ORDER : This Criminal Miscellaneous Case has been filed under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (‘Cr.P.C’ for short), challenging Annexure A3 order in Crl.R.P.No.10/2019 on the files of the Additions Sessions Judge, Thiruvananthapuram, and Annexure A2 order in M.C.No.77/2010, on the files of the Judicial First Class Magistrate, Attingal. 2. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned Public Prosecutor in detail. Perused the relevant documents, including Annexures-A3 and A2. 3. Coming to the facts of this case, the 1st respondent herein as petitioner filed M.C.No.77/2010 before the Judicial First Class Magistrate Court-I, Attingal, claiming reliefs under Section 3(2) of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986 (`Act, 1986’ for short). It was contended by the 1st respondent before the trial court that the petitioner herein married her on 03.11.2002 as per the Muslim religious rites and customs and a female child also was born to them. While so, on 08.02.2019, the petitioner herein pronounced talaq. On completion of talaq, she observed iddat from 08.02.2010 till 08.05.2010. Though talaq was pronounced, the petitioner herein failed to provide the reasonable and fair maintenance entitled to her and also did not return gold and other valuables of the 1st respondent. Accordingly, she sought the same. 4. The petition before the trial court was opposed by the revision petitioner contending that the 1st respondent herein is not entitled to the reliefs sought for. 5. The learned Magistrate appraised the contention by recording evidence. The 1st respondent got examined as PW1 and one witness examined as PW2. The revision petitioner got examined as DW1 and Exts.D1 and D2 were marked on his side. On appreciation of the evidence, the learned Magistrate passed the following order: “Based on the findings on Point No.1 to 3 it is found that the petitioner is entitled for the maintenance for the iddat period, entitled for the fair and reasonable provision and also entitled to realize her assets with the respondent. In the result petition is allowed. The respondent is ordered to pay Rs.30,000/-as maintenance to the petitioner for the iddat period. The respondent has been ordered to pay Rs.9,00,000/-as reasonable and fair provision to the petitioner. It is also ordered to pay an amount of Rs.2,30,000/-to the petitioner being the value of Rado watch and the Acharam amount. In the result petition is allowed. The respondent is ordered to pay Rs.30,000/-as maintenance to the petitioner for the iddat period. The respondent has been ordered to pay Rs.9,00,000/-as reasonable and fair provision to the petitioner. It is also ordered to pay an amount of Rs.2,30,000/-to the petitioner being the value of Rado watch and the Acharam amount. The petitioner is further directed to pay the ordered amounts within 90 days from the date of this order. While considering the nature of the petition, there is no order as to costs.” 6. Crl.R.P.No.10/2019 was filed by the petitioner herein before the Sessions Court, Thiruvananthapuram, and as per order dated 31.08.2022, the learned Additional Sessions Judge, on re-appreciation of the evidence, modified the order as under: “In the result, the Criminal Revision Petition is allowed to partly set aside the impugned order dated 30.11.2018 in MC 77/2010 on the file of Judicial First Class Magistrate-I, Attingal and it is ordered as follows:- “(i) The respondent/revision petitioner do pay an amount of Rs.30,000/-(Thirty Thousand only) to the original petitioner as maintenance for the `iddath’ period together with a simple interest @ 6% per annum from the date of filing of the Crl.M.C to the date of realization of that amount. (ii) The respondent/revision petitioner do pay an amount of Rs.9,00,000/-(Nine Lakhs) as a reasonable and fair provision to the original petitioner together with a simple interest @ 6% per annum from the date of filing of Crl.M.C to the date of realisation of that amount. (iii) That relief granted by the trial court to direct the respondent/revision petitioner to pay an amount of Rs.2,30,000/- to the petitioner under the head of `Acharam’ and `price of Rado watch’ is hereby set aside and that claim in the Crl.M.C is disallowed. (iv) The revision petitioner/respondent is directed to pay the amounts in Relief No.1 and 2 to the original petitioner within a period of two months from the date of this order without fail.” 7. Going by the calculation made by the learned Magistrate, considering the age of the 1st respondent as 44 years and taking note of the life span of a woman as per the Kerala Government standards as 77, maintenance for 15 years was granted calculating the same @ Rs.60,000/- per year. Going by the calculation made by the learned Magistrate, considering the age of the 1st respondent as 44 years and taking note of the life span of a woman as per the Kerala Government standards as 77, maintenance for 15 years was granted calculating the same @ Rs.60,000/- per year. The revisional court also taken note of the fact that the life span of woman in Kerala as 75-80 years. 8. The learned counsel for the petitioner placed decision of this Court reported in [ 2009(2) KHC 1009 : 2009 (3) KLT 37 : ILR 2009 (3) Ker. 106], Seenath v. Iqbal and Anr., to point out what are the factors to be considered by the trial court while fixing reasonable and fair provision for maintenance to be paid to a divorced woman under the Act, 1986, where this Court considered a case when a divorced woman approached the Trial Court seeking fair and reasonable provision and maintenance and other customary dues as mandated by S.3 of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986. The respondent, however, contended that he had already returned the entire ornaments and cash taken from the petitioner and that there was an agreement evidencing the payment so made. Accepting the contentions of the respondent husband, the Magistrate rejected the petition. Aggrieved, the criminal revision petition was preferred by the divorced Muslim woman. 9. Finally this Court allowed the criminal revision petition and held as under: “It is trite that the Court, while fixing reasonable and fair provision and maintenance to be paid to the divorced woman shall keep in view the status of the parties, capacity and ability of the former husband to pay maintenance and all such other attendant circumstances. There is no provision in Act, 1986 which is pari materia to S.127(3)(b) of the Code. But the purpose behind giving absolution of the obligation to pay maintenance is only to avoid giving double benefit to the divorced woman. But at the same time, Courts have to keep in view the legislative and social intent and purpose while dealing with an application by an `ill used’ wife or a `castaway exwife’ as observed by the Apex Court. The provisions contained in Act 1986 in no uncertain terms mandate that a divorced Muslim woman should be provided with fair and reasonable provision and maintenance by her former husband. The provisions contained in Act 1986 in no uncertain terms mandate that a divorced Muslim woman should be provided with fair and reasonable provision and maintenance by her former husband. He shall also pay maintenance during `iddat’ period, Mahar, etc. and shall return the other properties given to her at the time of marriage or after her marriage by her relatives or friends or the husband or any relatives of the husband or his friends. There is no escape route for the former husband to extricate himself out of the statutory liability by taking recourse to a precious plea that he had paid the `customary dues’ to his former wife. The Court must find out whether the divorced woman had in fact received reasonable and fair provision and maintenance apart from other dues paid as postulated under S.3 of the Act. It must be ensured that the dues paid are in consonance and harmony with the statutory obligation cast on the former husband in terms of its real money value. The payment must be such that it takes care of the future needs of the woman in the prevailing socio economic scenario. The words `reasonable and fair provision and maintenance’ shall not be rendered illusory or meaningless.” 10. In the decision reported in [2022 KHC 918 : 2022 KHC OnLine 918 : 2022 (6) KLT 581 ], Suhadath K.K v. Shihab K.B, this Court held as under: “It is trite that the court while fixing the reasonable and fair provision of maintenance to be paid to a divorced woman shall keep in view the status of parties, capacity of the former husband to pay maintenance and also other attendant circumstances. The amount so fixed must be enough to take care of the future needs of a woman in the prevailing socio-economic scenario. It has come out in evidence that the petitioner is a well qualified lady. She possesses M.Sc Degree in Chemistry, M.Tech in Industrial Catalysis and B.Ed in Physical Science. She was enrolled as a junior research fellow at CUSAT and also selected for a project work at Baba Atomic Research Centre, Mumbai during 2008-2009. It has further come out in evidence that her father is a reputed B class contractor of Public Works Department and brother and sisters are well settled. The 1st respondent was working as a lab technician in Red Crescent Workers’ Health Centre, Sanayya, Doha. It has further come out in evidence that her father is a reputed B class contractor of Public Works Department and brother and sisters are well settled. The 1st respondent was working as a lab technician in Red Crescent Workers’ Health Centre, Sanayya, Doha. His father is a construction contractor and a political leader. It has come out in evidence that both the petitioner and the 1st respondent are hailing from very financially well settled families and their standard of living was very high. It has also come out in evidence that the petitioner along with her child had stayed at Doha along with the 1st respondent. The petitioner specifically alleged in the petition that the 1st respondent was working as the lab technician at Red Crescent Workers’ Health Centre, Doha and drawing a salary of Rs.2,00,000/-. She gave oral evidence also to that effect. She specifically deposed that in May, 2012, the 1st respondent had shown the salary certificate to her which he had brought home to apply for family status visa. In cross-examination, she specifically stated that the salary certificate contained the signature of the authorized person of the Red Crescent Workers’ Health Centre. The learned Magistrate relied on the said evidence of PW1. It must be noted that as against the positive evidence of the petitioner, no rebuttal evidence was given by the 1st respondent. The 1st respondent even did not enter into the box. Instead, his father and power of attorney holder who had no direct knowledge about his job and income gave evidence. No salary certificate was produced. Thus, based on the materials on record, the learned Magistrate concluded that the case of the petitioner that the 1st respondent was drawing a salary of Rs.2,00,000/-was only to be accepted and the said amount was reckoned for quantifying the amount towards fair and reasonable compensation u/s 3 of the Act of 1986. The learned Magistrate also found that the petitioner and her child require at least Rs.33,000/-per month for their livelihood. The said amount was arrived by the learned Magistrate on a rational basis. The petitioner is very young. The court below while quantifying the reasonable and fair provision for future maintenance has taken 8 years as the multiplier. It appears to be absolutely reasonable. The said amount was arrived by the learned Magistrate on a rational basis. The petitioner is very young. The court below while quantifying the reasonable and fair provision for future maintenance has taken 8 years as the multiplier. It appears to be absolutely reasonable. This Court applied the principle of 5 years purchase value for fixing the quantum payable under the head “reasonable and fair provision of maintenance”. However, thereafter, in Kunhi Mohammed v. A.P.Sajitha, [2013 KHC 786] and another, this Court held that 5 years multiplier was fixed in Ahammed v. Aysha, [1990 KHC 41] as early as in 1990 and it was high time to increase the multiplier by the passage of time. Accordingly, ten years purchase value was adopted. The said finding was arrived at observing that fall of money value has to be taken into consideration while fixing the reasonable and fair provision of maintenance. The learned Magistrate has taken only eight year as multiplier in this case. The learned Magistrate has given a well reasoned order and fixed Rs.31,68,000/-as fair and reasonable compensation.” 11. Similarly decision reported in [ 2014 (2) KLT 780 ], Moideen v. Nusaiba, dealing with the same issue has been placed by the learned counsel for the revision petitioner, where this Court held in paragraph 11 as under: “The most relevant consideration provided in the aforesaid Act was that the husband is required to make fair provision and maintenance to his wife within a time limit that is to be done within iddat period. If it is explained in other way the divorced wife is entitled to have a reasonable and fair provision and maintenance to be made and paid within `iddat’ period by her former husband. Therefore, two propositions can be laid down from the aforesaid Section, (a) a fair and reasonable amount of maintenance has to be provided by the husband to the wife during iddat period, (b) fair and reasonable provision is to be made by the husband during iddat period for the divorced wife, after the period of `iddat’ till she is re-married. Therefore, it is clear that if the divorce not come into force during iddat period, the husband has the duty to maintain his wife during `iddat’ period. The second thing is the benefit of divorced wife after the period of iddat. 12. Therefore, it is clear that if the divorce not come into force during iddat period, the husband has the duty to maintain his wife during `iddat’ period. The second thing is the benefit of divorced wife after the period of iddat. 12. Similarly decision of the Apex Court reported in [2024 KLT OnLine 1813 (SC)] : 2024(4) KLT SN 33 (C.No.23) SC : 2024 INSC 506 ], Mohd. Abdul Samad v. State of Telangana also has been placed where the Apex Court held that insofar as divorced Muslim women are concerned, (i) Section 125 of the Cr.P.C applies to all such Muslim women, married and divorced under the Special Marriage Act in addition to remedies available under the Special Marriage Act. If Muslim women are married and divorced under Muslim law then Section 125 of the Cr.P.C as well as the provisions of the 1986 Act are applicable. Option lies with the Muslim divorced women to seek remedy under either of the two laws or both laws. This is because the 1986 Act is not in derogation of Section 125 of the Cr.P.C but in addition to the said provision. If Section 125 of the Cr.P.C is also resorted to by a divorced Muslim woman, as per the definition under the 1986 Act, then any order passed under the provisions of 1986 Act shall be taken into consideration under Section 127(3)(b) of the CrPC. The 1986 Act could be resorted to by a divorced Muslim woman, as defined under the said Act, by filing an application thereunder which could be disposed of in accordance with the said enactment. In case of an illegal divorce as per the provisions of the 2019 Act then, relief under Section 5 of the said Act could be availed for seeking subsistence allowance or, at the option of such a Muslim woman, remedy under Section 125 of the CrPC could also be availed. If during the pendency of a petition filed under Section 125 of the Cr.P.C, a Muslim woman is `divorced’ then she can take recourse under Section 125 of the Cr.P.C or file a petition under the 2019 Act. 13. Now the questions pose for consideration are: (1) What is the period for which a divorced Muslim wife is entitled to get reasonable and fair provision and maintenance ? 13. Now the questions pose for consideration are: (1) What is the period for which a divorced Muslim wife is entitled to get reasonable and fair provision and maintenance ? (2) What are the essentials to be considered while granting a reasonable and fair provision and maintenance? (3) What is the basis on which reasonable and fair provision and maintenance to be calculated in terms of Section 3 of the Act, 1986 ? 14. In this connection it is relevant to refer Section 3 of the Act, 1986 as under: “3. Mahr or other properties of Muslim woman to be given to her at the time of divorce:-- (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, a divorced woman shall be entitled to-- (a) a reasonable and fair provision and maintenance to be made and paid to her within the iddat period by her former husband. (b) where she herself maintains the children born to her before or after her divorce, a reasonable and fair provision and maintenance to be made and paid by her former husband for a period of two years from the respective dates of birth of such children; (c) an amount equal to the sum of mahr or dower agreed to be paid to her at the time of her marriage or at any time thereafter according to Muslim law; and (d) all the properties given to her before or at the time of marriage or after the marriage by her relatives or friends or the husband or any relatives of the husband or his friends. (2) Where a reasonable and fair provision and maintenance or the amount of mahr or dower due has not been made or paid or the properties referred to in clause (d) of sub-section (1) have not been delivered to a divorced woman on her divorce, she or any one duly authorised by her may, on her behalf, make an application to a Magistrate for an order for payment of such provision and maintenance, mahr or dower or the delivery of properties, as the case may be. (3) Where an application has been made under subsection (2) by a divorced woman, the Magistrate may, if he is satisfied that -- (a) her husband having sufficient means, has failed or neglected to make or pay her within the iddat period a reasonable and fair provision and maintenance for her and the children; or (b) the amount equal to the sum of mahr or dower has not been paid or that the properties referred to in clause (d) of sub-section (1) have not been delivered to her. make an order, within one month of the date of the filing of the application, directing her former husband to pay such reasonable and fair provision and maintenance to the divorced woman as he may determine as fit and proper having regard to the needs of the divorced woman, the standard of life enjoyed by her during her marriage and the means of her former husband or, as the case may be, for the payment of such mahr or dower or the delivery of such properties referred to in clause (d) of sub-section (1) to the divorced woman: Provided that if the Magistrate finds it impracticable to dispose of the application within the said period, he may, for reasons to be recorded by him, dispose of the application after the said period. (4) If any person against whom an order has been made under sub-section (3) fails without sufficient cause to comply with the order, the Magistrate may issue a warrant for levying the amount of maintenance or mahr or dower due in the manner provided for levying fines under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) and may sentence such person, for the whole or part of any amount remaining unpaid after the execution of the warrant, to imprisonment for a term which may extend to one year or until payment if sooner made, subject to such person being heard in defence and the said sentence being imposed according to the provisions of the said Code.” 15. Going by the statutory provisions, Section 3(1)(a) provides that a reasonable and fair provision and maintenance to be made and paid to her within the iddat period by her former husband and Section 3(1)(b) provides that where she herself maintains the children born to her before or after her divorce, a reasonable and fair provision and maintenance to be made and paid by her former husband for a period of two years from the respective date of birth of such children. 16. In Mohd. Ahmed Khan v. Shah Bano Begum and others [1985 KLT OnLine 1235(SC) : (1985) 2 SCC 556 : 1985 SCC (Cri) 245], the Apex Court held that, if the divorced wife is unable to maintain herself before the iddat period, the husband should provide her maintenance . But when she is unable to maintain herself after the period of iddat, she is entitled to seek remedy under Section 125 of Cr.P.C. Similarly when the divorced wife herself maintains the children born to her before or after her divorce, a reasonable and fair provision and maintenance to be made and paid by her former husband for a period of two years from the respective dates of birth of such children in terms of Section 3(1) of Act, 1986. But later in the decision reported in [ 2001 (3) KLT 651 (SC) : (2001) 7 SCC 740 : (2007) 3 SCC (Cri) 266], Danial Latifi v. Union of India, the Apex Court considered the impact of the Act, 1986 and concluded the legal position in paragraph 36 as under: “21. It is imperative to acknowledge that the enactment of the Family Courts Act, 1984 (hereinafter referred to as “FCA 1984”) had excluded the jurisdiction of a Magistrate under Chapter IX of Cr.P.C 1973, of which Section 125 is a part, wherein a Family Court had been established for the concerned area or jurisdiction. After the enactment of FCA 1984, a situation arose where a divorced Muslim woman moved a Family Court under Section 125 of CrPC 1973, and a similar circumstance was dealt in Shamima Farooqui v. Shahid Khan (2015(2) KLT SN 78 (C.No.89) SC : (2015) 5 SCC 705 ] in light of the question of law at hand. After the enactment of FCA 1984, a situation arose where a divorced Muslim woman moved a Family Court under Section 125 of CrPC 1973, and a similar circumstance was dealt in Shamima Farooqui v. Shahid Khan (2015(2) KLT SN 78 (C.No.89) SC : (2015) 5 SCC 705 ] in light of the question of law at hand. Herein, while relying on the earlier mentioned judgments of this Court, it observed that the concerned Family Court had rightly, and without a shadow of a doubt, held that Section 125 of CrPC 1973 would be applicable. The relevant paragraph number 09 is reproduced below: “9. First of all, we intend to deal with the applicability of Section 125 CrPC to a Muslim woman who has been divorced. In Shamim Bano v. Asraf Khan (2014 (2) KLT SN 56 (C.No.74) SC : (2014) 12 SCC 636 : (2014) 5 SCC (Civ) 145 : (2014) 5 SCC (Cri) 162, this Court after referring to the Constitution Bench decisions in Danial Latifi v. Union of India ( 2001 (3) KLT 651 (SC) : (2001) 7 SCC 740 : (2007) 3 SCC (Cri) 266) and Khatoon Nisa v. State of U.P (Khatoon Nisa v. State of U.P, [2002 (2) KLT OnLine 1046 (SC) : (2014) 12 SCC 646 : (2014) 5 SCC (Civ) 155 : (2014) 5 SCC (Cri) 170) had opined as follows: (Shamim Bano case (2014 (2) KLT SN 56 (C.No.74) SC : (2014) 12 SCC 636 : (2014) 5 SCC (Civ) 145 : (2014) 5 SCC (Cri) 162), SCC p.644, paras 13-14) “13. The aforesaid principle clearly lays down that even after an application has been filed under the provisions of the Act, the Magistrate under the Act has the power to grant maintenance in favour of a divorced Muslim woman and the parameters and the considerations are the same as stipulated in Section 125 of the Code. The aforesaid principle clearly lays down that even after an application has been filed under the provisions of the Act, the Magistrate under the Act has the power to grant maintenance in favour of a divorced Muslim woman and the parameters and the considerations are the same as stipulated in Section 125 of the Code. We may note that while taking note of the factual score to the effect that the plea of divorce was not accepted by the Magistrate which was upheld by the High Court, the Constitution Bench ( 2001 (3) KLT 651 (SC) : (2001) 7 SCC 740 : (2007) 3 SCC (Cri) 266) opined that as the Magistrate could exercise power under Section 125 of the Code for grant of maintenance in favour of a divorced Muslim woman under the Act, the order did not warrant any interference. Thus, the emphasis was laid on the retention of the power by the Magistrate under Section 125 of the Code and the effect of ultimate consequence. 14. Slightly recently, in Shabana Bano v. Imran Khan (2009 (4) KLT SN 102 (C.No.100) SC : (2010) 1 SCC 666 : (2010) 1 SCC (Civ) 216 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 873), a two-Judge Bench, placing reliance on Danial Latifi ( 2001 (3) KLT 651 (SC) : (2001) 7 SCC 740 : (2007) 3 SCC (Cri) 266), has ruled that : (Shabana Bano case (2009 (4) KLT SN 102 (C.No.100) SC : (2010) 1 SCC 666 : (2010) 1 SCC (Civ) 216 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 873, SCC p.672, para.21) “21. The appellant’s petition under Section 125 CrPC would be maintainable before the Family Court as long as the appellant does not remarry. The amount of maintenance to be awarded under Section 125 CrPC cannot be restricted for the iddat period only.’ Though the aforesaid decision was rendered interpreting Section 7 of the Family Courts Act, 1984, yet the principle stated therein would be applicable, for the same is in consonance with the principle stated by the Constitution Bench in Khatoon Nisa (Khatoon Nisa v. State of U.P., 2002 (2) KLT OnLine 1046 (SC) :(2014) 12 SCC 646 : (2014) 5 SCC (Civ) 155 : (2014) 5 SCC (Cri) 170).’ In view of the aforesaid dictum, there can be no shadow of doubt that Section 125 CrPC has been rightly held to be applicable by the learned Family Judge.” 17. In the decision in Mohd. Abdul Samad’s case (supra), the Apex Court held that apart from the option of filing petition under Section 3 of the Act, 1986, there is a discretion available to a divorced Muslim wife to opt for remedy under Section 125 of Cr.P.C as well. Thus it appears that even though as per Section 3(1)(a) of the Act, 1986, reasonable and fair provision and maintenance to be paid to the divorced wife was provided within the iddat period by her former husband, in view of the decision of the Apex Court in Danial Latifi’s case (supra), the said amount shall stand extended beyond the iddat period in terms of Section 3(1)(a) of the Act. Therefore, a Muslim divorced woman is entitled to get reasonable and fair provision and maintenance for her future not only during the iddat period, but would extend beyond the iddat period till she re-marries and the same is not confined to the iddat period alone. The first question answered thus. 18. Coming to the second question, it has been consistently held that while fixing reasonable and fair provision and maintenance to be paid to the divorced woman, the Court shall keep in view the status of the parties, capacity and ability of the former husband to pay maintenance and all such other attendant circumstances. The provisions contained in Act 1986 in no uncertain terms mandate that a divorced Muslim woman should be provided with fair and reasonable provision and maintenance by her former husband. He shall also pay maintenance during `iddat’ period, Mahar, etc. and shall return the other properties given to her at the time of marriage or after her marriage by her relatives or friends or the husband or any relatives of the husband or his friends. There is no escape route for the former husband to extricate himself out of the statutory liability by taking recourse to a precious plea that he had paid the `customary dues’ to his former wife . The payment must be such that it takes care of the future needs of the woman in the prevailing socio economic scenario. The words `reasonable and fair provision and maintenance’ shall not be rendered illusory or meaningless. 19. The payment must be such that it takes care of the future needs of the woman in the prevailing socio economic scenario. The words `reasonable and fair provision and maintenance’ shall not be rendered illusory or meaningless. 19. In fact, reasonable and fair provision and maintenance entitled by Section 3(1)(a) of the Act, 1986, is nothing but the amount required for the divorced wife to maintain herself, in juxtaposition with the status of the parties’ capacity, income, assets, ability of the former husband and the entire attendant circumstances. Similarly, when the divorced wife herself maintains the children born to her before or after her divorce also, the said amount is entitled to by the divorced wife for the welfare of the children from the respective birth date of such children in terms of Section 3(1) of Act, 1986. The second question is answered thus. 20. Adverting to the third question, there is no straitjacket formula available either in the statutory provision or by other means to lock in a methodology to work out reasonable and fair provision and maintenance. 21. In this connection calculation assumes significance. In the decision reported in [ 2017 (5) KHC 350 ], National Insurance Company Ltd. v. Pranay Sethi & Ors., a Constitutional Bench of the Apex Court, while dealing with the multiplier to be applied for calculating loss of income, approved the multiplier fixed by the Apex Court in the decision in Sarla Verma v. Delhi Tranport Corporation, [ 2009 (6) SCC 121 ]. In Sarla Verma’s case (supra), after discussing the schedule of multiplier attached under Section 163A of the Motor Vehicles Act (prior to the amendment) along with the multiplier fixed by the Apex Court in other cases and held in paragraph 21 as under: “21. In Sarla Verma’s case (supra), after discussing the schedule of multiplier attached under Section 163A of the Motor Vehicles Act (prior to the amendment) along with the multiplier fixed by the Apex Court in other cases and held in paragraph 21 as under: “21. We therefore hold that the multiplier to be used should be as mentioned in column (4) of the Table above (prepared by applying Susamma Thomas, Trilok Chandra and Charlie), which starts with an operative multiplier of 18 (for the age groups of 15 to 20 and 21 to 25 years), reduced by one unit for every five years, that is M-17 for 26 to 30 years, M-16 for 31 to 35 years, M-15 for 36 to 40 years, M-14 for 41 to 45 years, and M-13 for 46 to 50 years, then reduced by two units for every five years, that is, M-11 for 51 to 55 years, M-9 for 56 to 60 years, M-7 for 61 to 65 years and M-5 for 66 to 70 years.” 22. Since Act, 1986 doesn’t provide how reasonable and fair provision and maintenance to be calculated, in order to fill up the legislative vacuum, till the legislature makes the calculation procedure with certainty by prescription, I am of the view that the multiplier to calculate loss of income in motor accident cases fixed in Sarla Verma’s case (supra) followed by the Constitution Bench decision in Pranay Sethi’s case (supra) can be followed as a guideline, while fixing the reasonable and fair provision and maintenance under Section 3(1)(a) of the Act, 1986 after fixing the monthly sum entitled by the divorced wife in accordance with the status, capacity, income, assets and ability of the former husband and other attendant circumstances. The multiplier is as under: Age of the deceased Multiplier scale in Trilok Chandra as clarified in Charlie Upto 15 yrs 15 to 20 yrs. 18 21 to 25 yrs. 18 26 to 30 yrs. 17 31 to 35 yrs. 16 36 to 40 yrs. 15 41 to 45 yrs. 14 46 to 50 yrs. 13 51 to 55 yrs. 11 56 to 60 yrs. 09 61 to 65 yrs. 07 Above 65 yrs. 05 23. 18 21 to 25 yrs. 18 26 to 30 yrs. 17 31 to 35 yrs. 16 36 to 40 yrs. 15 41 to 45 yrs. 14 46 to 50 yrs. 13 51 to 55 yrs. 11 56 to 60 yrs. 09 61 to 65 yrs. 07 Above 65 yrs. 05 23. Coming to the facts of the case, the trial court as well as the appellate court in consideration of the status of the revision petitioner herein Rs.5,000/-has been fixed as the monthly income and thereby the monthly income @ Rs.5,000/-for a period of 15 years was granted towards the reasonable and fair provision and maintenance and accordingly the same was arrived at Rs.9 lakh. 24. In so far as the grant of Rs.30,000/-towards maintenance for the iddat period and the relief granted directing the revision petitioner to pay an amount of Rs.2,30,000/-under the head `Acharam amount and the value of the Rado watch’, no challenge was raised by the learned counsel for the revision petitioner. Therefore, I am not inclined to revisit the same. 25. The trial court as well as the appellate court fixed monthly income @ Rs.5,000/-for calculating reasonable and fair provision and maintenance. In the instant case, no documentary evidence let in by the petitioner to see what actually is the income, capacity etc. of the former husband to pay Rs.5,000/-per month as reasonable and fair provision and maintenance to the 1st respondent and accordingly the trial court as well as the appellate court fixed the same. In consideration of the above fact, I am of the view that the monthly income fixed by the trial court as well as the revisional court can be reduced to Rs.4,500/-per month and the amount under the head `reasonable and fair provision and maintenance’ can be calculated accordingly. Regarding the multiplier, the trial court as well as the appellate court practically applied the multiplier of 15 holding 15 years as the life expectancy of the 1st respondent/original petitioner. But applying the multiplier as stated above, the same in the case of the 1st respondent herein is 14 since her age is 44 years (14 is the multiplier for the age group between 41-45). Thus the amount under the head reasonable and fair provision and maintenance is recalculated as under: 4500 X 12 X 14 = Rs.7,56,000/-. But applying the multiplier as stated above, the same in the case of the 1st respondent herein is 14 since her age is 44 years (14 is the multiplier for the age group between 41-45). Thus the amount under the head reasonable and fair provision and maintenance is recalculated as under: 4500 X 12 X 14 = Rs.7,56,000/-. Accordingly, the relief granted by the trial court and confirmed by the appellate court in regard to reasonable and fair provision and maintenance is reduced from Rs.9 lakh to Rs.7,56,000/-(Rupees Seven lakh fifty six thousand only) along with the interest granted by the revisional court, while confirming the other reliefs granted by the revisional court. Accordingly, this Crl.M.C stands allowed in part, as indicated above.