ORDER : 1. Heard learned Advocate Mr. Girish K. Patel for the petitioner, who by way of this petition challenges orders dated 12.09.2012, 24.01.2013 and 22.03.2024, whereby the promotion issued to the petitioner is cancelled and representations there-against were rejected. 2. It would appear that the petitioner had been promoted vide an order dated 11.05.2012 from the post of Sub-Inspector, Fire to the post of Inspector, Fire. It appears that upon the promotion being given, the petitioner was required to give his willingness for accepting the promotional post, more particularly it appears that at the relevant point of time, the petitioner was selected for joining the UN Peace Keeping Force in Haiti. It appears that vide communication dated 18.06.2012, the petitioner has given his unwillingness for accepting the promotion to the rank of Inspector and whereas in the communication of unwillingness the petitioner has clearly mentioned as under : "I, No 984140037 (PSL No. 35) Rank SI/Fire Name RAM NARAYAN PRASAD GUPTA of CISF Unit PPT Paradip, am hereby certified that I am unwilling to assume the charge of Insp/Fire on promotion issued vide IG/ES HQrs Patna S.O. Pt I No 43/2012 issued under letter No. E-31014/CISF/ PCP/Estt. 12011/SOS/Estt II/ES/12/6431 dated 12.06.2012 due to Selection for deployment at FPU (Haiti) 5th tenure as SI/Fire vide FHQrs New Delhi letter No.E-16015/1/FPU Haiti/5th/2012/Pers.II/1189 dated 06.06.2012 and I am willing for deployment at FPU Haiti 5th tenure. It is also certified that I am willing to forego my promotion and will not claim for seniority if my juniors are promoted to the next higher rank due to my unwillingness. This declaration may be recorded in my Service Document." 3. Based upon such unwillingness, the promotion given to the petitioner from the post of Sub-Inspector, Fire to the Inspector, Fire had been cancelled vide order dated 12.09.2012. It appears that the petitioner had thereafter upon joining the Peace Keeping Force at Haiti, submitted a representation for restoration of his promotion and whereas vide a communication dated 24.01.2013, the same had been rejected by the competent authority. It appears that the petitioner had thereafter upon joining the Peace Keeping Force at Haiti, submitted a representation for restoration of his promotion and whereas vide a communication dated 24.01.2013, the same had been rejected by the competent authority. The petitioner thereafter again made a representation to the respondents for the promotion to be restored and whereas vide a communication dated 22.07.2013, the respondents had rejected such representation, more particularly submitting that an earlier representation which had been submitted by the petitioner had been disposed of on 24.01.2013, and whereas the petitioner was directed not to make representations on issues which had already been decided. It appears that the petitioner was promoted as Inspector on 01.09.2014. It also appears that the petitioner had submitted representations intermittently. Thereafter, on 09.01.2024, the petitioner had submitted a legal notice through his learned Advocate, more particularly again seeking for grant of deemed date from the date the petitioner was first promoted. The said application/notice had been rejected by the respondents vide their communication dated 22.03.2024. It would thus appear that the actual order impugned would be only the order dated 12.09.2012, whereby promotion given to the petitioner had been cancelled and possibly the order dated 24.01.2013, whereby the representation against cancellation of promotion had been rejected. The order dated 22.03.2024, clearly appears to be a ruse, just to come out of the limitation of 11-12 years, which the petitioner would face, if a petition was filed challenging the order or the year 2012-2013. As it is, in the order dated 22.03.2024, the respondents have merely reiterated that since in the order dated 24.01.2013, the respondents have already rejected the representation of the present petir, therefore nothing else was required to be done and whereas the order dated 24.01.2013 has been reproduced in the order dated 22.03.2024. Thus, essentially it is only the order dated 12.09.2012 which is under challenge before this Court. 4. Since essentially an order of the year 2012 was being challenged, therefore, learned Advocate Mr. Patel had been asked by this Court to explain why such a delayed petition should be entertained and whereas learned Advocate Mr. Thus, essentially it is only the order dated 12.09.2012 which is under challenge before this Court. 4. Since essentially an order of the year 2012 was being challenged, therefore, learned Advocate Mr. Patel had been asked by this Court to explain why such a delayed petition should be entertained and whereas learned Advocate Mr. Patel would rely upon paragraph No. 5 of the petition submitting that there was a policy by the Ministry of Home Affairs dated 14.02.2005 which the petitioner came to know recently upon juniors shortlisted for promotion to the post of Assistant Commandant which would cause continuous humiliation and being a gross violation of Article 21 of the Constitution of India, therefore this Court should consider the present petition. 5. Having heard the learned Advocate for the petitioner and having perused the averments and the documents, in the considered opinion of this Court, the present petition is frivolous both on merits as well as on the ground of explanation for delay. 6. Insofar as the merits are concerned, it would appear that upon the petitioner being promoted from the post of Sub-Inspector, Fire to the post of Inspector, Fire, since he was taking training for joining the UNP Keeping Force at Haiti, he was asked to give willingness for accepting the promotion and whereas the petitioner in no uncertain terms has submitted as noticed above that he is forgoing his promotion and he will not claim seniority if juniors are promoted to the next higher rank due to his unwillingness. Having given such a specific undertaking, it is not open for the petitioner too, after more than a decade to claim as averred in the petition that he did not have equal bargaining power, therefore he gave his unwillingness involuntarily. As a matter of fact, for persons working in the uniform services, promotion in addition to bringing financial benefit, is also an issue of rising higher in the hierarchy and whereas it could not be said that a person working in the post of Sub- Inspector would involuntarily give up a promotion which was accorded to him because of some pressure. As it is, it appears to this Court that the petitioner wanted to avail of a chance to join the UNP Keeping Force at Haiti, and therefore, he had voluntarily given up his promotion and whereas after having availed of the outstation deputation, the petitioner now wants the respondents to restore the promotion. Such a case of rethink, more particularly upon a clear unwillingness submitted by the petitioner cannot and is not required to be countenanced. The respondents have rightly not acceded to the request of the petitioner for restoration of promotion. 7. Insofar as the issue of delay is concerned, it would appear that somewhere in the year 2013, after his representation had been rejected for the second time, the petitioner had given up any claim and whereas after more than a decade, the petitioner is now trying to revive a stale claim. The revival also is not based upon any kind of facts or figures for justifying the delay of almost one decade. It is now a trite position that while there is no limitation prescribed for approaching this Court for invoking the writ jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, yet, a writ petition can only be invoked by a litigant who comes before this Court within a reasonable time. A writ Court would not normally grant any relief to a person who sleeps over his right and approaches the Court after an extraordinary delay. The principle has been succinctly explained by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in a recent decision in case of Mrinmoy Maity Vs. Chhanda Koley and Others (Civil Appeal No. 5027 of 2020, decision dated 18.04.2024). Paragraphs No. 9 to 14 of the said decision being relevant for the present purpose are reproduced hereinbelow for benefit. "9. Having heard rival contentions raised and on perusal of the facts obtained in the present case, we are of the considered view that writ petitioner ought to have been non-suited or in other words writ petition ought to have been dismissed on the ground of delay and latches itself. An applicant who approaches the court belatedly or in other words sleeps over his rights for a considerable period of time, wakes up from his deep slumber ought not to be granted the extraordinary relief by the writ courts. This Court time and again has held that delay defeats equity. An applicant who approaches the court belatedly or in other words sleeps over his rights for a considerable period of time, wakes up from his deep slumber ought not to be granted the extraordinary relief by the writ courts. This Court time and again has held that delay defeats equity. Delay or latches is one of the factors which should be born in mind by the High Court while exercising discretionary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a given case, the High Court may refuse to invoke its extraordinary powers if laxity on the part of the applicant to assert his right has allowed the cause of action to drift away and attempts are made subsequently to rekindle the lapsed cause of action. 10. The discretion to be exercised would be with care and caution. If the delay which has occasioned in approaching the writ court is explained which would appeal to the conscience of the court, in such circumstances it cannot be gainsaid by the contesting party that for all times to come the delay is not to be condoned. There may be myriad circumstances which gives rise to the invoking of the extraordinary jurisdiction and it all depends on facts and circumstances of each case, same cannot be described in a straight jacket formula with mathematical precision. The ultimate discretion to be exercised by the writ court depends upon the facts that it has to travel or the terrain in which the facts have travelled. 11. For filing of a writ petition, there is no doubt that no fixed period of limitation is prescribed. However, when the extraordinary jurisdiction of the writ court is invoked, it has to be seen as to whether within a reasonable time same has been invoked and even submitting of memorials would not revive the dead cause of action or resurrect the cause of action which has had a natural death. In such circumstances on the ground of delay and latches alone, the appeal ought to be dismissed or the applicant ought to be non- suited. If it is found that the writ petitioner is guilty of delay and latches, the High Court ought to dismiss the petition on that sole ground itself, in as much as the writ courts are not to indulge in permitting such indolent litigant to take advantage of his own wrong. If it is found that the writ petitioner is guilty of delay and latches, the High Court ought to dismiss the petition on that sole ground itself, in as much as the writ courts are not to indulge in permitting such indolent litigant to take advantage of his own wrong. It is true that there cannot be any waiver of fundamental right but while exercising discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226, the High Court will have to necessarily take into consideration the delay and latches on the part of the applicant in approaching a writ court. This Court in the case of Tridip Kumar Dingal v. State of W.B., (2009) 1 SCC 768 has held to the following effect: “56. We are unable to uphold the contention. It is no doubt true that there can be no waiver of fundamental right. But while exercising discretionary jurisdiction under Articles 32, 226, 227 or 136 of the Constitution, this Court takes into account certain factors and one of such considerations is delay and laches on the part of the applicant in approaching a writ court. It is well settled that power to issue a writ is discretionary. One of the grounds for refusing reliefs under Article 32 or 226 of the Constitution is that the petitioner is guilty of delay and laches. 57. If the petitioner wants to invoke jurisdiction of a writ court, he should come to the Court at the earliest reasonably possible opportunity. Inordinate delay in making the motion for a writ will indeed be a good ground for refusing to exercise such discretionary jurisdiction. The underlying object of this principle is not to encourage agitation of stale claims and exhume matters which have already been disposed of or settled or where the rights of third parties have accrued in the meantime (vide State of M.P. vs. Bhailal Bhai [ AIR 1964 SC 1006 : (1964) 6 SCR 261 ], Moon Mills Ltd. vs. Industrial Court [ AIR 1967 SC 1450 ] and Bhoop Singh vs. Union of India [ (1992) 3 SCC 136 : (1992) 21 ATC 675 : (1992) 2 SCR 969 ]). This principle applies even in case of an infringement of fundamental right (vide Tilokchand Motichand vs. H.B. Munshi [ (1969) 1 SCC 110 ], Durga Prashad vs. Chief Controller of Imports & Exports [ (1969) 1 SCC 185 ] and Rabindranath Bose vs. Union of India [ (1970) 1 SCC 84 ]). 58. There is no upper limit and there is no lower limit as to when a person can approach a court. The question is one of discretion and has to be decided on the basis of facts before the court depending on and varying from case to case. It will depend upon what the breach of fundamental right and the remedy claimed are and when and how the delay arose.” 12. It is apposite to take note of the dicta laid down by this Court in Karnataka Power Corportion Ltd. vs. K. Thangappan, (2006) 4 SCC 322 whereunder it has been held that the High Court may refuse to exercise extraordinary jurisdiction if there is negligence or omissions on the part of the applicant to assert his right. It has been further held thereunder: “6. Delay or laches is one of the factors which is to be borne in mind by the High Court when they exercise their discretionary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution. In an appropriate case the High Court may refuse to invoke its extraordinary powers if there is such negligence or omission on the part of the applicant to assert his right as taken in conjunction with the lapse of time and other circumstances, causes prejudice to the opposite party. Even where fundamental right is involved the matter is still within the discretion of the Court as pointed out in Durga Prashad vs. Chief Controller of Imports and Exports [ (1969) 1 SCC 185 : AIR 1970 SC 769 ]. Of course, the discretion has to be exercised judicially and reasonably. 7. What was stated in this regard by Sir Barnes Peacock in Lindsay Petroleum Co. vs. Prosper Armstrong Hurd [(1874) 5 PC 221 : 22 WR 492] (PC at p. 239) was approved by this Court in Moon Mills Ltd. vs. M.R. Meher [ AIR 1967 SC 1450 ] and Maharashtra SRTC vs. Shri Balwant Regular Motor Service [ (1969) 1 SCR 808 : AIR 1969 SC 329 ]. vs. Prosper Armstrong Hurd [(1874) 5 PC 221 : 22 WR 492] (PC at p. 239) was approved by this Court in Moon Mills Ltd. vs. M.R. Meher [ AIR 1967 SC 1450 ] and Maharashtra SRTC vs. Shri Balwant Regular Motor Service [ (1969) 1 SCR 808 : AIR 1969 SC 329 ]. Sir Barnes had stated: “Now, the doctrine of laches in courts of equity is not an arbitrary or a technical doctrine. Where it would be practically unjust to give a remedy either because the party has, by his conduct done that which might fairly be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it, or where by his conduct and neglect he has though perhaps not waiving that remedy, yet put the other party in a situation in which it would not be reasonable to place him if the remedy were afterwards to be asserted, in either of these cases, lapse of time and delay are most material. But in every case, if an argument against relief, which otherwise would be just, is founded upon mere delay, that delay of course not amounting to a bar by any statute of limitation, the validity of that defence must be tried upon principles substantially equitable. Two circumstances always important in such cases are, the length of the delay and the nature of the acts done during the interval which might affect either party and cause a balance of justice or injustice in taking the one course or the other, so far as it relates to the remedy.” 8. It would be appropriate to note certain decisions of this Court in which this aspect has been dealt with in relation to Article 32 of the Constitution. It is apparent that what has been stated as regards that article would apply, a fortiori, to Article 226. It was observed in Rabindranath Bose v. Union of India [ (1970) 1 SCC 84 : AIR 1970 SC 470 ] that no relief can be given to the petitioner who without any reasonable explanation approaches this Court under Article 32 after inordinate delay. It was stated that though Article 32 is itself a guaranteed right, it does not follow from this that it was the intention of the Constitution-makers that this Court should disregard all principles and grant relief in petitions filed after inordinate delay. 9. It was stated that though Article 32 is itself a guaranteed right, it does not follow from this that it was the intention of the Constitution-makers that this Court should disregard all principles and grant relief in petitions filed after inordinate delay. 9. It was stated in State of M.P. v. Nandlal Jaiswal [ (1986) 4 SCC 566 : AIR 1987 SC 251 ] that the High Court in exercise of its discretion does not ordinarily assist the tardy and the indolent or the acquiescent and the lethargic. If there is inordinate delay on the part of the petitioner and such delay is not satisfactorily explained, the High Court may decline to intervene and grant relief in exercise of its writ jurisdiction. It was stated that this rule is premised on a number of factors. The High Court does not ordinarily permit a belated resort to the extraordinary remedy because it is likely to cause confusion and public inconvenience and bring, in its train new injustices, and if writ jurisdiction is exercised after unreasonable delay, it may have the effect of inflicting not only hardship and inconvenience but also injustice on third parties. It was pointed out that when writ jurisdiction is invoked, unexplained delay coupled with the creation of third-party rights in the meantime is an important factor which also weighs with the High Court in deciding whether or not to exercise such jurisdiction.” 13. Reiterating the aspect of delay and latches would disentitle the discretionary relief being granted, this Court in the case of Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply & Sewerage Board v. T.T. Murali Babu, (2014) 4 SCC 108 has held: “16. Thus, the doctrine of delay and laches should not be lightly brushed aside. A writ court is required to weigh the explanation offered and the acceptability of the same. The court should bear in mind that it is exercising an extraordinary and equitable jurisdiction. As a constitutional court it has a duty to protect the rights of the citizens but simultaneously it is to keep itself alive to the primary principle that when an aggrieved person, without adequate reason, approaches the court at his own leisure or pleasure, the court would be under legal obligation to scrutinise whether the lis at a belated stage should be entertained or not. Be it noted, delay comes in the way of equity. Be it noted, delay comes in the way of equity. In certain circumstances delay and laches may not be fatal but in most circumstances inordinate delay would only invite disaster for the litigant who knocks at the doors of the court. Delay reflects inactivity and inaction on the part of a litigant — a litigant who has forgotten the basic norms, namely, “procrastination is the greatest thief of time” and second, law does not permit one to sleep and rise like a phoenix. Delay does bring in hazard and causes injury to the lis.” 14. Having regard to the afore-stated principles of law enunciated herein above, when we turn our attention to facts on hand, it would not detain us for too long for accepting the plea of the appellant in affirming the order of the Learned Single Judge and dismissing the writ petition on the ground of delay and latches. We say so for reasons more than one, firstly, it requires to be noticed that the writ petitioner was a rival applicant along with the appellant herein for grant of LPG distributorship and she along with the appellant herein, were found to be eligible and the appellant herein was held to be successful by virtue of draw of lots. This factual aspect would reflect that the writ petitioner was aware of all the developments including that of the allotment of distributorship having been made in favour of the appellant herein way back in 2014, yet did not challenge and only on acceptance of the alternate land offered by the appellant in March, 2017 and permitting him to construct the godown and the showroom. Same was challenged in the year 2017 and thereby the writ petitioner had allowed his right if at all if any to be drifted away or in other words acquiesced in the acts of the Corporation and as such on this short ground itself the appellant has to succeed. Same was challenged in the year 2017 and thereby the writ petitioner had allowed his right if at all if any to be drifted away or in other words acquiesced in the acts of the Corporation and as such on this short ground itself the appellant has to succeed. Secondly, another fact which has swayed in our mind to accept the plea of the appellant herein is that, undisputedly the appropriate government had felt the need of permitting the Oil Marketing Companies to be more flexible and as such modification to the guidelines had been brought about on 15.04.2015 whereby the applicants were permitted to offer alternate land where the land initially offered by them was found deficient or not suitable or change of the land, subject to specifications as laid down in the advertisement being met. There being no stiff opposition or strong resistance to the alternate land offered by the appellant herein not being as per the specifications indicated in the advertisement, we see no reason to substitute the court’s view to that of the experts namely, the Corporation which has in its wisdom has exercised its discretion as is evident from the report filed in the form of affidavit by the territory manager (LPG)/BPCL whereunder it has been stated: “13. On the basis of xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx to non- agricultural. In his application form the said Respondent no. 9 had provided the Land for godown at Plot No 3732, Khatian No LR 2585, 2586, 2587 JL No 34, Mouza Kolera, Jamalpur, Distt Burdwan admeasuring 33 decimal. The same was cleared based on Registered Lease Deed, which was found to have been genuine in all respects as confirmed by the ADSR Jamalpur. 16. The land offered by the successful candidate, namely the Respondent no. 9 was found to be eligible by relying on the abovementioned clauses, which determine eligibility of the land based on the status of ownership. The fact that the said land was a “Barga” land is not a material condition on the basis of which the Respondent no. 9’s candidature could be cancelled. 24. Subsequently, FVC of the said newly offered land by the LOI holder, Respondent no. 9 was conducted and the same was found suitable for construction of LPG Godown. The fact that the said land was a “Barga” land is not a material condition on the basis of which the Respondent no. 9’s candidature could be cancelled. 24. Subsequently, FVC of the said newly offered land by the LOI holder, Respondent no. 9 was conducted and the same was found suitable for construction of LPG Godown. A letter being DGP:LPG OMP: Jamalpur dated 21.03.2017 was provided to the said LOI holder informing him that the alternate land provided is found suitable and therefore his request to construct LPG Godown in the said alternate land has been approved. A copy of the said letter dated 21.03.2017 is annexed hereto and is marked as “R-5”. 25. It is therefore submitted that the steps taken by the Respondent no. 3 in allowing the LOI holder, Respondent no. 9, to provide alternate land for construction of godown, have been in consonance. with the change in policies and no favoritism or nepotism, as suggested by the petitioner has been in play. 32. It is further clarified that the FVC conducted on the original land offered by the Respondent no. 9 was found to be satisfactory on all counts, and only on the basis of this, his request for provision of alternate land wall accepted.”" 8. Considering the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court, since the present petition is preferred after a gross delay of more than 11-12 years after the impugned impugned decision dated 12.09.2012, and whereas since no reasonable cause has been stated in the present petition, in the considered opinion of this Court, the petition suffers from delay and is not required to be entertained. While the petitioner is attempting to rely upon representations submitted, it has been held by the Hon'ble Apex Court that submitting memorials/representations would not revive a dead cause of action. The respondents having rejected the representation as far as back in the year 2013, any further representation on the same subject matter would be a futile exercise. 9. Furthermore, reliance upon some policy of 2005, would not help to revive a dead cause. The petitioner having remained indolent and inactive for almost a decade is attempting to now revive his cause based on a some policy which was in existence much before the probable grievance of the petitioner had arisen. 9. Furthermore, reliance upon some policy of 2005, would not help to revive a dead cause. The petitioner having remained indolent and inactive for almost a decade is attempting to now revive his cause based on a some policy which was in existence much before the probable grievance of the petitioner had arisen. The petitioner having waives his right to agitate any grievance, the present petition does not deserve to be entertained. Hence, the present petition stands disposed of as rejected.