ORDER : The point to be decided in this case is that, whether a prosecution initiated under Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code can be quashed because there is a finding by the Court in a proceeding initiated under Section 12 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (for short 'Act 2005') to the effect that there is no domestic violence as defined in the Act 2005. 2. The brief facts in this case can be narrated first: Petitioner is an accused in C.C.No.4071/2013 on the file of the Judicial First Class Magistrate Court, Chalakudy. The above case is charge-sheeted against the petitioner alleging the offence punishable under Section 498A IPC. The prosecution case is that the accused married CW1 on 03.09.2000 in accordance with the Hindu Religious customs and after the marriage, when the accused and CW1 were residing in the house of the accused, 30 sovereigns of gold given to CW1 was misappropriated by the accused. It is also the prosecution case that the accused said that, to live with CW1, 30 sovereigns of gold ornaments is insufficient and he demanded 5 lakh rupees and another 50 sovereigns of gold ornaments. It is also the case of the prosecution that the accused told CW1 that he married her because of the compulsion from his family even though he is not interested in the marriage. The crux of the allegation is that, the petitioner without maintaining CW1 and the children mentally ill-treated her. Hence it is alleged that the accused committed the offence. 3. It is submitted that, there are two children in the matrimonial relationship between the petitioner and the defacto complainant. The petitioner is a B.Tech holder and the 3rd respondent is a Diploma holder. It is the case of the petitioner that he wants the company of the 3rd respondent, who is the defacto complainant herein. But the 3rd respondent is not interested in continuing the relationship. It is also the case of the petitioner that the 3rd respondent preferred complaints before different authorities without any basis. It is submitted that, on 20.01.2011 she preferred O.P. No. 135/2011 before the Family Court, Thrissur under Section 13(1)(ia) of the Hindu Marriage Act for divorce alleging that, after solemnization of the marriage, she was treated with cruelty. She also filed O.P.No.139/2011 for return of 30 sovereigns of gold ornaments or its equal value. It is submitted that, on 20.01.2011 she preferred O.P. No. 135/2011 before the Family Court, Thrissur under Section 13(1)(ia) of the Hindu Marriage Act for divorce alleging that, after solemnization of the marriage, she was treated with cruelty. She also filed O.P.No.139/2011 for return of 30 sovereigns of gold ornaments or its equal value. It is further submitted that, on 08.02.2011, the petitioner filed M.C.No.15/2011 under Section 12 of the Act 2005 before the Judicial First Class Magistrate Court, Chalakudy alleging dowry harassment by the petitioner and his parents, not to alienate the landed property and the house owned by the petitioner, and to give maintenance to her children. It is submitted by the petitioner that, on 27.03.2011, the 3rd respondent on her own accord, vacated the parental house of the petitioner with children and all her belongings. Annexure - I is alleged to be the letter sent by the 3rd respondent, in which, she stated that she is leaving on her own will. It is the case of the petitioner that, he resigned from his job in the Gulf and came back to his native place hoping for a reunion. But the 3rd respondent was not ready for the same, is the submission. It is also submitted that, O.P.No.139/2011 filed by the 3rd respondent for return of gold ornaments was dismissed by the Family Court. It is also submitted that, as per Annexure-III order, the learned Magistrate dismissed M.C.15/2011 rejecting the contention of the 3rd respondent that there was harassment from the side of the petitioner. It is the case of the petitioner that, knowing that M.C.No.15/2011 will be dismissed, criminal prosecution was initiated against the petitioner with the same set of facts. The contention raised by the petitioner is that, when there is a finding in Annexure - III order that there is no cruelty from the side of the petitioner, the continuation of the prosecution under Section 498A IPC is an abuse of the process of the court. Annexure - VI is the final report filed against the petitioner alleging the offence punishable under Section 498A IPC. Hence this Criminal Miscellaneous Case is filed. 4. Heard Adv. K.S. Madhusoodanan, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, Adv. M. Shaju Purushothaman, the learned counsel appearing for the 3rd respondent and the learned Public Prosecutor. 5. Annexure - VI is the final report filed against the petitioner alleging the offence punishable under Section 498A IPC. Hence this Criminal Miscellaneous Case is filed. 4. Heard Adv. K.S. Madhusoodanan, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, Adv. M. Shaju Purushothaman, the learned counsel appearing for the 3rd respondent and the learned Public Prosecutor. 5. The one and only point raised by the petitioner is that, in the light of Annexure - III order passed by the Judicial First Class Magistrate Court, Chalakudy in a petition filed under Section 12 of the Act 2005, the continuation of Annexure - V criminal prosecution under Section 498A IPC is to be quashed. 6. It is true that, there is some similarity between the cruelty mentioned in Section 498A IPC and also the definition of ‘Domestic Violence’ as per the Act 2005. It would be better to extract Section 498A IPC and also Section 3 of the Act 2005 in a table. SECTION 498A. IPC SECTION 3 ACT 2005 Husband or relative of husband of a woman subjecting her to cruelty. Whoever, being the husband or the relative of the husband of a woman, subjects such woman to cruelty shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years and shall also be liable to fine. Explanation. - For the purpose of this section, "cruelty" means- a. any wilful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health (whether mental or physical) of the woman; or b. harassment of the woman where such harassment is with a view to coercing her or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable security or is on account of failure by her or any person related to her to meet such demand. Definition of domestic violence. Definition of domestic violence. For the purposes of this Act, any act, omission or commission or conduct of the respondent shall constitute domestic violence in case it- a. harms or injures or endangers the health, safety, life, limb or well-being, whether mental or physical, of the aggrieved person or tends to do so and includes causing physical abuse, sexual abuse, verbal and emotional abuse and economic abuse; or b. harasses, harms, injures or endangers the aggrieved person with a view to coerce her or any other person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any dowry or other property or valuable security; or c. has the effect of threatening the aggrieved person or any person related to her by any conduct mentioned in clause (a) or clause (b); or d. otherwise injures or causes harm, whether physical or mental, to the aggrieved person. Explanation I. - For the purposes of this section,- i. "physical abuse" means any act or conduct which is of such a nature as to cause bodily pain, harm, or danger to life, limb, or health or impair the health or development of the aggrieved person and includes assault, criminal intimidation and criminal force; ii. "sexual abuse" includes any conduct of a sexual nature that abuses, humiliates, degrades or otherwise violates the dignity of woman; iii. "verbal and emotional abuse" includes- a. insults, ridicule, humiliation, name calling and insults or ridicule specially with regard to not having a child or a male child; and b. repeated threats to cause physical pain to any person in whom the aggrieved person is interested; iv. "verbal and emotional abuse" includes- a. insults, ridicule, humiliation, name calling and insults or ridicule specially with regard to not having a child or a male child; and b. repeated threats to cause physical pain to any person in whom the aggrieved person is interested; iv. "economic abuse" includes- a. deprivation of all or any economic or financial resources to which the aggrieved person is entitled under any law or custom whether payable under an order of a Court or otherwise or which the aggrieved person requires out of necessity including, but not limited to, household necessities for the aggrieved person and her children, if any, stridhan, property, jointly or separately owned by the aggrieved person, payment of rental related to the shared household and maintenance b. disposal of household effects, any alienation of assets whether movable or immovable, valuables, shares, securities, bonds and the like or other property in which the aggrieved person has an interest or is entitled to use by virtue of the domestic relationship or which may be reasonably required by the aggrieved person or her children or her stridhan or any other property jointly or separately held by the aggrieved person; and c. prohibition or restriction to continued access to resources or facilities which the aggrieved person is entitled to use or enjoy by virtue of the domestic relationship including access to the shared household. Explanation II. - For the purpose of determining whether any act, omission, commission or conduct of the respondent constitutes "domestic violence" under this section, the overall facts and circumstances of the case shall be taken into consideration 7. Annexure - III is the order passed by the Judicial First Class Magistrate Court, Chalakudy in a petition filed under Section 12 of the Act 2005. Section 12 of the Act 2005 says that, an aggrieved person or a Protection Officer or any other person on behalf of the aggrieved person may present an application to the Magistrate seeking one or more reliefs under this Act. The relief sought for under sub-section (1) of Section 12 may include a relief for issuance of an order for payment of compensation or damages without prejudice to the right of such person to institute a suit for compensation or damages for the injuries caused by the acts of domestic violence committed by the respondent. The relief sought for under sub-section (1) of Section 12 may include a relief for issuance of an order for payment of compensation or damages without prejudice to the right of such person to institute a suit for compensation or damages for the injuries caused by the acts of domestic violence committed by the respondent. Section 17 of Act 2005 deals about the right to reside in a shared household. Section 18 deals about the protection orders that can be passed by the Magistrate based on the petition filed by the aggrieved person. Section 19 deals about the residence orders that can be passed by the Magistrate. Section 19 says that, while disposing of an application under sub-section (1) of section 12, the Magistrate may, on being satisfied that domestic violence has taken place, pass a residence order. It will be better to extract Section 19 of Act 2005: “19. Residence orders.— (1) While disposing of an application under sub-section (1) of section12, the Magistrate may, on being satisfied that domestic violence has taken place, pass a residence order— (a) restraining the respondent from dispossessing or in any other manner disturbing the possession of the aggrieved person from the shared household, whether or not the respondent has a legal or equitable interest in the shared household; (b) directing the respondent to remove himself from the shared household; (c) restraining the respondent or any of his relatives from entering any portion of the shared household in which the aggrieved person resides; (d) restraining the respondent from alienating or disposing off the shared household or encumbering the same; (e) restraining the respondent from renouncing his rights in the shared household except with the leave of the Magistrate; or (f) directing the respondent to secure same level of alternate accommodation for the aggrieved person as enjoyed by her in the shared household or to pay rent for the same, if the circumstances so require: Provided that no order under clause (b) shall be passed against any person who is a woman. (2) The Magistrate may impose any additional conditions or pass any other direction which he may deem reasonably necessary to protect or to provide for the safety of the aggrieved person or any child of such aggrieved person. (3) The Magistrate may require from the respondent to execute a bond, with or without sureties, for preventing the commission of domestic violence. (3) The Magistrate may require from the respondent to execute a bond, with or without sureties, for preventing the commission of domestic violence. (4) An order under sub-section (3) shall be deemed to be an order under Chapter VIII of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) and shall be dealt with accordingly. (5) While passing an order under sub-section (1), sub- section (2) or sub-section (3), the Court may also pass an order directing the officer in-charge of the nearest police station to give protection to the aggrieved person or to assist her or the person making an application on her behalf in the implementation of the order. (6) While making an order under sub-section (1), the Magistrate may impose on the respondent obligations relating to the discharge of rent and other payments, having regard to the financial needs and resources of the parties. (7) The Magistrate may direct the officer in-charge of the police station in whose jurisdiction the Magistrate has been approached to assist in the implementation of the protection order. (8) The Magistrate may direct the respondent to return to the possession of the aggrieved person her stridhan or any other property or valuable security to which she is entitled to.” 8. Section 20 of the Act 2005 deals about the monetary reliefs that can be claimed and Section 21 deals about the custody orders that can be passed by the Magistrate. Section 22 deals about the compensation orders and Section 23 deals about the power to grant interim and ex parte orders. Section 3 of the Act 2005, which is extracted above, defines ‘Domestic Violence’. The question to be decided is that, if the Magistrate found that there is no domestic violence as defined in Section 3 of the Act 2005, whether the prosecution under Section 498A IPC is maintainable. 9. Sections 40 to 44 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 deals about the judgments of Courts of Justice when relevant. Section 40 of the Indian Evidence Act says that the existence of any judgment, order or decree which by law prevents any Court from taking cognizance of a suit or holding a trial is a relevant fact when the question is whether such Court ought to take cognizance of such suit, or to hold such trial. Section 40 of the Indian Evidence Act says that the existence of any judgment, order or decree which by law prevents any Court from taking cognizance of a suit or holding a trial is a relevant fact when the question is whether such Court ought to take cognizance of such suit, or to hold such trial. Section 41 of the Indian Evidence Act deals about the relevancy of certain judgments in probate, etc jurisdiction. Section 41 says that a final judgment, order or decree of a competent Court, in the exercise of probate, matrimonial, admiralty or insolvency jurisdiction, which confers upon or takes away from any person any legal character, or which declares any person to be entitled to any such character, or to be entitled to any specific thing, not as against any specified person but absolutely, is relevant when the existence of any such legal character, or the title of any such person to any such thing, is relevant. Section 42 deals about the relevancy and effect of judgments, orders or decrees other than those mentioned in Section 41. Section 43 deals about the judgment , etc., other than those mentioned in Sections 40 to 42, when relevant. Section 42 says that the judgments, orders or decrees other than those mentioned in section 41, are relevant if they relate to matters of a public nature relevant to the enquiry; but such judgments, orders or decrees are not conclusive proof of that which they state. Section 43 says that judgments, orders or decrees, other than those mentioned in sections 40, 41 and 42, are irrelevant, unless the existence of such judgment, order or decree, is a fact in issue, or is relevant under some other provision of the Evidence Act. Section 44 deals about fraud or collusion in obtaining judgment, or incompetency of Court, may be proved. Any party to a suit or other proceeding may show that any judgment, order or decree which is relevant under sections 40, 41 or 42, and which has been proved by the adverse party, was delivered by a Court not competent to deliver it, or was obtained by fraud or collusion. 10. In the light of Sections 40 to 44, this Court has to consider whether Annexure-III judgment is relevant to quash Annexure-V prosecution initiated under Section 498A IPC. 10. In the light of Sections 40 to 44, this Court has to consider whether Annexure-III judgment is relevant to quash Annexure-V prosecution initiated under Section 498A IPC. To decide the same, this Court has to decide first about the nature of the proceedings in a petition under Section 12 of Act 2005. The statement of objects and reasons of Act 2005 is relevant at this stage. The same is extracted hereunder: Statement of Objects and Reasons.- Domestic violence is undoubtedly a human rights issue and serious deterrent to development. The Vienna Accord of 1994 and the Beijing Declaration and the Platform for Action (1995) have acknowledged this. The United Nations Committee on Convention on Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) in its General Recommendation No. XII (1989) has recommended that State parties should act to protect women against violence of any kind especially that occurring within the family. 2. The phenomenon of domestic violence is widely prevalent but has remained largely invisible in the public domain. Presently, where a women is subjected to cruelty by her husband or his relatives, it is an offence under section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code. The civil law does not however address this phenomenon in its entirety. 3. It is, therefore, proposed to enact a law keeping in view the rights guaranteed under articles 14, 15 and 21 of the Constitution to provide for a remedy under the civil law which is intended to protect the woman from being victims of domestic violence and to prevent the occurrence of domestic violence in the society.’ (Underline supplied) 11. Therefore, it is clear that the Act 2005 is enacted to protect the women against violence of any kind especially that occurring within the family and it is a civil remedy in addition to the criminal remedy under section 498 A IPC. In Rupali Devi v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others [ (2019) 5 SCC 384 ] the Apex Court observed that the Act 2005 is a civil remedy to victims of domestic violence as against the remedy in criminal law which is what is provided under Section 498A IPC. The relevant portion of the above judgment is extracted hereunder: ‘15. In Rupali Devi v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others [ (2019) 5 SCC 384 ] the Apex Court observed that the Act 2005 is a civil remedy to victims of domestic violence as against the remedy in criminal law which is what is provided under Section 498A IPC. The relevant portion of the above judgment is extracted hereunder: ‘15. The Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, as the object behind its enactment would indicate, is to provide a civil remedy to victims of domestic violence as against the remedy in criminal law which is what is provided under Section 498-A of the Penal Code. The definition of "domestic violence" in the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 contemplates harm or injuries that endanger the health, safety, life, limb or well-being, whether mental or physical, as well as emotional abuse. The said definition would certainly, for reasons stated above, have a close connection with Explanations (a) & (b) to Section 498-A of the Penal Code which define "cruelty". The provisions contained in Section 498-A of the Penal Code, undoubtedly, encompass both mental as well as the physical well-being of the wife. Even the silence of the wife may have an underlying element of an emotional distress and mental agony. Her sufferings at the parental home though may be directly attributable to commission of acts of cruelty by the husband at the matrimonial home would, undoubtedly, be the consequences of the acts committed at the matrimonial home. Such consequences, by itself, would amount to distinct offences committed at the parental home where she has taken shelter. The adverse effects on the mental health in the parental home though on account of the acts committed in the matrimonial home would, in our considered view, amount to commission of cruelty within the meaning of Section 498- A at the parental home. The consequences of the cruelty committed at the matrimonial home results in repeated offences being committed at the parental home. This is the kind of offences contemplated under Section 179 CrPC which would squarely be applicable to the present case as an answer to the question raised.’ 12. In Cesil Jesudas v. Sandhya J.S. [ 2022(2) KHC 147 ] this Court also observed that the main object of the proceedings under Act 2005 is to protect the women rather than adjudicating the disputes. In Cesil Jesudas v. Sandhya J.S. [ 2022(2) KHC 147 ] this Court also observed that the main object of the proceedings under Act 2005 is to protect the women rather than adjudicating the disputes. It will be better to extract the relevant portion of the above judgment. ‘8. The very objective of the D.V. Act is to protect women from violence that occurs within the family and for matters connected therein. In fact, it was not intended to create another forum for adjudication of disputes arising out of matrimonial relationship. So, the proceedings under the Act has to be understood as supplemental provision, besides the right to adjudicate their issues in a competent Civil Court, Family Court or Criminal Court. The protective measures envisaged under the Act include residence orders, monetary reliefs, custody orders, compensation orders etc. The main objective of such proceedings is to protect the women, rather than adjudicating the disputes. 13. The Scheme of the D.V. Act, does not contemplate that any order, interim / final, passed under the said Act, prevents any Court of competent jurisdiction, civil, criminal or Family Court, from taking cognizance of a suit or holding of trial. The orders passed under the D.V Act cannot be held to be orders or judgments passed in exercise of any matrimonial jurisdiction by the Court.’ 13. In Cesil Jesudas’s case (supra), this Court also observed that the standard of proof is different in civil and criminal cases. Paragraph 15 of Cesil Jesudas’s case is also extracted hereunder: ‘It is well settled that, a decision by a Criminal Court does not bind the Civil Court, while a decision by the Civil Court binds the Criminal Court. In Seth Ramdayal Jat v. Laxmi Prasad, 2009 KHC 483: 2009 (3) KLT SN 14: 2009 (5) SCALE 527 : AIR 2009 SC 2463 : (2009) 11 SCC 545 , the Apex Court held that the judgment in a criminal case is admissible for a limited purpose. Relying only on, or on the basis thereof, a civil proceeding cannot be terminated, but that would not mean that it is not admissible for any purpose whatsoever. The standard of proof is different in civil and criminal cases. In civil cases it is preponderance of probabilities while in criminal cases it is proof beyond reasonable doubt. Relying only on, or on the basis thereof, a civil proceeding cannot be terminated, but that would not mean that it is not admissible for any purpose whatsoever. The standard of proof is different in civil and criminal cases. In civil cases it is preponderance of probabilities while in criminal cases it is proof beyond reasonable doubt. There is neither any statutory nor any legal principle, that findings recorded by the Court either in civil or criminal proceedings shall be binding between the same parties, while dealing with the same subject matter, and both the cases have to be decided on the basis of the evidence adduced therein. If the judgment of a Criminal Court is relevant as per S.43 of the Evidence Act, that judgment can very well be taken note of, and there is no embargo on the Civil Court to place reliance upon it as a corroborative material.’ 14. In Ritesh Ratilal Jain and Others v. Sandhya and Another [2013 KHC 3448] the Bombay High Court observed that the purpose behind the proceedings under Section 498A IPC and also the Act 2005 are different and they have to be decided separately. The relevant portion of the above judgment is extracted hereunder: ‘8. One more ground was argued in respect of this proceeding. It was submitted that the same allegations are made by respondent in the complaint which was filed by her for offence under S.498A of IPC. It was submitted that either of the 2 proceedings need to be stayed in view of the nature of contents of the 2 proceedings. This Court holds that this proposition is misconceived. The purpose behind the 2 proceedings is altogether different and the 2 proceedings need to be heard and decided separately in view of the nature of the proceedings and the final order which can be made in the proceedings. Thus, on second ground also, the petitioners have no case in Writ Petition No. 631/11.’ 15. In Bimal Mitra and Others v. Ashalata Mitra [2013 KHC 3473] the Gauhati High Court also considered the same point. The relevant portion of the above judgment is extracted hereunder: ‘9. In my considered opinion, the fact of disclosing previous litigation itself admits the legal position that an aggrieved person can file a complaint under S.12 of the Act in addition to other criminal or civil proceedings. The relevant portion of the above judgment is extracted hereunder: ‘9. In my considered opinion, the fact of disclosing previous litigation itself admits the legal position that an aggrieved person can file a complaint under S.12 of the Act in addition to other criminal or civil proceedings. I am also of the view that the requirement to inform the victim that she can also initiate a criminal proceeding is only to apprise the victim about her legal right about additional and alternative remedy. Besides this, under the DV Act a victim can seek various reliefs viz., protection order under S.18, residential order under S.19, monetary relief under S.20 and S.22 and custody order under S.21 etc. These reliefs cannot be granted in a proceeding under S.498A of the IPC. Even if some of the reliefs can be sought for in a civil proceeding and that would also not be a bar for filing complaint under S.12 of the DV Act. The only pre condition is that if any such civil or criminal proceeding is initiated the same shall be reflected in the complaint and the result of such litigation should also be brought to the notice of the Court.’ 16. In K. Jagadish v. Udaya Kumar G.S and Another [ (2020) 14 SCC 552 ] the Apex Court observed that it is well settled that in certain cases the very same set of facts may give rise to remedies in civil as well as in criminal proceedings and even if a civil remedy is availed by a party, he is not precluded from setting in motion the proceedings in criminal law. Paragraphs 9 and 10 of Jagadish’s case (supra) are extracted hereunder: ‘9. In Pratibha Rani v. Suraj Kumar this Court summed up the distinction between the two remedies as under: (SCC pp. 382-83, para 21) "21.... There are a large number of cases where criminal law and civil law can run side by side. The two remedies are not mutually exclusive but clearly coextensive and essentially differ in their content and consequence. The object of the criminal law is to punish an offender who commits an offence against a person, property or the State for which the accused, on proof of the offence, is deprived of his liberty and in some cases even his life. The object of the criminal law is to punish an offender who commits an offence against a person, property or the State for which the accused, on proof of the offence, is deprived of his liberty and in some cases even his life. This does not, however, affect the civil remedies at all for suing the wrongdoer in cases like arson, accidents, etc. It is an anathema to suppose that when a civil remedy is available, a criminal prosecution is completely barred. The two types of actions are quite different in content, scope and import. It is not at all intelligible to us to take the stand that if the husband dishonestly misappropriates the stridhan property of his wife, though kept in his custody, that would bar prosecution under Section 406 IPC or render the ingredients of Section 405 IPC nugatory or abortive. To say that because the stridhan of a married woman is kept in the custody of her husband, no action against him can be taken as no offence is committed is to override and distort the real intent of the law." 10. In Rajesh Bajaj v. State (NCT of Delhi) this Court observed: (SCC p. 263, paras 10-12) "10. It may be that the facts narrated in the present complaint would as well reveal a commercial transaction or money transaction. But that is hardly a reason for holding that the offence of cheating would elude from such a transaction. In fact, many a cheatings were committed in the course of commercial and also money transactions. One of the illustrations set out under Section 415 of the Penal Code, 1860 [Illustration f is worthy of notice now: '(f) A intentionally deceives Z into a belief that A means to repay any money that Z may lend to him and thereby dishonestly induces Z to lend him money, A not intending to repay it. A cheats.' 17. From the above dictum laid down by the Apex Court, this Court and the other High Courts, it is clear that the proceedings under the Act 2005 is civil in nature. It provides a civil remedy to victims of domestic violence as against the remedy in criminal law which is provided in Section 498A IPC. A cheats.' 17. From the above dictum laid down by the Apex Court, this Court and the other High Courts, it is clear that the proceedings under the Act 2005 is civil in nature. It provides a civil remedy to victims of domestic violence as against the remedy in criminal law which is provided in Section 498A IPC. Therefore, prima facie I am of the opinion that, even if a petition filed under the provisions of Act 2005 alleging domestic violence is rejected, that is not a reason to terminate the criminal prosecution initiated under Section 498A IPC. Moreover, I am of the considered opinion that, Sections 40 to 44 of the Indian Evidence Act are also not attracted for accepting the orders passed by the Magistrate Court under the provisions of Act 2005 to quash criminal prosecution under Section 498A IPC. There may be similarities in the definitions of 'domestic violence' mentioned in Act 2005 and 'cruelty' mentioned in Section 498A IPC. But, that is not a reason to accept the findings of the Magistrate Court in a proceedings initiated under Act 2005 to quash a criminal proceeding under Section 498A IPC. Both are different and the reliefs that can be given in both those proceedings are different. One is to protect the women against domestic violence and the other is to prosecute the accused if there is any cruelty as alleged in Section 498A IPC. Therefore, the findings by the Magistrate Court in a proceedings under the provisions of Act 2005 is not binding or acceptable as a ground to quash a criminal proceedings under Section 498A IPC. 18. Moreover, the above stand is justified in the light of Section 26 of the Act 2005. Section 26 of the Act 2005 is extracted hereunder: Relief in other suits and legal proceedings.— (1) Any relief available under sections 18, 19, 20, 21 and 22 may also be sought in any legal proceeding, before a civil court, family court or a criminal court, affecting the aggrieved person and the respondent whether such proceeding was initiated before or after the commencement of this Act. (2) Any relief referred to in sub-section (1) may be sought for in addition to and along with any other relief that the aggrieved person may seek in such suit or legal proceeding before a civil or criminal court. (2) Any relief referred to in sub-section (1) may be sought for in addition to and along with any other relief that the aggrieved person may seek in such suit or legal proceeding before a civil or criminal court. (3) In case any relief has been obtained by the aggrieved person in any proceedings other than a proceeding under this Act, she shall be bound to inform the Magistrate of the grant of such relief.’ 19. Section 26(1) says that, any relief available under sections 18, 19, 20, 21 and 22 may also be sought in any legal proceeding, before a civil court, family court or a criminal court, affecting the aggrieved person and the respondent whether such proceeding was initiated before or after the commencement of this Act. Sub Section (2) of Section 26 says that, any relief referred to in sub-section (1) may be sought for in addition to and along with any other relief that the aggrieved person may seek in such suit or legal proceeding before a civil or criminal court. Therefore, the reliefs sought as per Act 2005 is not a bar to initiate proceedings before the civil and criminal Court with the same reliefs. The counsel appearing for the petitioner relied paragraph 26 of the apex court judgment in Juveria Abdul Majid Patni v Atif Iqbal Mansoori and another ( 2014 SCC 736 ) and submitted that the criminal proceedings can be quashed when there is an order to the effect that, there is no domestic violence. I cannot agree with him. This court perused the finding in paragraph 26 of the above judgment. No such dictum is laid down by the apex court in the above case. 20. The upshot of the above discussion is that the findings in Annexure-III by the Judicial First Class Magistrate Court, Chalakkudy in a petition under Section 12 of the Act 2005 is not a ground to quash a criminal proceedings initiated under Section 498A IPC. Annexure-VI is the final report filed by the police against the petitioner. The petitioner cannot rely on Annexure-III order to quash the criminal proceedings. Therefore, there is no merit in this case. Hence, this Criminal Miscellaneous Case is dismissed.