JUDGMENT : ARUN BHANSALI, J. 1. This appeal is directed against the order dated 2/5/2023 passed by the learned Single Judge, whereby, the writ petition filed by the appellant-petitioners has been dismissed. 2. The appellant-petitioners were initially appointed as Patwaris and came to be promoted as Inspector (Land Records) (‘ILR’) vide DPC held on 14/10/2014 against the vacancies of the year 2014-15 by order dated 15/10/2014. The private respondents were also appointed as Patwaris and came to be promoted as ILR pursuant to the Limited Departmental Competitive Examination (‘LDCE’). The dispute pertains to the challenge laid by the appellant-petitioners to the final seniority lists dated 1/11/2019 (Annex.8 to 10), whereby, the respondents No.3 to 8, who have been impleaded in representative capacity, have been indicated as senior to the petitioners. 3. While the petitioners, as noticed hereinbefore, were promoted through DPC by order dated 15/10/2014, the respondents were promoted pursuant to the advertisement for holding competitive examination, which was first published on 17/6/2011 for 93 posts, fresh advertisement for 155 posts was published on 28/1/2013, the examinations were held on 21/4/2013 and result was declared on 16/5/2013, wherein, the respondents were declared successful and were sent to school for training on 31/12/2013; the training was completed on 4/3/2014 and by order dated 31/3/2014 they were allocated the districts. 4. The said group of 136 ILRs have been indicated as Batch Number 24 by the respondents in the seniority list. The final seniority list initially came to be published by the Board of Revenue on 28/8/2019, wherein, the petitioners were indicated as senior to the batch number 24, however, the Board of Revenue cancelling the seniority list dated 28/8/2019, issued provisional seniority list dated 24/10/2019 inviting objections of all concerned, wherein, in the provisional seniority list, the respondents – batch number 24 were indicated as senior to the petitioners. The petitioners submitted their objections to the provisional seniority list dated 24/10/2019 contending that batch number 24 has joined in the Financial Year 2014-15 i.e. in the same year in which the petitioners were promoted and hence they were entitled to be given precedence in terms of Rule 299 of the Land Revenue (Land Records) Rules, 1957 (‘the Rules, 1957’). The petitioners submitted their objections to the provisional seniority list dated 24/10/2019 contending that batch number 24 has joined in the Financial Year 2014-15 i.e. in the same year in which the petitioners were promoted and hence they were entitled to be given precedence in terms of Rule 299 of the Land Revenue (Land Records) Rules, 1957 (‘the Rules, 1957’). The impugned seniority lists (Annex.8 to 10 to the writ petition) were published by the State Government/Board of Revenue for three years (1/4/2015, 1/4/2016 and 1/4/2017) in which the ILRs of batch no. 24 were ranked senior to the petitioners. Feeling aggrieved the writ petition was filed. 5. Submissions were made that the seniority list published was contrary to the law inasmuch as Rule 171-A of the Rules, 1957 was violated and that the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ganga Vishan Gujarati vs. State of Rajasthan : (2019) 16 SCC 28 has not been followed. 6. Further submissions were made that the final seniority list i.e. 28/8/2019 could not be revised/reviewed by the respondents. 7. After hearing the parties, the learned Single Judge came to the conclusion that applicable Rule 171-A of the Rules, 1957 was amended w.e.f. 8/10/2014 and in case unamended provision is taken into consideration, the petitioners, who were promoted on 15/10/2014 cannot claim to be senior to the batch number 24, who were promoted on 31/3/2014 and joined latest on 4/4/2014. 8. It was further held that in case the amended rule is held applicable, on issuance of order dated 31/3/2014, whereby, the State Govt./Board of Revenue directed all successful candidates (while allocating them districts) to report to the concerned District Collector, the batch number 24, who was promoted on the post of ILR and as such, their year of promotion would be 2013-14. 9. It was further held that the petitioners and respondents were not promotees of the same year and that the respondents cannot be termed as direct recruits in relation to Rule 299 of the Rules, 1957. It was further held that the judgment in the case of Ganga Vishan Gujarati (supra) has no bearing on the present controversy. 10. 9. It was further held that the petitioners and respondents were not promotees of the same year and that the respondents cannot be termed as direct recruits in relation to Rule 299 of the Rules, 1957. It was further held that the judgment in the case of Ganga Vishan Gujarati (supra) has no bearing on the present controversy. 10. The learned Single Judge also came to the conclusion that the State Government has the power under Section 83 of the Land Revenue Act, 1956 (‘the Act, 1956’) to revise the order passed under the Act and the Rules and consequently dismissed the writ petition. 11. Learned counsel for the appellants made vehement submissions that the action of the respondents in according seniority to batch no. 24 is ex facie contrary to the law. Submissions have been made that the provisions of Section 33 of the Act, 1956 are very clear, which inter alia provides that the appointment of ILR is to be made by the Collector. In the present case, batch no. 24 have all been accorded appointment by the District Collector on or after 4/4/2014 and, therefore, the claim that they were appointed on 31/3/2014 i.e. during 2013-14 has no basis. It was emphasized that the order dated 31/3/2014 had admittedly been passed by the Divisional Commissioner, who is not the appointing authority and, therefore, the finding recorded by the learned Single Judge on the assumption that the batch no.24 is of 31/3/2014 is against the law. 12. Further submissions were made that Rule 299 of the Rules, 1957 envisages that promotee of the same year shall rank senior to the direct recruits from serving Patwaris of the same year and, therefore, as the batch no. 24 has been appointed in the year 2014-15, qua the petitioners they will rank junior. It was emphasized that the learned Single Judge was not justified in coming to the conclusion that the final seniority list dated 28/8/2019 could be revised under Section 83 of the Act and on that count also the finding deserves to be set aside. 13. Besides reference to the judgment in the case of Ganga Vishan Gujarati (supra), reliance was placed on Kuntesh Gupta vs. Management of Hindu Kanya Mahavidyalaya, Sitapur : AIR 1987 SC 2186 and Shivraji & Ors. vs. Dy. Director of Consolidation and Ors. : 1997 AWC 454 (Allahabad). 13. Besides reference to the judgment in the case of Ganga Vishan Gujarati (supra), reliance was placed on Kuntesh Gupta vs. Management of Hindu Kanya Mahavidyalaya, Sitapur : AIR 1987 SC 2186 and Shivraji & Ors. vs. Dy. Director of Consolidation and Ors. : 1997 AWC 454 (Allahabad). It was prayed that the order impugned be set aside and the writ petition be allowed and the order dated 1/11/2019 be quashed and set aside. 14. Learned counsel for the respondents made vehement submissions that the entire premise of the appellants is wholly incorrect. Submissions have been made that the respondents – batch no. 24, have been promoted based on the limited competitive examination undertaken by them under Rule 284 of the Rules, 1957. Submissions have been made that the said Rule 284 envisages promotion of Patwaris on the basis of seniority-cum-merit for 80% of the vacancies and on the basis of competitive examination, which is restricted to the serving Patwaris of Revenue Department, who fulfill the condition of eligibility, for 20% of the vacancies, and as such, it cannot be said that they have been recruited, as claimed by the appellants. Submissions have been made that the respondents – batch no. 24, initially were wrongly shown as juniors to the appellants in the seniority list dated 28/8/2019, based on which the representation was made and the respondents considering the mistake committed, issued a fresh provisional list, and after thoroughly considering the objections raised, have rightly issued the final seniority list dated 1/11/2019. It was submitted that in the previous round of litigation between the parties, the Division bench has categorically come to the conclusion that the batch of 24 was promoted on 31/3/2014, reference in this regard has been made to para 3, 19 and 31 of the judgment dated 6/8/2018 in Prakash Chand & Anr. vs. Ganga Vishan Gujarati & Ors. : D.B.Spl. Appeal Writ No. 852/2018. 15. Further submissions have been made that the challenge laid on the basis that the respondents could not have reviewed/revised the seniority list has no basis as there is no bar in law in this regard. 16. vs. Ganga Vishan Gujarati & Ors. : D.B.Spl. Appeal Writ No. 852/2018. 15. Further submissions have been made that the challenge laid on the basis that the respondents could not have reviewed/revised the seniority list has no basis as there is no bar in law in this regard. 16. Further submissions have been made that exhaustive reasons have been indicated while issuing the seniority list dated 1/11/2019 and the mistake committed while issuing the seniority list dated 28/8/2019 could always be corrected and, therefore, the challenge laid on the said count also has no substance. 17. Ultimately it was submitted that even if the Court comes to the conclusion that the seniority list dated 28/8/2019 could not be reviewed, in view of obvious illegality in the said seniority list, interference in the appeal would result in restoring the illegality, which would not be just and, therefore, also the appeal deserves to be dismissed. 18. We have considered the submissions made by learned counsel for the parties and have perused the material available on record. 19. The provisions relevant to the present appeal inter alia read as under: “284. Selection of candidates for admission to the school in the respective cadre strength shall be made):— (i) by promotion of Patwaris of the Revenue and Land Records Departments, on the basis of seniority-cum-merit, for 80% of the vacancies; (ii) on the basis of a competitive examination which shall be restricted to serving Patwaris of Revenue (Land Records) Department who fulfill the conditions of eligibility as given in Rules 286, for 20% of the vacancies. Provided that the minimum age limit for such patwaris shall be 45 years.” “286. Qualifications - Candidates intending to apply for selection must possess the following qualification:- (i) That he is a patwari of Revenue (Land Records) Department and has five years of service experience as patwari; (ii) That he has passed Secondary Examination or any other equivalent examination recognised by Government; (iii) That he is not above 45 years of age on the first day of January, next following the last date fixed for receipt of application for admission to the said school; (iv) That he is patwar diploma holder or he is exempted from this diploma as per rules.” Rule 171-A prior to amendment: “171-A. Seniority. - (1) The seniority of Inspectors, Land Record working in the various districts will be interlaced by the Board of Revenue and the Secretary (Land Records) Revenue Board will maintain an upto-date list of seniority of the Inspectors. Land Records working in the Department. (2) The seniority of the Inspector, Land Records will be determined from the date of their continuous officiation on the post of Inspector Land Records in the Land Records Department and/or Inspector in the Settlement/Consolidation/Colonization Department or any other equivalent post in such Departments provided such officiation was not fortuitous or ad hoc in nature and subject to the condition that they possess a diploma of having passed the Girdawar Qanungo Examination…” Rule 171-A substituted by amendment reads thus: “(2) The seniority of Inspector, Land Records shall be determined on the basis of recruitment year of promotion on the post of Inspector, Land Records in the Land Records Department and Inspector in the Settlement Department, Colonisation Department and Consolidation Department.” “299. Completion of probation.- On completion of one year of probation the I.R.Rs/Office Qanungo and Assistant Sadar Qanungo shall be eligible for being confirmed. Promotees of the same year shall however rank senior to the direct recruits from serving patwaries of the same year.” 20. A perusal of the provisions of Rule 284 and 286 would reveal that the promotion through competitive examination is restricted to in-service candidates and, therefore, the same cannot be termed as direct recruitment. 21. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Ganga Vishan Gujarati (supra) on the aspect of nature of such recruitment has categorically in the context of Rule 299 of the Rules, 1957 laid down as under: “32. Now, it is in the above context, that both the Single Judge as well as Division Bench in appeal came to the conclusion that the examination which is confined to candidates drawn from the feeder category would essentially be a case of accelerated promotion. The learned Single Judge held: “45. Now, it is in the above context, that both the Single Judge as well as Division Bench in appeal came to the conclusion that the examination which is confined to candidates drawn from the feeder category would essentially be a case of accelerated promotion. The learned Single Judge held: “45. .…The very fact that at one stage there were three sources for selection/appointment, which included that direct recruitment, regular promotion and accelerated promotion is sufficient to come to a conclusion that selection through competitive examination cannot be equated with direct recruitment…” The Single Judge held that the quota of 20% is to be filled up by accelerated promotion and merely because a competitive examination for entry to the training school is envisaged that does not change the status of the selection. Though, the streams are different, essentially, the selection is by way of promotion. The Division Bench accepted this analysis of the learned Single Judge, holding: “13. …An examination restricted only to the feeder category prescribed for promotion by seniority-cum-merit, would therefore essentially be a case of promotion by way of selection or accelerated promotion as learned single judge has rightly put and not direct recruitment...” The Division Bench noticed that Rule 299 of the 1957 Rules (in the context of the completion of the probationary period) provides that promotees of the same year will rank senior to the direct recruits from serving Patwaris of the same year. The mere use of the expression “direct recruitment” in Rule 299 was held not to render the source comprehended in Rule 284(ii) as a source of direct recruitment. For the purpose of the present proceedings, we accept the correctness of this view which has been adopted both by the Single Judge and by the Division Bench. This is also the consistent view of the Department of Personnel of the State Government. Hence, we hold that the limited departmental examination for in-service Patwaris under Rule 284(ii) is a means of accelerated promotion. Rule 284 provides for selection by promotion through two streams: one by seniority-cum-merit and the other on the basis of a limited departmental examination for in-service Patwaris.” 22. Therefore, the plea raised in this regard has no substance. 23. Hence, we hold that the limited departmental examination for in-service Patwaris under Rule 284(ii) is a means of accelerated promotion. Rule 284 provides for selection by promotion through two streams: one by seniority-cum-merit and the other on the basis of a limited departmental examination for in-service Patwaris.” 22. Therefore, the plea raised in this regard has no substance. 23. The respondents while issuing the final seniority list dated 1/11/2019 have elaborately dealt with the issue, wherein, detailed reasons were given for the purpose of maintaining the seniority, wherein, it was inter alia indicated that the exercise was undertaken after the Supreme Court judgment in the case of Ganga Vishan Guajarati (supra). The indications were also made that those, who had joined prior to 8/10/2014 i.e. prior to amendment in Rule 171-A, their seniority was determined as per the existing Rule and those, who had joined after the amendment in the Rule on 8/10/2014, their seniority was based on the amended Rule. 24. Admittedly, the said aspect was not questioned by the appellants at all before the learned Single Judge despite specific stipulation in the orders made. As in terms of unamended Rule, the batch no. 24 had already been appointed and admittedly appellants were promoted after the amendment took place on 8/10/2014 i.e. on 15/10/2014, the plea raised apparently has no substance. 25. So far as the challenge laid on the ground that the order dated 28/8/2019 i.e. the final seniority list could not be reviewed, the plea raised also has no substance inasmuch as, the determination had taken place on 28/8/2019 and pursuant thereto, no further action had been taken and on 24/10/2019 i.e. within two months a fresh provisional seniority list was issued calling for the objections, if any, to the said provisional seniority list and after providing opportunity in this regard, the seniority list dated 1/11/2019 was issued. The nature of orders, which have been passed while determining the seniority are administrative in nature only and they cannot be termed as quasi judicial so as to come to a conclusion that the review, in absence of statutory provision, is impermissible. Holding that the seniority list is not open to review/revision, would result in undesirable consequences, wherein, on account of several factors, the seniority gets disturbed and list has to be revised. Holding that the seniority list is not open to review/revision, would result in undesirable consequences, wherein, on account of several factors, the seniority gets disturbed and list has to be revised. However, for the purpose of revision or reviewing the seniority list, there has to be very strong reasons and same cannot be done only at the whims of the respondents. The exercise, if any undertaken, is also open to be examined by the competent court/authority. 26. So far as the reliance placed on the judgment in Kuntesh Gupta (supra) is concerned, the same pertained to exercise of power of review by a quasi judicial authority, which, as noticed hereinbefore, is not the status in the present case. 27. Similarly, in the case of Shivraji (supra), the Allahabad High Court was dealing with the orders passed by the Consolidation Authorities under the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953, which judgment also has no application to the facts of the present case. 28. The Division Bench in the previous round of litigation has inter alia in para 3, 19 and 31, which judgment has been upheld by the Supreme Court, which are relevant to the present controversy observed as under: “3. The facts as pleaded by the parties would reveal that the Revenue (Land Records) Department issued an advertisement on 17.6.2011 to fill up 93 vacancies to the post of Inspector Land Records by way of Limited Departmental Competitive Examination from amongst the serving Patwaris of the Revenue (Land Records) Department. The number of posts to be filled was enhanced to 155 vide subsequent notification dated 28.1.2013. The result of the examination was declared on 16.5.2013 wherein the writ petitioners were selected. By a posting order dated 31.3.2014 the writ petitioners were promoted as Inspector Land Records. 19. Supreme Court in 1994 Supp. (2) SCC 490 Harish Candra Ram vs. Mukhram Dubey, has defined the term “recruitment year” as the year in which recruitment takes place but not each successive years in which the vacancies exist. It is thus clear from the seniority rule that seniority to the post of Inspector (Land Records) is to be determined on the basis of the year in which recruitment takes place and not the years in which the vacancy for such recruitment arose. It is thus clear from the seniority rule that seniority to the post of Inspector (Land Records) is to be determined on the basis of the year in which recruitment takes place and not the years in which the vacancy for such recruitment arose. In the present case, it is an admitted position that the advertisement for recruitment was issued on 28.01.2013, the result was declared on 16.05.2013 and the promotion order were issued on 31.03.2014. The recruitment rules governing the field in the present case specifically provide the method and manner in which seniority in the grade of Inspector (Land Records) has to be determined. Thus the year in which the vacancies for which such recruitment was held, arose would be irrelevant for the purpose of determination of seniority in terms of sub-rule (2) of Rule 171-A. 31. Rule 298 of the 1957 Rules requires the board of revenue to maintain a list of all the successful candidates in the competitive examination held under Rule 287 in the order of seniority based on aggregate marks obtained by them in such examination irrespective of their seniority position in the feeder category namely the Patwaris. Thus the rule clearly envisages alteration of seniority position of candidates appointed through competitive examination based on their performance in such examination. The Patwaris so selected are therefore born in the cadre of Inspector Land Records on their successfully qualifying the competitive examination held under Rule 287. The thrust of the matter therefore is as to how the seniority of such candidates is to be determined in the light of the claim that they are recruited in a subsequent recruitment year against the vacancies of previous years.”(emphasis supplied) 29. From the determination made hereinbefore also, it is apparent that the Court has assumed that the batch no. 24 was appointed as ILR on 31/3/2014. 30. The plea raised based on Section 33 of the Act apparently also has no basis, as would be evident from the orders passed. 31. From the determination made hereinbefore also, it is apparent that the Court has assumed that the batch no. 24 was appointed as ILR on 31/3/2014. 30. The plea raised based on Section 33 of the Act apparently also has no basis, as would be evident from the orders passed. 31. The order dated 31/3/2014 inter alia reads as under: ^^jktLFkku ljdkj jktLo e.My jktLFkku] vtesj Øekad %& jke@Hkw-v-@bZ&1@i&17@95@4475 fnukad 31-3-2014 vkns'k izkpk;Z] loZ mn~ns'kh; jktLo izf'k{k.kky] Vkad ds i= Øekad 777 fnukad 31-03-2014 esa jktLo e.My }kjk Hkw&vfHkys[k fujh{kd HkrhZ ijh{kk&2011 esa p;fur cSp uEcj 24 ds Hkw&vfHkys[k fujh{kdksa dh vk;ksftr foHkkxh; inksUufr ijh{kk dk ifj.kke ?kksf"kr fd;k tkdj dj fuEukafdr vH;fFkZ;ksa dks lQy ?kksf"kr fd;k gSA vr% fuEukafdr vH;fFkZ;ksa dks Hkkjr fuokZpu vk;ksx dh Lohd`fr i=kad 437@vkj-ts-&,p-ih-@2014@,u,l&1@fnukad 31-03-2014 ,oa jktLFkku fuokZpu foHkkx ds i= Øekad ,Q-3¼1½¼5½ izFke@fuokZpu@2014@4246 t;iqj fnukad 31-03-2014 ds Øe esa muds orZeku inLFkkiu ftys esa gh lacaf/kr ftyk dysDVj dk;kZy; esa Hkw&vfHkys[k fujh{kd ds inksUur in ij mifLFkfr nsus gsrq ,rn~ }kjk vknsf'kr fd;k tkrk gSA leLr uoinksUur Hkw&vfHkys[k fujh{kdx.k ds inLFkkiuUu vkns'k vyx ls lacaf/kr laHkkxh; vk;qDr fu;ekuqlkj tkjh djsaxsA Ø-la- uke lQy vH;FkhZ orZeku inLFkkfir ftyk Hkw&vfHkys[k fujh{kd in ij mifLFkfr gsrq ftyk 1- duhtk >kykokM+ >kykokM+ 2- XXXX 3- XXXX 85- XXXX Mh-ch- flfoy fjV Lis'ky vihy la[;k 378@2014 lqjs'k dqekj xxZ cuke Jo.k dqekj [kqj[kqfj;k esa ikfjr ekuuh; mPp U;k;ky; ds vkns'k fnukad 08-03- 2014 ds vuqlkj i{kdkjksa ds fgr iwoZ esa ikfjr ekuuh; U;k;ky; ds vkns'k fnukad 12-11-2013] 21-11-2013 rFkk 06-02-2014 ls xouZ gSA lQy Hkw&vfHkys[k fujh{kdksa dk p;u@fu;qfDr ekuuh; mPp U;k;ky;] tks/kiqj esa fopkjk/khu ;kfpdk la[;k 1162@2013 lqesj flag cuke ljdkj o vU; rFkk t;iqj mPp U;k;ky; esa fopkjk/khu Mh-ch flfoy Lis'ky vihy la[;k 343@2014 jfo izdk'k xqIrk o iou dqekj Lokeh o vU; rFkk leku izd`fr dh vU; fopkjk/khu ;kfpdkvksa esa ikfjr gksus okys vafre fu.kZ; ds v/;/khu gksxhA vkns'kkuqlkj ¼Lusgyrk iaokj½ fucU/kd jktLo e.My jktLFkku] vtesj^^ (emphasis supplied) 32. A perusal of the above order dated 31/3/2014 would reveal that by the said order the respondent – Batch No.24 were promoted as ILRs and were directed to report on the promoted post. Further indication was made that the order of posting shall be issued by the Divisional Commissioner. 33. The language of the said order is very specific, whereby, the respondents were promoted by the said order. Further indication was made that the order of posting shall be issued by the Divisional Commissioner. 33. The language of the said order is very specific, whereby, the respondents were promoted by the said order. Whereafter, the respective Divisional Commissioner in relation to their jurisdictional divisions, passed order dated 4/4/2014 (filed as Ex.A by the appellants along with the present appeal) indicating as under: jktLFkku ljdkj dk;kZy; lEHkkxh; vk;qDr] tks/kiqj Øekad% ,Q ¼1½ Hkw-v-@2014@34 fnukad 04-04-2014 vkns'k jktLo e.My jktLFkku vtesj ds vkns'k Øekad jke@Hkw-v-@bZ&1@i&17@95@4475 fnukad 31-03-2014 ds vuqlj.k esa jktLo e.My }kjk Hkw vfHkys[k fujh{kd HkrhZ ijh{kk 2011 esa p;fur cSp uEcj 24 ds Hkw-v- fujh{kdksa dh vk;ksftr foHkkxh; inksUufr ijh{kk esa lQy ?kksf"kr tks/kiqj leHkkx ds fuEukafdr vH;fFkZ;ksa dks lEcfU/kr ftyksa esa Hkw&vfHkys[k fujh{kd in ij mifLFkfr izLrqr djus dh n'kk esa muds uke ds lEeq[k ftyksa esa inLFkkiu gsrq ,rn~}kjk vkoafVr fd;k tkrk gS %& Øe la uke lQy vH;FkhZ orZeku inLFkkfir ftyk Hkw-v- fujh{kd in ij vkoafVr ftyk 1- Jh lqjs'k dqekj xxZ tks/kiqj tks/kiqj 2- Jh Qrsg flag jkBkSM+ ckM+esj ckM+esj 3- xxx Xxx Xxx 4- Xxx Xxx Xxx 5- Xxx Xxx Xxx 19- Jh ruflag HkkVh tSlyesj tSlyesj mijksDr vH;fFkZ;ksa ds laca/k esa Hkkjr fuokZpu vk;ksx dh Lohd`fr i=kad 437@vkj-ts-&,pih@2014@,u,l&1@fnukad 31-04-2014 ,oa jktLFkku fuokZpu foHkkx ds i= Øekad ,Q-3 ¼1½¼5½ izFke@fuokZpu@2014@4246 t;iqj fnukad 31-03-2014 ls Lohd`fr izkIr gksus ij jktLo e.My ds mijksDr i= fnukad 31-03-2014 ds Øe esa ;g inLFkkiu vkns'k tkjh fd;s x;s gSA ------------------------- ----------------------- ¼gseUr xsjk½ lEHkkxh; vk;qDr tks/kiqj^^ 34. A perusal of the above order would reveal that the said order only relates to posting and not appointment, as the appointment had already taken place on 31/3/2014. 35. A perusal of the above order would reveal that the said order only relates to posting and not appointment, as the appointment had already taken place on 31/3/2014. 35. Further, the order dated 7/4/2014 (Ex.B) produced by the appellants pertains to the order of the District Collector, which reads as under: ^^jktLFkku ljdkj dk;kZy; ftyk dysDVj ¼Hkwv½ ckM+esj Øekad@Hkw-v-@laLFkk@2014@41841 Fnukad 07-04-2014 vkns'k jktLo e.My jktLFkku vtesj ds vkns'kkad jke@Hkwv@bZ&1@i&17@ 95@4475 fnukad 31-03-2014 ds vUrxZr Hkw&vfHkys[k fujh{kd HkrhZ ijh{kk 2011 esa p;fur cSp uacj 24 ds lQy ?kksf"kr vH;fFkZ;ksa dh foHkkxh; ijh{kk dk ifj.kke fnukad 31-03-2014 dks ?kksf”kr fd;k tkus ij dk inLFkkiu gsrq djus gsrq laHkkxh; vk;qDr tks/kiqj dks vknsf'kr fd;k x;kA laHkkxh; vk;qDr tks/kiqj ds vkns'kkad ,Q ¼1½ Hkwv@2014@34 fnukad 04-04-2014 ds }kjk bu uo inksUur Hkw vfHkys[k fujh{kdksa dks inLFkkiu djus gsrq ftyk ckM+esj vkoafVr fd;k x;k gSA jktLo e.My jktLFkku ds vkns'k fnukad 31-03-14 ds Øe esa mDr lQy Hkw&vfHkys[k fujh{kdksa }kjk viuh mifLFkfr fnukad 01-04-2014 dks bl dk;kZy; esa izLrqr dh gSA vr% foHkkxh; lh/kh HkrhZ ls p;fur ,oa lQy ?kksf"kr vH;fFkZ;ksa dk inLFkkiu fuEu izdkj muds lEeq[k vafdr LFkku ij fd;k tkrk gS Øe-l- lQy vH;FkhZ dk uke iVokjh ds in ij orZeku inLFkku LFkku Hkw-v- fujh{kd ds in fd;k x;k inLFkkiu LFkku fo-fo - 1- Hkh[knku@nsohnku iVokjh dwM+h rglhy ipinjk vfr- vkfQl dkuuwxks rglhy ipinjk 2- Xxx 5- gehjkjke ckykp@:ikjke iVokjh 'kksHkkyk tSr rglhy pkSgVu vkfQj dkuwuxks rglhy/kksjheuk vr% lacaf/kr rglhynkjksa dks vkns'k fn, tkrs gS fd mDr uohu Hkw vfHkys[k fujh{kdksa ls iVokjh dk izHkkj utnhdh iVokfj;ksa dks rRdky gLrkrj.k djkrs gq, uo inLFkkiu LFkku ij dk;Z xzg.k djus gsrq dk;ZeqDr dj bl dk;kZy; dks voxr djkosaA ---------------------------------- ----------------------------- ¼Hkkuq izdk'k ,Vw:½ ftyk dyDVj] ckM+esj^^ 36. The order of the Collector also pertains to according posting within the district and not according appointment to the respondents. 37. From the above orders dated 31/3/2014, 4/4/2014 and 7/4/2014, it is apparent that the appointment pursuant to the promotion was accorded to the batch no. 24 on 31/3/2014 and it cannot be said that the appointment was accorded by order dated 7/4/2014 by the District Collector so as to claim that in terms of Section 33 of the Act, the appointment of the batch no. 24 was made on 7/4/2014. 38. 24 on 31/3/2014 and it cannot be said that the appointment was accorded by order dated 7/4/2014 by the District Collector so as to claim that in terms of Section 33 of the Act, the appointment of the batch no. 24 was made on 7/4/2014. 38. This is besides the fact that even as on 7/4/2014, in terms of provisions of Rule 171-A of the Rules, 1957, as it then existed, the batch no. 24, having been posted (appointed, as claimed by the appellants) when the petitioners were not even born on the cadre, as they were promoted by the DPC on 14/10/2014 and orders were passed on 15/10/2014, the batch no. 24 was always senior to the petitioners by way of year of appointment i.e. 2013-14 and point of appointment i.e. 31.3.2014/4.4.2014/7.4.2014 and, therefore, the plea raised by the appellants even otherwise has no substance. 39. In view of the above discussion, the order passed by the learned Single Judge does not call for any interference. 40. There is no force in the appeal and the same is, therefore, dismissed.