ORDER : 1. This Criminal Revision Petition has been filed by the accused in S.T. No. 6/2013 on the file of the Judicial First Class Magistrate Court, Nilambur, assailing the judgment of conviction and sentence in Crl.A No. 44/2016 of the Sessions Court, Manjeri for the offence punishable under Section 138 of The Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (hereinafter referred to as N.I Act, 1881). 2. The parties shall be referred to as complainant and accused as before the trial court. 3. The case of the complainant is that in February 2012, the accused who is a relative of the complainant, borrowed an amount of Rs. 5 lakhs from her and in discharge of the said liability, accused issued Ext.P1 cheque dated 30.9.2012 to the complainant. Though the complainant presented Ext.P1 cheque for encashment, it was bounced due to insufficient funds in the account of the accused. In spite of receipt of Ext.P4 lawyer notice sent by the complainant, accused failed to pay the amount covered by the cheque. Accused thereby committed the offence punishable under Section 138 of N.I. Act, 1881. 4. The defence canvassed by the accused is that he had borrowed an amount of Rs. 1 lakh from PW1 Vasudevan, who is the power of attorney holder of the complainant and had issued two blank signed cheque leaves and one blank signed stamp paper by way of security; that Ext.P1 is one among the said signed blank cheque leaves misused by the complainant. 5. PW1 is the power of attorney holder of the complainant. He has testified that he is a close relative of the complainant; that he has personal knowledge regarding the transaction between the complainant and the accused and he has witnessed the transaction between the complainant and the accused. In A.C. Narayanan and another v. State of Maharashtra and another, (2014) 11 SCC 790 , the Apex Court held that a power of attorney holder is competent to file, appear, and depose for the purpose of issue of process for the offence punishable under Section 138 of N.I Act, 1881. An exception to the above is when the power of attorney holder does not have personal knowledge about the transaction. According to PW1, accused who is a relative of the complainant approached the complainant in December 2011 demanding a loan of Rs. An exception to the above is when the power of attorney holder does not have personal knowledge about the transaction. According to PW1, accused who is a relative of the complainant approached the complainant in December 2011 demanding a loan of Rs. 5 lakhs for his business purpose; that the complainant lent an amount of Rs. 5 lakhs to the accused by way of cheque dated 21.2.2012. Further version of PW1 is that in discharge of the said liability, accused issued Ext.P1 cheque for Rs. 5 lakhs to the complainant. 6. In order to substantiate the case of the complainant that accused borrowed an amount of Rs. 5 lakhs from her, complainant has produced Ext.P7 namely the statement of account from her bank. Ext.P7 would reveal that on 21.2.2012, the accused encashed a cheque for Rs. 5 lakhs from the account of the complainant. Thus, the case of the complainant that the accused borrowed an amount of Rs. 5 lakhs from her stands proved. The specific case of the complainant is that in discharge of the liability to pay a sum of Rs. 5 lakhs, accused issued Ext.P1 cheque. 7. It is not in dispute that, Ext.P1 is a cheque issued from the account of the accused maintained by him at Chungathara Service Co-operative Bank Ltd. Accused would also admit his signature in Ext.P1 cheque. Undisputably, Ext.P1 cheque was returned dishonoured due to insufficient funds in the account of the accused, Ext.P2 is the memo issued from the Chungathara Service Co-operative Bank Ltd. and Ext.P3 is the memo issued from the SBT, Nilambur Branch. Exts.P1 to P3 would reveal that Ext.P1 cheque was dishonoured due to insufficient funds in the account of the accused. Ext.P4 is the copy of the lawyer notice sent to the accused and its postal receipt. Ext.P5 is the acknowledgement card. It has come out in evidence that in spite of receipt of Ext.P4 notice, accused did not send any reply. If there was no legally enforceable debt as contended by the accused, he could have sent a reply denying the liability. That was not done for reasons best known to him. 8. Ext.P5 is the acknowledgement card. It has come out in evidence that in spite of receipt of Ext.P4 notice, accused did not send any reply. If there was no legally enforceable debt as contended by the accused, he could have sent a reply denying the liability. That was not done for reasons best known to him. 8. It is a well-settled principle that in a case where the cheque and the signature are admitted by the accused, the presumption under Sections 118(a) and 139 of N.I Act, 1881 would operate and the burden shifts to the accused to disprove or non existence of any legally enforceable debt or liability. 9. Chapter XVII comprising Sections 138 to 142 of the N.I Act, 1881 was introduced in the statute by Act 66 of 1988. The object underlying the provision contained in the said Chapter was aimed at inculcating faith in the efficacy of banking operations and giving credibility to negotiable instruments in business and day-to-day transactions by making dishonour of such instruments an offence. A negotiable instrument, whether the same is in the form of a promissory note or a cheque, is by its very nature, a solemn document that carries with it not only a representation to the holder in due course of any such instrument but also a promise that the same shall be honoured for payment. To that end, Section 139 of N.I Act, 1881 raises a statutory presumption that the cheque is issued in discharge of a lawfully recoverable debt or other liability. This presumption is no doubt rebuttable at trial but there is no gainsaying that the same favours the complainant and shifts the burden to the drawer of the instrument (in case the same is dishonoured) to prove that the instrument was without any lawful consideration. It is also noteworthy that Section 138 of N.I Act, 1881 while making dishonour of a cheque an offence punishable with imprisonment and fine also provides for safeguards to protect drawers of such instruments where dishonour may take place for reasons other than those arising out of dishonest intentions. It envisages service of a notice upon the drawer of the instrument calling upon him to make the payment covered by the cheque and permits prosecution only after the expiry of the statutory period and upon failure of the drawer to make the payment within the said period. 10. It envisages service of a notice upon the drawer of the instrument calling upon him to make the payment covered by the cheque and permits prosecution only after the expiry of the statutory period and upon failure of the drawer to make the payment within the said period. 10. In Section 4 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, “shall presume” has been explained as follows: “Whenever it is directed by this Act, that the court shall presume a fact, it shall regard such fact as proved unless and until it is disproved.” 11. The complainant has established the factual basis for raising the presumptions under Sections 118(a) and 139 of N.I. Act, 1881. Therefore, it is obligatory for the court to raise the presumption under Section 139 of N.I. Act, 1881. It is a presumption of law. 12. In Maruti Udyog Ltd. vs. Narender and others, 1999 (1) SCC 113 , the Apex Court held that in view of the express provision of Section 139 of N.I. Act 1881, a presumption must be drawn that the holder of the cheque received the cheque, of the nature referred to in Section 138, for the discharge of any debt or other liability unless the contrary is proved that there was no legally enforceable debt or liability. 13. In Hiten P. Dalal v. Bratindranath Banerjee, (2001) 6 SCC 16 , the Apex Court held that both Sections 138 and 139 of N.I.Act, 1881 requires that the Court shall presume the liability of the drawer of the cheque for the amounts for which the cheques are drawn. 14. Section 139 of N.I Act, 1881 puts the burden on the accused to prove his defence. Accused has to prove his defence on the balance of probabilities and not beyond reasonable doubt and he can prove his defence by drawing inferences from the materials already on record including the complainant’s evidence and also from the circumstances of the case and also leading his own evidence. The accused must meet the standard of preponderance of probabilities, similar to a defendant in a civil proceeding and accused has the option to ask the court to consider the non-existence of debt/liability so probable that a prudent man ought, under the circumstances of the case, to act upon the supposition that debt/liability did not exist. The accused must meet the standard of preponderance of probabilities, similar to a defendant in a civil proceeding and accused has the option to ask the court to consider the non-existence of debt/liability so probable that a prudent man ought, under the circumstances of the case, to act upon the supposition that debt/liability did not exist. But the mere denial by the accused is not enough and the accused has to prove by cogent evidence that there was no debt or liability. 15. In the case at hand, though the accused would contend that Ext.P1 was a blank signed cheque issued to PW1 namely the power of attorney holder of the complainant, at the time when he borrowed an amount of Rs. 1 lakh from PW1, there is no acceptable evidence in support of the said defence. The defence canvassed by the accused remains only as a defence and there is no acceptable evidence in support of the same. 16. In Rajesh Jain v. Ajay Singh, 2023 Live Law SC 866, the Apex Court held as follows: “.........Once the presumption under Section 139 was given effect to, the courts ought to have proceeded on the premise that the cheque was, indeed, issued in discharge of a debt/liability. The entire focus would then necessarily have to shift on the case set up by the accused, since the activation of the presumption has the effect of shifting the evidential burden on the accused. The nature of inquiry would then be to see whether the accused has discharged his onus of rebutting the presumption. If he fails to do so, the court can straight away proceed to convict him, subject to satisfaction of the other ingredients of Section 138. If the court finds that the evidential burden placed on the accused has been discharged, the complainant would be expected to prove the said fact independently, without taking aid of the presumption. The court would then take an overall view based on the evidence on record and decide accordingly. At the stage when the courts concluded that the signature had been admitted, the court ought to have enquired into either of the two questions (depending on the method in which the accused has chosen to rebut the presumption): Has the accused led any defence evidence to prove and conclusively established that there existed no debt/liability at the time of issuance of cheque? In the absence of rebuttal evidence being led the enquiry would entail: Has the accused proved the non existence of debt/liability by a preponderance of probabilities by referring to the particular circumstances of the case?” 17. Apart from the mere denial of liability, accused has not rebutted the presumption under Section 139 of N.I. Act, 1881. Though he would contend that Ext.P1 was a blank signed cheque leaf given to the power of attorney holder of the complainant when he borrowed an amount of Rs. 1 lakh, he failed to establish the said defence by acceptable evidence. 18. On a reappraisal of the evidence both oral and documentary, this Court finds no reasons at all to interfere with the conviction rendered by the trial court which was confirmed by the appellate court. 19. The sentence awarded against the accused by the trial court to undergo imprisonment till rising of the court and to pay compensation of Rs. 5 lakhs to the complainant under Section 357(3) Cr.P.C and in default of payment of compensation, to undergo simple imprisonment for three months which was confirmed in appeal does not warrant any interference by this Court. 20. The Criminal Revision Petition is devoid of any merit and accordingly stands dismissed. 21. The trial court shall take steps to execute the sentence. 22. Registry shall transmit the records to the trial court forthwith.