JUDGMENT : RAVI NATH TILHARI, J. 1. Heard Sri K. Ratanga Pani Reddy, learned counsel for the claimants and Sri K. Viswanatham, learned standing counsel for Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation (in short ‘APSRTC’) in both the appeals. 2. The appellants in MACMA No. 2574 of 2013 are the claimants in MVOP No. 816 of 2008. They are the respondents in MACMA No. 2357 of 2013. APSRTC is the appellant in MACMA No. 2357 of 2013 and the respondent in MACMA No. 2574 of 2013. 3. The claimants filed MVOP No. 816 of 2008 in the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal-cum-First Additional District Court, Kurnool (in short ‘the Tribunal’) under Sections 163A and 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (in short ‘MV Act’) claiming compensation of Rs.60,00,000/- on account of the death of R. Srinivasa Reddy (hereinafter referred to as ‘deceased’), their predecessor in a road accident, dated 08.10.2008. 4. The claim petition was filed inter alia on the averments that the deceased was born on 11.06.1969. He joined in Indian Air Force in 1990 and worked as a Technician, Senior Technician and as Senior Noncommissioned Officer (SNCO) for 15 years, and later on, he retired voluntarily from Indian Air Force and joined in Firepro Systems Limited, Hyderabad in the year 2005 as Senior Manager and worked till 2008. As he got better opportunity, he joined in RSP Design Consultants (India) Private Limited, Bangalore on 25.08.2008 as Project Engineer and was posted at Hyderabad. He was drawing salary of Rs.44,432/- per month by the date of his accident and was getting pension of Rs.5,000/- per month from Indian Air Force. From agricultural field, he was earning Rs.50,000/- per annum. On 08.10.2008 in the early morning the deceased and his family members left Hyderabad for Dhone in a Car bearing No. AP9-BJ8723. He was driving the car slowly with due care and caution. Then, at about 8 a.m. when the said car was proceeding, near Kodandapur village limits, on NH-7 road, one APSRTC Bus bearing No. AP11-Z1545 being driven by its driver at a very high speed in a rash and negligent manner, came in opposite direction on wrong side of the road and dashed the car of the deceased. The accident occurred due to sole rash and negligence driving of the driver of the APSRTC Bus only. 5. The APSRTC filed counter denying the allegations. The accident occurred due to sole rash and negligence driving of the driver of the APSRTC Bus only. 5. The APSRTC filed counter denying the allegations. Inter alia, it was submitted that the accident occurred due to rash and negligent driving of the driver of the Car. There was contributory negligence. The owner and the insurance company of the car were also necessary parties and in their absence, the petition was bad for non-joinder of parties. With respect to other averments, it was further pleaded that the applicants be put to strict proof. The compensation claim was said to be highly excessive and imaginary. 6. On the basis of the pleadings, the Tribunal framed the following issues: 1. Whether the accident occurred on 08.10.2008 due to rash and negligent driving of APSRTC bus bearing No. AP11-Z1545 driven by its driver? 2. Whether the petitioners are entitled to compensation? If so, to what extent? 3. To what relief? 7. On behalf of the claimants, PWs 1 to 3 were examined and Exs.A1 to A21, viz., Ex.A1-Attested copy of FIR in Cr. No. 43/2008 of Kodandapur P.S. Ex.A2-Certified copy of Inquest Report, Ex.A3-Certified copy of Postmortem Certificate, Ex.A4-Certified copy of MVI Report, Ex.A5-Certified copy of charge sheet in CC.45/2008 on the file of the Judicial Magistrate of I Class, Alampur, Ex.A6-S.C.C. Marks Memorandum, Ex.A7-Provisional Certificate of Diploma in Mechanical Engineering, Ex.A8-Provisional Certificate Degree in Mechanical Engineering, Ex.A9-Letter of appointment dated 1.1.2005, Ex.A10-Letter dated 17.4.2005, Ex.A11-Letter dated 5.5.2007, Ex.A12-Letter dated 16.5.2008, Ex.A13-Salary particulars statement, Ex.A14-Bank Statement, Ex.A15-Bank Statement, Ex.A16-Appointment letter dated 25.8.2008, Ex.A17-Pay slip for the month of September, 2008, Ex.A18-Bank Statement, Ex.A19-Xerox copy of title deed (marked after verifying with original), Ex.A20-Driving license of R. Srinivasa Reddy and Ex.A21-Ex-servicemen Identity card, were marked. 8. On behalf of APSRTC, the driver of the bus was examined as RW-1 and no documents were marked. 9. The Tribunal recorded the finding that the accident took place because of negligence on the part of the driver of APSRTC bus. The 1st issue was answered in favour of the claimants and against the APSRTC. The Tribunal also recorded that the petition was not bad for non-joinder of necessary parties. 10. On the point of compensation, the claimants were held entitled for compensation of Rs.51,27,420/- in total together with interest @ 9% p.a. from the date of the petition to the date of realization. The Tribunal also recorded that the petition was not bad for non-joinder of necessary parties. 10. On the point of compensation, the claimants were held entitled for compensation of Rs.51,27,420/- in total together with interest @ 9% p.a. from the date of the petition to the date of realization. The Tribunal considered the age of the deceased as 39 ½ years. His net income per month was taken as Rs.42,427/- based on Ex.A17, the pay slip for the month of September, 2008 and the evidence of PW 3. It made 1/3rd deduction towards personal expenses of the deceased and applied the multiplier of ‘15’. Thus, it determined Rs.42,427/- x 12 = Rs.5,09,124 per annum. After 1/3rd deduction, it came to Rs.3,39,828/- per annum. Multiplied by ‘15’ came to Rs.50,97,420/-. It added Rs.20,000/- for loss of consortium to widow; Rs.10,000/- for funeral charges. Total came to Rs.51,27,420/-. 11. Thus, the Tribunal vie Award dated 05.07.2013 partly allowed the claim petition. 12. Challenging the Award dated 05.07.2013, the Insurance Company filed MACMA No. 2357 of 2013. The claimants filed MACMA No. 2574 of 2013 for enhancement of the compensation amount to make it a just and fair compensation. 13. Learned counsel for the claimants submitted that the claimants are entitled for future prospects which @ 40% deserves to be added to the income. 14. Learned counsel for the claimants further submitted that considering the number of the claimants, the Tribunal erred in making deduction towards personal expenditure as 1/3rd. In his submission, it should have been 1/4th in view of the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Sarla Verma v. DTC, (2009) 6 SCC 121 . 15. Learned standing counsel for APSRTC further submitted that there was contributory negligence on the part of the driver of the Car (deceased). 16. Learned standing counsel for APSRTC submitted that the deceased had no permanent job. The Tribunal rightly did not grant future prospects. 17. We have considered the aforesaid submissions and perused the material on record. 18. The points that arise for consideration are as under: (A) Whether there was contributory negligence on the part of the deceased, driving the car? (B) Whether the compensation awarded by the Tribunal is just and fair? ANALYSIS: Point-A: Contributory negligence: 19. We first deal with the arguments on contributory negligence. 20. The APSRTC did not produce any evidence except the driver of the bus (RW-1). 21. (B) Whether the compensation awarded by the Tribunal is just and fair? ANALYSIS: Point-A: Contributory negligence: 19. We first deal with the arguments on contributory negligence. 20. The APSRTC did not produce any evidence except the driver of the bus (RW-1). 21. On consideration of the oral evidence and documentary evidence on record, the Tribunal recorded finding that the accident took place because of the negligence on the part of the driver of the APSRTC bus. It also observed that the evidence of driver RW-1 was not going to help the case of APSRTC which related to the reasons for the accident. We are also of the view that based on the solitary evidence of RW-1, the driver of the offending APSRTC bus, the contributory negligence on the part of the deceased, driving the car, could not be arrived at. RW-1 is the driver of the offending vehicle causing death, in all probabilities would shift the burden on the deceased. It would not be safe to rely on solitary evidence of RW-1 in the absence of any other evidence on such point. 22. In APSRTC, Vijayawada vs. Changantipati Venkateswaramma, (2007) 4 ALT 662 also the driver of the bus RW-1 was examined. He was accused of causing the accident. This Court observed that the statement of RW-1 was of the person accused of causing the accident and unless it was corroborated by an independent witness it could not be taken on face value and declined to take a view different from the view as was taken by the Tribunal. 23. If the Tribunal was not satisfied on the solitary evidence of RW-1 without corroboration, for the reasons assigned, considering Changantipati (supra), we do not find any illegality neither in the approach of the Tribunal nor in the finding recorded by it. 24. In M/s. The National Insurance Company Ltd. v. E. Suseelamma, 2023 SCC Online AP 1725 also considering the judgment in Changantipati (supra) the same view has been taken. 25. On the point of contributory negligence, in E.Suseelamma (supra), after considering the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court, it was observed that the point of contributory negligence is required to be decided by the Tribunal on the touchstone of preponderance of probabilities and certainly not on the basis of proof beyond reasonable doubt. 26. 25. On the point of contributory negligence, in E.Suseelamma (supra), after considering the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court, it was observed that the point of contributory negligence is required to be decided by the Tribunal on the touchstone of preponderance of probabilities and certainly not on the basis of proof beyond reasonable doubt. 26. It is apt to refer paragraphs-37, 38 and 40 of E. Suseelamma (supra) as under: “37. In Anitha Sharma v. New India Assurance Company Limited, the Hon'ble Apex Court held that the strict principles of evidence and standards of proof like in a criminal trial are inapplicable in Motor Accident Claim Cases. The standard of proof in such like matters is one of preponderance of probabilities, rather than beyond reasonable doubt. One needs to be mindful that the approach and role of Courts while examining evidence in accident claim cases ought not to be to find fault; but, instead should be only to analyze the material placed on record by the parties to ascertain whether the claimant's version is more likely than not true. 38. In Anitha Sharma (supra), the Hon'ble Apex Court referred to its previous judgment in Dulcina Fernandes v. Joaquim Xavier Cruz, in which it was held that the plea of negligence on the part of the first respondent who was driving the pick-up van as setup by the claimants was required to be decided by the learned Tribunal on the touchstone of preponderance of probabilities and certainly not on the basis of proof beyond reasonable doubt. 40. In Usha Rajkhowa v. Paramount Industries, the Hon'ble Apex Court observed and held that the question of contributory negligence arises when there has been some act or omission on the claimant's part, which has materially contributed to the damage caused, and is of such a nature that it may properly be described as ‘negligence’. Negligence ordinarily means breach of a legal duty to care, but when used in the expression ‘contributory negligence’ it does not mean breach of any duty. It only means the failure by a person to use reasonable care for the safety of either himself or his property, so that he becomes blameworthy in part as an author of his own wrong.” 27. It only means the failure by a person to use reasonable care for the safety of either himself or his property, so that he becomes blameworthy in part as an author of his own wrong.” 27. We find that there is absolutely no evidence to suggest that there was any failure on the part of the car driver/deceased to take any particular care or that he had breached his duty in any manner. The Insurance Company has failed to discharge its burden to prove the contributory negligence on the part of the deceased. It failed to lead any evidence to substantiate its case. 28. In view of the aforesaid judgments, we are of the view that the finding on issue No. 1 that it was the driver of the APSRTC bus, which caused the accident by driving negligently, need no interference and is affirmed. Point-B: Just Compensation: (I) Future Prospects: 29. With respect to the future prospects, the Hon’ble Apex Court in National Insurance Company Limited v. Pranay Sethi, (2017) 16 SCC 680 held as under in Paras 57, 58 & 59: “57. Having bestowed our anxious consideration, we are disposed to think when we accept the principle of standardisation, there is really no rationale not to apply the said principle to the self-employed or a person who is on a fixed salary. To follow the doctrine of actual income at the time of death and not to add any amount with regard to future prospects to the income for the purpose of determination of multiplicand would be unjust. The determination of income while computing compensation has to include future prospects so that the method will come within the ambit and sweep of just compensation as postulated under Section 168 of the Act. In case of a deceased who had held a permanent job with inbuilt grant of annual increment, there is an acceptable certainty. But to state that the legal representatives of a eceased who was on a fixed salary would not be entitled to the benefit of future prospects for the purpose of computation of compensation would be inapposite. It is because the criterion of distinction between the two in that event would be certainty on the one hand and staticness on the other. One may perceive that the comparative measure is certainty on the one hand and uncertainty on the other but such a perception is fallacious. It is because the criterion of distinction between the two in that event would be certainty on the one hand and staticness on the other. One may perceive that the comparative measure is certainty on the one hand and uncertainty on the other but such a perception is fallacious. It is because the price rise does affect a self-employed person; and that apart there is always an incessant effort to enhance one's income for sustenance. The purchasing capacity of a salaried person on permanent job when increases because of grant of increments and pay revision or for some other change in service conditions, there is always a competing attitude in the private sector to enhance the salary to get better efficiency from the employees. Similarly, a person who is self-employed is bound to garner his resources and raise his charges/fees so that he can live with same facilities. To have the perception that he is likely to remain static and his income to remain stagnant is contrary to the fundamental concept of human attitude which always intends to live with dynamism and move and change with the time. Though it may seem appropriate that there cannot be certainty in addition of future prospects to the existing income unlike in the case of a person having a permanent job, yet the said perception does not really deserve acceptance. We are inclined to think that there can be some degree of difference as regards the percentage that is meant for or applied to in respect of the legal representatives who claim on behalf of the deceased who had a permanent job than a person who is self-employed or on a fixed salary. But not to apply the principle of standardisation on the foundation of perceived lack of certainty would tantamount to remaining oblivious to the marrows of ground reality. And, therefore, degree-test is imperative. Unless the degree-test is applied and left to the parties to adduce evidence to establish, it would be unfair and inequitable. The degree-test has to have the inbuilt concept of percentage. And, therefore, degree-test is imperative. Unless the degree-test is applied and left to the parties to adduce evidence to establish, it would be unfair and inequitable. The degree-test has to have the inbuilt concept of percentage. Taking into consideration the cumulative factors, namely, passage of time, the changing society, escalation of price, the change in price index, the human attitude to follow a particular pattern of life, etc., an addition of 40% of the established income of the deceased towards future prospects and where the deceased was below 40 years an addition of 25% where the deceased was between the age of 40 to 50 years would be reasonable. 58. The controversy does not end here. The question still remains whether there should be no addition where the age of the deceased is more than 50 years. Sarla Verma v. DTC, (2009) 6 SCC 121 : (2009) 2 SCC (Civ) 770 : (2009) 2 SCC (Cri) 1002 thinks it appropriate not to add any amount and the same has been approved in Reshma Kumari v. Madan Mohan, (2013) 9 SCC 65 : (2013) 4 SCC (Civ) 191 : (2013) 3 SCC (Cri) 826. Judicial notice can be taken of the fact that salary does not remain the same. When a person is in a permanent job, there is always an enhancement due to one reason or the other. To lay down as a thumb rule that there will be no addition after 50 years will be an unacceptable concept. We are disposed to think, there should be an addition of 15% if the deceased is between the age of 50 to 60 years and there should be no addition thereafter. Similarly, in case of self-employed or person on fixed salary, the addition should be 10% between the age of 50 to 60 years. The aforesaid yardstick has been fixed so that there can be consistency in the approach by the tribunals and the courts. 59. In view of the aforesaid analysis, we proceed to record our conclusions: 59.1. The two-Judge Bench in Santosh Devi v. National Insurance Co. The aforesaid yardstick has been fixed so that there can be consistency in the approach by the tribunals and the courts. 59. In view of the aforesaid analysis, we proceed to record our conclusions: 59.1. The two-Judge Bench in Santosh Devi v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. (2012) 6 SCC 421 : (2012) 3 SCC (Civ) 726 : (2012) 3 SCC (Cri) 160 : (2012) 2 SCC (L&S) 167 should have been well advised to refer the matter to a larger Bench as it was taking a different view than what has been stated in Sarla Verma v. DTC, (2009) 6 SCC 121 : (2009) 2 SCC (Civ) 770 : (2009) 2 SCC (Cri) 1002, a judgment by a coordinate Bench. It is because a coordinate Bench of the same strength cannot take a contrary view than what has been held by another coordinate Bench. 59.2. As Rajesh v. Rajbir Singh, (2013) 9 SCC 54 : (2013) 4 SCC (Civ) 179 : (2013) 3 SCC (Cri) 817 : (2014) 1 SCC (L&S) 149 has not taken note of the decision in Reshma Kumari v. Madan Mohan, (2013) 9 SCC 65 : (2013) 4 SCC (Civ) 191 : (2013) 3 SCC (Cri) 826, which was delivered at earlier point of time, the decision in Rajesh v. Rajbir Singh, (2013) 9 SCC 54 : (2013) 4 SCC (Civ) 179 : (2013) 3 SCC (Cri) 817 : (2014) 1 SCC (L&S) 149 is not a binding precedent. 59.3. While determining the income, an addition of 50% of actual salary to the income of the deceased towards future prospects, where the deceased had a permanent job and was below the age of 40 years, should be made. The addition should be 30%, if the age of the deceased was between 40 to 50 years. In case the deceased was between the age of 50 to 60 years, the addition should be 15%. Actual salary should be read as actual salary less tax. 59.4. In case the deceased was self-employed or on a fixed salary, an addition of 40% of the established income should be the warrant where the deceased was below the age of 40 years. An addition of 25% where the deceased was between the age of 40 to 50 years and 10% where the deceased was between the age of 50 to 60 years should be regarded as the necessary method of computation. An addition of 25% where the deceased was between the age of 40 to 50 years and 10% where the deceased was between the age of 50 to 60 years should be regarded as the necessary method of computation. The established income means the income minus the tax component. 59.5. For determination of the multiplicand, the deduction for personal and living expenses, the tribunals and the courts shall be guided by Paras 30 to 32 of Sarla Verma v. DTC, (2009) 6 SCC 121 : (2009) 2 SCC (Civ) 770 : (2009) 2 SCC (Cri) 1002 which we have reproduced hereinbefore. 59.6. The selection of multiplier shall be as indicated in the Table in Sarla Verma v. DTC, (2009) 6 SCC 121 : (2009) 2 SCC (Civ) 770 : (2009) 2 SCC (Cri) 1002 read with Para 42 of that judgment. 59.7. The age of the deceased should be the basis for applying the multiplier. 59.8. Reasonable figures on conventional heads, namely, loss of estate, loss of consortium and funeral expenses should be Rs. 15,000, Rs. 40,000 and Rs. 15,000 respectively. The aforesaid amounts should be enhanced at the rate of 10% in every three years.” 30. The Tribunal referring to the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Rajesh v. Rajbir Singh, (2013) 9 SCC 54 and Vimal Kanwar v. Kishore Dan, (2013) 7 SCC 476 and observing that in those cases the deceased in both those cases were government employees and there was certainty of the service, but in the present case, the deceased had taken voluntary retirement from the Indian Air Force and within 5 years, he changed from one company to another company and was already aged about 40 years, getting better employment opportunities at higher amount of salary were only contingent developments and even if there was increase in salary, it would only be marginal, did not grant future prospects. 31. In Pranay Sethi (supra), the Constitution Bench held that Rajesh (supra) is not a binding precedent. 32. 31. In Pranay Sethi (supra), the Constitution Bench held that Rajesh (supra) is not a binding precedent. 32. The observation of the Tribunal that the deceased was not the government employee; he had taken voluntary retirement from Indian Air Force, and within 5 years, he changed from one company to another company; at the age of nearly about 40 years the chances of getting better employment opportunities at higher amount of salary were only contingent developments and even if there was increase in salary, it would be only marginal increase, in our view, are no grounds to deny the future prospects, if otherwise entitled. 33. The actual age of the deceased was 39 years 4 months as per the SSC Certificate (Ex.A6-DOB 11.06.1969) and the evidence was also led (PW-1/R. Lakshmi Prasanna, 3rd claimant). The specific case of the claimants was and evidence was also led that after voluntary retirement from Indian Air Force, the deceased joined Firepro Systems Limited, Hyderabad in 2005 as Senior Manager and worked till 2008. From there, as he got better opportunity, he joined in RSP Design Consultants (India) Private Limited on 25.08.2008 as Project Engineer. It could not be said that the deceased had no better future prospects in terms of income. Considering the nature of the job he was at the time of the accident, the claimants are entitled under the head of ‘future prospects’ @40% of the income of the deceased, as determined by the Tribunal. Applying the criteria, the future prospects are to be awarded as per the judgment in Pranay Sethi (supra). The claimants cannot be denied future prospects on considerations on which, so denied by the Tribunal. (II) Deduction towards personal expenses of the deceased: 34. The Tribunal deducted 1/3rd towards personal expenses of the deceased. 35. In Sarla Verma (supra), the Hon’ble Apex Court held as under in Paras-30, 31 & 32: “30. Though in some cases the deduction to be made towards personal and living expenses is calculated on the basis of units indicated in Trilok Chandra (1996) 4 SCC 362 , the general practice is to apply standardised deductions. 35. In Sarla Verma (supra), the Hon’ble Apex Court held as under in Paras-30, 31 & 32: “30. Though in some cases the deduction to be made towards personal and living expenses is calculated on the basis of units indicated in Trilok Chandra (1996) 4 SCC 362 , the general practice is to apply standardised deductions. Having considered several subsequent decisions of this Court, we are of the view that where the deceased was married, the deduction towards personal and living expenses of the deceased, should be one-third (1/3rd) where the number of dependent family members is 2 to 3, one-fourth (1/4th) where the number of dependent family members is 4 to 6, and one-fifth (1/5th) where the number of dependent family members exceeds six. 31. Where the deceased was a bachelor and the claimants are the parents, the deduction follows a different principle. In regard to bachelors, normally, 50% is deducted as personal and living expenses, because it is assumed that a bachelor would tend to spend more on himself. Even otherwise, there is also the possibility of his getting married in a short time, in which event the contribution to the parents and siblings is likely to be cut drastically. Further, subject to evidence to the contrary, the father is likely to have his own income and will not be considered as a dependant and the mother alone will be considered as a dependant. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, brothers and sisters will not be considered as dependants, because they will either be independent and earning, or married, or be dependent on the father. 32. Thus even if the deceased is survived by parents and siblings, only the mother would be considered to be a dependant, and 50% would be treated as the personal and living expenses of the bachelor and 50% as the contribution to the family. However, where the family of the bachelor is large and dependent on the income of the deceased, as in a case where he has a widowed mother and large number of younger non-earning sisters or brothers, his personal and living expenses may be restricted to one-third and contribution to the family will be taken as two-third.” 36. The aforesaid judgment has been upheld by the Constitution Bench in Pranay Sethi (supra). 37. The claimants are 5 in number. The aforesaid judgment has been upheld by the Constitution Bench in Pranay Sethi (supra). 37. The claimants are 5 in number. Consequently, towards personal expenses of the deceased 1/4th deduction would apply and not 1/3rd. 38. We, accordingly, deduct 1/4th towards personal expenses of the deceased. (III) Conventional Heads: Non-pecuniary 39. The Tribunal has not awarded the just compensation under the different conventional heads, which ought to have been allowed. We allow the same, in the light of the Constitution Bench Judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Pranay Sethi (supra) and Magma General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Nanu Ram, (2018) 18 SCC 130 and Smt. Anjali v. Lokendra Rathod, 2022 Live Law (SC) 1012 as under: (a) Loss of ‘consortium’ @ Rs. 40,000/- x 5 = Rs. 2,00,000/- (b) ‘Loss of Estate’ Rs. 15,000/- (c) ‘funeral expenses’ Rs. 15,000/- with 10% increase thereon for every 3 years, i.e. 20% as on today, which comes to Rs. 2,76,000/- (IV) Monthly Income: 40. The Tribunal determined the monthly income as Rs. 42,427/- per month based on the salary certificate/pay slip for the month of September 2008. 41. We have perused Ex.A17. The net pay reflected therein is Rs. 42,427/-. It further shows that it contain the deductions under the ‘professional tax’ and also ‘the income tax’. It also mentions the deduction under ‘PF’ of Rs.1706/-. So, we are of the considered view that the Tribunal erred in taking Rs. 42,427/- as the net income, it ought not to have deducted the PF amount of Rs. 1706/-. Adding the PF deduction of Rs. 1706/- to Rs. 42,427/- the monthly earnings of the deceased would come to Rs. 44,133/- as this amount is after deduction of the income tax, the Tribunal rightly did not deduct the income tax, placing reliance in the case of Vimal Kanwar (supra). (V) Interest: 42. The Tribunal has awarded interest @ 9% per annum. The same being as per the Hon’ble Apex Court judgments in Rahul Sharma v. National Insurance Company Limited, (2021) 6 SCC 188 and Kirthi v. Oriental Insurance Company Limited, (2021) 2 SCC 166 is maintained. 43. Thus, the claimants are entitled for just and fair compensation in total as under: 1. Net income, per annum comes to [Rs. 44,133 x 12 = Rs. 5,29,596/-] Rs. 5,29,596.00 2. Future prospects @ 40% thereon [Rs. 5,29,596/- x 40/100 = 2,11,838.40 ps] Rs. 2,11,838.40 Total Rs. 43. Thus, the claimants are entitled for just and fair compensation in total as under: 1. Net income, per annum comes to [Rs. 44,133 x 12 = Rs. 5,29,596/-] Rs. 5,29,596.00 2. Future prospects @ 40% thereon [Rs. 5,29,596/- x 40/100 = 2,11,838.40 ps] Rs. 2,11,838.40 Total Rs. 7,41,434.40 ps 3. Deduction of 1/4th towards personal expenses [Rs. 7,41,434.40 ps - (1/4th ) 1,85,358.60] Rs. 5,56,075.80 ps 4. Applying multiplier ‘15’ [Rs. 5,56,075.80 ps x 15] Rs. 83,41,137.00 5. Conventional Head: Non-pecuniary: (i) Loss of Consortium [Rs. 40,000/- x 5] Rs. 2,00,000.00 (ii) Loss of Estate Rs. 15,000.00 (iii) Funeral expenses [Rs. 15,000.00 with an enhancement @ 20%] Rs. 2,76,000.00 Total: [Rupees eighty six lakh seventeen thousand one hundred and thirty seven only] Rs. 86,17,137.00 44. Thus, considered, the compensation as awarded by the Tribunal is enhanced from Rs. 51,27,420/- to Rs. 86,17,137/- together with interest @ 9% per annum from the date of claim petition till deposit/realization. 45. The APSRTC shall make the payment by depositing the amount in total as per this judgment, after adjusting the amount if any already deposited/paid, before the Tribunal, within 4 (four) weeks from today. 46. The claimants, including the son and daughter of the deceased, who have now attained majority, shall be allowed to withdraw the compensation amount with interest in the proportion, in terms of the award of the Tribunal. 47. Result: (i) MACMA No. 2574 of 2013 by claimants is partly allowed, enhancing the compensation amount, and with directions as aforesaid, with costs. (ii) MACMA No. 2357 of 2013 by APSRTC is dismissed with costs to the claimants. 48. Pending miscellaneous petitions, if any, shall stand closed in consequence.