JUDGMENT : (Viju Abraham, J.) : The above original petition is filed challenging Ext.P7 order, whereby Ext.P5 application filed by the petitioner seeking to reject the plaint under Order VII Rule 11(d) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 (CPC) was rejected. 2. The brief facts necessary for the disposal of the original petition are as follows: The petitioner is a Grama Panchayat and the defendant in O.S. No. 39/2017 on the files of Sub Court, Neyyattinkara and the respondent herein is the plaintiff in the suit. The said suit is one for realisation and recovery of an amount of Rs.25,65,728/- with interest at the rate of 12% from the defendant and his assets. Subsequently, the respondent/plaintiff without issuing a proper notice as contemplated under Section 249 of the Panchayat Raj Act,1994( for short 'the Act, 1994') amended the plaint and made substantial changes in the relief portion of the plaint. It is averred in the plaint that a notice was issued to the defendant on 19.07.2017, calling up the defendant to grant the relief sought in Ext.P1 plaint. The case of the petitioner is that subsequently, Ext.P1 plaint was amended and an entirely different relief is sought therein as evident from Ext.P3 amended plaint. It is further contended by the petitioner that going by Section 249 of the Act, 1994, no suit shall be filed until the expiration of one month after issuance of notice in writing stating the cause of action, name and place of abode of intending plaintiff and nature of relief which he claims and the plaint shall also contain an affirmation as to how the notice was delivered to the Panchayat. The suit notice contemplated as per sub-section 2 of Section 249 of the Act, 1994 should explicitly state the relief sought in the plaint and if the nature of relief sought in the plaint is not affirmed or demanded in the statutory notice, the same cannot be termed as a statutory notice. Failure of issuance of a notice apparently attracts the bar under Section 249(1) of the Act, 1994. The case of the petitioner is that the relief that is sought in Ext.P3 amended plaint was not demanded or sought in Ext.P4 notice and therefore, it is contended that there is no statutory notice as contemplated and mandated by Section 249 of the Act, 1994. The case of the petitioner is that the relief that is sought in Ext.P3 amended plaint was not demanded or sought in Ext.P4 notice and therefore, it is contended that there is no statutory notice as contemplated and mandated by Section 249 of the Act, 1994. Thereupon the petitioner filed Ext.P5 application under Order VII Rule 11(d) CPC as I.A.No.8/2024 in O.S.No.39 of 2017 seeking to reject Ext.P1 plaint. The Subordinate Judge’s Court as per Ext.P7 order, disposed of Ext.P5 petition stating that the case is listed for trial and therefore, there is no need to raise a preliminary issue regarding the same and that admittedly the plaintiff had issued notice to the defendant prior to institution of the suit and whether the said notice comes under the purview of Section 249 of the Act 1994 could be decided after taking evidence and that the same could be considered by raising an additional issue regarding the same. The contention of the petitioner is that the trial court has not adjudicated the application under Order VII Rule 11(d) CPC and the same was neither allowed nor dismissed, but postponed the consideration of the said issue at the time of trial. It is the contention of the petitioner that if an application is filed under Order VII Rule 11(d), the court is bound to entertain and adjudicate the said application without considering the stage at which the same was filed as the same could be considered at any stage of the suit prior to the judgment. Since a copy of the order in I.A. No.8/2024 was not issued, the petitioner was constrained to file OP(C) No.1364 of 2024 before this Court and this Court as per judgment dated 28.06.2024 directed the trial court to issue a certified copy of the order to the petitioner and deferred trial of the case till then. It is challenging Ext.P7 order that the present original petition has been filed. 3. It is challenging Ext.P7 order that the present original petition has been filed. 3. The learned counsel for the petitioner would contend that going by the mandate of Section 249 of the Act, 1994, no suit or other civil proceedings against a Panchayat for anything done or purporting to be done under the Act 1994 shall be instituted until the expiration of one month after notice in writing, stating the cause of action, the name and place of abode of the intending plaintiff and the nature of the relief which is claimed or sought against the Panchayat. The petitioner contends that if the plaint does not depict that statutory notice under Section 249 of the Act, 1994 is served in terms of said section, it is the mandatory duty of the court to reject the plaint under Order VII Rule 11(d) CPC. Counsel for the petitioner would further contend that none of the reasons stated in Ext.P7 order to reject the request of the petitioner under Order VII Rule 11(d) CPC is legally sustainable. The petitioner relies on the judgment in Prem Lala Nahata and Another v. Chandi Prasad Sikaria [ 2007 (2) SCC 551 ], Regional Transport Officer Kozhikode v. N.V. Motors service and Others [1973 KHC 352], State of Kerala and Anr v. Sankaran [1962 KHC 287], Saleem Bhai and Others v. State of Maharashtra and Others[ 2003 (1) SCC 557 ], Srihari Hanumandas Totala v. Hemant Vithal Kammat & others [ 2021 (5) KHC 85 ], Eldeco Housing and Industries Limited v. Ashok Vidyarthi [2023 KHC 1015], Bishandayal and Sons v. State of Orissa and Others [2001 KHC 1374] and the unreported judgment of this Court in O.P.C. No. 898 of 2023 (2023:KER:57656) in support of his contention. 4. Per contra, the learned counsel for the respondent, based on the counter affidavit filed, would submit that the contention of the petitioner that there is no statutory notice as prescribed under Section 249 of the Act, 1994, cannot be accepted, inasmuch as proper notice was issued by the plaintiff/respondent under Section 249 of the Act, 1994. It is also contended that in Ext.P4 notice, the request made by the plaintiff/respondent is either to issue requisite (P) Forms to remove the left out ordinary soil or in the alternative to return the amount of Rs. 25,65,728/- which is the value of the soil left to be removed. It is also contended that in Ext.P4 notice, the request made by the plaintiff/respondent is either to issue requisite (P) Forms to remove the left out ordinary soil or in the alternative to return the amount of Rs. 25,65,728/- which is the value of the soil left to be removed. It is also contended that the nature of the amendment carried out has not in any way substantially altered the relief portion as alleged. A perusal of Ext.P1 plaint and Ext.P3 amended plaint would show that the plaintiff has only excluded prayer (A) seeking a mandatory injunction for issuance of (P) Form to remove the 20350 m3 of ordinary soil left. The reason behind excluding the said prayer is reflected in para 24(A) of Ext.P3 amended plaint as the nature of the soil has been substantially altered due to the passage of time and the quantity of soil has also reduced as is evident from the commissioner report and in the said changed circumstance, which was beyond the control of the plaintiff, has made the terms of the contract impossible to be performed and the plaintiff sought for amendment and to exclude prayer (A) from the original plaint. It is further contended that Section 249 of the Act, 1994, only speaks of a pre-litigation notice, giving the Panchayat sufficient notice of the judicial proceedings intended to be initiated against it and therefore it is contended that there was sufficient notice as mandated under Section 249 of the Act, 1994. The fresh contention now raised by the petitioner when the case was listed for trial is made on an experimental basis and the court has rightly found that the purview of Section 249 of the Act, 1994 can be decided after taking evidence and has also raised an additional issue regarding the same. It is also contended that though the petitioner vehemently contends that the nature of relief has been altered by amending the plaint, there is no specific pleading as to how the alteration/amendment substantially alters the nature of relief claimed and the respondent sought for dismissal of the original petition. It is also contended that though the petitioner vehemently contends that the nature of relief has been altered by amending the plaint, there is no specific pleading as to how the alteration/amendment substantially alters the nature of relief claimed and the respondent sought for dismissal of the original petition. Learned counsel for respondent relying on the judgment of this Court in Surya Hotels and Properties v. Misty Mountain Plantation Resort [ 2024 (4) KHC 200 ] would contend that if the allegation in the plaint prima facie shows a cause of action, the court cannot embark upon a roving enquiry whether allegations are true in fact while considering an application under Order VII Rule 11(a). Learned counsel for the respondent also relies on the judgment of the Apex Court in Geetha v. Nanjundaswamy [2023 KHC 6967] in support of her contentions. 5. I have heard the learned counsels appearing on both sides. 6. A perusal of Ext.P7 order would reveal that the same has been passed on the following grounds: 1. The written statement does not aver that the suit is bad for want of notice under Section 249 of the Act, 1994. 2. The case is listed for trial. 3. The plaintiff has issued notice under Section 249 of the Act, 1994 to the defendant prior to the institution of the suit. 4. Whether the said notice comes under the purview of Section 249 of the Act, 1994, could be decided after taking evidence and raising additional issues regarding it. 7. The 1st reason stated in Ext.P7 order to reject the request of the petitioner for rejection of plaint is that in the written statement there is no contention taken that the suit is bad for want of notice under Section 249 of the Act, 1994. The Apex Court in Saleem Bhai's case cited (Supra) has held in paragraph 9 as follows: “9. A perusal of Order VII Rule 11 C.P.C. makes it clear that the relevant facts which need to be looked into for deciding an application thereunder are the averments in the plaint. The trial court can exercise the power under Order VII Rule 11 C.P.C. at any stage of the suit-before registering the plaint or after issuing summons to the defendant at any time before the conclusion of the trial. The trial court can exercise the power under Order VII Rule 11 C.P.C. at any stage of the suit-before registering the plaint or after issuing summons to the defendant at any time before the conclusion of the trial. For the purposes of deciding an application under clauses (a) and (d) of Rule 11 of Order VII C.P.C. the averments in the plaint are germane; the pleas taken by the defendant in the written statement would be wholly irrelevant at that stage, therefore, a direction to file the written statement without deciding the application under Order VII Rule 11 C.P.C. cannot but be procedural irregularity touching the exercise of jurisdiction by the trial court. The order, therefore, suffers from non-exercising of the jurisdiction vested in the court as well as procedural irregularity. The High Court, however, did not advert to these aspects.” (underline supplied) The Apex Court in Srihari Hanumandas Totala's case cited (Supra) has also considered the said issue and held in paragraph 20 as follows: “20. On a perusal of the above authorities, the guiding principles for deciding an application under Order 7 Rule 11(d) can be summarized as follows: (i) To reject a plaint on the ground that the suit is barred by any law, only the averments in the plaint will have to be referred to; (ii) The defense made by the defendant in the suit must not be considered while deciding the merits of the application; (iii) To determine whether a suit is barred by res judicata, it is necessary that (i) the ‘previous suit’ is decided, (ii) the issues in the subsequent suit were directly and substantially in issue in the former suit; (iii) the former suit was between the same parties or parties through whom they claim, litigating under the same title; and (iv) that these issues were adjudicated and finally decided by a court competent to try the subsequent suit; and (iv) Since an adjudication of the plea of res judicata requires consideration of the pleadings, issues and decision in the ‘previous suit’, such a plea will be beyond the scope of Order 7 Rule 11 (d), where only the statements in the plaint will have to be perused. “ (underline supplied) This court took a similar view in Surya Hotel’s case cited supra. “ (underline supplied) This court took a similar view in Surya Hotel’s case cited supra. Therefore, the reason stated in Ext.P7 to reject the application for lack of contention taken in the written statement that the suit is bad for want of notice under Section 249 of the Act, 1994, is only to be rejected. 8. Yet another reason stated for rejecting the application is that the case is listed for trial and therefore Ext.P5 application seeking rejection of plaint cannot be considered. The Apex Court in Saleem Bhai's case cited (Supra) has categorically held that the Trial Court can exercise the power under Order VII Rule 11 CPC at any stage of the suit - before registering the plaint or after issuing summons to the defendant or at any time before the conclusion of the trial. The said view was reiterated in Srihari Hanumandas Totala's case cited supra also. Therefore, the said reason stated in Ext.P7 to reject the application also cannot be accepted. 9. Yet another reason stated in Ext.P7 for rejecting the application of the petitioner is that the issue as to whether there was proper notice under Section 249 of the Act, 1994 could be decided after taking evidence in the case and the court raised an additional issue for being decided at the time of final disposal of the suit. Going by Ext.P7 order, it is clear that the Court did not enter a finding as to whether the plaint is liable to be rejected but postponed the same to be decided at the time of trial. The Apex Court in Eldeco Housing and Industries Ltd.'s case cited (Supra) has held that the remedy under Order 7 Rule 11 is an independent and special remedy, wherein the court is empowered to summarily dismiss a suit at the threshold, without proceeding to record evidence and conducting a trial, on the basis of the evidence adduced, if it is satisfied that the action should be terminated on any of the grounds contained in this provision. The Court further held that the whole purpose of the conferment of powers under this provision is to ensure that a litigation that is meaningless, and bound to prove abortive, should not be permitted to waste judicial time of the court. The Court further held that the whole purpose of the conferment of powers under this provision is to ensure that a litigation that is meaningless, and bound to prove abortive, should not be permitted to waste judicial time of the court. It is further held that if any of the grounds specified in Order VII Rule 11 CPC are made out and if the court finds that the plaint does not disclose a cause of action, or that the suit is barred by any law, the court has no option, but to reject the plaint. Paragraph 19 of Eldeco Housing and Industries Ltd.'s case cited (Supra) reads as follows: “19. The law applicable for deciding an application under Order VII R.11 C.P.C. was summed up by this Court in Dahiben v. Arvindbhai Kalyanji Bhanusali (Gajra) dead through legal representatives and Others ( 2020 (7) SCC 366 : 2020: INSC:450). Relevant parts of paragraph 23 thereof are extracted below: "23 to 23.1 xxxx xxxx xxxx 23.2. The remedy under O.7 R.11 is an independent and special remedy, wherein the court is empowered to summarily dismiss a suit at the threshold, without proceeding to record evidence, and conducting a trial, on the basis of the evidence adduced, if it is satisfied that the action should be terminated on any of the grounds contained in this provision. 23.3. The underlying object of O.7 R.11(a) is that if in a suit, no cause of action is disclosed, or the suit is barred by limitation under R.11(d), the court would not permit the plaintiff to unnecessarily protract the proceedings in the suit. In such a case, it would be necessary to put an end to the sham litigation, so that further judicial time is not wasted. 23.4. In Azhar Hussain v. Rajiv Gandhi 1986 Supp SCC 315, this Court held that the whole purpose of conferment of powers under this provision is to ensure that a litigation which is meaningless, and bound to prove abortive, should not be permitted to waste judicial time of the court, in the following words : "12. ... The whole purpose of conferment of such powers is to ensure that a litigation which is meaningless, and bound to prove abortive should not be permitted to occupy the time of the court, and exercise the mind of the respondent. ... The whole purpose of conferment of such powers is to ensure that a litigation which is meaningless, and bound to prove abortive should not be permitted to occupy the time of the court, and exercise the mind of the respondent. The sword of Damocles need not be kept hanging over his head unnecessarily without point or purpose. Even in an ordinary civil litigation, the court readily exercises the power to reject a plaint, if it does not disclose any cause of action." 23.5. The power conferred on the court to terminate a civil action is, however, a drastic one, and the conditions enumerated in O.7 R.11 are required to be strictly adhered to. 23.6. Under O.7 R.11, a duty is cast on the court to determine whether the plaint discloses a cause of action by scrutinising the averments in the plaint (Liverpool & London S. P. & I Assn. Ltd. v. M. V. Sea Success I, 2004 (9) SCC 512 ), read in conjunction with the documents relied upon, or whether the suit is barred by any law. xxxx xxxx xxxx 23.9. In exercise of power under this provision, the court would determine if the assertions made in the plaint are contrary to statutory law, or judicial dicta, for deciding whether a case for rejecting the plaint at the threshold is made out. 23.10. At this stage, the pleas taken by the defendant in the written statement and application for rejection of the plaint on the merits, would be irrelevant, and cannot be adverted to, or taken into consideration. (Sopan Sukhdeo Sable v. Charity Commr., 2004 (3) SCC 137 ) 23.11. The test for exercising the power under O.7 R.11 is that if the averments made in the plaint are taken in entirety, in conjunction with the documents relied upon, would the same result in a decree being passed. This test was laid down in Liverpool & London S. P. & I Assn. Ltd. v. M. V. Sea Success I (Liverpool & London S. P. & I Assn. Ltd. v. M. V. Sea Success I, 2004 (9) SCC 512 ) which reads as : (SCC p. 562, para 139) "139. Whether a plaint discloses a cause of action or not is essentially a question of fact. But whether it does or does not must be found out from reading the plaint itself. Ltd. v. M. V. Sea Success I, 2004 (9) SCC 512 ) which reads as : (SCC p. 562, para 139) "139. Whether a plaint discloses a cause of action or not is essentially a question of fact. But whether it does or does not must be found out from reading the plaint itself. For the said purpose, the averments made in the plaint in their entirety must be held to be correct. The test is as to whether if the averments made in the plaint are taken to be correct in their entirety, a decree would be passed." 23.12. In Hardesh Ores (P) Ltd. v. Hede & Co. (Hardesh Ores (P) Ltd. v. Hede & Co., 2007 (5) SCC 614 ) the Court further held that it is not permissible to cull out a sentence or a passage, and to read it in isolation. It is the substance, and not merely the form, which has to be looked into. The plaint has to be construed as it stands, without addition or subtraction of words. If the allegations in the plaint prima facie show a cause of action, the court cannot embark upon an enquiry whether the allegations are true in fact. D. Ramachandran v. R. V. Janakiraman, 1999 (3) SCC 267 ; See also Vijay Pratap Singh v. Dukh Haran Nath Singh, AIR 1962 SC 941 ). 23.13. If on a meaningful reading of the plaint, it is found that the suit is manifestly vexatious and without any merit, and does not disclose a right to sue, the court would be justified in exercising the power under O.7 R.11 CPC. 23.14. The power under O.7 R.11 CPC may be exercised by the court at any stage of the suit, either before registering the plaint, or after issuing summons to the defendant, or before conclusion of the trial, as held by this Court in the judgment of Saleem Bhai v. State of Maharashtra, 2003 (1) SCC 557 . The plea that once issues are framed, the matter must necessarily go to trial was repelled by this Court in Azhar Hussain v. Rajiv Gandhi, 1986 Supp SCC 315. Followed in Manvendrasinhji Ranjitsinhji Jadeja v. Vijaykunverba, 1998 SCC OnLine Guj. 281 : (1998) 2 GLH 823 . 23.15. The provision of O.7 R.11 is mandatory in nature. The plea that once issues are framed, the matter must necessarily go to trial was repelled by this Court in Azhar Hussain v. Rajiv Gandhi, 1986 Supp SCC 315. Followed in Manvendrasinhji Ranjitsinhji Jadeja v. Vijaykunverba, 1998 SCC OnLine Guj. 281 : (1998) 2 GLH 823 . 23.15. The provision of O.7 R.11 is mandatory in nature. It states that the plaint "shall" be rejected if any of the grounds specified in clauses (a) to (e) are made out. If the court finds that the plaint does not disclose a cause of action, or that the suit is barred by any law, the court has no option, but to reject the plaint." This Court in O.P(C)No.898/2023, wherein an identical stand taken by the Trial Court that the issue raised under Order VII Rule 11 CPC could be decided only after the trial in the suit was interfered with and the Court held in paragraph 9 to 13 as follows: “9. It is perspicuous and indubitable, even from a plain reading of the afore provision that, what is provided for is the rejection of the plaint if any of the causes mentioned therein are attracted. 10. Apodictically, therefore, what was required for the learned Munsiff was to decide, solely on an assessment of the plaint, whether it was deserving of being rejected as prayed for by the petitioner; and if any of the reasons mentioned therein are attracted for such purpose. 11. When the provision starts by saying “rejection of plaint”, one fails to fathom how the learned Munsiff could have issued Ext.P11 order, saying that the application of the petitioner, preferred under it, will be considered only after trial, because this would - as rightly argued by Smt.Parvathi Menon and Sri.Millu Dhandapani - defeat the very purpose for which it has been brought into the statute. 12. The binding various precedents which cover the field make it incontestable that, what is expected of a Trial Judge is to verify whether the plaint is an abuse of process; and whether any of the inhibiting factors as enumerated thereunder are attracted, so as to render the same incompetent and incapable of prosecution. 13. 12. The binding various precedents which cover the field make it incontestable that, what is expected of a Trial Judge is to verify whether the plaint is an abuse of process; and whether any of the inhibiting factors as enumerated thereunder are attracted, so as to render the same incompetent and incapable of prosecution. 13. Obviously, the holding of the learned Munsiff in Ext.P11, that the petitioner will have to wait until the trial is completed, for his application under Order VII, Rule 11 of the CPC to be considered, is not merely anachronistic, but militates against the very purpose for which said provision has been brought into force.” This Court in Sankaran's case cited (Supra) has held that if there is no notice under Section 80 CPC, the suit falls clearly within Order VII Rule 11(d) CPC and the plaint in the suit has to be rejected. The said proposition was reiterated in Prem Lala Nahata's case cited (Supra). In view of the same, the reason stated in Ext.P7 for rejecting Ext.P5 application and the postponing of the said decision after taking evidence in the suit as done in Ext.P7 is totally against the provisions of Order VII Rule 11 CPC and against the declaration of law as stated above. 10. In Ext.P7 order, yet another reason stated by the Trial Court for not considering the request of the petitioner is that the plaintiff had issued a notice to the defendant as provided in Section 249 of the Act 1994 prior to the institution of the suit. Admittedly, the plaint was amended and the contention of the petitioner is that new relief is sought for by the amendment. In this context, another aspect to be considered is whether in a case where the plaint has been amended to incorporate a new relief, was it incumbent on the part of the respondent/plaintiff to have issued a fresh notice under Section 249 of the Act, 1994. Learned Counsel for the petitioner relies on the judgment of the Apex Court in Bishandayal and Sons' case cited Supra which held in paragraph 16 as follows: “16. There can be no dispute to the proposition that a notice under Section 80 can be waived. But the question is whether merely because in the amended written statement such a plea is not taken it amounts to waiver. This contention was argued before the Appellate Court. There can be no dispute to the proposition that a notice under Section 80 can be waived. But the question is whether merely because in the amended written statement such a plea is not taken it amounts to waiver. This contention was argued before the Appellate Court. Even otherwise we find that in the suit itself Issue No. 4 had been raised as to whether or not there was a valid and appropriate notice under Section 80. Such a point having been taken in the original written statement and an issue having been raised, it was not necessary that in the amended written statement such a plea be again taken. On behalf of the Respondents, reliance has been placed on the case of Gangappa Gurupadappa Gugwad vs. Rachawwa and others reported in AIR 1971 S.C. 442 , wherein it has been held that where the plaintiff’s cause of action is against a Government and the plaint does not show that notice under Section 80 was served, it would be duty of the Court to reject the plaint. In this case the original notice was only in respect of a claim under the plaint as it originally stood. That claim was on the basis that there was a concluded contract and that the Appellants had already acquired rights in the mill and the lands. As has been fairly conceded those reliefs were not maintainable and were given up before the Appellate Court. The amended plaint was on an entirely new cause of action. It was based on facts and events which took place after the filing of the original plant. It was a fresh case. Now the claim was for specific performance of the agreement alleged to have been entered into on 29th December, 1978. Admittedly no notice under Section 80 CPC was given for this case. As there was an Issue pertaining to Notice under Section 80, the trial court should have dealt with this aspect. The trial court failed to do so. It was then pressed before the Appellate Court. In our view the finding in the impugned Judgment that the suit based on this claim was not maintainable is correct and requires no interference. If a new cause of action is being introduced a fresh notice under Section 80 CPC would be required to be given. It was then pressed before the Appellate Court. In our view the finding in the impugned Judgment that the suit based on this claim was not maintainable is correct and requires no interference. If a new cause of action is being introduced a fresh notice under Section 80 CPC would be required to be given. The same not having been given, the suit on this cause of action was not maintainable” (underline supplied) As per the dictum laid down by the Apex Court, if a new cause of action is being introduced by way of amendment of plaint, a fresh notice under Section 80 CPC would be required. 11. A perusal of Ext.P7 would reveal that the request made by the petitioner in Ext.P5 application for rejecting the plaint has not been considered on merits while issuing the impugned order. The Trial Court without considering the said issue, postponed the said decision to be considered at the time of trial, which this Court has already held, is against the spirit and purpose of Order VII Rule 11 CPC. The Trial Court was bound to consider Ext.P5 application seeking to reject the plaint without postponing the decision on the same at the time of trial. In view of the above facts and circumstances of the present case, I am of the view that Ext.P5 application is liable to be reconsidered. Accordingly Ext.P7 order is set aside with a consequential direction to the Trial Court to reconsider Ext.P5 application in the light of the observation made in this judgment. The rival contention of the parties as to whether there was sufficient notice as contemplated under Section 249 of the Act, 1994 and whether Ext.P4 notice was sufficient even after the plaint was amended incorporating a new relief or as to whether no new relief has been sought by the amendment are all matters to be considered by the Trial Court while reconsidering Ext.P5 application. All contentions on both sides are left open to be agitated before the trial court. The Trial Court shall take a decision in the matter as expeditiously as possible, at any rate, within a period of one month from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment.