ORDER : A. Badharudeen, J. This Criminal Miscellaneous Case has been filed under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, to quash all further proceedings in Annexure-V Final Report, now pending as S.C. No.605/2020 on the files of the Special Court for trial of cases under the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act [hereinafter referred as ‘POCSO Act’ for short], Palakkad. The petitioner herein is the sole accused in the above case. 2. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned Public Prosecutor, in detail. Perused the case diary and the relevant materials available. 3. In a nut shell, the prosecution allegation is that, while the victim, a minor girl, was studying in the 4th standard at Govt. Higher Secondary School, Thiruvazhiyadu, she felt head ache and informed the same to one Suchitra teacher. The teacher advised her to take rest inside the class room and she found abode inside the class room. The petitioner/accused is also a teacher of the school. Later, she was brought to the class room of the petitioner/accused and the accused insisted her to sit at his class room. During interval, all students went out of the class room and the victim laid on the bench, because of headache. Soon, the petitioner/accused touched on her forehead, put his hands inside her shirt and pressed on her breast. Then, he pressed on her buttocks, thigh and vagina with sexual intent. He also kissed on the forehead of the victim. Then, he instructed the victim that this occurrence should not be disclosed to anybody. When the victim apprehended similar overt acts at the instance of the accused, she had informed the same to her friends Anusree, Nandana and Keerthana. Later, they informed the said occurrence to the father of the victim and accordingly police complaint was lodged, after discussing the matter with her mother also. On this premise, the prosecution alleges commission of offences punishable under Section 354A(i)(i) of IPC and Sections 8 read with 7, 10 read with 9(f)(m) of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act. 4. On this premise, the prosecution alleges commission of offences punishable under Section 354A(i)(i) of IPC and Sections 8 read with 7, 10 read with 9(f)(m) of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act. 4. While seeking quashment of this proceedings, the learned counsel for the petitioner argued that, the allegations of the prosecution are false and the bonafide intention of the accused, who is a teacher of the school, to apply vicks on the neck of the victim, so as to give her relief from the headache, was given the colour of non bailable sexual offences, to implicate him in this crime. It is argued further that, now the parents of the victim filed affidavits stating that they have no grievance in the matter of quashing the proceedings. Therefore, the prayer for quashment is liable to be allowed. It is further argued that, even otherwise, in the subsequent statements given by the victim, as well as in the subsequent 164 statement of the victim, the victim not stated the alleged overt acts as stated in the FIS and in the previous 164 statement. It is specifically pointed out that, the parents of the victim also given a letter to the Superintendent of Police as Annexure.A2, stating that the entire case emanated under misconception of facts and the proceedings thereof was liable to be dropped. 5. Opposing the quashment sought for, on the ground of settlement and subsequent statements given by the victim, the learned Public Prosecutor would submit that, going by the initial statement given by the victim and the initial 164 statement given by her, the allegation of the prosecution is well made out, prima facie and the subsequent statement, if any, not disclosing the alleged overt acts at the instance of the victim, by itself is not a ground for quashing the entire proceedings. 6. Adverting to the power of this Court to quash criminal proceedings restoring to Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. is concerned, indubitably, in respect of serious offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc., or other offences of mental depravity under IPC or offences of moral turpitude under special statutes, like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity, the settlement between the offender and the victim can have no legal sanction at all. In a case of rape or attempt of rape, the conception of compromise under no circumstances can really be thought of. These are crimes against the body of a woman which is her own temple. These are offences which suffocate the breath of life and sully the reputation. And reputation, needless to emphasise, is the richest jewel one can conceive of in life. No one would allow it to be extinguished. When a human frame is defiled, the "purest treasure", is lost. Dignity of a woman is a part of her non-perishable and immortal self and no one should ever think of painting it in clay. There cannot be a compromise or settlement as it would be against her honour which matters the most. It is sacrosanct. Sometimes solace is given that the perpetrator of the crime has acceded to enter into wedlock with her which is nothing but putting pressure in an adroit manner; and that the Courts are to remain absolutely away from this subterfuge to adopt a soft approach to the case, for any kind of liberal approach has to be put in the compartment of spectacular error. Or to put it differently, it would be in the realm of a sanctuary of error. Such an attitude reflects lack of sensibility towards the dignity, the elan vital, of a woman. Any kind of liberal approach or thought of mediation in this regard is thoroughly and completely sans legal permissibility. Heinous and serious offences involving mental depravity or offences such as murder, rape and dacoity cannot appropriately be quashed though the victim or the family of the victim have settled the dispute. Such offences are, truly speaking, not private in nature but have a serious impact upon society. The decision to continue with the trial in such cases is founded on the overriding element of public interest in punishing persons for serious offences. In other words, grave or serious offences or offences which involve moral turpitude or have a harmful effect on the social and moral fabric of the society or involve matters concerning public policy, cannot be construed betwixt two individuals or groups only, for such offences have the potential to impact the society at large. In other words, grave or serious offences or offences which involve moral turpitude or have a harmful effect on the social and moral fabric of the society or involve matters concerning public policy, cannot be construed betwixt two individuals or groups only, for such offences have the potential to impact the society at large. Effacing abominable offences through quashing process would not only send a wrong signal to the community, but may also accord an undue benefit to unscrupulous habitual or professional offenders, who can secure a “settlement” through duress, threats, social boycotts, bribes or other dubious means. It is well said that “let no guilty man escape, if it can be avoided.” 7. Thus, the law as it stands is that although High Court can invoke its jurisdiction u/s.482 Cr.P.C. even in non-compoundable offence and can quash the proceedings on the basis of settlement arrived at between the parties even in the cases of non-compoundable offences but while exercising its jurisdiction this Court must consider the fact that whether the proceeding relates to any serious and heinous offences and whether the crime in question has impact over the society. In cases of serious nature which affects the society at large this Court should not exercise its jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. for quashing the proceedings on the basis of compromise executed between the parties. (See decisions in Gian Singh v. State of Punjab and Another reported in [ (2012) 10 SCC 303 ], Narinder Singh and Others v. State of Punjab and Another reported in [(2014) 9 SCC 466], Shimbhu v. State of Haryana reported in [AIR 2014 Supreme Court 739](three Bench), State of Madhya Pradesh v. Madanlal reported in [AIR 2015 Supreme Court 3003] (two Bench), Parbatbhai Aahir @ Parbatbhai Bhimsinhbhai Karmur and Others v. State of Gujarat and Another reported in [ (2017) 9 SCC 641 ], State of Madhya Pradesh v. Laxmi Narayan & Ors. reported in [ (2019) 5 SCC 688 ], Arun Singh and Others v. State of Uttar Pradesh Through its Secretary and Another reported in [(2020) (3) SCC 736], Ram Gopal & Another v. State of Madhya Pradesh reported in [(2021 0 Supreme (SC) 529)], Daxaben v. The State of Gujarat & others reported in [2022 LiveLaw (SC) 642], P.Dharmraj v. Shanmugam and others decided on 8th September 2022 in Crl.Appeal Nos.1515-1516 of 2022). 8. 8. Thus, settlement of cases under the POCSO Act offences is not permissible under law. This position has been affirmed by the Apex Court in a recent decision reported in [2024 KLT OnLine 2105 (SC)] In Re: Right to Privacy of Adolescents (Suo Motu W.P.(C) No.3/2023) and it was held by the Apex Court in paragraph No.21 that, on a plain reading of “sixthly” in Section 375 read with Section 376(2) (n) of the IPC, notwithstanding the consensual sexual relationship, the offence punishable under clause (n) of subsection (2) of Section 376 of the IPC, was made out. One of the objectives of the POSCO Act is to effectively address sexual exploitation and sexual abuse of children, as both offences are very heinous. To give effect to the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Children ratified by India on 11th December 1992, the POCSO Act has been enacted. As noted earlier, in the facts of the case, the accused was not an adolescent, but his age was about twenty-five years on the date of the commission of the offence, and the victim was only fourteen years old. When such offences of rape and aggravated penetrative sexual assault are committed, by exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and/or Section 482 of the Cr.PC, the High Court cannot acquit an accused whose guilt has been proved. The case considered by the Apex Court is one where evidence already adduced and guilt was proved. 9. In this matter, as per the FIS given by the victim, it is stated that the, while the victim was laying on a bench inside the class room, due to headache, the accused touched on her forehead, put his hands inside her shirt and pressed on her breast. Then, he pressed on her buttocks, thigh and vagina and also kissed on her forehead with sexual intent. He also instructed the victim that this occurrence should not be disclosed to anybody. That apart, in the 164 statement recorded soon after the occurrence also, the victim reiterated the said overt acts. It is true that subsequently, Annexure.A2 petition was filed before the Superintendent of Police by the parents of the victim, on the submission that the entire allegations are based on misconception of facts and therefore, the case had to be dropped. That apart, in the 164 statement recorded soon after the occurrence also, the victim reiterated the said overt acts. It is true that subsequently, Annexure.A2 petition was filed before the Superintendent of Police by the parents of the victim, on the submission that the entire allegations are based on misconception of facts and therefore, the case had to be dropped. It was thereafter, the subsequent 164 statement was recorded on 10.08.2020, after recording the initial 164 statement on 15.10.2019, wherein the victim confined her statement to putting of vicks on her forehead and neck by the petitioner/accused. But, she did not give statement that the statement given on earlier occasion was false. 10. In this context, it is relevant to note that, the during crime stage, Crl.M.C. No.7501/2019 was filed by the petitioner before this Court seeking quashment of this crime, where, after discussing the matter, in paragraph Nos. 5, 6 and 7, this Court disallowed the prayer for quashment on the ground of settlement between the parties. In paragraph Nos. 5, 6 and 7 of the order this Court observed as under: 5. After having heard both sides, it is seen that the allegations disclosed in this case are quite serious and grave. The petitioner is a senior teacher, aged 50 years and the victim in this case is a minor girl aged 10 years. 6. The Apex Court and this Court has held in catena decisions as in Gian Singh v. State of Punjab reported in 2013 (1) SCC (Cri) 160 = (2012) 10 SCC 303 that though High Courts could liberally exercise the inherent powers under Sec.482 of Cr.PC in the matter of the quashment of the impugned criminal proceedings on the ground of settlement, in matters disclosing personal offences, commercial disputes etc,. the said power to quash the proceedings on the ground of settlement may not be exercised in serious cases like rape, dacoity, etc,. 7. Taking note of the nature of the allegations disclosed in this case, this Court is constrained to take the view that this is not a fit case for exercising the hyperactive inherent powers conferred under Sec.482 of Cr.PC, for quashment of the impugned criminal proceedings on the ground of settlement between the parties. 11. 7. Taking note of the nature of the allegations disclosed in this case, this Court is constrained to take the view that this is not a fit case for exercising the hyperactive inherent powers conferred under Sec.482 of Cr.PC, for quashment of the impugned criminal proceedings on the ground of settlement between the parties. 11. Thus, it appears that the prayer to quash the proceedings, at the crime stage, on the ground of settlement was disallowed by this Court and the said order has become final. Now, the same relief is sought for in the present Crl.M.C. also, without challenging the earlier order refusing quashment of the crime on the ground of settlement. 12. Now, the pertinent question is, whether a second petition under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. is maintainable on grounds that were available at the time of filing the first petition under Section 482 of Cr.P.C? 13. In this regard, paragraph 10 and 11 of latest decision of the Apex Court reported in [2023 KLT OnLine 2405 (SC) Bhisham Lal Verma v. State of Uttar Pradesh are relevant. The same are under: 10. In S. Madan Kumar vs. K. Arjunan (2006 NWN 8, the Madras High Court observed that a person who invokes Section 482 Cr.P.C. should honestly come before the Court raising all the pleas available to him at that point of time and he is not supposed to approach the Court with instalment pleas. It was further observed that there may be a change of circumstances during the course of criminal proceedings which would give scope for the person aggrieved to invoke the inherent jurisdiction of the Court, but when he is posted with all the facts and circumstances of a case, he cannot withhold part of it for the purpose of filing yet another petition seeking the same relief. 11. We are in complete agreement with these observations of the Madras High Court. Though it is clear that there can be no blanket rule that a second petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. would not lie in any situation and it would depend upon the facts and circumstances of the individual case, it is not open to a person aggrieved to raise one plea after the other, by invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C., though all such pleas were very much available even at the first instance. Permitting the filing of successive petitions under Section 482 Cr.P.C. ignoring this principle would enable an ingenious accused to effectively stall the proceedings against him to suit his own interest and convenience, by filing one petition after another under Section 482 Cr.P.C., irrespective of when the cause therefor arose. Such abuse of process cannot be permitted. 14. Thus, the legal position is clear that there can be no blanket rule that a second petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. would not lie in any situation and it would depend upon the facts and circumstances of the individual case. However, it is not open to a person aggrieved to raise one plea after the other, by invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C., though all such pleas were very much available even at the first instance. Permitting the filing of successive petitions under Section 482 Cr.P.C. ignoring this principle would enable an ingenious accused to effectively stall the proceedings against him to suit his own interest and convenience, by filing one petition after another under Section 482 Cr.P.C., irrespective of when the cause therefor arose. Such abuse of process cannot be permitted and such instances a second petition under Section 428 of Cr.P.C. is not at all maintainable. 15. In the present case, the prayer for quashment on the ground of settlement was earlier dismissed by this Court. The said order has become final since the same was not challenged at all. Now, the same relief has been asked for and the same cannot be considered by this Court. Holding so, affidavits filed by the parents of the victim supporting settlement or non disclosure of the event, when the victim’s statement was recorded for the second time under Section 164 of Cr.P.C, after a long gap are not grounds to quash the criminal proceedings on the ground of settlement, though the same are matters to be considered by the trial court, during trial, if opted by the accused with the aid of Section 145 of the Evidence Act. In view of the matter, quashment sought for by the petitioner/accused is liable to fail. 16. Accordingly this Crl.M.C stands dismissed with liberty to the petitioner to raise his contentions before the trial court during trial. Interim stay in this matter stands vacated. Registry shall forward a copy of this order to the jurisdictional court for information and further steps.