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2024 DIGILAW 1055 (KER)

New Hope Foundation v. Union Of India

2024-08-22

GOPINATH P.

body2024
JUDGMENT : A short, but interesting question arises for consideration in these writ petitions. The question relates to the eligibility of the petitioners in these cases to file applications for settlement in terms of the provisions contained in Section 245C of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘1961 Act’) following the amendments to the provisions contained in Chapter XIX-A of the 1961 Act by the Finance Act, 2021. 2. The following facts are not in dispute. By virtue of the provisions contained in the Finance Act, 2021, which came into force with effect from 01-04-2021, amendments were made to the provisions of Chapter XIX-A of the 1961 Act, providing inter alia for the abolition of the Income-tax Settlement Commission (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Settlement Commission’) and providing that no application shall be made for settlement before the Settlement Commission on or after 01.02.2021. The amendments were to take effect from 01-02-2021. A search under the provisions of Section 132 of the 1961 Act had taken place in respect of the petitioners in all these cases prior to 01-02-2021. However, the notices following the search were issued to the petitioners under the provisions of Section 153A of the 1961 Act only after 01-02-2021. The question arising for consideration of this Court is whether, in the light of the amendments to the provisions of Chapter XIX-A of the 1961 Act, persons like the petitioners in whose cases a search under Section 132 of the 1961 Act was prior to 01-02-2021, but notices under Section 153A had been issued only after 01-02-2021, could maintain an application for settlement before the Settlement Commission/Interim Settlement Board. 3. Sri. Balbir Singh, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioners, on the instructions of Sri. 3. Sri. Balbir Singh, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioners, on the instructions of Sri. R. Sivaraman, would refer to the provisions of Section 132, Section 153A and the relevant provisions of Chapter XIX-A of the 1961 Act, to contend that, since the time limit for filing an application before the Interim Settlement Board stood extended to 30-09-2021 by virtue of a notification issued by the Central Board of Direct Taxes (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Central Board’), exercising powers under Section 119(2)(b) of the 1961 Act, notwithstanding the fact that a notice under Section 153A of the 1961 Act had been issued only after 01-02-2021, the petitioners were entitled to maintain applications for settlement in terms of the provisions contained in Chapter XIX-A of the 1961 Act. The learned Senior Counsel placed considerable reliance on the judgment of the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in Senapati Santaji Ghorpade Sugar Factory Ltd. v. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax, Central Circle 1(1) and Ors.; MANU/MH/2202/2024; the judgment of the Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court in Vetrivel Infrastructure v. Deputy Commissioner of Income-tax; (2024) 164 taxmann.com 123 (Gujarat); as also to the judgment of another Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in Vishwakarma Developers v. Central Board of Direct Taxes and Ors; 2024 SCC OnLine Bom 2507 in support of his contentions. It is pointed out that the definition of ‘case’in Section 245A(b) r/w the provisions of Section 245C of the 1961 Act, clearly indicate that the trigger for filing an application before the Settlement Commission/Interim Settlement Board would be that a ‘case’as defined in Section 245A(b) must be pending on the date of the application. It is pointed out that the Bombay High Court in Senapati Santaji Ghorpade Sugar Factory Ltd. (supra), the Madras High Court in Jain Metal Rolling Mills v.Union of India and Ors.; MANU/TN/6417/2023, and another Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in Vishwakarma Developers (supra) had taken the view that since the Finance Act, 2021, came into force only with effect from 01-04-2021, the vested right of filing an application for settlement in respect of notices issued prior to 31-03-2021 could not be taken away. He submits that the Gujarat High Court had, even in respect of cases where notices had been issued after 31-03-2021, taken the view that the applications before the Interim Settlement Board could be maintainable, provided they were filed on or before 30-09-2021. The learned Senior Counsel also submitted that, if the right to file an application for settlement had to be determined with reference to the date of issuance of the notice, the same would result in a very anomalous situation, where, some assessees whose premises were the subject matter of search under Section 132 of the 1961 Act (on the same day) would have the right to approach the Settlement Commission if the notice under Section 153A was issued to them before 01-02-2021 (31-3-2021 by virtue of the law laid down in Senapati Santaji Ghorpade Sugar Factory Ltd. (supra)) while other assessees would have no such right if the notices were issued to them after 31-03-2021. In other words, it is submitted that if in the case of one of the persons involved, the notice was issued prior to 31-03-2021 they would be entitled to maintain an application before the Settlement Commission/Interim Settlement Board while certain others to whom notices were issued thereafter would not be in a position to do so. 4. Sri. Anil D. Nair, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioners in WP(C) Nos. 44271/2023, 2017/2024 & 2496/2024, on the instructions of Adv. Binisha Baby, would supplement the submissions of Sri. Balbir Singh. He submits that the orders issued by the Interim Settlement Board finding the applications filed by the petitioners in these cases as ‘not eligible’ are liable to be set aside, and the applications filed should be restored to the file of the Interim Settlement Board for adjudication (in connection with settlement) in accordance with the law. 5. Smt. Susie B. Varghese, the learned Senior Standing Counsel appearing for the department, vehemently opposes the grant of any relief to the petitioners. She has extensively referred to the provisions of Sections 153A, 245A and 245C of the 1961 Act to demonstrate as to when an application can be maintained before the Settlement Commission/Interim Settlement Board. 5. Smt. Susie B. Varghese, the learned Senior Standing Counsel appearing for the department, vehemently opposes the grant of any relief to the petitioners. She has extensively referred to the provisions of Sections 153A, 245A and 245C of the 1961 Act to demonstrate as to when an application can be maintained before the Settlement Commission/Interim Settlement Board. It is submitted that in the case of proceedings initiated on the basis of a search under Section 132 of the 1961 Act, Explanation (iiia) to Section 245A(b) of the 1961 Act, indicates that the proceedings shall commence from the date of issue of the notice initiating such proceeding and will conclude on the date on which the assessment is made. It is submitted that as long as the notice under Section 153A of the 1961 Act, in the case of the petitioners, was issued after 01-02-2021, no case can be stated to be pending on 01-02-2021, the date on which the amended provisions of Chapter XIX-A of the 1961 Act came into force. It is submitted that a reading of the operative portion of the judgment of the Gujarat High Court in Vetrivel Infrastructure (supra) would clearly indicate that it is only when notices had been issued prior to 31-03-2021 would the benefit of the directions issued in that judgment be available. It is submitted that it is the admitted case of the petitioners that the notices under Section 153A of the 1961 Act and the filing of the application for settlement were both beyond 31-03-2021 in the facts of these cases. It is submitted that the judgment of the Bombay High Court in Senapati Santaji Ghorpade Sugar Factory Ltd. (supra), that of the Madras High Court in Jain Metal Rolling Mills (supra), and that of another Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in Vishwakarma Developers (supra) also do not come to the aid of the petitioners that those were all cases where the notices under Section 153A of the 1961 Act had been issued prior to 31-03-2021. It is also submitted that the extension of time to file an application by the Central Board in the exercise of jurisdiction vested under Section 119(2)(b) of the 1961 Act does not mean that the operation of statutory provisions abolishing the Settlement Commission with effect from 01-02-2021 stood adjourned till 30-09-2021. It is also submitted that the extension of time to file an application by the Central Board in the exercise of jurisdiction vested under Section 119(2)(b) of the 1961 Act does not mean that the operation of statutory provisions abolishing the Settlement Commission with effect from 01-02-2021 stood adjourned till 30-09-2021. In other words, it is the submission that the Central Board cannot be deemed to have any authority to extend or give life to the Settlement Commission when the Parliament had categorically abolished the Settlement Commission with effect from 01-02-2021. It is submitted that these writ petitions deserve to be dismissed. 6. Having considered the submissions made across the bar, I am of the view that the petitioners are entitled to succeed. 7. The Finance Bill, 2021 ((2021) 430 ITR (Stat) 74) proposed certain amendments to Chapter XIX-A of the 1961 Act. The bill was placed before Parliament on 01-02-2021 and obtained the assent of the President on 28-3-2021. For the purposes of this case, the following amendments to the provisions of Chapter XIX-A are relevant:- i. Insertion of sub-section (5) to Section 245C providing that “No application shall be made under this section on or after February 1, 2021”; ii. Amendment of Section 245B providing for the abolition of the Settlement Commission “on or after the 1st day of February, 2021”; iii. Interim Board was defined in section 245A(da) to mean a Board as constituted under section 245AA; iv. Interim Board for settlement was constituted as per section 245AA of the Act “for settlement of pending cases” v. “pending application” was defined in section 245A(eb) to mean an application which was filed under section 245C and which fulfills the following conditions, viz.: (a) it was not declared invalid under sub-section (2C) of section 245D of the Act; and (b) No order under sub-section (4) of section 245D was issued on or before January 31, 2021 with respect to such applications. 8. 8. A reading of Section 153A of the 1961 Act inter alia indicates that notwithstanding anything contained in Sections 139, 147, 148, 149, 151 and 153 of the 1961 Act where a search is initiated under section 132 of the 1961 Act or books of account, other documents or any assets are requisitioned under section 132A of the 1961 Act, the Assessing Officer shall issue a notice calling upon the assessee to furnish a return of income and proceed to assess or reassess the total income relating to six assessment years immediately preceding the assessment year relevant to the previous year in which such search is conducted or requisition is made. Thus it is clear that the provision authorises the assessment or reassessment of income for the period mentioned notwithstanding the provisions contained in Sections 139, 147, 148, 149, 151 or 153 of the 1961 Act where a search is initiated under Section 132 of the 1961 Act. Thus even if any proceeding had been already completed under any of the aforesaid provisions for the years in question, the assessment for the years in question become open for fresh assessment. 9. Section 245A(b) of the 1961 Act defines 'case' for the purposes of Section 245C of the 1961 Act. The definition of 'case'in Section 245A(b) reads thus: “245A.Definitions In this Chapter unless the context otherwise requires,- (a) xxxx xxxx xxxx (b)“case” means any proceeding for assessment under this Act, of any person in respect of any assessment year or assessment years which may be pending before an Assessing Officer on the date on which an application under sub-section (1) of section 245C is made.” There is an Explanation Clause to Section 245A(b) which starts with the words “For the purposes of this clause”. Explanation (ii) of Section 245A(b) of the 1961 Act (which was deleted w.e.f 1.6.2010) provided as under:- “(ii) a proceeding for assessment or reassessment referred to in clause (ii) or clause (iii) of the proviso shall be deemed to have commenced on the date of initiation of the search under section 132 or requisition under section 132A” Explanation (iiia) (which was inserted w.e.f 1.6.2010) of Section 245A(b) of the 1961 Act reads thus:- “(iiia) a proceeding for assessment or reassessment for any of the assessment years, referred to in clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 153A in case of a person referred to in section 153A or section 153C, shall be deemed to have commenced on the date of issue of notice initiating such proceeding and concluded on the date on which the assessment is made;” A conjoint reading of the definition of 'case' under Section 245A(b) of the 1961 Act and Explanation (iiia) does not lead me to conclude that the definition of 'case' for the purposes of Section 245A(b) is in any manner controlled or limited by the provisions of Explanation (iiia) of Section 245A(b). In other words, the definition of 'case' under Section 245A(b) of the 1961 Act indicates that any person in respect of whom any proceeding for assessment under the 1961 Act for any assessment year or assessment years that is ‘pending’ before an Assessing Officer is eligible for making an application under sub-section (1) of Section 245C. The deletion of Explanation (ii) and the insertion of Explanation (iiia) does not in my view lead to a conclusion that a ‘case’ as defined in Section 245A(b) is not pending for the period specified in Section 153A from the date a search is conducted or a requisition is made under Section 132 or a requisition is made under Section 132A. The provisions of Explanation (iiia) indicate that in the case of a proceeding following a search under Section 132 of the 1961 Act, the proceeding shall commence from the date of issuance of the notice initiating such proceeding and conclude on the date on which such assessment is made. While the proceedings may commence with the issuance of a formal notice and conclude with the assessment, the fact remains that the assessment for all the years (six assessment years) mentioned in Section 153A remains ‘pending’ on account of a search or requisition. While the proceedings may commence with the issuance of a formal notice and conclude with the assessment, the fact remains that the assessment for all the years (six assessment years) mentioned in Section 153A remains ‘pending’ on account of a search or requisition. In my view, Explanation (iiia) does not indicate that a ‘case’ as defined in Section 245A(b) of the 1961 Act in the case of a person who is the subject matter of a search under Section 132 of the 1961 Act or whose books of account or other documents are requisitioned under Section 132A of the 1961 Act is not pending on or immediately after the date of the search. The opening words of sub-section (1) of Section 245C of the 1961 Act provide that an assessee may, at any stage of a case relating to him, make an application in such form and in such manner as may be prescribed, containing a full and true disclosure of his income, which has not been disclosed before the Assessing Officer, the manner in which such income has been derived, the additional amount of income tax payable on such income and such other particulars as may be prescribed, to the Settlement Commission to have the case settled and any such application shall be disposed of in the manner provided thereafter. A reading of the provisions of Section 153A of the 1961 Act indicates beyond doubt that in the case of a person, who is the subject matter of a search under Section 132, a ‘case’as defined in Section 245A(b) can be said to be pending for the purposes of Section 245A(b) on the date of the search or immediately thereafter or from the date of the requisition, as every proceeding taken on the basis of the search or requisition is intrinsically connected to the date of the search or requisition. To a pointed question from the Court, the learned Senior Standing Counsel conceded that even concluded assessments for any of the years mentioned in Section 153A would stand re-opened if a search is conducted under Section 132. 10. There is yet another aspect of the matter. Immediately prior to its amendment by the provisions of the Finance Act, 2010, Section 245A(b) reads thus:- “245A. Definitions. 10. There is yet another aspect of the matter. Immediately prior to its amendment by the provisions of the Finance Act, 2010, Section 245A(b) reads thus:- “245A. Definitions. In this Chapter unless the context otherwise requires,- (a) xxxx xxxx xxxx (b)“case” means any proceeding for assessment under this Act, of any person in respect of any assessment year or assessment years which may be pending before an Assessing Officer on the date on which an application under sub-section (1) of section 245C is made: Provided that- (i) a proceeding for assessment or reassessment orcomputationundersection147; (ii) a proceeding for assessment or reassessment for any of the assessment years referred to in clause (b) of section 153A in case of a person referred to in Section 153A or Section 153C; (iii) a proceeding for assessment or reassessment for the assessment year referred to in clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 153B in case of a person referred to in section 153A or section 153C; (iv) a proceeding for making fresh assessment in pursuance of an order under section 254 or section 263 or section 264, setting aside or cancelling an assessment, shall not be a proceeding for assessment for the puroses of this clause. Explanation:- For the purposes of this clause- (i) a proceeding for assessment or reassessment or recomputation referred to in clause (i) of the proviso shall be deemed to have commenced from the date on which a notice under section 148 is issued; (ii) a proceeding for assessment or reassessment referred to in clause (ii) or clause (iii) of the proviso shall be deemed to have commenced on the date of initiation of the search under section 132 or requisition under section 132A; (iii) a proceeding for making fresh assessment referred to in clause (iv) of the proviso shall be deemed to have commenced from the date on which the order under section 254 or section 263 or section 264, setting aside or cancelling an assessment was passed; (iv) a proceeding for assessment for any assessment year, other than the proceedings of assessment or reassessment referred to in clause (i) or clause (ii) or clause (iii) or clause (iv) of the proviso, shall be deemed to have commenced from the 1st day of the assessment year and concluded on the date on which the assessment is made;” The scheme of the provisions of Section 245A(b) (as it originally stood) is the following:- A case is a proceeding for assessment pending before an assessing authority on the date the application is filed for settlement; Proceedings for assessment/re-assessment under Sections 147, 153A(b), 153B(1)(b) and proceedings for fresh assessment pursuant to orders under Sections 254 or 263 or 264 ‘shall not be a proceeding for assessment for the purposes of this clause’. In other words, proceedings under the aforesaid Sections would not amount to a ‘case’ for the purposes of Section 245A(b); and The Explanations indicated when the proceedings under the excluded provisions would ‘COMMENCE’. In other words, no application for settlement could not be made at any time after the commencement date in respect of proceedings under the excluded provisions. The inescapable conclusion is that each explanation relates specifically to the four provisos referred to above. In other words, no application for settlement could not be made at any time after the commencement date in respect of proceedings under the excluded provisions. The inescapable conclusion is that each explanation relates specifically to the four provisos referred to above. This can be easily demonstrated by putting each of the provisos against each of the related explanations in tabular form:- The provisos The Explanations (i) a proceeding for assessment or reassessment or recomputation under section 147 Note: This proviso was deleted w.e.f 1.10.2014 by the Finance Act (No.2), 2014 (i) a proceeding for assessment or reassessment or recomputation referred to in clause (i) of the proviso shall be deemed to have commenced from the date on which a notice under section 148 is issued; (ii) a proceeding for assessment or reassessment for any of the assessment years referred to in clause (b) of section 153A in case of a person referred to in Section 153A or Section 153C Note: This proviso was deleted w.e.f 1.6.2010 by the Finance Act, 2010 (ii) a proceeding for assessment or reassessment referred to in clause (ii) or clause (iii) of the proviso shall be deemed to have commenced on the date of initiation of the search under section 132 or requisition under section 132A (iii) a proceeding for assessment or reassessment for the assessment year referred to in clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 153B in case of a person referred to in section 153A or section 153C Note: This proviso was deleted w.e.f 1.6.2010 by the Finance Act, 2010 SAME AS ABOVE AS EXPLANATION (ii) refers to clauses (provisos) (ii) & (iii) (iv) a proceeding for making fresh assessment in pursuance of an order under section 254 or section 263 or section 264, setting aside or cancelling an assessment Note: This proviso was deleted w.e.f 1.10.2014 by the Finance Act (No.2), 2014 (iii) a proceeding for making fresh assessment referred to in clause (iv) of the proviso shall be deemed to have commenced from the date on which the order under section 254 or section 263 or section 264, setting aside or cancelling an assessment was passed; Thus, while certain classes of proceedings were excluded from the definition of ‘case’, the extent of exclusion or the period of exclusion was determined by the corresponding Explanation Clauses inserted therein. In other words, the explanations defined the period of exclusion and not the period of inclusion. For example, the second proviso contemplates that, a proceeding for assessment or reassessment for any of the assessment years referred to in clause (b) of Section 153A or Section 153C shall not be a proceeding for assessment for the purposes of Chapter XIX-A. Explanation (ii) clarifies that proceedings referred to in the second proviso shall be deemed to have commenced from the date of initiation of a search under Section 132 or requisition under Section 132A. Therefore, the Explanation Clauses to Section 245A(b) existed solely to clarify and elaborate on the provisos and have no independent existence or meaning. As already noticed, through the Finance Act, of 2010, proviso (ii) was deleted and explanation (iiia) was inserted into clause (b) of Section 245A of the 1961 Act. However, the addition of explanation (iiia) after the deletion of the Second Proviso was totally unnecessary. Search cases which were completely excluded from the scope of an application for settlement could now be subject matter of settlement by virtue of the deletion of the second proviso. Useful reference may be made in this regard to a Circular issued by the Government of India in the Ministry of Finance, Department of Revenue (Central Board of Direct Taxes) dated, the 6th April, 2011 (CIRCULAR NO.01/2011.F.No.142/1/2011-SO (TPL)), which to the extent relevant reads thus:- “22.1 Under the existing provisions of section 245A (b), the term “case”, in relation to which an application can be made is defined as any proceeding for assessment of any person in respect of any assessment year or assessment years which may be pending before an Assessing Officer on the date on which an application is made to the Settlement Commission. However, it excluded, among others, proceedings for assessment or reassessment resulting from a search or as a result of requisition of books of account or other documents or any assets, initiated under the Act. The Act has been amended to include proceedings for assessment or reassessment resulting from search or as a result of requisition of books of account or other documents or any assets, within the definition of a “case” which can be admitted by the Settlement Commission. The Act has been amended to include proceedings for assessment or reassessment resulting from search or as a result of requisition of books of account or other documents or any assets, within the definition of a “case” which can be admitted by the Settlement Commission. Explanation to section 245A (b) has been amended to specify the date on which the proceedings for assessment or reassessment shall be deemed to have commenced and concluded in the case of a person whose income is being assessed or reassessed as a result of search or as a result of requisition of books of account or other documents or any assets.” (emphasis supplied). Thereafter, by virtue of the Finance Act (No. 2), 2014, all the remaining provisos to clause (b) of Section 245A of the 1961 Act were deleted thereby bringing within the definition of ‘case’ all the proceedings which were hitherto excluded. The result was the further widening of the jurisdiction of the Settlement Commission and the same is evident from the Circular (CIRCULAR NO. 01/2015, F. No. 142/13/2014-TPL) issued by the Government of India, Ministry of Finance Department of Revenue (Central Board of Direct Taxes) dated, the 21st January, 2015 which, to the extent relevant, reads thus:- “50. Enlarging the scope of Settlement Commission 50.1 Clause (b) of section 245A provides the definition of ‘case’ which means any proceeding for assessment under the Income-tax Act, of any person in respect of any assessment year or assessment years which may be pending before an assessing officer. However, the proviso to the said clause,before its amendment by the Act, provided that proceedings for assessment or reassessment under section 147 or a proceeding for making fresh assessment in pursuance of an order under section 254 or section 263 or section 264 of the Income-tax Act, setting aside or cancelling an assessment shall not be a proceeding for assessment for the purpose of this clause. 50.2 In order to enlarge the scope of Settlement Commission, the proviso to clause (b) of section 245A of the Income-tax Act has been omitted to enable proceedings under section 147 and proceedings for making fresh assessment in pursuance of an order under section 254 or section 263 or section 264 of the Income-tax Act, setting aside or cancelling an assessment also be eligible for settlement before the Settlement Commission. Similar amendment has also been made in section 22A of the Wealth -tax Act.” 11. That the amendments made in the year 2010 and in the year 2014 were intended to expand the scope of cases that could go to the settlement commission is evident from the relevant portions of the Budget speech for those years. In the Budget Speech of the then Union Finance Minister on 26/02/2010 for the Financial year 2010-2011 it was stated:- “123. To expeditiously resolve disputes with taxpayers I propose to expand the scope of cases which may be admitted by the Settlement Commission to include proceedings related to search and seizure cases pending for assessment. I also propose to expand the scope of Settlement Commission in respect of Central Excise and Customs so that certain categories of cases that hitherto fell outside its jurisdiction may be admitted.” In the Budget Speech of the then Union Finance Minister on 10/07/2014 for the Financial year 2014-2015 it was stated:- “Advance Ruling and Other Tax Related Measures 11 ………… 12. ………….. I further propose to enlarge the scope of the Income-tax Settlement Commission so that taxpayers may approach the Commission for settlement of disputes. This would continue to be once in a lifetime opportunity for any taxpayer.” 12. Section 245A(b), as it stands, after the amendment by Finance Act (2) of 2014 (together with the explanations) is extracted below:- "case" means any proceeding for assessment under this Act, of any person in respect of any assessment year or assessment years which may be pending before an Assessing Officer on the date on which an application under sub-section (1) of section 245C is made. Explanation.—For the purposes of this clause— (i) a proceeding for assessment or reassessment or recomputation under section 147 shall be deemed to have commenced— (a) from the date on which a notice under section 148 is issued for any assessment year; (b) from the date of issuance of the notice referred to in sub-clause (a), for any other assessment year or assessment years for which a notice under section 148 has not been issued, but such notice could have been issued on such date, if the return of income for the other assessment year or assessment years has been furnished under section 139 or in response to a notice under section 142; (ii)[***] (iii) a proceeding for making fresh assessment in pursuance of an order under section 254 or section 263 or section 264, setting aside or cancelling an assessment shall be deemed to have commenced from the date on which such order, setting aside or cancelling an assessment was passed; (iiia) a proceeding for assessment or reassessment for any of the assessment years, referred to in clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 153A in case of a person referred to in section 153A or section 153C, shall be deemed to have commenced on the date of issue of notice initiating such proceedings and concluded on the date on which the assessment is made; (iv) a proceeding for assessment for any assessment year, other than the proceedings of assessment or reassessment referred to in clause (i) or clause (iii) or clause (iiia), shall be deemed to have commenced from the date on which the return of income for that assessment year is furnished under section 139 or in response to a notice served under section 142 and concluded on the date on which the assessment is made; or on the expiry of the time specified for making assessment under sub-section (1) of section 153, in case where no assessment is made; In my view, since the provisos to Section 245A(b) were deleted with the intention of enlarging the scope of the term ‘case’’; the explanations being inextricably tied to the proviso, should also have been deleted to reflect the true intention of the Parliament. This interpretation appears to be the only palusible one considering the fact the Explanation Clauses still use the words ‘commenced’ and/or ‘commenced’ and ‘concluded’, even in the absence of the provisos. This interpretation appears to be the only palusible one considering the fact the Explanation Clauses still use the words ‘commenced’ and/or ‘commenced’ and ‘concluded’, even in the absence of the provisos. In other words, even though the time-frames mentioned in the Explanation Clause only identified the period of exclusion with reference to each of the proceedings taken out of the definition of ‘case’ by operation of the provisos which were deleted (as already noticed, two provisos deleted in 2010 and the rest were deleted in 2014) the Explanation Clauses that were ancillary to the provisos, continued to remain in the statute book. With the deletion of the provisos, the Explanation Clauses cannot by themselves control or restrict the definition of ‘case’ in Section 245A(b). If the interpretation now sought to be canvassed by the Revenue is accepted, the legislative intent behind the deletion of the provisos will not be achieved and the period which was originally excluded by operation of the provisos read with the explanations will become the period during which an application for settlement could be filed. This is, obviously, not the intention of the parliament. It is settled that where two views are possible and one produces anomalous results it is the duty of the Court to adopt the view that does not produce anomalous results. In the words of Venkatarama Iyer, J., in N.T. Veluswami Thevar v. G. Raja Nainar, AIR 1959 SC 422 :- “12……..It is no doubt true that if on its true construction, a statute leads to anomalous results, the courts have no option but to give effect to it and leave it to the legislature to amend and alter the law. But when on a construction of a statute, two views are possible, one which results in an anomaly and the other, not, it is our duty to adopt the latter and not the former, seeking consolation in the thought that the law bristles with anomalies…….” In the light of the interpretation that I have placed on the relevant provisions, I find myself unable to agree with the contrary view expressed by the Delhi High Court in Sushil Kumar Goyal & ors v. Principal Commissioner of Income Tax-1 & ors; 2023 SCC OnLine Del 2921. 13. 13. In Jain Metals (supra) the Madras High Court held that the purpose of the amendments to Chapter XIX-A of the 1961 Act (in 2021) was to abolish the Income-tax Settlement Commission and establish an Interim Board to deal with pending applications. The Court held, on interpretation of the relevant provisions and the terms of the order issued under section 119(2) of the 1961 Act (Order bearing F.No.299/22/2021-Dir(Inv.III)/174 dated 28-09-2021), that if retrospective legislation takes away a vested right, it must do so explicitly or by necessary implication. Therefore, the right that had accrued to eligible assessees to approach the Income-tax Settlement Commission until the the Finance Act, 2021 came into force on 01-04-2021 remained vested in them and such rights continued to be enforceable notwithstanding the amendment to the relevant provisions. A Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in Senapati Santaji Ghorpade Sugar Factory Ltd. (supra) and another Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in Vishwakarma Developers (supra) essentially take the same view. I am in respectful agreement with the views expressed in those cases. The order issued by the Central Board under section 119(2) of the 1961 Act permitted the actual filing of applications by assessees who are entitled to make such applications by 30.9.2021. Thus upon the interpretation that has been placed on the amended provisions of Chapter XIX-A of the 1961 Act and taking into consideration of the order issued under section 119(2) of the 1961 Act (Order bearing F.No. 299/22/2021 -Dir(Inv.III)/174 dated 28-09-2021) the position that emerges is this:- (i) If in the case of the petitioners herein, the search under Section 132 of the 1961 Act, was prior to or on 31-03-2021 they would be entitled to maintain an application for settlement under Section 245C of the 1961 Act; (ii) Such applications could have been filed till 30-9-2021 in view of the Order bearing F.No. 299/22/2021 -Dir(Inv.III)/174 dated 28-09.2021 under Section 119(2)(b) of the 1961 Act and such applications will be disposed of in accordance with the law by the Interim Board for Settlement constituted under Section 245AA of the 1961 Act; (iii) No application for settlement can be maintained if the search was conducted on or after 01-04-2021 as the Settlement Commission ceased to exist. In that view of the matter and since it is not disputed before me that the search under Section 132 in the case of all the petitioners in these cases was prior to 31-03-2021, the persons/entities, who were subject matter of the search, will be entitled to maintain an application for settlement before the Interim Settlement Board, provided such application has been filed on or before 30-09-2021. These writ petitions are therefore ordered directing that if the search under Section 132 in respect of the petitioners was prior to 31-03-2021, the petitioners are entitled to maintain applications for settlement before the Interim Board for Settlement, provided such applications were filed on or before 30-09-2021. Orders issued by the Interim Board for Settlement finding the applications for settlement filed by the petitioners as not maintainable will stand set aside. The applications are restored to the files of the Interim Board for Settlement, to be disposed of keeping in mind the declaration of the law contained in this judgment.