JUDGMENT : Virender Singh, J. Applicant-Hitesh Gandhi has filed the present application, under Section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter referred to as ‘CrPC’), seeking, his release on bail, during the pendency of trial, in case No. ECIR/SHSZO/04/2019, dated 22nd July, 2019, registered with the Enforcement Directorate office (ED), Sub Zonal office, Rani Villa, Bagrian House, Strawberry Hills, Chotta Shimla, Shimla, Himachal Pradesh. 2. According to the applicant, the necessary facts, giving rise to the present case, are as under: 3. The Central Bureau of Investigation, Shimla, Railway Board Building, The Mall, Shimla (hereinafter referred to as ‘CBI’) had registered RC0962019A0002,dated 7th May, 2019, under Sections 409, 419, 465, 466, 467 read with Section 120-B of the Indian Penal Code (hereinafter referred to as ‘IPC’) and Sections 13(1) (c), 13 (1) (d) read with Section 13 (2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act (hereinafter referred to as ‘PC Act’). 4. As per the case set up by CBI, the applicant, who is Vice Chairman of KC Group of Institutes, Pandoga, Una, H.P., has wrongly claimed the scholarship of the students belonging to certain class, who, without completing the concerned course, left the institute. After registration of the FIR by the CBI, the case was taken up by the Directorate of Enforcement (hereinafter referred to as ‘ED’), on the basis of which ECIR/SHSZO/04/2019, dated 22nd July, 2019, was registered, under the provisions of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (hereinafter referred to as ‘PMLA’). 5. It is the further case of the applicant that on 29th August, 2023, raid was conducted by ED, in the premises of the applicant. Thereafter, summons were issued to the applicant, by hand, without specifying therein the place and date. Thereafter, the applicant was arrested on 29th August, 2023, from Chandigarh, at 09.20 p.m. at Nawashaher. These facts have been highlighted to plead that the arrest of the applicant was in violation of the provisions of Section 19 (3) of the PMLA. 6. According to the applicant, in order to cover up the delay, the arrest of the applicant has been shown at Chandigarh, instead of Navashaher. It is the case of the applicant that the applicant, through summons, was directed to appear before the authorized officer forthwith and those summons were issued at Nawashaher, when the raid was completed. 7. 6. According to the applicant, in order to cover up the delay, the arrest of the applicant has been shown at Chandigarh, instead of Navashaher. It is the case of the applicant that the applicant, through summons, was directed to appear before the authorized officer forthwith and those summons were issued at Nawashaher, when the raid was completed. 7. As per the further case of the applicant, he was to appear in the office of the Authority at Shimla and the date for the same was not specified. 8. Apart from this, it has been pleaded that the provisions of Section 19 (1) of PMLA have been violated, which mandated that the authorized officer, on the basis of the material in his possession, is bound to record the reasons to believe that any person has been guilty of the offence, punishable under PMLA. Not only this, the grounds of arrest are to be informed to him, as soon as, the said person is arrested. The reasons to believe, according to the applicant, have to be recorded before the arrest of the accused. Highlighting the fact that as per the arrest order, no grounds of arrest have been supplied to the applicant, which is complete violation of Section 19 (a) of PMLA. 9. It has further been pleaded, in the application, that during the course of investigation, the applicant was associated eight times since the year 2019 and lastly, he was associated on 29th August, 2023. He was arrested on 29th August, 2023 at 09.20 p.m., from his house at Mohal Bhatti Colony, Navashaher, Punjab. 10. The applicant has also tried his luck by moving bail application, under Section 439 CrPC, before the learned Special Judge, Shimla. However, his application has been dismissed, vide order, dated 16th September, 2023. 11. According to the applicant, no offence is made out against him, under the provisions of PMLA. Reproducing the allegations, which have been levelled against the applicant, it has been prayed that the entire case of the ED is based upon assumptions and hypothesis. 12. The applicant has put forward the explanation to prima facie prove that the alleged receipt of the scholarship amount cannot be called as proceeds of crime. 13. Reproducing the allegations, which have been levelled against the applicant, it has been prayed that the entire case of the ED is based upon assumptions and hypothesis. 12. The applicant has put forward the explanation to prima facie prove that the alleged receipt of the scholarship amount cannot be called as proceeds of crime. 13. Not only this, according to the applicant, the land, which is stated to be purchased out of the proceeds of crime, was purchased on 8th September, 2017 and 8th December, 2017. 14. On the basis of the above facts, a prayer has been made to allow the bail application. 15. When put to notice, the status report/reply, on behalf of the Assistant Director, ED, Sub Zonal Office, Shimla, has been filed, mentioning therein that the applicant has been arrested, as per the procedure prescribed under Section 19 of the PMLA. 16. According to ED, the matter revolves around a scam, involving the allocation of scholarships to SC, ST and OBC students, under the Post Matric Scheme. In this fraudulent activity, officials from the Department of Higher Education, alongwith private Educational Institutions and Banks, were involved, which has resulted into misappropriation of scholarship funds of more than Rs. 200 crore. 17. The applicant, according to the stand taken by ED, alongwith others, has played a major role in the scam, wrongfully withholding the rightful scholarship entitlement of the scholarships of the students, belonging to SC, ST and OBC students of Himachal Pradesh. According to ED, they have diverted the said funds into their pockets/accounts. 22 institutions are stated to be involved. In this regard, ED has relied upon the charge sheet submitted by CBI. The investigation is stated to be going on to unearth the illicit money and ascertain the proceeds of crime (PoC), obtained by way of this scam. 18. After recording the reason to believe in writing, the applicant and his co-accused were arrested by ED on 30th August, 2023, under Section 19 of PMLA, in the said ECIR. The investigation is stated to be going on to unearth the illicit money and ascertain the proceeds of crime (PoC), obtained by way of this scam. 18. After recording the reason to believe in writing, the applicant and his co-accused were arrested by ED on 30th August, 2023, under Section 19 of PMLA, in the said ECIR. Thereafter, they were produced before the Special Designated Court (PMLA), Shimla, on 31st August, 2023, and the learned Special Court, after perusal of all the documents, including the arrest memo, grounds of arrest, reasons to believe and material for formation of such belief, has granted five days’ ED custody, with a direction, to produce the accused persons before the Special Court on 4th September, 2023, on which date, they were produced before the Special Court and were remanded to judicial custody. 19. It is the further case of the ED that investigation is on going and is at crucial stage, which requires gathering of additional evidence, examination of voluminous records and recording of statements of several persons associated with the applicant and other accused persons related to the case. 20. The prayer, so made by the applicant, has further been opposed, on the ground that the offences, under the PMLA, are different offences, as such, constitute class apart and need to be dealt with different approach, in the matter of bail. 21. According to the ED, the offence, under investigation, requires detailed investigation to unearth the material and in such circumstances, if bail is granted, it would defeat the case of the prosecution. The twin conditions, as per Section 45 of the PMLA, are also stated to be not satisfied, in this case. 22. Elaborating their stand, it is the case of the ED that CBI registered Fir No. RC0962019S0002, dated 7th May, 2019, under Sections 409, 419, 465, 466 and 471 IPC, against the unknown persons. As per the allegations of the said case, there were complicity of individuals from State Government Education Department, Bank Officials and private institutions. Misappropriation in the disbursement of scholarship funds, in large scale, has also been alleged. The offences, under Sections 419 and 471 IPC, are also stated to be scheduled offences, mentioned in the schedule, appended to PMLA and as such, inquiry was initiated. 23. The applicant is stated to be the Vice Chairman of KC Group of Institutions at Pandoga, Una and Nawashehar, Punjab. The offences, under Sections 419 and 471 IPC, are also stated to be scheduled offences, mentioned in the schedule, appended to PMLA and as such, inquiry was initiated. 23. The applicant is stated to be the Vice Chairman of KC Group of Institutions at Pandoga, Una and Nawashehar, Punjab. According to the ED, during the course of investigation, it has been revealed that KC Group of Institutions, Pandoga and Nawashehar, in connivance with the officials of Directorate of Higher Education, Himachal Pradesh and Bank officials, have fraudulently availed the scholarship, under the Post Matric Scheme, for SC/ST/OBC of Himachal Pradesh. 24. According to the ED, the applicant has verified and claimed the scholarship under Post Matric Scheme, for the students, belonging to SC/ST/OBC, who were not enrolled in any course, with KC Group of Institutions Pandoga and who had left the institute without completing their studies. In order to grab more and more scholarship, false details of students were uploaded on scholarship portal, by changing the course of study in subsequent years, by changing the caste category of students and by showing the students as hosteler, instead of day scholars. Such false details were verified by the staff of KC Group of Institutions Pandoga and scholarship was claimed from the Directorate of Higher Education. 25. The applicant is alleged to have supervised the entire work related to admission and claim of scholarship, under Post Matric Scheme, for SC/St/OBC students of Himachal Pradesh of KC Group of Institutions, Pandoga and Nawashehar. According to the ED, the applicant was joint account holder in bank accounts, alongwith his father Prem Pal Gandhi, in which, illegally obtained scholarship amount got transferred from the bank accounts of the students. 26. It is the further allegation of the ED that the applicant, so far has obtained proceeds of crime to the tune of Rs. 4.42 crore, through KC Group of Institutions, Pandoga. 27. The bail application has also been opposed, on the ground, that the twin conditions, as per Section 45 of the PMLA, have not been fulfilled, in this case, and the applicant cannot be released on bail, unless, this Court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that he is not guilty of such offence and that he is not likely to commit any offence, while on bail. 28. 28. The learned Deputy Solicitor General of India, in this regard, has relied upon the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in Special Leave Petition (Criminal) No. 4634 of 2014, titled as Vijay Madanlal Choudhary and others versus Union of India and others, decided on 27th July, 2022; Criminal Appeal No. 1706 of 2015, titled as Gautam Kundu versus Manoj Kumar, Assistant Director, decided on 16th December, 2015; Criminal Appeal No. 730 of 2013, titled as Y.S. Jaganmohan Reddy versus CBI, Criminal Appeal Nos. 1878-1879 of 2017, titled as Rohit Tandon versus Directorate of Enforcement; and of the Allahabad High Court, in a case, titled as Anirudh Kamal Shukla versus Union of India Thru. Assistant Dir. Directorate of Enforcement. 29. Lastly, it has been submitted that in money laundering cases, jail is the rule and bail is an exception. 30. According to the further stand of ED, searches, under Section 17 of PMLA was conducted at 24 locations, including the residential premises of the applicant. After completion of search, the summons, under Section 50 of PMLA, were served upon him, for appearing before the authorized officer at Zonal Office of Directorate of Enforcement at Chandigarh, pursuant to which, the applicant appeared before the Directorate of Enforcement at Zonal Office, Chandigarh. After recording his statement and the reasons to believe, in writing, on the basis of material in possession, the applicant was arrested, under Section 19 of PMLA, on 30th August, 2023, at 09.24 a.m. According to ED, before his arrest, the applicant was informed about the grounds of his arrest, in writing. The applicant not only read the grounds of arrest, but, also signed each page of grounds of arrest in token of having read the same. 31. It is the further stand of the ED that the investigation conducted had revealed hat the applicant, through KC Group of Institutions at Pandoga and Nawashehar had obtained scholarship to the tune of Rs. 14,92,37,220/- illegally and fraudulently, in connivance with the officials of Directorate of Higher Education, Himachal Pradesh and the bank officials. This amount is stated to have been obtained by the applicant as a result of criminal activity of cheating and making false claims of students to obtain scholarship under Post Matric Scheme, in criminal conspiracy with public servant, between the years 2013-14 to 2017-18. 32. This amount is stated to have been obtained by the applicant as a result of criminal activity of cheating and making false claims of students to obtain scholarship under Post Matric Scheme, in criminal conspiracy with public servant, between the years 2013-14 to 2017-18. 32. According to the ED, after his arrest, the father of the applicant was informed about the arrest over call through mobile phone. The averment of the applicant that he was arrested from Nawashehar and neither the grounds of arrest nor the arrest order were supplied to him is stated to be baseless, as he was produced before the learned Special Court PMLA on 31st August, 2023 and the said Court, after careful examination of the material available on record, granted five days’ ED custody to the applicant. 33. Rest of the contents of the bail application have been denied. 34. Mr. N.S. Chandel, learned Senior Counsel, assisted by Mr. Jyotirmay Bhatt, learned counsel for the applicant, has argued that in the present case, there is no such allegation that the applicant may tamper with the evidence or he was not co-operating with the investigation. 35. It has also been argued by the learned Senior Counsel for the applicant that on 30 th August, 2023, on the day of arrest of the applicant, no Proceeds of Crime were with the ED. The details about the material in possession of the ED, recorded reasons to believe were not communicated to the applicant, as such, according to Mr. N.S. Chandel, learned Senior Counsel, the statutory safeguard, provided under Section 19 of the PMLA, were not complied with, by the investigating agency. 36. Lastly, it has been argued on behalf of the applicant that the Proceeds of Crime should be of the relevant period. 37. In order to decide the present application, it would be just and appropriate for this Court to reproduce the provisions of Section 3 of the PMLA, as under: “3. Offence of money-laundering. - Whosoever directly or indirectly attempts to indulge or knowingly assists or knowingly is a party or is actually involved in any process or activity connected with the proceeds of crime including its concealment, possession, acquisition or use and projecting or claiming it as untainted property shall be guilty of offence of money-laundering. Explanation. Offence of money-laundering. - Whosoever directly or indirectly attempts to indulge or knowingly assists or knowingly is a party or is actually involved in any process or activity connected with the proceeds of crime including its concealment, possession, acquisition or use and projecting or claiming it as untainted property shall be guilty of offence of money-laundering. Explanation. - For the removal of doubts, it is hereby clarified that,- (i) a person shall be guilty of offence of money-laundering if such person is found to have directly or indirectly attempted to indulge or knowingly assisted or knowingly is a party or is actually involved in one or more of the following processes or activities connected with proceeds of crime, namely:- (a) concealment; or (b) possession; or (c) acquisition; or (d) use; or (e) projecting as untainted property; or (f) claiming as untainted property, in any manner whatsoever; (ii) the process or activity connected with proceeds of crime is a continuing activity and continues till such time a person is directly or indirectly enjoying the proceeds of crime by its concealment or possession or acquisition or use or projecting it as untainted property or claiming it as untainted property in any manner whatsoever.” 38. The term ‘proceeds of crime’ has been defined in Section 2 (u) of PMLA, as follows: 2. Definitions. *** (u) “proceeds of crime” means any property derived or obtained, directly or indirectly, by any person as a result of criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence or the value of any such property or where such property is taken or held outside the country, then the property equivalent in value held within the country or abroad; Explanation.—For the removal of doubts, it is hereby clarified that "proceeds of crime" include property not only derived or obtained from the scheduled offence but also any property which may directly or indirectly be derived or obtained as a result of any criminal activity relatable to the scheduled offence. 39. It would be also be profitable to reproduce Section 2 (v) of PMLA, as under: 2. Definitions. 39. It would be also be profitable to reproduce Section 2 (v) of PMLA, as under: 2. Definitions. * * * (v) “property” means any property or assets of every description, whether corporeal or incorporeal, movable or immovable, tangible or intangible and includes deeds and instruments evidencing title to, or interest in, such property or assets, wherever located; Explanation.—For the removal of doubts, it is hereby clarified that the term “property” includes property of any kind used in the commission of an offence under this Act or any of the scheduled offences; 40. The provisions of Section 19 of PMLA are reproduced, as under: 19. Power of arrest. - (1) If the Director, Deputy Director, Assistant Director or any other officer authorised in this behalf by the Central Government by general or special order, has on the basis of material in his possession, reason to believe (the reason for such belief to be recorded in writing) that any person has been guilty of an offence punishable under this Act, he may arrest such person and shall, as soon as may be, inform him of the grounds for such arrest. (2) The Director, Deputy Director, Assistant Director or any other officer shall, immediately after arrest of such person under sub-section (1), forward a copy of the order along with the material in his possession, referred to in that sub-section, to the Adjudicating Authority in a sealed envelope, in the manner, as may be prescribed and such Adjudicating Authority shall keep such order and material for such period, as may be prescribed. (3) Every person arrested under sub-section (1) shall, within twenty-four hours, be taken to a 1[Special Court or] Judicial Magistrate or a Metropolitan Magistrate, as the case may be, having jurisdiction: Provided that the period of twenty-four hours shall exclude the time necessary for the journey from the place of arrest to the Special Court or Magistrate's Court. 41. Similarly, the provisions of Section 45 of the PMLA, reads, as under: 45. 41. Similarly, the provisions of Section 45 of the PMLA, reads, as under: 45. Offences to be cognizable and non-bailable.-(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), no person accused of an offence under this Act shall be released on bail or on his own bond unless- (i) the Public Prosecutor has been given a opportunity to oppose the application for such release; and (ii) where the Public Prosecutor opposes the application, the court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that he is not guilty of such offence and that he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail: Provided that a person, who, is under the age of sixteen years, or is a woman or is sick or infirm, or is accused either on his own or along with other co-accused of money- laundering a sum of less than one crore rupees may be released on bail, if the Special Court so directs: Provided further that the Special Court shall not take cognizance of any offence punishable under section 4 except upon a complaint in writing made by- (i) the Director; or (ii) any officer of the Central Government or a State Government authorised in writing in this behalf by the Central Government by a general or special order made in this behalf by that Government. (1A) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), or any other provision of this Act, no police officer shall investigate into an offence under this Act unless specifically authorised, by the Central Government by a general or special order, and, subject to such conditions as may be prescribed. (2) The limitation on granting of bail specified in sub-section (1) is in addition to the limitations under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) or any other law for the time being in force on granting of bail. (2) The limitation on granting of bail specified in sub-section (1) is in addition to the limitations under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) or any other law for the time being in force on granting of bail. Explanation.--For the removal of doubts, it is clarified that the expression "Offences to be cognizable and non-bailable" shall mean and shall be deemed to have always meant that all offences under this Act shall be cognizable offences and non-bailable offences notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), and accordingly the officers authorised under this Act are empowered to arrest an accused without warrant, subject to the fulfillment of conditions under section 19 and subject to the conditions enshrined under this section. 42. In order to buttress his contentions, Mr. N.S. Chandel, learned Senior Counsel, has relied upon the decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case, titled as Bachhu Yadav versus Directorate of Enforcement Government of India Represented by its Assistant Director (PMLA) and another, reported in AIR 2023 Supreme Court 4384; and Pankaj Bansal versus Union of India, reported in 2023 (13) SCALE 312. 43. The above decisions have been relied upon to show that the mandatory provisions of PMLA have not been complied with, by the ED, in this case, and non-compliance of the provisions, vitiates the arrest. 44. While relying upon paras 32 to 35 of the judgment in Bachhu Yadav’s case (supra), it has been argued on behalf of the applicant that in this case, the statutory mandate of Section 19 of the PMLA, has not been complied with and as such, the arrest is vitiated on account of the said fact. Paras 32 to 35 of the judgment, read as under: “32. That being so, there is no valid reason as to why a copy of such written grounds of arrest should not be furnished to the arrested person as a matter of course and without exception. There are two primary reasons as to why this would be the advisable course of action to be followed as a matter of principle. That being so, there is no valid reason as to why a copy of such written grounds of arrest should not be furnished to the arrested person as a matter of course and without exception. There are two primary reasons as to why this would be the advisable course of action to be followed as a matter of principle. Firstly, in the event such grounds of arrest are orally read out to the arrested person or read by such person with nothing further and this fact is disputed in a given case, it may boil down to the word of the arrested person against the word of the authorized officer as to whether or not there is due and proper compliance in this regard. In the case on hand, that is the situation insofar as Basant Bansal is concerned. Though the ED claims that witnesses were present and certified that the grounds of arrest were read out and explained to him in Hindi, that is neither here nor there as he did not sign the document. Non-compliance in this regard would entail release of the arrested person straightaway, as held in V. Senthil Balaji (supra). Such a precarious situation is easily avoided and the consequence thereof can be obviated very simply by furnishing the written grounds of arrest, as recorded by the authorized officer in terms of Section 19(1) of the Act of 2002, to the arrested person under due acknowledgment, instead of leaving it to the debatable ipse dixit of the authorized officer. 33. The second reason as to why this would be the proper course to adopt is the constitutional objective underlying such information being given to the arrested person. Conveyance of this information is not only to apprise the arrested person of why he/she is being arrested but also to enable such person to seek legal counsel and, thereafter, present a case before the Court under Section 45 to seek release on bail, if he/she so chooses. In this regard, the grounds of arrest in V. Senthil Balaji (supra) are placed on record and we find that the same run into as many as six pages. The grounds of arrest recorded in the case on hand in relation to Pankaj Bansal and Basant Bansal have not been produced before this Court, but it was contended that they were produced at the time of remand. The grounds of arrest recorded in the case on hand in relation to Pankaj Bansal and Basant Bansal have not been produced before this Court, but it was contended that they were produced at the time of remand. However, as already noted earlier, this did not serve the intended purpose. Further, in the event their grounds of arrest were equally voluminous, it would be well-nigh impossible for either Pankaj Bansal or Basant Bansal to record and remember all that they had read or heard being read out for future recall so as to avail legal remedies. More so, as a person who has just been arrested would not be in a calm and collected frame of mind and may be utterly incapable of remembering the contents of the grounds of arrest read by or read out to him/her. The very purpose of this constitutional and statutory protection would be rendered nugatory by permitting the authorities concerned to merely read out or permit reading of the grounds of arrest, irrespective of their length and detail, and claim due compliance with the constitutional requirement under Article 22(1) and the statutory mandate under Section 19(1) of the Act of 2002. 34. We may also note that the grounds of arrest recorded by the authorized officer, in terms of Section 19(1) of the Act of 2002, would be personal to the person who is arrested and there should, ordinarily, be no risk of sensitive material being divulged therefrom, compromising the sanctity and integrity of the investigation. In the event any such sensitive material finds mention in such grounds of arrest recorded by the authorized officer, it would always be open to him to redact such sensitive portions in the document and furnish the edited copy of the grounds of arrest to the arrested person, so as to safeguard the sanctity of the investigation. 35. On the above analysis, to give true meaning and purpose to the constitutional and the statutory mandate of Section 19(1) of the Act of 2002 of informing the arrested person of the grounds of arrest, we hold that it would be necessary, henceforth, that a copy of such written grounds of arrest is furnished to the arrested person as a matter of course and without exception. The decisions of the Delhi High Court in Moin Akhtar Qureshi (supra) and the Bombay High Court in Chhagan Chandrakant Bhujbal (supra), which hold to the contrary, do not lay down the correct law. In the case on hand, the admitted position is that the ED's Investigating Officer merely read out or permitted reading of the grounds of arrest of the appellants and left it at that, which is also disputed by the appellants. As this form of communication is not found to be adequate to fulfil compliance with the mandate of Article 22(1) of the Constitution and Section 19(1) of the Act of 2002, we have no hesitation in holding that their arrest was not in keeping with the provisions of Section 19(1) of the Act of 2002. Further, as already noted supra, the clandestine conduct of the ED in proceeding against the appellants, by recording the second ECIR immediately after they secured interim protection in relation to the first ECIR, does not commend acceptance as it reeks of arbitrary exercise of power. In effect, the arrest of the appellants and, in consequence, their remand to the custody of the ED and, thereafter, to judicial custody, cannot be sustained.” 45. In addition to this, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the applicant has also relied upon para 187 of the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in Vijay Madanlal Choudhary versus Union of India, reported in 2022 (1) SCALE 577. The relevant portion of para 187 of the judgment, is reproduced, as under: “187. In light of the above analysis, we now proceed to summarise our conclusion on seminal points in issue in the following terms:- (i) The question as to whether some of the amendments to the Prevention of Money-laundering Act, 2002 could not have been enacted by the Parliament by way of a Finance Act has not been examined in this judgment. The same is left open for being examined along with or after the decision of the Larger Bench (seven Judges) of this Court in the case of Rojer Mathew705. (ii) The expression “proceedings” occurring in Clause (na) of Section 2(1) of the 2002 Act is contextual and is required to be given expansive meaning to include inquiry procedure followed by the Authorities of ED, the Adjudicating Authority, and the Special Court. (ii) The expression “proceedings” occurring in Clause (na) of Section 2(1) of the 2002 Act is contextual and is required to be given expansive meaning to include inquiry procedure followed by the Authorities of ED, the Adjudicating Authority, and the Special Court. (iii) The expression “investigation” in Clause (na) of Section 2(1) of the 2002 Act does not limit itself to the matter of investigation concerning the offence under the Act and is interchangeable with the function of “inquiry” to be undertaken by the Authorities under the Act. (iv) The Explanation inserted to Clause (u) of Section 2(1) of the 2002 Act does not travel beyond the main provision predicating tracking and reaching upto the property derived or obtained directly or indirectly as a result of criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence. (v)(a) Section 3 of the 2002 Act has a wider reach and captures every process and activity, direct or indirect, in dealing with the proceeds of crime and is not limited to the happening of the final act of integration of tainted property in the formal economy. The Explanation inserted to Section 3 by way of amendment of 2019 does not expand the purport of Section 3 but is only clarificatory in nature. It clarifies the word “and” preceding the expression projecting or claiming as “or”; and being a clarificatory amendment, it would make no difference even if it is introduced by way of Finance Act or otherwise. (b) Independent of the above, we are clearly of the view that the expression “and” occurring in Section 3 has to be construed as “or”, to give full play to the said provision so as to include “every” process or activity indulged into by anyone. Projecting or claiming the property as untainted property would constitute an offence of money-laundering on its own, being an independent process or activity. (c) The interpretation suggested by the petitioners, that only upon projecting or claiming the property in question as untainted property that the offence of Section 3 would be complete, stands rejected. (d) The offence under Section 3 of the 2002 Act is dependent on illegal gain of property as a result of criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence. It is concerning the process or activity connected with such property, which constitutes the offence of money-laundering. (d) The offence under Section 3 of the 2002 Act is dependent on illegal gain of property as a result of criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence. It is concerning the process or activity connected with such property, which constitutes the offence of money-laundering. The Authorities under the 2002 Act cannot prosecute any person on notional basis or on the assumption that a scheduled offence has been committed, unless it is so registered with the jurisdictional police and/or pending enquiry/trial including by way of criminal complaint before the competent forum. If the person is finally discharged/acquitted of the scheduled offence or the criminal case against him is quashed by the Court of competent jurisdiction, there can be no offence of money-laundering against him or any one claiming such property being the property linked to stated scheduled offence through him.” 46. Now, judging the facts and circumstances of the present case, in the light of the above decisions, this Court would not proceed to discuss the stand of the applicant, in this case. 47. As per record, the Assistant Director, Directorate of Enforcement, had issued summons, bearing No. ECIR/SHSZO/04/ 2019-521, on 29th August, 2023, directing applicant-Hitesh Gandhi, to appear before him, forthwith. On the same day, this notice was received by applicant- Hitesh Gandhi. Thereafter, the statement of applicant- Hitesh Gandhi was recorded under Sections 50 (2) and 50 (3) of PMLA, on 29th August, 2023. The said statement was duly signed by applicant-Hitesh Gandhi. Thereafter, the grounds of arrest were served upon him on 30th August, 2023. Applicant-Hitesh Gandhi not only put his signatures over it, but, he has written “read and understood” over it. Thereafter, he was arrested on 30th August, 2023. 48. It is not the case of the applicant that he was forced by the ED, to put his signatures and date over the arrest memo, which does not contain the actual date. 49. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, in a case, titled as Vikram Singh and others versus State of Punjab, reported in AIR 2010 SC 1007 , has distinguished between the words ‘arrest’ and ‘custody’. 49. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, in a case, titled as Vikram Singh and others versus State of Punjab, reported in AIR 2010 SC 1007 , has distinguished between the words ‘arrest’ and ‘custody’. Although, in the said case, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has discussed the above terms in relation to the provisions of Section 27 of the Evidence Act, however, the said decision has bearing on the merits of the present case, as, the applicant was associated in the investigation, by the ED, prior to his arrest, on 30th August, 2023. The relevant paras-12 and 16 of the judgment, are reproduced, as under: “12. Mr. Sharan has, however, referred us to Section 46(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure to argue that till the appellants had been arrested in accordance with the aforesaid provision they could not be said to be in police custody. We see that Section 46 deals with 'Arrest how made'. We are of the opinion that word “arrest” used in Section 46 relates to a formal arrest whereas Section 27 of the Evidence Act talks about custody of a person accused of an offence. In the present case the appellants were undoubtedly put under formal, arrest on the 15th February 2005 whereas the recoveries had been made prior to that date but admittedly, also, they were in police custody and accused is an offence at the time of their apprehension on the 14th February 2005. Moreover, in the light of the judgment in the Constitution Bench and the observation that the words in Section 27 “accused of any offence” are descriptive of a person making the statement, the submission that this Section would be operable only after formal arrest under Section 46(1) of the Code, cannot be accepted. This argument does not merit any further discussion. * * * 16. It is also significant that Jasvir Singh also disclosed that he had kept concealed the dead body in the fields of village Daulatpur and that it had been removed from Darshan Kaur's house in the Chevrolet car belonging to him and the three appellants had further revealed that the dead body had been disposed of in the fields of village Daulatpur and the dead body was recovered and taken into possession by Memo Ex.PGGG signed by Manohar Lal as also Sub-Inspector Jeevan Kumar. We are unable to accept Mr. We are unable to accept Mr. Sharan's bare submission that the evidence of Manohar Lal and Sub-Inspector Jeevan Kumar should not be believed as they were interested in the successful outcome of the prosecution, as no other material adverse circumstance has been brought to our notice.” 50. Similar view has also been taken by the Hon’ble Full Bench of Lahore High Court in case, titled as Hakam Khuda Yar versus Emperor, reported in AIR 1940 Lahore 129 . Relevant portion of the judgment, is reproduced, as under: “……… As regards the first point, the term "custody" is not defined either in the Criminal Procedure Code or in the Evidence Act. There is, of course, no doubt that an accused person will be in the "custody" of the police after his arrest; but the question is whether he can be considered to be in "custody" at any time earlier, when he has not been formally arrested, but is merely detained by the police for the purpose of the investigation. Section 27 is anomalous in so far as it applies only to information leading to a discovery when received from an accused person in the custody of the police, but not if he is not in the custody of the police. If the information is relevant when it comes from a person in the custody of the police, there seems no good reason why it should not be so when it comes from an accused person, who is not in the custody of the police and therefore not under the influence of the police. The real intention of the Section very probably is to make information from an accused person which leads to discovery relevant even when the person is in police custody. But the language of, the Section makes such information relevant only when it comes from an accused person in the custody of the police. The language used in the Section thus leads to the curious result probably never intended-- that when such information is given by an accused person, who is not in the "custody" of the police it will not be covered by the Section. The language used in the Section thus leads to the curious result probably never intended-- that when such information is given by an accused person, who is not in the "custody" of the police it will not be covered by the Section. However, apart from the above anomaly, the intention of the Section seems, I think, clear enough and that is to make information leading to a discovery relevant, even when it comes from an accused person who is in the custody of the police and thus subject to police influence. Ordinarily information coming from an accused person, who is liable to be influenced by the police will be open to suspicion. But if the information leads to the discovery of a relevant fact, that discovery is considered to be a guarantee of the truth of the information as has been pointed out already and hence such information is made relevant by Section 27. Now there can be little doubt, that even before his formal arrest, an accused person, who is detained by the police owing to suspicion against him, is liable to be influenced by the police. This Court has therefore put a wide interpretation on the word "custody" as used in Section 27. In AIR 1933 Lah 609, it was held by a Division Bench of this Court consisting of Sir Shadi Lal and Coldstream J. that 'police custody' does not necessarily mean custody after formal arrest and that it also includes 'some form of police surveillance and restriction on the movements of the person concerned by the police.” 51. In view of the above, the applicant is proved to be arrested on 30th August, 2023, as per the documents, i.e. arrest memo, which has not been disputed by the applicant, till date. 52. After going through the above documents, it cannot be said that the mandatory provisions of Section 19 of PMLA have not been complied with by the ED, in the present case. 53. Not only this, the Assistant Director, Directorate of Enforcement, has also recorded the reasons to believe, which were produced for approval before his senior. 52. After going through the above documents, it cannot be said that the mandatory provisions of Section 19 of PMLA have not been complied with by the ED, in the present case. 53. Not only this, the Assistant Director, Directorate of Enforcement, has also recorded the reasons to believe, which were produced for approval before his senior. The reasons to believe contained the brief details of the scheduled offences, material collected during the course of investigation, the investigation conducted so far, under the provisions of PMLA, the details about the proceeds of crime and the role of the accused persons, in the offence of money laundering. The role alleged against applicant-Hitesh Gandhi has been mentioned in para 3 of the proceedings, on the basis of which, the reasons to believe have been recorded, upon which, the Deputy Director, Directorate of Enforcement, has recorded the following approval: “After careful consideration of facts and material mentioned in the above note, it is found that there are sufficient reasons to believe that Hitesh Gandhi is guilty of offences punishable under PMLA. Therefore, the action u/s 19 of PMLA to arrest Hitesh Gandhi is approved.” 54. If the facts and circumstances of the present case are seen in the light of the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in case titled as Ram Kishor Arora versus Directorate of Enforcement, reported in 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1682, neither the violation of Article 22 (1) of the Constitution of India is prima facie proved, nor, the provisions of Section 19 of the PMLA are found to have been violated. The relevant paras-20 to 24 of the said judgment, are reproduced, as under: “20. Again, a three-judge bench in Durga Pada Ghosh v. State of West Bengal while considering the scheme of Article 22 of the Constitution held as under:— “8. The scheme underlying Article 22 of the Constitution highlights the importance attached in our constitutional set-up to the personal freedom of an individual. Sub-articles (1) and (2) refer to the protection against arrest and detention of a person under the ordinary law. Persons arrested or detained under a law providing for preventive detention are dealt with in sub- articles (4) to (7). Sub-articles (1) and (2) refer to the protection against arrest and detention of a person under the ordinary law. Persons arrested or detained under a law providing for preventive detention are dealt with in sub- articles (4) to (7). Sub-article (5) says that when a person is detained in pursuance of an order under a law providing for preventive detention the grounds on which the order is made have to be communicated to the person concerned as soon as may be and he has to be afforded earliest opportunity to represent against the order. The object of communicating the grounds is to enable the detenu to make his representation against the order. The words “as soon as may be” in the context must imply anxious care on the part of the authority concerned to perform its duty in this respect as early as practicable without avoidable delay.” 21. In view of the above, the expression “as soon as may be” contained in Section 19 of PMLA is required to be construed as- “as early as possible without avoidable delay” or “within reasonably convenient” or “reasonably requisite” period of time. Since by way of safeguard a duty is cast upon the concerned officer to forward a copy of the order along with the material in his possession to the Adjudicating Authority immediately after the arrest of the person, and to take the person arrested to the concerned court within 24 hours of the arrest, in our opinion, the reasonably convenient or reasonably requisite time to inform the arrestee about the grounds of his arrest would be twenty-four hours of the arrest. 22. In Vijay Madanlal Choudhary (supra), it has been categorically held that so long as the person has been informed about the grounds of his arrest, that is sufficient compliance of mandate of Article 22(1) of the Constitution. It is also observed that the arrested person before being produced before the Special Court within twenty-four hours or for that purposes of remand on each occasion, the Court is free to look into the relevant records made available by the Authority about the involvement of the arrested person in the offence of money-laundering. It is also observed that the arrested person before being produced before the Special Court within twenty-four hours or for that purposes of remand on each occasion, the Court is free to look into the relevant records made available by the Authority about the involvement of the arrested person in the offence of money-laundering. Therefore, in our opinion the person asserted, if he is informed or made aware orally about the grounds of arrest at the time of his arrest and is furnished a written communication about the grounds of arrest as soon as may be i.e as early as possible and within reasonably convenient and requisite time of twenty-four hours of his arrest, that would be sufficient compliance of not only Section 19 of PMLA but also of Article 22(1) of the Constitution of India. 23. As discernible from the judgment in Pankaj Bansal Case also noticing the inconsistent practice being followed by the officers arresting the persons under Section 19 of PMLA, directed to furnish the grounds of arrest in writing as a matter of course, “henceforth”, meaning thereby from the date of the pronouncement of the judgment. The very use of the word “henceforth” implied that the said requirement of furnishing grounds of arrest in writing to the arrested person as soon as after his arrest was not the mandatory or obligatory till the date of the said judgment. The submission of the learned Senior Counsel Mr. Singhvi for the Appellant that the said judgment was required to be given effect retrospectively cannot be accepted when the judgment itself states that it would be necessary “henceforth” that a copy of such written grounds of arrest is furnished to the arrested person as a matter of course and without exception. Hence non furnishing of grounds of arrest in writing till the date of pronouncement of judgment in Pankaj Bansal case could neither be held to be illegal nor the action of the concerned officer in not furnishing the same in writing could be faulted with. As such, the action of informing the person arrested about the grounds of his arrest is a sufficient compliance of Section 19 of PMLA as also Article 22(1) of the Constitution of India, as held in Vijay Madanlal (supra). 24. As such, the action of informing the person arrested about the grounds of his arrest is a sufficient compliance of Section 19 of PMLA as also Article 22(1) of the Constitution of India, as held in Vijay Madanlal (supra). 24. In so far as the facts of the present case are concerned, it is not disputed that the appellant was handed over the document containing grounds of arrest when he was arrested, and he also put his signature below the said grounds of arrest, after making an endorsement that “I have been informed and have also read the above-mentioned grounds of arrest.” The appellant in the rejoinder filed by him has neither disputed the said endorsement nor his signature below the said endorsement. The only contention raised by the learned Senior Counsel, Mr. Singhvi is that he was not furnished a copy of the document containing the grounds of arrest at the time of arrest. Since the appellant was indisputably informed about the grounds of arrest and he having also put his signature and the endorsement on the said document of having been informed, we hold that there was due compliance of the provisions contained in Section 19 of PMLA and his arrest could neither be said to be violative of the said provision nor of Article 22(1) of the Constitution of India.” 55. So far as the arguments of the learned senior counsel appearing for the applicant, that only the applicant has been arrested, in the present case, whereas, the other persons, against whom, the allegations have been levelled, have not been arrested, are concerned, considering the stand of the ED that the investigation is still going on, no benefit could be derived from the said fact, as such, the case law relied upon by the learned senior counsel for the applicant, in case titled as State of Madhya Pradesh versus Sheetle Sahai and others, reported in (2009) 8 SCC 617 , in no way helps the case of the applicant. 56. 56. In the present case, the twin conditions, as enumerated in Section 45 of the PMLA, cannot be said to be existing in favour of the applicant, as, at this stage, there are no reasonable grounds for believing that the accused (applicant) is not guilty of such offence and it cannot be said that in case, he is ordered to be released on bail, he is not likely to commit any offence. 57. Considering all these facts, the applicant is not able to make out a case for grant of bail, at this stage. Consequently, the bail application is dismissed. 58. Any of the observations, made hereinabove, shall not be taken as an expression of opinion on the merits of the case and the learned trial Court shall decide the matter uninfluenced by any of the observations made hereinabove. 59. Record be returned to the quarter concerned.