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2024 DIGILAW 108 (ALL)

Sohrab Ali v. District Magistrate Pratapgarh

2024-01-10

ALOK MATHUR

body2024
JUDGMENT : (1). Heard Shri Dinesh Kumar Ojha, learned counsel for petitioner, learned Standing Counsel for the State. (2). At the very outset, learned counsel for petitioner submits that due to inadvertent the challenge to the impugned orders could not be incorporated in the prayer clause and consequently, prays that he may be permitted to assail the validity of the impugned orders dated 06.09.2007 passed by the District Magistrate, Pratapgarh under Section 17 (3) (b) of the Arms Act and dated 21.11.2007 passed by learned Commissioner, Allahabad Division, Allahabad. (3). Learned Standing Counsel for the State did not object the same. (4). Accordingly, the prayer of the petitioner is allowed and the petitioner is permitted to incorporate necessary amendment in the prayer clause during the course of the day. (5). By means of the present writ petition, the petitioner has challenged the impugned orders dated 06.09.2007 passed by the District Magistrate, Pratapgarh under Section 17 (3) (b) of the Arms Act and also order dated 21.11.2007 passed by learned Commissioner, Allahabad Division, Allahabad. (6). It has been submitted by learned counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner moved an application to the District Magistrate, Pratapgarh to grant him SBBL Gun Licence on account of the fact that the father of the petitioner was murdered in the year 1997 on 11.04.1997. It is further submitted that a criminal case was registered against the petitioner before the murder of this father in Case Crime No. 148 of 1996, under Sections 307, 323 and 504 IPC, Police Station Sangipur, District Pratapgarh. Subsequently, it seems that petitioner was involved in another criminal case in Case Crime No. 40 of 2006, under Sections 307, 323, 147, 148 & 149 IPC and Section 7 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act. (7). In the aforesaid circumstances, notice under Section 17 (3) of the Arms Act was issued to the petitioner on 23.04.2007 asking him to show cause as to why his arm licence should not be cancelled. Apart from noticing that there are two criminal cases lodged against the petitioner, the licencing authority also mentioned that the petitioner had suppressed material information at the time of grant of licence, inasmuch as, he had concealed the fact that a criminal case in Case Crime No. 148 of 1996, under Sections 307, 323 and 504 IPC was pending against him when he applied for grant of arms licence. The petitioner replied to the notice issued by the District Magistrate on 05.02.2007 and after consideration of his response, which was found to be unsatisfactory, his licence was cancelled. While cancelling the said licence, the District Magistrate has invoked the provisions of Section 17 (3) (c)/(b) of the Arms Act. Against the order dated 06.09.2007 passed by the District Magistrate, Pratapgarh, the petitioner preferred an appeal before the Commissioner, Allahabad Division, Allahabad, who has also rejected his appeal and affirmed the findings recorded by the District Magistrate, Pratapgarh by means of order dated 21.11.2007. Both the said orders have been assailed by the petitioner in the present writ petition. (8). Learned counsel for petitioner has submitted that in the year 1997 his father was murdered and the petitioner faced with the trauma of murder of his father and the insecurity to his life and the existing threat perception had to make an urgent application for grant of arms licence. Considering the grave urgency and threat to the life, the District Magistrate had immediately granted him the licence. It is stated that it is during those very dates that the First Information Report was also lodged against the petitioner in Case Crime No. 148 of 1996 under Sections 307, 323 and 504 IPC where the petitioner was implicated. He submits that there was no deliberate suppression of material information in his application so as to invoke the provisions of section 17 (3) (c) of the Arms Act. he submits that the District Magistrate has not considered his response adequately. He submits that on murder of his father he was traumatized and under these challenging situation hand made application for grant of arms licence. (9). With regard to the involvement of the petitioner in another criminal case in Case Crime No. 40 of 2006, under Sections 307, 323, 147, 148 & 149 IPC and Section 7 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, it is submitted that there is no allegation of use of arms by the petitioner and consequently merely lodging of the FIR against the petitioner cannot be a ground for cancellation of arm licence. He further submits that there are several judgments of this Court and the law in this regard is settled that merely due to pendency of criminal cases, the arm licence cannot be cancelled. (10). He further submits that there are several judgments of this Court and the law in this regard is settled that merely due to pendency of criminal cases, the arm licence cannot be cancelled. (10). It is further submitted that the petitioner has been acquitted in Case Crime No. 40 of 2006 under Sections 307, 323, 147, 148 & 149 IPC and Section 7 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act by means of judgment dated 11.06.2010 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Pratapgarh. (11). In support of his submission, learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on the judgments passed by this Court in the cases of Ram Murti Madhukar vs. District Magistrate, Sitapur [1998 (16) LCD-905], Ram Karpal Singh vs. Commissioner, Devi Patan Mandal, Gonda and Ors. [2006 (24) LCD 114] and Ram Prasad vs. Commissioner and Ors. decided on 07.02.2020 in Writ-C No. 56378 of 2006, wherein it has been held that mere pendency of criminal case or apprehension of misuse of arms are not sufficient grounds for passing the order of suspension or revocation of licence under Section 17 of the Act. (12). In Ram Murti Madhukar (supra), this Court has held in paragraph no. 8, is quoted as under :- "(8) It is also well settled in law that mere pendency of criminal case or apprehension of abuse of Arms Act, are not sufficient ground for passing of the order of suspension or revocation of licence under Section 17 of the Act. A reference in this regard may be made to the decisions of this Court in Ganesh Chandra Bhatt v. D. M. Almora, AIR 1993 All 291 " (13). In the case of Ram Karpal Singh (supra), this Court has held as following in paragraph nos. 6 and 7 which are being reproduced hereunder:- '6, Learned counsel for the petitioner had relied upon the two judgments of this Court reported in 2002 ACC; Habib v. State of U.P 7. In the case of Ram Karpal Singh (supra), this Court has held as following in paragraph nos. 6 and 7 which are being reproduced hereunder:- '6, Learned counsel for the petitioner had relied upon the two judgments of this Court reported in 2002 ACC; Habib v. State of U.P 7. Para 3 of the said judgment is reproduced as under: "Para 3: The question as to whether mere involvement in a criminal case or pendency of a criminal case can be a ground for revocation of the license under Arrns Act, has been deal with by a Division Bench in this Court reported in Sheo Prasad Misra v. The District Magistrate, Basti and others, wherein the Division Bench relying upon the earlier decision reported in Mai Uddin v. Commissioner, Allahabad, found that mere involvement in criminal case cannot be in any way affect the public security or public interest and the order canceling or revoking the licence of fire arm has been set aside. The present impugned order also suffers from the same infirmity as was pointed out by the Division Bench in the above mentioned cases. I am in full agreement with the view taken by the Division Bench that these orders cannot be sustained and deserve to be quashed and are hereby quashed.' (14). This Court in the case of Ram Prasad (supra) has held as under. Relevant paragraphs of the said judgments i.e. 16, 19, 22, 23, 24, 25, 28, 32 and 36 are being quoted hereunder:- "16. The matter which requires consideration is, whether on the ground of pendency of the criminal case the petitioner's fire arm licence could be cancelled and his appeal could be dismissed, notwithstanding his acquittal on 17.1.2003. It also requires consideration if the ground in the impugned orders that if the petitioner's fire arm licence remain with the petitioner, it would not be in the public interest and public security, are justified for cancellation and based on substantial material." 19. In Masiuddin Vs. Commissioner, Allahabad Division, Allahabad and another reported in 1972 A.L.J. 573 this Court held in paragraph Nos. 4 and 7 as under: "4. After a license is granted, the right to hold the license and possess a gun is a valuable individual right in a free country. The security of public peace and public safety is a valuable social interest. Commissioner, Allahabad Division, Allahabad and another reported in 1972 A.L.J. 573 this Court held in paragraph Nos. 4 and 7 as under: "4. After a license is granted, the right to hold the license and possess a gun is a valuable individual right in a free country. The security of public peace and public safety is a valuable social interest. Section 17 shows that Parliament had decided that neither of the two valuable interests should unduly impinge on the other Section 17 seeks to establish a fair equilibrium between the two contending interests. It says: Hear the licensee first; and then cancel the license "if necessary for the security of the public peace or for public safety". True, there is no express provision for hearing. But the nature of the right affected, the language of Sec. 17, the grounds for cancellation, the requirement of a reasoned order and the right of appeal plainly implicate a fair hearing procedure. Jai Narain Rai v. District Magistrate, Azamgarh. While cancelling a licence, the District Magistrate acts as a quasi-judicial authority. 7. A license may be cancelled, inter alia on the ground that it is "necessary for the security of the public peace or for public safety" to do so. The District Magistrate has not recorded a finding that it was necessary for the security of the public peace or for public safety to revoke the license. The mere existence of enmity between a licensee and another person would not establish the ''necessary' connection with security of public peace or public safety. There should be something more than mere enmity. There should be some evidence of the provocative utterances of the licensee or of his suspicious movements or of his criminal designs and conspiracy in reinforcement of the evidence of enmity. It is not possible to give an exhaustive list of facts and circumstances from which an inference of threat to public security or public peace may be deduced. The District Magistrate will have to take a decision on the facts of each case. But in the instant case there is nothing in his order to indicate that it was necessary for the security of the public peace or for public safety to cancel the license of the petitioner. Mere enmity is not sufficient." 22. In Chhanga Prasad Sahu Vs. But in the instant case there is nothing in his order to indicate that it was necessary for the security of the public peace or for public safety to cancel the license of the petitioner. Mere enmity is not sufficient." 22. In Chhanga Prasad Sahu Vs. State of U.P. and others reported in 1984 AWC 145 (FB), after noticing the provisions of Section 17 (3) of the Arms Act the Full Bench in paragraph 5 held as follows: "A perusal of abovementioned provisions indicates that the licensing authority has been given the power to suspend or remove an arms licence only if any of the conditions mentioned in sub-clauses (a) to (e) of sub-section (3) of Section 17 of Act exists." sub section (5) of Section 17 makes it obligatory upon the licensing authority to, while passing the order revoking/suspending an arms licence, record in writing the reasons therefore and to, on demand, furnish a brief statement thereof to the holder of the license unless it considers that it will not be in the public interest to do so." In paragraph-9 it has been emphasised as under:- "it is true that in order to revoke/suspend an arms licence, the licensing authority has necessarily to come to the conclusion that the facts justifying revocation/suspension of licence mentioned in grounds (a) to (e) of section 17 exist" 23. In Ilam Singh v. Commissioner, Meerut Division and others [1987 ALL. L.J. 416] this Court held that under Section 17(3) (b) the licencing authority may suspend or revoke a licence if it becomes necessary for the security of public peace or public safety. In this case no report was lodged against the licensee indicating that he had used the gun in the incident which led to the breach of public peace or public safety. It was held that there must be some positive incident in which the petitioner participated and used his gun which led to breach of public peace or public safety and in the absence of the use of the gun by the licencee against the security of public peace or public safety the licence of the gun could not be suspended or revoked. The relevant paragraphs 4 and 5 of the judgment in Ilam Singh (supra) are being reproduced as under: "4. The relevant paragraphs 4 and 5 of the judgment in Ilam Singh (supra) are being reproduced as under: "4. Having heard the learned counsel for the petitioner I am of the view that the submissions raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner cannot be said to be without substance. Section 17(3) (b) of the Arms Act enacts that licensing authority may by order in writing suspend a licence or revoke the same if it becomes necessary for the security of public peace or the public safety. When once a person has been granted a licence and he acquires a gun, it becomes one of his properties. In the present case no incident of breach of security of the public peace or public safety at the behest of the petitioner has been pointed out. Even no report was lodged against the petitioner indicating that he used his gun in the incident which led to the breach of public peace or public safety. Even though some reports might have been lodged but that could not be said to be a sufficient reason to cancel the licence." 5. There must be some positive incident in which the petitioner participated and used his gun which led to the breach of the public peace or public safety. In the absence of the use of the gun by the petitioner against the security of public peace or public safety the licence of the gun of the petitioner was not liable either to be suspended or revoked. The licensing authority as well as the Commissioner committed errors on the face of the record in cancelling the licence of the gun held by the petitioner in utter disregard of the provisions of Section 17 (3) (b) of the Arms Act. In view of these facts the impugned orders cannot be sustained and deserves to be quashed." 24. In Habib v. State of U.P. and others [2002 (44) ACC 783] this Court held that mere involvement in a criminal case cannot in any way affect the public security or public interest and the order cancelling or revoking licence of fire arm was not justified. Paragraph 3 of this judgment reads as under: "3. In Habib v. State of U.P. and others [2002 (44) ACC 783] this Court held that mere involvement in a criminal case cannot in any way affect the public security or public interest and the order cancelling or revoking licence of fire arm was not justified. Paragraph 3 of this judgment reads as under: "3. The question as to whether mere involvement in a criminal case or pendency of a criminal case can be a ground for revocation of the licence under Arms Act, has been dealt with by a Division Bench of this court reported in Sheo Prasad Misra Vs. The District Magistrate, Basti and others, wherein the Division Bench relying upon the earlier decision reported in Masi Uddin v. Commissioner, Allahabad, found that mere involvement in criminal case cannot in any way affect the public security or public interest and the order cancelling or revoking the licence of fire arm has been set aside." 25. In Satish Singh v. District Magistrate, Sultanpur 2009 (4) ADJ 33 (LB), this Court elaborately explained what is detrimental to the security of the public peace or public safety and held that mere involvement in criminal case cannot in any way affect the public security or public interest. Paragraphs 6 and 7 of Satish Singh case (supra) are being reproduced as under: "6. A plain reading of section 17 indicates that the arms licence can be cancelled or suspended on the ground that the licensing authority deems it necessary for security of the public peace or the public safety. In the present case, while passing the impugned order, neither the District Magistrate nor the appellate authority has recorded the finding as to how and under what circumstance, the possession of arms licence by the petitioner, is detrimental to the public peace or the public security and safety. Merely because criminal case is pending more so, does not seem to attract the provisions of section 17 of the Arms Act. To attract the provisions of section 17 of the Arms Act with regard to public peace, security and safety it shall always be incumbent on the authorities to record a finding that how, under what circumstances and what manner, the possession of arms licence shall be detrimental to public peace, safety and security. To attract the provisions of section 17 of the Arms Act with regard to public peace, security and safety it shall always be incumbent on the authorities to record a finding that how, under what circumstances and what manner, the possession of arms licence shall be detrimental to public peace, safety and security. In absence of such finding merely on the ground that a criminal case is pending without any mitigating circumstances with regard to endanger of public peace, safety and security, the provisions contained under Section 17 of the Arms Act, shall not satisfy. 7. Needless to say that right to life and liberty are guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India and the arms licences are granted for personal safety and security after due inquiry by the authorities in accordance with the provisions contained in Arms Act, 1959. The provisions of section 17 of the Arms Act with regard to suspension or cancellation of arms licence cannot be invoked lightly in an arbitrary manner. The provisions contained under Section 17 of the Arms Act should be construed strictly and not liberally. The conditions provided therein, should be satisfied by the authorities before proceeding ahead to cancel or suspend an arms licence. We may take notice of the fact that any reason whatsoever, the crime rate is raising day by day. The Government is not in a position to provide security to each and every person individually. Right to possess arms is statutory right but right to life and liberty is fundamental guaranteed by Article 21 of the Constitution of India. Corollary to it, it is citizen's right to possess firearms for their personal safety to save their family from miscreants. It is often said that ordinarily in a civilised society, only civilised persons require arms licence for their safety and security and not the criminals. Of course, in case the government feels that arms licence are abused for oblique motive or criminal activities, then appropriate measures may be adopted to check such mal-practice. But arms licence should not be suspended in a routine manner mechanically, without application of mind and keeping in view the letter and spirit of Section 17 of the Arms Act." 28. In Thakur Prasad Vs. State of U.P. and others reported in 2013(31) LCD 1460 (LB) this Court after referring to the earlier pronouncements in the case of Ram Murli Madhukar Vs. In Thakur Prasad Vs. State of U.P. and others reported in 2013(31) LCD 1460 (LB) this Court after referring to the earlier pronouncements in the case of Ram Murli Madhukar Vs. District Magistrate, Sitapur [1998 (16) LCD 905] and Habib Vs. State of U.P., 2002 ACC 783, held in paragraphs 10 and 11 as follows: "10. "Public peace" or ''public safety" do not mean ordinary disturbance of law and order public safety means safety of the public at large and not safety of few persons only and before passing of the order of cancellation of arm license as per Section 17 (3) of the Act the Licensing Authority is under an obligation to apply his mind to the question as to whether there was eminent danger to public peace and safety involved in the case in view of the judgment given by this court in the case of Ram Murli Madhukar v. District Magistrate, Sitapur [1998 916) LCD 905], wherein it has been held that license can not be suspended or revoked on the ground of public interest (Jan-hit) merely on the registration of an F.I.R. and pendency of a criminal case." 11. Further, this Court in the case of Habib v. State of U.P. 2002 ACC 783 held as under: "The question as to whether mere Involvement in a criminal case or pendency of a criminal case can be a ground for revocation of the licence under Arms Act, has been dealt with by a Division Bench of this Court in Sheo prasad Misra Vs. District Magistrate, Basti and Others, 1978 AWC 122 , wherein the Division Bench relying upon the earlier decision in Masi Uddin Vs. Commissioner, Allahabad, 1972 ALJ 573, found that mere involvement in criminal case cannot, in any way, affect the public security or public interest and the order cancelling or revoking the licence of fire arm has been set aside. The present impugned orders also suffer from the same infirmity as was pointed out by the Division Bench in the above mentioned cases. I am in full agreement with the view taken by the Division Bench that these orders cannot be sustained and deserves to be quashed and are hereby quashed. The present impugned orders also suffer from the same infirmity as was pointed out by the Division Bench in the above mentioned cases. I am in full agreement with the view taken by the Division Bench that these orders cannot be sustained and deserves to be quashed and are hereby quashed. There is yet another reason that during the pendency of the present writ petition, the petitioner has been acquitted from the aforesaid criminal case and at present there is neither any case pending, nor any conviction has been attributed to the petitioner, as is evident from Annexure SA-I and II to the supplementary affidavit filed by the petitioner. In this view of the matter, the petitioner is entitled to have the fire-arm licence." 32. In Ghanshyam Gupta v. State of U.P. and others [ 2016 (34) LCD 3035 ] this Court has again held that the necessary ingredients to invoke jurisdiction of the licencing authority in terms of Section 17 were clearly lacking and no finding had been returned on the basis of materials produced in that regard by the licencing authority, which must justify passing of the order of cancellation. Paragraph 9 of the said judgment is being quoted as under: "9. In a recent decision of Lucknow Bench of this court in Surya Narain Mishra v. State of U.P. and others, reported in 2015 (7) ADJ 510 , similar view has been taken by this Court relying upon subsequent decisions. Para-14 of the judgment is reproduced: "14. In the case of Raj Kumar Verma v. State of U.P., 2013 (80) ACC 231 this court in paragraph No.3 held as under:- "The ground for issue of show-cause notice, suspension and ultimately cancellation of the licence is that one and precisely one criminal case was registered against the petitioner. The District Magistrate has also held that the petitioner has been enlarged on bail. He has gone further to observe that if the licence remained intact, the petitioner, may disturb public peace and tranquility. The same findings have been given by the Commissioner, Unmindful of the fact that this Court is repeating the law of the land, but the deaf ears of the administrative officers do not ready to succumb the law of the land. The same findings have been given by the Commissioner, Unmindful of the fact that this Court is repeating the law of the land, but the deaf ears of the administrative officers do not ready to succumb the law of the land. The settled law is that mere involvement in a criminal case without any finding that involvement in such criminal case shall be detrimental to public peace and tranqulity shall not create the ground for the cancellation of Armed Licence. In Ram Suchi v. Commissioner, Devipatan Division reported in 2004 (22) LCD 1643, it was held that this law was relied upon in Balram Singh Vs. State of U.P. 2006 (24) LCD 1359. Mere apprehension without substance is simply an opinion which has no legs to stand. Personal whims are not allowed to be reflected while acting as a public servant. 36. In the present case the petitioner's licence was cancelled by the District Magistrate on the ground of pendency of criminal case against him. The petitioner was later on acquitted of the criminal case by order dated 17.1.2003. A perusal of the order of acquittal does not show the use of fire arm. After acquittal the very basis of the order of cancellation vanished. The finding of the District Magistrate as affirmed by the Commissioner, that it was not in the interest of public peace and the public security that the licence remained with the petitioner/licencee, is not based on any evidence/material, except the police reports which in their turn were in view of the pendency of the criminal case against the petitioner. On mere apprehension expressed in the impugned orders that the petitioner would misuse the fire arm and would extend threat to the persons of the weaker section of the society, the arm licence could not be cancelled" (15). Learned Standing Counsel for the State on the other hand has opposed the writ petition. It is submitted that the arm licence of the petitioner has been cancelled on the ground that at the time of applying for arm licence, the criminal prosecution against the petitioner in Case Crime No. 148 of 1996 under Sections 307, 323 and 504 IPC was pending against the petitioner, which the petitioner did not disclose in the said application. (16). (16). He submits that there is no infirmity in the finding recorded by the District Magistrate in this regard and accordingly prayed for dismissal of the writ petition. (17). I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record. (18). It seems that father of the petitioner was murdered on 11.04.1997 and it was a very traumatic experience for the petitioner and security was provided to him and his family under the conditions that had prevailed. It is in the aforesaid circumstances, the petitioner had to move an application for grant of arm licence and also for security for his person. The arm licence was provided to him within six days i.e. on 17.04.1997 and it is during this period it seems due to oversight he did not disclose about the pendency of the criminal case pending against him. (19). Undoubtedly, there was suppression information by the petitioner with regard to the pending criminal cases against him but the same has been sought to be justified by the petitioner on account of the peculiar circumstances, which he was faced at the time when the application was moved. Though the power is vested with the District Magistrate to cancel the arm licence, in case licence was obtained by the suppression of material information and on the basis of wrong information provided by the holder of the arm licence and accordingly, it was incumbent upon the District Magistrate to consider whether suppression of fact that an FIR No. 148 of 1996 was lodged against the petitioner amounts to material suppression of fact or not. (20). The Legislature in its wisdom has provided for material suppression of fact to be a condition for cancellation of arms licence as per Section 17 (3) (c) of the Arms Act. Clearly, the “suppression” would be different from “material suppression of fact”. Accordingly, materiel suppression has to be some what more grave than mere material suppression of facts. (21). This Court is of the considered view that material suppression would be deliberate and intentional suppression of such facts, which if had been disclosed, would have lead to rejection of application for grant of arms licence. Accordingly, materiel suppression has to be some what more grave than mere material suppression of facts. (21). This Court is of the considered view that material suppression would be deliberate and intentional suppression of such facts, which if had been disclosed, would have lead to rejection of application for grant of arms licence. Accordingly, whenever, the authority is considering the case for cancellation of arms licence on the ground of suppression of fact it is incumbent to return finding that firstly there was deliberate and intentional suppression of facts and secondly, had the suppressed fact been brought to the knowledge of the licencing authority at the time of grant of arms licence, it would have materially interfered with his discretion regarding grant of the licence. (22). Though the Prescribed Authority has duly considered the circumstances under which the arm licence was granted but he has failed to consider the relevant aspect of the matter while rejecting the application of the petitioner. The District Magistrate has duly taken into account of the fact that at the time of cancellation of arm licence, the petitioner had already been acquitted by the competent court and consequently at the stage of cancellation whether the pendency of the said criminal case would be a material consideration of cancellation is an issue which had to be considered by the Prescribed Authority as per the provisions of Section 17 (3) (c) of the Arms Act, 1959. (23). In light of the aforesaid judgments it is clear that the ground for cancellation of the licence of the petitioner on the ground of pendency of Criminal Case in Case Crime No. 40 of 2006 under Sections 307, 323, 147, 148 & 149 IPC and Section 7 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act is clearly indicate that the said issue has wrongly been decided by the Prescribed Authority as well as appellate authority and the finding in this regard of both the authorities being arbitrary are set aside. (24). In light of the above, especially considering the fact that the Prescribed Authority has not considered the aspect of the material suppression information at the time of granting arm licence is an issue for which the matter is remitted to the District Magistrate, Pratapgarh for passing afresh orders in light of the directions given hereinabove by this Court. (25). (24). In light of the above, especially considering the fact that the Prescribed Authority has not considered the aspect of the material suppression information at the time of granting arm licence is an issue for which the matter is remitted to the District Magistrate, Pratapgarh for passing afresh orders in light of the directions given hereinabove by this Court. (25). The petitioner is granted liberty to file a fresh reply before the District Magistrate, Pratapgarh within a period of two weeks from today and the District Magistrate, Pratapgarh is directed to conclude and decide the matter afresh within two months thereafter by a reasoned and speaking order. (26). In light of the above, the writ petition is allowed.