JUDGMENT : Ajit Kumar, J. 1. Heard Sri Kripa Shankar Singh, learned Senior Advocate assisted by Sri Gaurav Singh, learned counsel for the petitioner, Sri Pankaj Misra, learned counsel for the contesting private respondent No. 4 and learned Standing Counsel for the State respondent Nos. 1 to 3. 2. Petitioners before this Court are sons of late Mukund Lal and 4th respondent, namely, Smt. Meera Devi. There is also admitted to be a daughter of late Mukund Lal and Smt. Meera Devi, namely, Sarita @ Sangeeta Gupta who resides separately at Bhadohi district alongwith her husband and in-laws. 3. The proceedings under Section 5 of the Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007 (hereinafter referred to as 'Senior Citizens Act, 2007') came to be instituted at the instance of the 4th respondent against the petitioners with a specific relief that three sons, namely petitioners before this Court may be evicted from House No. BP-644, situate in Mohalla - Kailashpuri (Bechupur), Pargana-Mawai, Tehsil and District - Pt. Deen Dayal Upadhyay Nagar the erstwhile district Mughalsarai. 4. The basic plea taken as per the allegation made in the petition filed under Section 5 filed by the 4th respondent, has been that sons of opposite party were trying to somehow physically assault one servant, namely Bahadur who had been taking care of earlier husband of 4th respondent and now her care and that they use the residential property which was got constructed out of the fund, namely Stridhan of the 4th respondent. During the proceedings instituted before the competent prescribed authority under the Act, the matter was referred for mediation and conciliation before the Court and prescribed authority obtained report from Conciliation Officer, who submitted two reports on 13th July, 2021 and then on 13th August, 2021. 5. Prescribed authority proceeded to allow application under Section 5 directing for eviction of the petitioners from the house property bearing House No. 664 (supra) giving them a month's time, failing which appropriate legal proceedings were directed to be drawn for getting the order acted upon. The petitioners before this Court preferred statutory appeal under Section 16 of the Senior Citizens Act, 2007 which also came to be dismissed under the order passed by the appellate authority dated 16th March, 2022. Thus, these two orders are under challenge before this Court. 6. The petitioners before this Court preferred statutory appeal under Section 16 of the Senior Citizens Act, 2007 which also came to be dismissed under the order passed by the appellate authority dated 16th March, 2022. Thus, these two orders are under challenge before this Court. 6. Learned Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioners has argued that looking to the provisions as contained under Section 5 of the Senior Citizens Act, 2007, application as such filed by the 4th respondent was not maintainable as it was beyond the scope and power of the prescribed authority to have passed any order in the absence of any pleadings raised for maintenance and harassment being meted out by not providing maintenance to senior citizens. 7. It is submitted that as a matter of fact 4th respondent was playing in the hands of her daughter and that is why during the pendency of proceedings she executed three gift deeds in respect of other properties that she had succeeded from her husband, in favour of the daughter, Smt. Sarita @ Sangeeta Gupta on 1st September, 2022. It is submitted that conduct of respondent No. 4 in gifting away a part of the property shows that she had no such problem with the sons otherwise instead of some property would have gifted away the entire property to her daughter. 8. Sri Singh, learned Senior Advocate has placed reliance upon Section 23 to argue that such transfer of property is void during the pendency of proceedings under the Senior Citizens Act, 2007. 9. Further argument advanced by learned Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioners is that the findings returned by both the authorities namely Prescribed authority and appellate authority that it was for the harassment that necessitated the eviction of the real sons of 4th respondent are perverse because no such evidence was led by the 4th respondent before the authority concerned that at any point of time they ever physically or verbally assaulted the mother or otherwise they ill-treated her so as to be suggestive of any harassment in any forum of 4th respondent at the end of her sons. He submits that the report of Conciliation Officer dated 13th August, 2021 is more suggestive of the fact that 4th respondent had confined herself within the four corners of the room by putting a lock in the verandah that had blocked every possible entry to her room and so access to her room was next to impossible. 10. To buttress the argument learned Senior Advocate has drawn the attention towards paragraph 25 of the counter-affidavit filed here before this Court by the 4th respondent in which it is averred that she needed no maintenance amount from the sons and, therefore, if the sons were carrying out their business in shops which were earlier owned by their father, that itself could not have been a ground to order their eviction from the premise in question in which they had been living since the time of their father. 11. Meeting the arguments advanced by learned Senior Advocate, Sri Pankaj Mishra, learned counsel for the 4th respondent has submitted that if sons are not maintaining the senior citizen then such sons do not deserve to live in a house which belongs to the 4th respondent. He submits that even if such senior citizen does not want any maintenance from the sons, still she can maintain an application for eviction of her sons from the house property taking recourse to the provisions as contained under Section 5 of the Senior Citizens Act, 2007. 12. In support of the his arguments, learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance upon the judgment of Division Bench of this Court in the case of Shivani Verma v. State of U.P. and others, 2023 (6) ADJ 496 (DB). Sri Mishra has placed reliance upon paragraph 67 of the judgment that lays down that such sons are simply licensee in a house owned by a senior citizen and the moment senior citizen gives notice or tells them to vacate the house their license to continue in the house expires. Thus, in view of the judgment of Division Bench, Sri Mishra submits that sons have no legal rights to claim any right to live in a residential house owned by the mother and such a decree or an order can be passed by the prescribed authority under Section 5 of the Senior Citizens Act, 2007. 13. Thus, in view of the judgment of Division Bench, Sri Mishra submits that sons have no legal rights to claim any right to live in a residential house owned by the mother and such a decree or an order can be passed by the prescribed authority under Section 5 of the Senior Citizens Act, 2007. 13. Sri Mishra has also relied upon the judgment of Division Bench of this Court in the case of Gajendra Singh and others v. State of U.P. and others passed in Writ (C) No. 33781 of 2019 decided on 21st October, 2019, wherein the authority passing the order for ejectment/eviction of the sons was held justified as the senior citizen had complained of harassment. 14. Sri Mishra has further placed reliance upon a judgment of a coordinate Bench of this Court in the case of Harsh Singhal and another v. State of U.P. and others passed in Writ Appeal No. 32439 of 2023 delivered on 30th January, 2024, wherein the Court held that every senior citizen has a right to maintenance and if the sons do not admit their liability and willingness to provide maintenance, they are liable to be evicted. He has placed reliance upon paragraph 23 of the judgment which says that power to order eviction is implicit in the provision guaranteeing right to receive maintenance out of estate and the enforcement of that right. 15. He further submits that even though there was no material available regarding harassment being meted out at the end of the petitioners to the 4th respondent, application for eviction of the sons by senior citizens was equally maintainable under Section 5. He submits that even if there is no evidence led by the 4th respondent regarding demand of maintenance ever made and denial made thereof by the petitioners, the very right of 4th respondent to live alone in the house owned by her and constructed out of her Stridhan is sufficient enough to order eviction of sons as they are only licensees to continue in the property. 16. Sri Mishra has not advanced any further argument regarding perversity, if any, in findings returned by the prescribed authority as well as appellate authority on the question of harassment and the report submitted by the conciliation officer dated 13th August, 2021. 17. 16. Sri Mishra has not advanced any further argument regarding perversity, if any, in findings returned by the prescribed authority as well as appellate authority on the question of harassment and the report submitted by the conciliation officer dated 13th August, 2021. 17. Replying to the legal pleas raised by Sri Pankaj Mishra, learned counsel appearing for the 4th respondent justifying the orders passed by the prescribed authority as well as appellate authority, Sri Kripa Shankar Singh, learned Senior Advocate has placed before the Court that the judgment of Supreme Court in the case of S. Vanitha v. Deputy Commissioner, Bengaluru Urban District, AIR 2021 SC 117. Sri Singh has placed reliance upon paragraph 23 and 24 of the judgment. 18. Having heard learned counsel for the respective parties and their arguments raised across the bar and having perused the records and judgments cited before me, the basic point that emerges out for consideration before this Court is, as to whether any application simpliciter of eviction in the absence of any pleadings of harassment being meted out at the end of the sons, to the senior citizen, is maintainable under Section 5 of the Senior Citizens Act, 2007. 19. For better appreciation of the legal position that emerges out through various judgment cited before me by the learned Advocates appearing for the respective parties, it is necessary to first got through the very object with which the Senior Citizens Act, 2007 has been enacted and the section that deals with jurisdiction of authority to decide application under the said Act. 20. The Legislature while making the enactment in question, very clearly provides that it is an act for maintenance and welfare of parents and senior citizens, a right guaranteed under the Constitution and, therefore, for enforcement of that right, the Parliament in its wisdom thought appropriate to make this enactment. The statement of objects and reasons as contained under the Act by the Parliament is reproduced hereunder: “Statement of Objects and Reasons - Traditional norms and values of the Indian society laid stress on providing care for the elderly. However, due to withering of the joint family system, a large number of elderly are not being looked after by their family. However, due to withering of the joint family system, a large number of elderly are not being looked after by their family. Consequently, many older persons, particularly widowed women are now forced to spend their twilight years all alone and are exposed to emotional neglect and to lack of physical and financial support. This clearly reveals that ageing has become a major social challenge and there is a need to give more attention to the care and protection for the older persons. Though the parents can claim maintenance under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, the procedure is both time-consuming as well as expensive. Hence, there is a need to have simple, inexpensive and speedy provisions to claim maintenance for parents.” 21. From a bare reading of the aforesaid statement of objects and reasons as contained under the enactment it is clear that every older person or citizen, may be a widow or widower, cannot be permitted to force to live an oppressed life at the end of those whose primary duty is to provide maintenance to such senior citizens. Both physical and financial support are guaranteed, therefore by the Union Legislature though this enactment. 22. The Parliament has been very conscious while making this enactment that such rights are already a little bit protected under the code of criminal procedure, 1973 but those procedures have not only been very time taking but at times very expensive. Therefore, there was a need to draw an Act to provide inexpensive and speedy remedy as to the claims of maintenance of such senior citizens. Thus, it comes out absolutely clear and quite unequivocally as well that enactment is only to guarantee in the first place, maintenance in terms of financial support and also guarantee protection from any physical or mental harassment of the senior citizens. Section 4 of the Act provides for maintenance of parents and senior citizens. The relevant provisions as contained under Section 4 of the Senior Citizens Act, 2007 are reproduced hereunder: “4. Maintenance of parents and senior citizens: (1) A senior citizen including parent who is unable to maintain himself from his own earning or out of the property owned by him, shall be entitled to make an application under Section 5 in case of: (i) parent or grand-parent, against one or more of his children not being a minor. Maintenance of parents and senior citizens: (1) A senior citizen including parent who is unable to maintain himself from his own earning or out of the property owned by him, shall be entitled to make an application under Section 5 in case of: (i) parent or grand-parent, against one or more of his children not being a minor. (ii) a childless senior citizen, against such of his relative referred to in clause (g) of Section 2. (2) The obligation of the children or relative, as the case may be, to maintain a senior citizen extends to the needs of such citizen so that senior citizen may lead a normal life. (3) The obligation of the children to maintain his or her parent extends to the needs of such parent either father or mother or both, as the case may be, so that such parent may lead a normal life. (4) Any person being a relative of a senior citizen and having sufficient means shall maintain such senior citizen provided he is in possession of the property of such senior citizen or he would inherit the property of such senior citizen: Provided that where more than one relatives are entitled to inherit the property of a senior citizen, the maintenance shall be payable by such relative in the proportion in which they would inherit his property.” 23. From a bare reading of the aforesaid provisions it is very much clear that not only the children but all those persons who are related, who may have right to inherit the property from a senior citizen, are under obligation to take care and provide maintenance to such senior citizen. Thus, the provision that has been made more exhaustive and inclusive of various categories of persons, who may have right to inherit property from a senior citizen, so as to guarantee at the same time that such a senior citizen is not ill-treated in terms of physical or financial harassment even at the end of a third party who may be an heir not direct but entitled to succeed property in future. All such persons in proportion to their respective rights to succeed property of a senior citizen, are also bound in law to provide maintenance proportionally. 24. All such persons in proportion to their respective rights to succeed property of a senior citizen, are also bound in law to provide maintenance proportionally. 24. This also shows primarily as the title goes “maintenance of parents and senior citizens” that it is the maintenance which has been the basic cause for instituting a case for the purposes of relief under the Act. Section 5 of the act provides for an application for maintenance. Section 5 of the Senior Citizens Act, 2007 is reproduced hereunder: “5. Application for maintenance: (1) An application for maintenance under Section 4, may be made: (a) by a senior citizen or a parent, as the case may be. (b) if he is incapable, by any other person or organisation authorised by him. (c) the Tribunal may take cognizance suo motu. Explanation: For the purposes of this section “organisation” means any voluntary association registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 (21 of 1860), or any other law for the time being in force. (2) The Tribunal may, during the pendency of the proceeding regarding monthly allowance for the maintenance under this section, order such children or relative to make a monthly allowance for the interim maintenance of such senior citizen including parent and to pay the same to such senior citizen including parent as the Tribunal may from time to time direct. (3) On receipt of an application for maintenance under sub-section (1), after giving notice of the application to the children or relative and after giving the parties an opportunity of being heard, hold an inquiry for determining the amount of maintenance. (4) An application filed under sub-section (2) for the monthly allowance for the maintenance and expenses for proceeding shall be disposed of within ninety days from the date of the service of notice of the application to such person: Provided that the Tribunal may extend the said period, once for a maximum period of thirty days in exceptional circumstances for reasons to be recorded in writing. (5) An application for maintenance under sub-section (1) may be filed against one or mote persons: Provided that such children or relative may implead the other person liable to maintain parent in the application for maintenance. (6) Where a maintenance order was made against more than one person, the death of one of them does not affect the liability of others to continue paying maintenance. (6) Where a maintenance order was made against more than one person, the death of one of them does not affect the liability of others to continue paying maintenance. (7) Any such allowance for the maintenance and expenses for proceeding shall be payable from the date of the order, or, if so ordered, from the date of the application for maintenance or expenses of proceeding, as the case may be. (8) If, children or relative so ordered fail, without sufficient cause to comply with the order, any such Tribunal may, for every breach of the order, issue a warrant for levying the amount due in the manner provided for leaving fines, and may sentence such person for the whole, or any part of each month's allowance for the maintenance and expenses of proceeding, as the case may be, remaining unpaid after the execution of the warrant, to imprisonment for a term which may extend to one month or until payment if sooner made whichever is earlier: Provided that no warrant shall be issued for the recovery of any amount due under this section unless application be made to the Tribunal to levy such amount within a period of three months from the date on which it became due.” (Emphasis added) 25. The language in which various sub-sections of Section 5 are couched makes it clear that not only the authority under the Act is empowered to grant final maintenance but even to provide maintenance pendentlite such proceedings to a senior citizen. Therefore, a senior citizen is not to wait for final outcome of the case as even financial protection has been granted to such senior citizens during pendency of case and proper inquiry can also be ordered by the prescribed authority under the Act to find out what could be the need of a senior citizen so as to have minimum maintenance and protection, if any, from physical torture or assault or otherwise from sons, daughters or children or even otherwise from a third party, who may be succeeding the property in the absence of any direct descent. 26. The title of Section 5 makes it very clear that an application has to be made only for the maintenance. 26. The title of Section 5 makes it very clear that an application has to be made only for the maintenance. Allied and incidental reliefs, therefore could be for eviction or ejectment of such sons or children, who may be refusing maintenance, either during the pendency of the case or finally upon a finding being returned by the prescribed authority that despite efforts being made, the children have refused to provide maintenance to such senior citizen. 27. Sub-section 8 of Section 5 also provides Tribunal for an authority to ensure that breach of its order is arrested and for this purpose it can issue warrants levying fine and may sentence even with certain penalty for non-compliance of its order by the children. Section 6 provides for jurisdiction and Section 7 provides for constitution of maintenance of Tribunal. Since these provisions are not attracted in the present case, I am not referring to them in detail. Section 8 provides for procedure to be summary in nature. Thus, every inquiry to be made under Section 5 has to be only summary in nature so as to ensure that maintenance part of the relief is met. 28. The Tribunal in the present case has not gone into all these questions of title etc. as the core issue to be decided was whether children had right to continue in the residential premise or not in the absence of a primary issue of maintenance. However, sub-section 2 of Section 8 provides that the powers of Tribunal are like of Civil Court for the purposes of Section 195 of Code of Criminal Procedure as contained in its Chapter XXVI. The Tribunal is also vested with the power to chose any person or persons who is having special knowledge in the matter which may be relevant to hold inquiry, so as to have a proper assistance for the disposal of the case. Section 9 provides for maintenance. Section 10 provides for alteration in allowances. Section 11 provides for enforcement of the order of maintenance. Section 12 and 13 do provide for maintenance and its deposit and Section 14 provides for award, an award to be made by the Tribunal ultimately by disposing of the application. 29. Section 9 provides for maintenance. Section 10 provides for alteration in allowances. Section 11 provides for enforcement of the order of maintenance. Section 12 and 13 do provide for maintenance and its deposit and Section 14 provides for award, an award to be made by the Tribunal ultimately by disposing of the application. 29. The State Government has framed rules, namely, Uttar Pradesh Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizen Rules, 2014 in purported exercise of power under Section 32 of Senior Citizens Act, 2007. Rule 5 of the Rules, 2014 provides for filing of an application for maintenance and its registration. Rule 6 provides for preliminary scrutiny of the application. Rule 7 provides for notice. Rule 11 provides for reference to be made to the Conciliation Officer. Rule 12 provides for duties of the Conciliation Officer. 30. However, from the perusal of the entire scheme under the Act and Rules as referred to hereinabove, I do not find any specified provisions laid down for the disposal of the case. A question, therefore, arises as to whether the Tribunal would be only disposing of the application simpliciter or looking into the various aspects for maintenance of an application filed under Section 5. The provisions are very clear to the effect that it is the maintenance part which is focused basically under the Act and eviction and ejectment of the licensees as the Division Bench has held, is only contemplated in the circumstances where the maintenance is refused by the sons or children who have onerous duty to maintain senior citizen being members of the family. 31. Upon a pointed query being made as to whether statement of fact stated in paragraph 25 of the counter-affidavit is a fair admission on the part of the 4th respondent not to receive any maintenance from the sons, Sri Misra has simply stated that since the daughter has been visiting the 4th respondent and there is sufficient financial background available with the 4th respondent there was no question of claiming for maintenance from the sons. 32. 32. In my considered view, if application does not require an action for maintenance, nor there is any pleading or relief claimed as such an application simpliciter for ejectment of sons who have been living as family in the residential house from the days of father, would not be maintainable as per the scheme of the Act which has been referred to and quoted hereinabove in this judgment. The reason being that it is the maintenance which is the primarily an issue which is to be considered. However, since the law in the country is that entire plaint allegations and applications have to be read in its entirety to maintain application, I would like to refer here plaint allegations or allegations made by the 4th respondent and its relief clause in the petition filed under Section 5 of the Senior Citizen Act, 2007. 33. In the application that has been moved under Section 5 by the 4th respondent in paragraph 1 she has stated about the death of her husband on 20th October, 2019. In paragraph 2 she states that landed property was purchased on 2nd September, 1974 upon which two storey building was constructed which was later one numbered as 644 by the Munacipality of Mugalsarai. In paragraph 3 she stated that three sons were got separately settled by her late husband as they were not very skilled person. In paragraph 4 it is stated that the sons are residing in the house as per her permission. In paragraph 4 it is stated that her husband when was alive was taking care of her. In paragraph 6 it is stated that the sons were not maintaining her after death of her husband and want to somehow physically assault the servant namely Bahadur who has been living from the days of her husband, so that she may be forced to sign certain papers. In paragraph 7 it has been stated that daughter Sarita @ Sangeeta Gupta was married one and residing with her in-laws at Gyanpur, Bhadohi and she often visits her to provide medicines to her. In paragraph 8 it is stated that since daughter was taking care of her and, therefore the sons were envious of her and at times were abusing her. In paragraph 8 it is stated that since daughter was taking care of her and, therefore the sons were envious of her and at times were abusing her. In paragraph 9 it is stated that sons do not have any right in the property or in any part or portion of the property, nor do they have any right of residence in the property. In paragraph 10 it is stated that the sons who are opposite parties have gone greedy and are so much selfish that unwarranted incident may take place at their end. In paragraph 11 it is stated that in the light of the facts stated above in paragraphs 1 to 10 the sons of the opposite party be evicted from the house No. B 664 and right to the property of the applicant be protected. 34. From the conjoined reading of the various paragraphs raised in the application, it is clear that no specific incident was even noted in the entire application, of any action on the part of the sons, who are petitioners before this Court, to have ever physically assaulted the 4th respondent or mentally harassed her except for a very vague statement that they were not taking care of her after the demise of her husband. There is a plea also taken that they want to oust the servant Bahadur who has been residing with her from the date of her husband but no incident has been described to have ever taken placed, nor any date has been disclosed as to when apprehension got developed in her mind that sons were trying to oust the servant from the house. There is also a remark regarding sons having gone envious of their sister as she was taking care of her mother but no such incident is described as to how she came to form this view. But very interesting part in the entire application is paragraph 11, the penultimate paragraph with prayer made that she wanted to dislodge the sons from the residential house which she claims to be owned by her. There is no prayer for maintenance except for balled allegations that sons were not maintaining her. This shows that 4th respondent was not interested in obtaining any kind of maintenance or moral support from her sons. There is no prayer for maintenance except for balled allegations that sons were not maintaining her. This shows that 4th respondent was not interested in obtaining any kind of maintenance or moral support from her sons. This stands corroborated further by the statement so made in paragraph 25 in the counter-affidavit filed before this Court which has been sworn by 4th respondent herself. 35. Now coming to the application, it can be safely concluded that the application was not for maintenance but simpliciter for ousting the sons from the residential house. However, looking to the entire pleadings as have been raised since in the application the case was being hear and decided by the designated Tribunal under the Senior Citizens Act, 2007, it was bounden duty of the trial Court to have first tested the motive behind the application and if motive was to get maintenance in terms of financial or mental support or there was any incident of physical torture of 4th respondent and if it find, in the first instance, the Court ought to have ordered for maintenance and it is in the absence of maintenance being provided by the sons then eviction could have been ordered from the house as this would have been an incidental relief attached to the law of maintenance in the Act of 2007. 36. In my above view, I find support from the judgment of Division Bench cited by learned counsel for the respondent himself. Considering the definition of maintenance as given under sub-clause (b) of Section 2 of Senior Citizens Act, 2007 vide paragraphs 24 and 25 the Court held thus: “24. Sub-Clause (b) of Section 2 defines 'maintenance' which reads thus: 'maintenance' includes provision for food, clothing, residence and medical attendance and treatment.” 25. The definition is inclusive and not exhaustive and, in particular, includes provision for residence. We will return to the meaning of residence later on. On conjoint reading of Section 4 alongwith the definition of maintenance, it is explicit that senior citizen/parent is entitled to maintenance from their children or relative, as the case may be, which extends to the needs of such senior citizen/parent so that such senior citizen or parent leads a normal life. On conjoint reading of Section 4 alongwith the definition of maintenance, it is explicit that senior citizen/parent is entitled to maintenance from their children or relative, as the case may be, which extends to the needs of such senior citizen/parent so that such senior citizen or parent leads a normal life. It follows that residence is a facet of maintenance and the senior citizen may claim maintenance from his children/relative, inter alia, only of residence to their exclusion if in the opinion of the senior citizen, it extends to his needs to enable the senior citizen to lead a normal life with dignity, provided, the senior citizen is the owner of the property, whether, self acquired or ancestral. In the event the senior citizen does not own a residence, then in that event his children/relative would have to provide the residence, as the expression 'maintenance' includes residence. In cases where the children/relative are unable to provide residence to the senior citizen, for any reason whatsoever, the senior citizen would be setup in an old age home of the district by the Tribunal.” 37. Thus, maintenance not only includes food, clothing, residence and medical attendance but good treatment as well. Treatment means a treatment which is to be given to a senior citizen. If somebody abuses a senior citizen whether he or she physically assaults or not or if somehow he/she otherwise confines a senior citizen in a room causing mental agony or if senior citizen gives impression about the wrongful conduct and character of children, then such action and conduct on the part of the children would amount to ill-treatment and this itself can be a ground to either seeking maintenance and also ejectment of such children for their refusal, if any, to provide maintenance. The reason is obvious because a mere ejectment of sons and children cannot meet the object enshrined under the Senior Citizens Act, 2007. The Supreme Court in the case of Smt. S Vanitha (supra) has very categorically observed vide paragraph 24 thus: “24. For the above reasons, we have come to the conclusion that the claim of the appellant that the premises constitute a shared household within the meaning of the PWDV Act 2005 would have to be determined by the appropriate forum. The Supreme Court in the case of Smt. S Vanitha (supra) has very categorically observed vide paragraph 24 thus: “24. For the above reasons, we have come to the conclusion that the claim of the appellant that the premises constitute a shared household within the meaning of the PWDV Act 2005 would have to be determined by the appropriate forum. The claim cannot simply be obviated by evicting the appellant in exercise of the summary powers entrusted by the Senior Citizens Act, 2007......” 38. So, in my considered view, in the absence of any specific pleading as to the harassment being meted out or ill-treatment being given to a senior citizen and in the absence of any cogent material being placed in support of such allegations, the application under Section 5 for ejectment of sons and children itself cannot be said to be competent so as to invite judgment from the tribunal allowing such application. The maintenance part of an application, therefore, is a sine qua non to maintain application in which a decree/order for ejectment of course can be passed so as to achieve the real object in which the Parliament has made this enactment, namely the Senior Citizens Act, 2007. 39. The judgment that has been cited by learned counsel appearing for both the respondents and which has been discussed above by quoting relevant paragraphs of the judgment, basically the issue that Division Bench was dealing with was whether an application for ejecting sons at the instance of senior citizen is maintainable or not and the Court considering this legal point from the point of view of aims and objects of the Act and various provisions contained therein that maintenance includes a proper treatment as well, held that if a senior citizen is not given a proper treatment and he/she makes out a case before the Tribunal he/she is being harassed then such application would be maintainable as the civil suit is barred under Section 26 of the Act. 40. The Division Bench has not discussed the facts of the case and as far as the legal principle propounded by the Division Bench concerned, there is no quarrel about that. 41. It is well-settled law that judgments of the Court are not theorems of law to be applied in every case uniformally. 40. The Division Bench has not discussed the facts of the case and as far as the legal principle propounded by the Division Bench concerned, there is no quarrel about that. 41. It is well-settled law that judgments of the Court are not theorems of law to be applied in every case uniformally. The law is to be applied to the facts and therefore, a particular judgment in a particular case may not be attracted in the given setting of the facts of the case. In the case of Chintels India Limited v. Bhayana Builders Private Limited, (2021) 4 SCC 602 , Supreme Court has dealt with this principle of law in detail. vide paragraph No. 31 it has held thus: “31. It is well-settled that judgments are not to be construed like Euclid's theorems (see Amar Nath Om Prakash v. State of Punjab, (1985) 1 SCC 345 ), but all observations made therein must relate to the context in which they were made. In that case, the Court put it thus: “10. There is one other significant sentence in Sreenivasa General Traders v. State of A.P. (1983) 4 SCC 353 with which we must express our agreement, it was said: (SCC p. 377, paras 26-27) “26-27. With utmost respect, these observations of the learned Judge are not to be read as Euclid's theorems, nor as provisions of a statute. These observations must be read in the context in which they appear.” We consider it proper to say, as we have already said in other cases, that judgments of Courts are not to be construed as statutes. To interpret words, phrases and provisions of a statute, it may become necessary for Judges to embark into lengthy discussions but the discussion is meant to explain and not to define. Judges interpret statutes, they do not interpret judgments. They interpret words of statutes; their words are not to be interpreted as statutes. In London Graving Dock Co. Ltd. v. Horton, 1951 AC 737 , 761 Lord MacDermott observed: (AC p. 761) “...The matter cannot, of course, be settled merely by treating the ipsissima verba of Willes, J., as though they were part of an Act of Parliament and applying the rules of interpretation appropriate thereto. In London Graving Dock Co. Ltd. v. Horton, 1951 AC 737 , 761 Lord MacDermott observed: (AC p. 761) “...The matter cannot, of course, be settled merely by treating the ipsissima verba of Willes, J., as though they were part of an Act of Parliament and applying the rules of interpretation appropriate thereto. This is not to detract from the great weight to be given to the language actually used by that most distinguished Judge.?' In Home Office v. Dorset Yacht Co. Ltd. (1970) 2 All ER 294 Lord Reid said: (AC p. 1027) “...Lord Atkin's speech [Donoghue v. Stevension, 1932 All ER Rep 1, 11] ... is not to be treated as if it was a statutory definition. It will require qualification in new circumstances.” Megarry, J. in Shepherd Homes Ltd. v. Sandham (No. 2), (1971) 1 WLR 1062 observed: (WLR p. 1069) “...One must not, of course, construe even a reserved judgment of even Russell, L.J. as if it were an Act of Parliament.” And, in Herrington v. British Railways Board, 1972 AC 877 Lord Morris said: (AC p. 902) “There is always peril in treating the words of a speech or a judgment as though they were words in a legislative enactment, and it is to be remembered that judicial utterances are made in the setting of the facts of a particular case.” 11. There are a few other observations in Kewal Krishan Puri Case (1980) 1 SCC 416 to which apply with the same force all that we have said above. It is needless to repeat the oft-quoted truism of Lord Halsbury that a case is only an authority for what it actually decides and not for what may seem to follow logically from it.” 42. In such circumstances, therefore, when Division Bench has dealt with the fact position of the case and has simply gone on the principle of law vis-a-vis the provisions contained under the Act, I do not find the judgment cited to be of any help to the contesting respondent No. 4. 43. The other order that has been placed of a coordinate Bench of this Court like the judgment in the case of Harsh Singhal (supra) is concerned, I find that in that case also the Court dealt with the aspect of the ejectment of the sons upon not being providing maintenance to the senior citizens. 43. The other order that has been placed of a coordinate Bench of this Court like the judgment in the case of Harsh Singhal (supra) is concerned, I find that in that case also the Court dealt with the aspect of the ejectment of the sons upon not being providing maintenance to the senior citizens. The Court referred to the judgment in the case of Smt. S. Vanitha (supra) and held that the relief claimed for maintenance with an inbuilt relief of ejectment in principle. However, vide paragraph 24 the Court very clearly held that it was necessary and expedient to ensure maintenance and protection of the senior citizen or parent. The Court held that in ejectment/eviction would be incidental to the enforcement of the right to the maintenance and protection. Paragraph 24 of the judgment is reproduced hereunder: “24. In S. Vanitha (supra), the Apex Court has found that “Tribunal under the Senior Citizens Act, 2007 may have the authority to order an eviction, if it is necessary and expedient to ensure maintenance and protection of the senior citizen or parent. Eviction, in other words would be an incident of the enforcement of the right to maintenance and maintenance.” 44. In my considered view, incidental or secondary relief can never be principal relief as such. Secondary relief is always attracted when the main relief could not be satisfied without granting the secondary relief. Therefore, first relief should be for maintenance and then there should be a relief for ejectment or there should be cogent and convincing material available to the Court to form a view that there is definite case of ill-treatment by sons of their senior citizen parents. There is no such case in hand as far as the fact position is concerned. Respondent No. 4 never instituted any case under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 or lodged any criminal complaint for any unlawful action or immoral act of these sons-petitioners before this Court towards their mother. So again as far as legal principle is concerned judgment of a coordinate Bench in the case of Harsh Singhal (supra) would apply in principle but not to the fact position involved in the present case and, therefore, this judgment is not also of much help to the 4th respondent. So again as far as legal principle is concerned judgment of a coordinate Bench in the case of Harsh Singhal (supra) would apply in principle but not to the fact position involved in the present case and, therefore, this judgment is not also of much help to the 4th respondent. As far as the another judgment of a Division Bench cited in the case of Gajendra Singh (supra) is concerned, it appears to be a judgment in the facts of that case where the Court declined to interfere with the order passed by the authorities. The Court in that case found the application to be maintainable as there was a complaint by father against his sons. There was a finding that her sons and daughters-in-law were harassing the complainant and, therefore, this Court refused to grant indulgence in the matter. 45. Insofar as the second aspect is concerned as to whether there was any harassment being meted out to the mother by their sons, I find it necessary to go through the finding part of the judgment, first of the Tribunal and then of the appellate Court. 46. As far as the Tribunal's judgment is concerned, the Tribunal has chiefly relied upon the report of the Tehsildar of Tehsil Sadar of Pd. Deen Dayal Upadhyay Nagar of District Chandauli and came to conclude that there is likelihood of conciliation and thus drew the inference that 4th respondent was not being permitted to live peacefully. It is admitted fact position that the mother is living in the ground floor of the house whereas the sons are living on the first floor. 47. Mr. Dinesh Rai, who was conciliation officer submitted two reports. One report is dated 13th July, 2021 in which it was stated that two sons were residing in a house while the third son was residing at a different place and the shops that were earlier being run by Mukund Lal was being run by sons and that they have not given any maintenance amount to the mother and that the mother was of 65 to 70 years of age and had no source of income. These statements coming in the first report dated 13th July, 2021, it appears, led the Tribunal record a finding that mother was being ill-treated by the sons namely the petitioners. These statements coming in the first report dated 13th July, 2021, it appears, led the Tribunal record a finding that mother was being ill-treated by the sons namely the petitioners. This inference drawn by the Tribunal would have carried weight provided the mother had demanded maintenance. It is very interesting to notice that Tehsildar reported that mother had no source of income and yet the pleading raised before this Court in the counter-affidavit is that mother does not want maintenance. Even in the application filed before the Tribunal she had not claimed any maintenance. 48. I may also refer here another report of the Conciliation Officer dated 13th August, 2021 which records that mother had put a lock on the gate facing in the Courtyard so there was no possibility of any person entering the area occupied by the mother. Paragraph 2 of the report also says that sons were ready for conciliation. 49. These two reports by the same officer, therefore, are contrary to each other and the Tribunal was required to record its own finding as to why such a report could be taken to be as sufficient to return a finding of harassment being meted out by the sons to their mother. This I find to be lacking. 50. This, therefore, goes to the very root of the propriety of a Tribunal in arriving at a finding without considering the second report which was available with him. 51. Thus, in my considered view, the findings returned by the Tribunal qua harassment of 4th respondent is perverse. 52. The appellate Court affirms the order of the Tribunal and in that process records a finding that both the respondents did not permit their mother to live peacefully in their house and it is because of their conduct that she felt harassed. But nothing has been stated about the kind of misconduct or ill-treatment at the end of the petitioners of their mother that forced her to live a deprived life and virtually in illegal confinement so as to necessitate the sons' eviction who are admittedly her own sons living with daughters-in-law. 53. The finding, therefore, by the appellate Court that the continuance of the sons and daughters-in-law in the house was illegal cannot be approved of. 53. The finding, therefore, by the appellate Court that the continuance of the sons and daughters-in-law in the house was illegal cannot be approved of. Every daughter-in-law married to a person has a right to live in the house of in-laws and if the in-laws confine themselves in a locked room without citing any incident of any kind illegal act or misbehaviour on the part of daughter-in-law which may be indicative of ill-treatment, the family members like daughter-in-law and her sons and daughters who are the grandsons and granddaughters of the senior citizen, cannot be held to be unauthorizedly living in the house. 54. In view of the above, therefore, I do not find the judgments passed by both the Tribunal as well as appellate Court to be sustainable in law. 55. Coming to the question framed as above and the discussions made hereinabove, I hold that an application simpliciter for ejectment is not maintainable unless there is a claim for maintenance and ejectment is made only secondary relief thereto in the event maintenance is not granted. 56. I would further observe here that the discharge of duties by Tribunal is judicial in nature under the Act and therefore, the Tribunal is required to meet the principles that attract a judgment to be enriched with the findings of fact. The Court has to record findings of ill-treatment and maintenance, in the first instance, before concluding that sons and children deserve to be evicted. The findings should be based upon the cogent material placed before the Court/tribunal. 57. I do not find the judgments impugned before this Court to be sound on the principles discussed above. 58. In view of above, writ petition succeeds and is allowed. 59. The order passed by the Tribunal dated 24th August, 2021 and of the appellate Court dated 16th March, 2022 are hereby quashed. 60. However, it is left open for the senior citizen namely 4th respondent to avail such remedy as available in law and maintain an application for maintenance under the Senior Citizens Act, 2007 afresh if she wants maintenance and good care by her sons and daughters-in-law.