the Act,1996, an order passed during arbitration proceedings by the Arbitration Tribunal cannot be challenged under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India as the Act,1996 is a special act and a self contained code dealing with arbitration. 15. In view of aforesaid settled legal proposition, considering the policy, object and the provisions of the Act,1996, an order passed during arbitration proceedings by the Arbitration Tribunal cannot be challenged under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India as the Act,1996 is a special act and a self contained code dealing with arbitration. Therefore, the impugned order of the Arbitration Tribunal deciding the preliminary objection raised by the petitioner cannot be challenged under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India. 16. In view of foregoing reasons, the petition fails and is accordingly dismissed. It is, however, made clear that the petition is dismissed without entering into merits of the matter, only on the ground that the order passed during course of arbitration cannot be challenged under Articles 226 and/or 227 of the constitution of India and it would be open for both the sides to raise all the contentions on merits before the appropriate forum in appropriate proceeding at appropriate time in accordance with law. Interim relief, if any stands vacated. Rule is discharged with no order as to costs.” 9. In view of aforesaid discernment of law, the decisions relied upon by both the sides are not required to be discussed at length as impugned order dated 12th July,2019 passed by the sole arbitrator during the arbitration proceedings impleading the petitioner as party respondent in arbitration proceedings cannot be challenged by invoking extra ordinary jurisdiction under Articles 226 and/or 227 of the Constitution of India. 10. In view of foregoing reasons, the petition fails and is accordingly dismissed. It is, however, made clear that the petition is dismissed without entering into merits of the matter, only on the ground that the order passed during course of arbitration proceedings cannot be challenged under Articles 226 and/or 227 of the constitution of India and it would be open for both the sides to raise all the contentions on merits before the appropriate forum in appropriate proceeding at appropriate time in accordance with law. Interim relief, if any stands vacated. Rule is discharged with no order as to costs.” 4.2 The Coordinate Bench of this Court also considered the decision in the case of ‘M/s. S.B.P. and Co. Interim relief, if any stands vacated. Rule is discharged with no order as to costs.” 4.2 The Coordinate Bench of this Court also considered the decision in the case of ‘M/s. S.B.P. and Co. v. M/s. Patel Engineering Ltd. and Anr.’, reported in (2005) 8 SCC 618 , as well as the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court, in the case of ‘M/s. Deep Industries Limited Vs. Oil and Natural Gas Corporation’, (2019) 17 SCALE 85 . 4.3 In the case of ‘M/s. S.B.P. and Co.‘ (Supra), at Paragraphs- 44, 45 and 46, it is held as under; “44. It is seen that some High Courts have proceeded on the basis that any order passed by an arbitral tribunal during arbitration, would be capable of being challenged under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India. We see no warrant for such an approach. Section 37 makes certain orders of the arbitral tribunal appealable. Under Section 34, the aggrieved party has an avenue for ventilating his grievances against the award including any in between orders that might have been passed by the arbitral tribunal acting under Section 16 of the Act. The party aggrieved by any order of the arbitral tribunal, unless has a right of appeal under Section 37 of the Act, has to wait until the award is passed by the Tribunal. This appears to be the scheme of the Act. The arbitral tribunal is after all, the creature of a contract between the parties, the arbitration agreement, even though if the occasion arises, the Chief Justice may constitute it based on the contract between the parties. But that would not alter the status of the arbitral tribunal. It will still be a forum chosen by the parties by agreement. We, therefore, disapprove of the stand adopted by some of the High Courts that any order passed by the arbitral tribunal is capable of being corrected by the High Court under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India. Such an intervention by the High Courts is not permissible. 45. The object of minimizing judicial intervention while the matter is in the process of being arbitrated upon, will certainly be defeated if the High Court could be approached under Article 227 of the Constitution of India or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India against every order made by the arbitral tribunal. 45. The object of minimizing judicial intervention while the matter is in the process of being arbitrated upon, will certainly be defeated if the High Court could be approached under Article 227 of the Constitution of India or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India against every order made by the arbitral tribunal. Therefore, it is necessary to indicate that once the arbitration has commenced in the arbitral tribunal, parties have to wait until the award is pronounced unless, of course, a right of appeal is available to them under Section 37 of the Act even at an earlier stage. 46. We, therefore, sum up our conclusions as follows: i) The power exercised by the Chief Justice of the High Court or the Chief Justice of India under Section 11(6) of the Act is not an administrative power. It is a judicial power. ii) The power under Section 11(6) of the Act, in its entirety, could be delegated, by the Chief Justice of the High Court only to another judge of that court and by the Chief Justice of India to another judge of the Supreme Court. (iii) In case of designation of a judge of the High Court or of the Supreme Court, the power that is exercised by the designated, judge would be that of the Chief Justice as conferred by the statute. (iv) The Chief Justice or the designated judge will have the right to decide the preliminary aspects as indicated in the earlier part of this judgment. These will be, his own jurisdiction, to entertain the request, the existence of a valid arbitration agreement, the existence or otherwise of a live claim, the existence of the condition for the exercise of his power and on the qualifications of the arbitrator or arbitrators. The Chief Justice or the judge designated would be entitled to seek the opinion of an institution in the matter of nominating an arbitrator qualified in terms of Section 11(8) of the Act if the need arises but the order appointing the arbitrator could only be that of he Chief Justice or the judge designate. (v) Designation of a district judge as the authority under Section 11(6) of the Act by the Chief Justice of the High Court is not warranted on the scheme of the Act. (v) Designation of a district judge as the authority under Section 11(6) of the Act by the Chief Justice of the High Court is not warranted on the scheme of the Act. (vi) Once the matter reaches the arbitral tribunal or the sole arbitrator, the High Court would not interfere with orders passed by the arbitrator or the arbitral tribunal during the course of the arbitration proceedings and the parties could approach the court only in terms of Section 37 of the Act or in terms of Section 34 of the Act.” 4.4 Similarly, in the case of ‘M/s. Deep Industries Limited’ (Supra), it is held as under; “12) Most significant of all is the non-obstinate clause contained in Section 5 which states that notwithstanding anything contained in any other law, in matters that arise under Part I of the Arbitration Act, no judicial authority shall intervene except where so provided in this Part. Section 37 grants a constricted right of first appeal against certain judgments and orders and no others. Further, the statutory mandate also provides for one bite at the cherry, and interdicts a second appeal being filed (See Section 37(2) of the Act). 13) This being the case, there is no doubt whatsoever that if petitions were to be filed under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution against orders passed in appeals under Section 37, the entire arbitral process would be derailed and would not come to fruition for many years. At the same time, we cannot forget that Article 227 is a constitutional provision which remains untouched by the non-obstinate clause of Section 5 of the Act. In these circumstances, what is important to note is that though petitions can be filed under Article 227 against judgments allowing or dismissing first appeals under Section 37 of the Act, yet the High Court would be extremely circumspect in interfering with the same, taking into account the statutory policy as adumbrated by us herein above so that interference is restricted to orders that are passed which are patently lacking in inherent jurisdiction. XXX XXX XXX 15. XXX XXX XXX 15. In the judgments relied upon by Shri Vaidyanathan, which, by and large, reiterate the proposition laid down in Baburam Prakash Chandra Maheshwari v. Antarim Zila Parishad AIR 1969 SC 556 , it has been held that an alternative remedy is not a bar to the entertaining of writ petition filed for the enforcement of any of the fundamental rights or where there has been a violation of the principles of natural justice or where the order under challenge is wholly without jurisdiction or the vires of the statute is under challenge.” 4.5 This Court has also taken into consideration the decisions, relied on by the learned Sr. Advocate, Mr. Soparkar, so far as the maintainability of this petition is concerned, wherein, the view is taken that a petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India is maintainable even against an interim order passed during the arbitration proceedings, but then, in that case, the overall ratio laid down in a judgment is required to be taken into consideration. The Hon‘ble Apex Court in the case of ‘Surendar Kumar Singhal’ (Supra), at Paragraph-25 thereof, has observed as under; “24. A perusal of the above-mentioned decisions, shows that the following principles are well settled, in respect of the scope of interference under Article 226/227 in challenges to orders by an arbitral tribunal including orders passed under Section 16 of the Act. A perusal of the above-mentioned decisions, shows that the following principles are well settled, in respect of the scope of interference under Article 226/227 in challenges to orders by an arbitral tribunal including orders passed under Section 16 of the Act. (i) An arbitral tribunal is a tribunal against which a petition under Article 226/227 would be maintainable; (ii) The non-obstinate clause in section 5 of the Act does not apply in respect of exercise of powers under Article 227 which is a Constitutional provision; (iii) For interference under Article 226/227, there have to be `exceptional circumstances'; (iv) Though interference is permissible, unless and until the order is so perverse that it is patently lacking in inherent jurisdiction, the writ court would not interfere; (v) Interference is permissible only if the order is completely perverse i.e., that the perversity must stare in the face; (vi) High Courts ought to discourage litigation which necessarily interfere with the arbitral process; (vii) Excessive judicial interference in the arbitral process is not encouraged; (viii) It is prudent not to exercise jurisdiction under Article 226/227; (ix) The power should be exercised in ‘exceptional rarity' or if there is `bad faith' which is shown; (x) Efficiency of the arbitral process ought not to be allowed to diminish and hence interdicting the arbitral process should be completely avoided.” 4.6 If, the observations made by the Apex Court at Paragraph- 25, as noted herein above, are considered, I find that the same are made in respect of scope and extent of interference under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, against the orders passed by an arbitral tribunal and same is the crux of the principles laid down by the Apex Court in regard to the above aspect, by taking into consideration various other decisions. Even, by way of the observations made at Paragraph-25, as reproduced herein above, the Apex Court has taken a categorical view that for interference with an interim order under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, there shall have to be exceptional circumstances and that the order in question shall have to be so perverse that it is patently lacking inherent jurisdiction and in absence of the same, a writ Court shall not interfere with an interim order. The Apex Court has, further, observed that the High Courts ought to discourage the litigation, which necessarily interfere with the arbitral proceedings and excessive judicial interference with the arbitral proceedings is not to be encouraged. In view of the above specific observations made by the Apex Court that a petition, under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, is maintainable, even if, the submission made by the learned Sr. Advocate, Mr. Soparkar, is accepted then also, as per the decision cited by him, ordinarily, the Courts should not interfere with the arbitral proceedings, unless some exceptional circumstances are made out or pointed out. 4.7 In the instant case, as can be seen from the submissions made by the learned Sr. Advocate, Mr. Soparkar, and noted in the foregoing paragraphs, it can be said that the petitioner has failed to point out any exceptional circumstances, so as to warrant interference with the arbitral proceedings, at the hands of this Court. 4.8 On perusal of the record as well as considering the challenge in this petition, I find that the petitioner has challenged the rulings of the learned Arbitral Tribunal in respect of disallowing some questions put-forward by the present petitioner. However, in view of the fact that the arbitral award has not been published, yet, unless it is established by the petitioner, as to how and in what manner the aforesaid disallowance of the questions put-forward by the petitioner has caused any prejudice to the petitioner, it would not be appropriate for this Court to issue any direction to the learned Arbitral Tribunal in the midst of the arbitration proceedings, since, the same would amount to judicial interference with the process of arbitration, which is not approved by the Hon’ble Apex Court as well as the Coordinate Bench of this Court, as noted in the judgments referred to, herein above. 4.9 In view of the above discussion, I do not see any reason to interfere with the rulings, which are the subject-matter of challenge before this Court, as it is too premature for the petitioner to establish that because of such rulings, any prejudice has been caused to the petitioner. Unless, a prejudice is established, no exceptional circumstances can be said to have been made out by the petitioner and therefore, at this stage, there is no reason for this Court to interfere with the impugned rulings. Unless, a prejudice is established, no exceptional circumstances can be said to have been made out by the petitioner and therefore, at this stage, there is no reason for this Court to interfere with the impugned rulings. Accordingly, this petition deserves to be dismissed, without entering into merits of the matter. 5. Resultantly, this petition fails and is dismissed, without entering into the merits of the case of the petitioner. It is needless to say that it shall be open to both the sides to raise all the contentions on merits before the appropriate forum, appropriate proceedings and at an appropriate time. No order as to costs.