JUDGMENT : VIMAL K. VYAS, J. 1. Pursuant to the order passed by this Court dated 3rd April 2024, the present appeal has been taken up for final hearing. 2. This Court, while passing the aforesaid order, has considered the fact that the appellant-accused has already undergone 9 years and 8 months of incarceration. 3. The present appeal under Section 374(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short, the ‘Cr.P.C.’) is at the instance of the appellant-accused and is directed against the judgment and order of conviction and sentence dated 7th January 2016 passed by the learned Additional Session Judge, Patan, in Sessions Case No. 83 of 2014, whereby the learned Sessions Judge has convicted the appellant-accused for the offences punishable under Sections 302, 323 and 498A of the Indian Penal Code, 1809 (for short, the ‘IPC’). 4. By the aforesaid judgment and order, the learned Sessions Judge found the appellant-accused guilty of the offence under Section 302 of the IPC and consequently sentenced him to suffer life imprisonment and to pay a fine of Rs. 1,000=00. The learned Sessions Judge also found the appellant-accused guilty of the offence under Section 323 of the IPC and consequently sentenced him to suffer rigorous imprisonment for 1 year and to pay a fine of Rs. 500=00. The learned Sessions Judge also found the appellant-accused guilty of the offence under Section 498A of the IPC and consequently sentenced him to suffer rigorous imprisonment for 3 years and to pay a fine of Rs. 1,000=00 and in default of payment of fine, the appellant-accused was directed to undergo further simple imprisonment for one month. CASE OF THE PROSECUTION: 5. The brief facts of the case of the prosecution as emerges from the record can be summarised as under: 5.1. That the accused and the deceased Bhavanaben were husband and wife and they got married 4 years prior to the incident and from the wedlock they had a son named Meet aged about 11 months at the time of the incident. 5.2. It is the case of the prosecution that the accused used to raise doubt over the chastity of the deceased and often used to beat her. 5.2. It is the case of the prosecution that the accused used to raise doubt over the chastity of the deceased and often used to beat her. On 21st March 2014 at around 9:00 a.m., when the deceased was preparing a tea, the accused had beaten her with kick and fist blows and thereafter poured kerosene on her from a primus and a plastic can, and by lighting a matchstick, set her ablaze. She was immediately rushed to the Government hospital, Siddhpur, and after giving primary treatment, she was referred to the Civil Hospital, Mehsana, where her complaint was registered by the PSI, Kakoshi Police Station. 6. From the strength of the complaint lodged by the deceased Bhavnaben, the offence was registered vide I-CR No. 19 of 2014 at the Kakoshi Police Station and the investigation was carried out. During the investigation, the scene of offence panchnama, inquest panchnama, etc. were drawn in presence of the panchas and the statements of the witnesses, conversant with the incident, were recorded. 7. The appellant-accused was arrested on 7th April 2014. The documentary evidence in the nature of postmortem report, FSL report, etc. were collected. On completion of the investigation, chart-sheet came to be filed before the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Siddhpur, under Sections 302, 323, 498A of the Indian Penal Code. As the offence was exclusively triable by the Sessions Court, the case was committed to the Sessions Court, Patan, which was registered as Sessions Case No. 83 of 2014. The learned Additional Session Judge framed the Charge at Exh.4 against the accused. The charge was read over and explained to the accused. The accused pleaded not guilty to the charge and claimed to be tried. 8. The learned Additional Session Judge framed the Charge at Exh.4 against the accused. The charge was read over and explained to the accused. The accused pleaded not guilty to the charge and claimed to be tried. 8. To bring home the charge against the accused, the prosecution produced the following oral evidence: ORAL EVIDENCE: WITNESS NAME EXHIBIT 01 Chamanji Tejaji - Panch - Scene of Offence 07 02 Rameshbhai Amratbhai - Panch - Scene of Offence 09 03 Amratbhai Bababhai - Panch 10 04 Savitaben Bharatbhai - Panch 13 05 Vasantbhai Dungarbhai - Father of the deceased 14 06 Hansaben Vasantbhai - Mother of the deceased 15 07 Soniben Ishwarbhai Chauhan - Witness 16 08 Jashinben Vastabhai - Witness 17 09 Kamabhai Hamirbhai - Witness 18 10 Somabhai Hamirbhai - Witness 19 11 Ishwarbhai Hamirbhai - Witness 20 12 Dashrathbhai Bhikhabhai Chauhan - Witness 21 13 Viththalbhai Dhanabhai Chauhan - Witness 22 14 Dipakkumar Dharamshibhai Chauhan - Witness 23 15 Manjulaben Dharamshibhai Chauhan - Witness 24 16 Ramilaben Parsottambhai Chauhan - Witness 25 17 Dr. Hasit Patel - Medical Officer, Siddhpur 26 18 Dr. Girish Zala - Medical Officer, Mehsana 28 19 Dr. Dilip Thakkar, who carried out the postmortem 31 20 Jigneshkumar V. Jani - Executive Magistrate 36 21 Kiritkumar J. Modh - Deputy Mamlatdar 39 22 Jujarsinh B. Chavda - P.S.O. 42 23 J.B. Acharya - IO/PSI 44 9. The prosecution also adduced the following documentary evidence: DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE: S. NO. Girish Zala - Medical Officer, Mehsana 28 19 Dr. Dilip Thakkar, who carried out the postmortem 31 20 Jigneshkumar V. Jani - Executive Magistrate 36 21 Kiritkumar J. Modh - Deputy Mamlatdar 39 22 Jujarsinh B. Chavda - P.S.O. 42 23 J.B. Acharya - IO/PSI 44 9. The prosecution also adduced the following documentary evidence: DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE: S. NO. DETAILS EXHIBIT 01 Panchnama of the scene of offence 08 02 Panchname of the person of the deceased 11 03 Inquest Panchnama of the deceased 12 04 Medical Certificate of the deceased, Siddhpur 27 05 Medical Certificate of the deceased, Mehsana 29 06 Transfer Chit and Original Medical Case-papers 30 07 Postmortem Report of the deceased Bhavnaben 32 08 Cause of Death Certificate - Bhavnaben 33 09 Police Yadi to the Mehsana Hospital 34 10 Police Yadi to the Executive Magistrate, Mehsana 37 11 Dying Declaration of the deceased - First D.D. 38 12 Map of the scene of offence 40 13 Yadi written by the Executive Magistrate to the Kakoshi Police 41 14 Order for carrying out further investigation 43 15 Complaint by the deceased Bhavnaben - Second D.D. 45 16 Police Yadi 46 17 Further Deposition of Bhavnaben - Third D.D. 47 18 Yadi for preparing the map of the scene of offence 48 19 F.S.L. Outward Entry 49 20 Acknowledgment by F.S.L. of having received the muddamal 50 21 Forwarding Letter by F.S.L. 51 22 F.S.L. Examination Report 52 23 F.S.L. Letter 53 24 F.S.L. Report 54 25 Report to the Surgeon for carrying out the postmortem 56 10. On completion of recording of the evidence, the learned Sessions Judge explained the incriminating circumstances appearing against the accused in the offence. The accused, in his further statement recorded under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. explained the incriminating circumstances that the incident occurred due to the accident while the deceased was preparing the tea and he is innocent and falsely implicated in the alleged offence. 11. On completion of the trial, the learned Sessions Judge found the appellant-accused guilty of the offence and sentenced him as stated herein before. 12. Being dissatisfied with the aforesaid judgment and order of conviction and sentence, the appellant-accused has preferred the present appeal before this Court. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT-ACCUSED: 13. Learned advocate Mr. 11. On completion of the trial, the learned Sessions Judge found the appellant-accused guilty of the offence and sentenced him as stated herein before. 12. Being dissatisfied with the aforesaid judgment and order of conviction and sentence, the appellant-accused has preferred the present appeal before this Court. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT-ACCUSED: 13. Learned advocate Mr. Pratik Barot appearing for the appellant-accused has submitted that the trial court has erred in convicting and sentencing the appellant-accused for the offence punishable under Sections 302, 323 and 498A of the Indian Penal Code. He has submitted that the trial court has convicted the appellant-accused only on the basis of the dying declaration, which is not trust-worthy as the statements of the deceased before the Doctors and the Executive Magistrate are totally different. 14. While referring to the evidence of PW-5 Vasantbhai Dungarbhai (i.e. the father of the deceased) at Exh.14 and PW-6 Hansaben Vasantbhai (i.e. the mother of the deceased) at Exh.15, learned advocate Mr. Barot has submitted that both these witnesses have clearly deposed that the incident had occurred due to the accident while the deceased was preparing the tea and the deceased was not conscious during the treatment. They have also admitted that the deceased was happy with her in-laws and as such there was no harassment to the deceased by the appellant-accused or her in-laws. Learned advocate has also referred to the evidence of PW-7 Soniben Ishwarbhai Chauhan (Exh.16), PW-8 Jashinben Vastabhai, PW-9 Kamabhai Hamirbhai, PW-10 Somabhai Hamirbhai, PW-11 Ishwarbhai Hamirbhai and submitted that all these witnesses, who are the relatives of the deceased, have not supported the case of the prosecution. 15. While referring to the evidence of PW-12 Dashrathbhai Bhikhabhai Chauhan (i.e. the brother of the accused), PW-13 Viththalbhai Dhanabhai Chauhan (i.e. the uncle of the accused), PW-14 Dipakkumar Dharamshibhai Chauhan (i.e. the cousin of the accused), PW-15 Manjulaben Dharamshibhai Chauhan (i.e. the sister-in-law of the accused), PW-16 Ramilaben Parsottambhai Chauhan (i.e. the aunt of the accused), learned advocate Mr. Barot has submitted that all these witnesses have similarly deposed that when they went to the hospital, the deceased was unconscious and was not able to speak. Learned advocate Mr. Barot has, therefore, submitted that the trial court has committed a grave error in overlooking the aforesaid evidence. Barot has submitted that all these witnesses have similarly deposed that when they went to the hospital, the deceased was unconscious and was not able to speak. Learned advocate Mr. Barot has, therefore, submitted that the trial court has committed a grave error in overlooking the aforesaid evidence. It is further submitted that considering the evidence of the aforesaid witnesses, the evidence regarding the dying declaration seems to be suspicious, however, the trial court has erroneously placed reliance on it and convicted the appellant-accused, which is illegal and, therefore, interference by this Court is warranted. Thus, it is urged that the conviction of the appellant-accused may be set-aside and he may be acquitted from the charges levelled against him. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT-STATE: 16. Learned APP Mr. Ronak Raval appearing for the respondent-State has submitted that the conviction and sentence recorded by the trial court do not call for interference by this Court as the same has been precisely and rightly imposed after examining the ocular as well as the documentary evidence. Learned APP, while referring to the evidence of PW-17 Dr. Hasit Patel, Medical Officer at the Government Hospital, Siddhpur (Exh.26), has submitted that the evidence of this witness reveals that on 21st March 2014 at around 9:15 a.m., the deceased Bhavnaben was brought to the Government Hospital, Siddhpur by her relatives without the police yadi. The evidence of this witness further reveals that at the time of her examination, she was conscious, cooperative and well-oriented to the time, place and person, and on asking, she herself narrated the history about the incident and stated that her husband (i.e. the present appellant-accused) was harassing her, and on 21st March 2014 in the morning hours, he poured kerosene on her body and set her ablaze. It has also been noticed by this witness that the smell of kerosene was emitting from the body as well as the burnt clothes of Bhavnaben. He, therefore, made a specific note in the case-paper in this regard and as her condition was serious, she was transferred to the Civil Hospital, Mehsana. 17. Learned APP thereafter referred to the evidence of PW-18 Dr. He, therefore, made a specific note in the case-paper in this regard and as her condition was serious, she was transferred to the Civil Hospital, Mehsana. 17. Learned APP thereafter referred to the evidence of PW-18 Dr. Girish Zala, Medical Officer, Civil Hospital, Mehsana (Exh.28) and has submitted that the evidence of this witness reveals that on 21st March 2014 at about 18:00 hours, the deceased Bhavnaben was brought to the General Hospital, Mehsana, by her relatives with the transfer chit of the General Hospital, Siddhpur. The evidence of this witness also reveals that at the time of her examination, she was conscious, and on asking the history about the incident, she specifically named the accused and stated that at about 8:00 a.m., her husband Ashokbhai, after pouring kerosene on her body, set her ablaze. This witness has noticed 92 to 95 percentage of extensive burns of 2nd degree all over her body, except both the feet. He, therefore, made a note in the case-paper in this regard. 18. Learned APP, thereafter, referred to the evidence of PW-20 Shri Jigneshkumar V. Jani, Executive Magistrate who recorded the dying declaration of deceased Bhavnaben, and submitted that the evidence of this witness also clearly reveals that the deceased was conscious and she was able to speak. Her dying declaration was recorded in ‘question-answer’ form, wherein also, she has specifically named the accused and stated that today morning the quarrel had ensued with her husband with regard to tea and thereafter her husband poured kerosene on her body and set her ablaze. Learned APP has submitted that it is true that this witness has not obtained any endorsement of the doctor on the dying declaration Exh.38, however, that itself is of no consequence since soon after recording the dying declaration, this witness has specifically certified to the effect that: (1) At the time of recording the dying declaration, no relative of the patient or any police officer is present. (2) It is confirmed by the medical opinion that the patient is in a conscious state of mind. (3) The patient is willing and able to answer the questions. (4) The dying declaration has been recorded as per the statement made by the patient. 19. It is submitted that the evidence of this witness clearly establishes the complicity of the appellant-accused in the alleged offence. 20. (3) The patient is willing and able to answer the questions. (4) The dying declaration has been recorded as per the statement made by the patient. 19. It is submitted that the evidence of this witness clearly establishes the complicity of the appellant-accused in the alleged offence. 20. Lastly, learned APP has referred to the evidence of PW-23 Jujarsinh B. Chavda - P.S.O. (Exh.42), who recorded the complaint and the further statement of the deceased Bhavnaben on the day of the incident, and has submitted that the evidence of this witness reveals that on 21st March 2014 he received a yadi from the Civil Hospital, Mehsana, and on the basis of the same, he visited the hospital and as the deceased was in a fit state of mind and able to speak, he recorded her complaint (Exh.45) and obtained her thumb impression on it. The evidence of this witness further reveals that on the basis of the complaint of the deceased Bhavnaben, an offence was registered as I-CR No. 19 of 2014 at the Kakoshi Police Station initially under Sections 307, 323 and 498A of the Indian Penal Code and the investigation was entrusted to him. The evidence of this witness further reveals that during the course of investigation, he recorded the further statement of the deceased Bhavnaben on the very same day, i.e. on 21st March 2014, (Exh.47) and obtained the thumb impression of the deceased on it. It is submitted that on the further statement of the deceased, the Medical Officer has also specifically endorsed that the patient is conscious and cooperative. Learned APP Mr. Raval, while referring to the original complaint (Exh.45) filed by the deceased Bhavnaben and her further statement (Exh.47) recorded by the Investigating Officer (PW-23), has submitted that it reveals that at the time of recording her complaint and also at the time of recording her further statement, she was conscious, cooperative and was able to speak. It is further submitted that she has clearly stated in her complaint as well as the further statement that the appellant-accused was harassing her by raising doubt over her chastity and often used to beat her. She has also stated that on 20th March 2014, i.e. a day prior to the incident, also the appellant-accused had raised doubt over her chastity and beaten her with kick and fist blows. She has also stated that on 20th March 2014, i.e. a day prior to the incident, also the appellant-accused had raised doubt over her chastity and beaten her with kick and fist blows. Regarding the incident, she has specifically stated that on 21st March 2014, when she was preparing the tea, her husband Ashok had beaten her and poured kerosene on her body from a primus and a can and set her ablaze. She has also stated that she was brought to the Government Hospital, Siddhpur, and thereafter, she was taken to the Civil Hospital, Mehsana, by her relatives. Thus, it is submitted by Mr. Raval that considering the trust-worthy evidence of both the Medical Officers, Executive Magistrate and the Investigating Officer, there remains no doubt about the complicity of the present appellant-accused in the alleged offence. Thus, it is urged that the conviction and sentence recorded by the trial court does not require any interference by this Court and the Appeal may be dismissed. ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS: 21. We have heard learned advocates for the respective parties and threadbare examined the evidence on record as well as the judgment and order of the trial court. 22. It is the case of the prosecution as mentioned herein above that the appellant-accused and the deceased got married just four years prior to the incident and from the wedlock they had a son named Meet aged about 11 months at the time of the incident. As per the case of the prosecution, the appellant-accused used to raise doubt upon the deceased over her chastity and often used to beat her. On the fateful day, the appellant-accused and the deceased were alone at home as the mother-in-law of the deceased was not at home, and at about 9 O’clock when the deceased was preparing the tea, the appellant-accused had beaten her with kick and fist blows and thereafter poured kerosene on her from a primus and a can and by lighting a matchstick, he set her ablaze. It is the case of the prosecution that she was immediately rushed to the Government Hospital, Siddhpur, and thereafter, she was referred to the Civil Hospital, Mehsana, where her dying declaration was recorded by PW-20 Shri Jigneshkumar V. Jani, Executive Magistrate and thereafter her complaint (Exh.45) came to be recorded on the same day by PW-23 Jigneshkumar Bhanuprasad Acharya, P.S.I. Kakoshi Police Station, who is examined at Exh.44. It is the case of the prosecution that the deceased Bhavnaben succumbed to the injuries on 2nd April 2014 at about 2:25 p.m. and her postmortem was performed by PW-19 Dr. Dilip Thakkar and as per the postmortem report (Exh.32), the cause of death shown was septicemia due to extensive external burns. It transpires from the record that the deceased had made, in all, five statements with regard to the incident, which ultimately led to her death. The same are as under: S. No. Details about the statement Prosecution Witness Date Time 1 Dr. Hasit Patel, M.O., Siddhpur before whom the deceased narrated the history regarding the incident 17 21.03.2014 9:15 a.m. 2 Dr. Girish Zala, M.O. Mehsana before whom the deceased narrated the history regarding the incident 18 21.03.2014 10:18 a.m. 3 Shri Jigneshkumar V. Jani, Executive Magistrate, who recorded the dying declaration 20 21.03.2014 11:25 a.m. 4 Jigneshkumar B. Acharya, P.S.I. Kakoshi Police Station, who recorded the complaint of the deceased 23 21.03.2014 -- 5 P.S.I. Kakoshi Police Station, who recorded the further statement of the deceased 23 21.03.2014 22:00 p.m. 23. It is noteworthy that all the aforesaid witnesses have deposed in a similar line that the deceased, while making the statement before them, was conscious, cooperative and well-oriented. We will, therefore, analyze the evidence of all the aforesaid witnesses in chronology. 24. The prosecution has examined PW-17 Dr. Hasit Patel, who is examined at Exh.26. A close reading of the deposition of this witness reveals that on 21st March 2014, he was serving as the Medical Officer, Civil Hospital, Siddhpur. According to him, on 21st March 2014 at about 9:15 a.m., the deceased Bhavnaben, aged about 20 years, was brought before him by her relatives without the police yadi. A close reading of the deposition of this witness reveals that on 21st March 2014, he was serving as the Medical Officer, Civil Hospital, Siddhpur. According to him, on 21st March 2014 at about 9:15 a.m., the deceased Bhavnaben, aged about 20 years, was brought before him by her relatives without the police yadi. She was conscious and on asking about the incident, she herself narrated the history that her husband (present appellant) was harassing her and on 21st March 2014 her husband, after pouring kerosene over her body, set her ablaze at home. He has further deposed that he noticed that the smell of kerosene was emitting from her body as well as from her burnt clothes and, therefore, he made a specific note in the MLC case-paper in this regard. He, thereafter, referred the patient to the Civil Hospital, Mehsana, for further treatment. The MLC certificate No. 200 of 2014 issued by him in this regard is produced at Exh.27. A close reading of this certificate clearly reveals that when this witness was examining the deceased, she was conscious, cooperative and well-oriented about the time, place and person and she herself narrated history before this witness that in the morning, her husband has, after pouring kerosene over her body, set her ablaze at home. The cross-examination of this witness does not dent his evidence in any manner. 25. The prosecution has also examined PW-18 Dr. Girish Zala at Exh.28. He has stated that on 21st March 2014, he was on duty as the Medical Officer, Civil Hospital, Mehsana, and at that time, at about 10:18 a.m. the deceased Bhavnaben aged about 23 years was brought to the hospital by her relatives with transfer chit of the General Hospital, Siddhpur. The evidence of this witness clearly reveals that at the time of her examination, the patient was conscious and on asking the history about the incident, she specifically named the appellant-accused and stated that at about 8:00 a.m. her husband (present appellant), after pouring kerosene over her body, set her ablaze. It further reveals from the evidence of this witness that he noticed 92 to 95 percentage of extensive burns of 2nd degree all over her body except both the feet. In his cross-examination, he has denied the suggestion made by the defence that the history about the incident was narrated by her relatives. It further reveals from the evidence of this witness that he noticed 92 to 95 percentage of extensive burns of 2nd degree all over her body except both the feet. In his cross-examination, he has denied the suggestion made by the defence that the history about the incident was narrated by her relatives. On the contrary, he voluntarily stated that the deceased was conscious. The MLC certificate issued by him along with the indoor medical papers are produced at Exh.29. A close reading of this certificate and the indoor medical papers clearly reveal that when this witness was examining the deceased, she was conscious and she herself narrated the history regarding the incident. The indoor medical papers also establishes the fact that all throughout the treatment till her death (i.e. for almost 11 days), the deceased remained conscious, except for one day (i.e. on 25th March 2014) she was semi-conscious. The cross-examination of this witness does not dent his evidence in any manner. 26. The prosecution has thereafter examined PW-20 Shri Jigneshkumar Vishnuprasad Jani, Executive Magistrate (Exh.36), who recorded the dying declaration of the deceased Bhavnaben. The evidence of this witness reveals that on the basis of the police yadi dated 21st March 2014 (Exh.37), he visited the Civil Hospital, Mehsana, where the deceased was under treatment and after obtaining the consent of the Medical Officer, he recorded the dying declaration of the deceased in a question-answer form, wherein the deceased stated that the incident took place on 21st March 2014 at about 9:00 a.m. when her mother-in-law was not at home and a quarrel had taken place with her husband with regard to the cold tea. Thereafter, her husband, after pouring kerosene on her body, set her ablaze. She has further stated that her husband was physically and mentally harassing her. After recording the dying declaration, her right hand thumb impression was obtained on the dying declaration by this witness. The dying declaration recorded by this witness is produced at Exh.38. A close reading of the dying declaration at Exh.38 reveals that on the footnote of this document, the witness has certified that at the time of recording the dying declaration, no relative of the patient or any police officer was present and it was confirmed by medical opinion that the patient was in a conscious state of mind. A close reading of the dying declaration at Exh.38 reveals that on the footnote of this document, the witness has certified that at the time of recording the dying declaration, no relative of the patient or any police officer was present and it was confirmed by medical opinion that the patient was in a conscious state of mind. It is further certified that at the time of recording the dying declaration, the patient was willing and able to answer the question and the dying declaration was recorded as per the statement given by the patient. In his cross-examination, he has stated that he had received the police yadi at 11:15 a.m. He has admitted that he has not obtained endorsement of any medical officer regarding the consciousness of the patient on the dying declaration. 27. The prosecution has also examined PW-23 Jigneshkumar Bhanuprasad Acharya, P.S.I. Kakoshi Police Station, who is examined at Exh.44 and who recorded the complaint and the further statement of the deceased Bhavnaben. The evidence of this witness reveals that on the date of the incident, he was serving as P.S.I., Kakoshi Police Station. He has deposed that on 21st March 2014, he received a yadi (Exh.46) from the Civil Hospital, Mehsana, and on the basis of the same, he visited the hospital and met the deceased who was under the treatment. As she was able to speak and was in a conscious state of mind, he recorded her complaint and obtained her thumb impression on it. The complaint is produced at Exh.45. In the complaint, the deceased Bhavnaben has stated that her husband (i.e. the appellant-accused) used to raise doubt over her chastity and often used to beat her. She has further stated that on 20th March 2014, i.e. one day prior to the incident, her husband raised doubt over her chastity and beaten her with kick and fist blows. Regarding the incident, she has specifically stated that on the date of the incident, she and her husband both were alone at home as her mother-in-law was not present. She has stated that at about 9:00 a.m. when she was preparing the tea, at that time her husband (i.e. the present appellant-accused) had beaten her; poured kerosene on her body from a primus and a can; and by lighting a matchstick, set her ablaze. She has stated that at about 9:00 a.m. when she was preparing the tea, at that time her husband (i.e. the present appellant-accused) had beaten her; poured kerosene on her body from a primus and a can; and by lighting a matchstick, set her ablaze. She has also stated that she was brought to the Government Hospital, Siddhpur, and thereafter, she was referred to the Civil Hospital, Mehsana. The evidence of this witness further reveals that on the basis of the compliant of the deceased Bhavnaben, the offence was registered at the Kakoshi Police Station vide I-CR No. 19 of 2014 initially under Sections 307, 323 and 498A of the Indian Penal Code and the P.S.O. had entrusted the investigation to him. He has deposed that during the course of investigation, he recorded the further statement of the deceased on the very same day, i.e. on 21st March 2014 at 20:00 p.m. which was read over to her and thereafter her thumb impression was obtained on it. The statement is produced at Exh.47. A close reading of the statement at Exh.47 reveals that the deceased had again specifically stated that at about 9:00 a.m. when she was preparing the tea, her husband had raised doubt over her chastity; beaten her with kick and fist blows and set her ablaze by pouring kerosene on her body and thereafter her relatives brought her at the Civil Hospital, Siddhpur and thereafter at the Government Hospital, Mehsana. It transpires from the evidence of this witness that the Medical Officer made endorsement on the footnote to the effect that the patient was conscious and cooperative. In his cross-examination, he has denied the suggestion of the defence advocate that at the time of recording the complaint as well as the further statement, the deceased was not conscious. The cross-examination of this witness does not dent his evidence in any manner. 28. A conjoint reading of the aforesaid evidence clearly establishes the complicity of the appellant-accused in the alleged offence. It is true that the Executive Magistrate (PW-20) has not obtained the endorsement of the Medical Officer on the dying declaration, but that lapse on the part of the Executive Magistrate alone could not be the ground to falsify the version of the deceased. It is true that the Executive Magistrate (PW-20) has not obtained the endorsement of the Medical Officer on the dying declaration, but that lapse on the part of the Executive Magistrate alone could not be the ground to falsify the version of the deceased. As narrated herein above, both the Medical Officers, the Executive Magistrate and the Police Officer who recorded the complaint and the further statement of the deceased have similarly deposed that the deceased was conscious, cooperative and well-oriented and the deceased herself had narrated the history regarding the incident, which is consistent in nature and there is no reason to disbelieve the trustworthiness of the evidence as all these witnesses have no reason to falsely implicate the present appellant-accused. 29. It is noteworthy that the evidence of all the aforesaid witnesses is completely supported by the documents like MLC certificate of the Civil Hospital, Siddhpur (Exh.27), MLC certificate of the Civil Hospital, Mehsana (Exh.29), dying declaration of the deceased (Exh.38), complaint of the deceased (Exh.45) and further statement of the deceased (Exh.47). Considering these trustworthy evidence, there remains no doubt regarding the complicity of the present appellant-accused in the alleged offence. As all the aforesaid documents relate to the statement of the deceased regarding the cause of her death, the same can be treated as dying declaration as per the provisions of Section 32 of the Indian Evidence Act. 30. The principle on which the dying declaration is admitted in evidence is indicated in the legal maxim “nemo moriturus praesumitur mentire” i.e. a man will not meet his maker with a lie in his mouth. The situation in which a person is on a deathbed is so solemn and serene when he is dying, that the grave position in which he is placed, is the reason in law to accept veracity of his statement. It is for this reason the requirements of oath and cross-examination are dispensed with. Besides, should the dying declaration be excluded it will result in miscarriage of justice because the victim being generally the only eye-witness in a serious crime the exclusion of the statement would leave the court without a scrap of evidence. Though a dying declaration is entitled to great weight, it is worthwhile to note that the accused has no power of cross-examination. Such a power is essential for eliciting the truth as an obligation of oath could be. Though a dying declaration is entitled to great weight, it is worthwhile to note that the accused has no power of cross-examination. Such a power is essential for eliciting the truth as an obligation of oath could be. This is the reason the court also insists that the dying declaration should be of such a nature as to inspire full confidence of the court in its correctness. The court has to be on guard that the statement of the deceased was not as a result of either tutoring, or prompting or a product of imagination. The court must be further satisfied that the deceased was in a fit state of mind after a clear opportunity to observe and identify the assailant. Once the court is satisfied that the declaration was true and voluntary, undoubtedly, it can base its conviction without any further corroboration. It cannot be laid down as an absolute rule of law that the dying declaration cannot form the sole basis of conviction unless it is corroborated. The rule requiring corroboration is merely a rule of prudence. The Supreme Court has laid down, in several judgments, the principles governing the dying declaration, which could be summed up as under as indicated in Smt. Paniben vs. State of Gujarat, AIR 1992 SC 1817 : (i) There is neither rule of law nor of prudence that dying declaration cannot be acted upon without corroboration. [Mannu Raja vs. State of M.P. (1976) 2 SCR 764 ] (ii) If the Court is satisfied that the dying declaration is true and voluntary it can base conviction on it, without corroboration. [State of M.P. vs. Ram Sagar Yadav, AIR 1985 SC 416 and Ramavati Devi vs. State of Bihar, AIR 1983 SC 164 ] (iii) This Court has to scrutinise the dying declaration carefully and must ensure that the declaration is not the result of tutoring, prompting or imagination. The deceased had opportunity to observe and identify the assailants and was in a fit state to make the declaration. [Ram Chandra Reddy vs. Public Prosecutor, AIR 1976 SC 1994 ] (iv) Where dying declaration is suspicious it should not be acted upon without corroborative evidence. [Rasheed Beg vs. Sate of Madhya Pradesh, (1974) 4 SCC 264 ] (v) Where the deceased was unconscious and could never make any dying declaration the evidence with regard to it is to be rejected. [Rasheed Beg vs. Sate of Madhya Pradesh, (1974) 4 SCC 264 ] (v) Where the deceased was unconscious and could never make any dying declaration the evidence with regard to it is to be rejected. [Kake Singh vs. State of M.P. AIR 1982 SC 1021 ] (vi) A dying declaration which suffers from infirmity cannot form the basis of conviction. [Ram Manorath vs. State of U.P. 1981 SCC (Crl.) 531] (vii) Merely because a dying declaration does not contain the details as to the occurrence, it is not to be rejected. [State of Maharashtra vs. Krishnamurthi Laxmipati Naidu, AIR 1981 SC 617 ] (viii) Equally, merely because it is a brief statement, it is not to be discarded. On the contrary, the shortness of the statement itself guarantees truth. [Surajdeo Oza vs. State of Bihar, AIR 1979 SC 1505 ] (ix) Normally the court, in order to satisfy whether deceased was in a fit mental condition to make the dying declaration, look up to the medical opinion. But where the eye witness has said that the deceased was in a fit and conscious state to make this dying declaration, the medical opinion cannot prevail. [Nanahau Ram and Another vs. State] (x) Where the prosecution version differs from the version as given in the dying declaration, the said declaration cannot be acted upon. [State of U.P. vs. Madan Mohan, AIR 1989 SC 1519 ] 31. Applying the aforesaid principles, as explained by the Supreme Court, in the present case, more particularly, considering the evidence regarding the dying declaration, we hold that the same is voluntary, consistent and trust-worthy. 32. It transpires from the evidence of the PW-5 Vasantbhai Dungarbhai and PW-6 Hansaben Vasantbhai (i.e. the parents of the deceased) as well as PW-12 Dashrathbhai Bhikhabhai Chauhan (i.e. the brother of the accused); PW-13 Viththalbhai Dhanabhai Chauhan (i.e. the uncle of the accused); PW-14 Dipakkumar Dharamshibhai Chauhan (i.e. the cousin of the accused); PW-15 Manjulaben Dharamshibhai Chauhan (i.e. the sister-in-law of the accused); and PW-16 Ramilaben Parsottambhai Chauhan (i.e. the aunt of the accused), that they all have not supported the case of the prosecution and turned hostile, as perhaps some settlement might have arrived between them. However, that itself is of no consequence when the evidence of both the Medical Officers, Executive Magistrate and the Police Officer (i.e. the Investigating Officer) regarding the dying declaration clearly establishes the guilt of the appellant-accused, which is duly supported by the documentary evidence as discussed herein above. 33. It is pertinent to note that the evidence reveals that at the time of the incident, the deceased and the accused both were alone at home. The onus was upon the accused to explain as to under what circumstances the incident had occurred, as per Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act, however, the appellant-accused had not tendered any immediate explanation and no declaration to the police had been made by him. In response to the query raised by this Court, it was admitted that after the incident had taken place, the accused had ran away, but later on he had remained present at the Civil Hospital, Mehsana. It is also noteworthy that in her further statement, the deceased had specifically stated that her husband had set her ablaze and she had tried to caught hold of her husband but he moved away. There is nothing on record which even remotely suggest that the present appellant-accused had tried to save the deceased. Admittedly, the appellant-accused has not sustained any injury during the incident. 34. Considering the entire aforesaid evidence as a whole and also considering the conduct of the appellant-accused, we have no reason to disbelieve the case of the prosecution, rather in our opinion, the involvement of the appellant-accused in the alleged offence is clearly established. 35. In the case of Balvir Singh vs. State of Uttarakhand, 2023 Live Law (SC) 861, in Para-46 of the judgment, the Supreme Court has observed as under: “46. A manifest distinction exists between the burden of proof and the burden of going forward with the evidence. Generally, the burden of proof upon any affirmative proposition necessary to be established as the foundation of an issue does not shift, but the burden of evidence or the burden of explanation may shift from one side to the other according to the testimony. Thus, if the prosecution has offered evidence which if believed by the court would convince them of the accused guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the accused is in a position where he should go forward with countervailing evidence if he has such evidence. Thus, if the prosecution has offered evidence which if believed by the court would convince them of the accused guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the accused is in a position where he should go forward with countervailing evidence if he has such evidence. When facts are peculiarly within the knowledge of the accused, the burden is on him to present evidence of such facts, whether the proposition is an affirmative or negative one. He is not required to do so even though a prima facie case has been established, for the court must still find that he is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt before it can convict. However, the accused failure to present evidence on his behalf may be regarded by the court as confirming the conclusion indicated by the evidence presented by the prosecution or as confirming presumptions which might have been rebutted. Although not legally required to produce evidence on his own behalf, the accused may therefore as a practical matter find it essential to go forward with proof. This does not alter the burden of proof resting upon the prosecution [Wharton's Criminal Evidence, 12th Edn. 1955, Vol. 1, Ch. 2 p. 37 and foil].” 36. It is noteworthy in this regard that the present appellant-accused has not offered any explanation immediately after the incident, and on the contrary, ran away from the place of incident. 37. In the case of Balvir Singh (supra), the Supreme Court, in Para-62 has observed as under: “62. These appeals remind us of what this Court observed in the case of Dharam Das Wadhwani v. State of Uttar Pradesh: “The rule of benefit of reasonable doubt does not imply a frail willow bending to every whiff of hesitancy. Judges are made of sterner stuff and must take a practical view of legitimate inferences flowing from evidence, circumstantial or direct.” The role of courts in such circumstances assumes greater importance and it is expected that the courts would deal with such cases in a more realistic manner and not allow the criminals to escape on account of procedural technicalities, perfunctory investigation or insignificant lacunas in the evidence as otherwise the criminals would receive encouragement and the victims of crime would be totally discouraged by the crime going unpunished. The courts are expected to be sensitive in cases involving crime against women.” 38. The courts are expected to be sensitive in cases involving crime against women.” 38. Applying the aforesaid principle, as explained by the Supreme Court, on the facts of the present case, more particularly, considering the evidence on record, we have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that the trial court has committed no error and has rightly convicted the appellant-accused for the offences mentioned herein above. 39. On the overall consideration of the entire materials on record, we find that the prosecution has proved the case beyond reasonable doubt and we do not find any reason to disbelieve such evidence. 40. The Appeal is, thus, devoid of any merits and the same is accordingly dismissed. The judgment and order of conviction and sentence dated 7th January 2016 passed by the learned Additional Session Judge, Patan, in Sessions Case No. 83 of 2014 is hereby confirmed. Records and proceedings be sent back to the concerned court.