ORDER : (Nupur Bhati, J.) : 1. The instant Misc. Appeal has been filed under Section 30 of the Employee’s compensation Act, 1923 against the order dated 27.02.2015 passed by Employee’s Compensation Commissioner, Udaipur in case No.WC-03/2009 (J.L.C) titled as Smt. Shehnaz Bano & Ors. Vs. Khushbu Auto Finance Ltd. Udaipur & Ors. by which the application of the claimants filed under the Employee’s Compensation Act, 1923 (‘Act of 1923’) has been partly allowed and compensation of Rs.3,89,280/-along with interest @ 12 % per annum from the date of filing application i.e. 20.03.2009 till the date of realisation has been awarded. 2. Brief facts of the case are that the respondents/claimants filed and application before the Employee’s Compensation Commissioner, Udaipur under Section 3 of the Act of 1923 on 20.03.2009 claiming compensation of Rs.3,89,280/-on account of death of Nizamuddin. The case of the claimants is that two months prior to the accident, Nizamudding had been employed as driver on Auto No. RJ-27-PA-0143 which was belonged to respondent No.8 and 9 i.e. Khushbo Auto Finance Ltd. And Prakash Suthar at a salary of Rs.3,000/-per month with Rs. 1000/-by way of allowances. On 20.02.2009, Nizamuddin along with other passesngers in his Auto being driven by him was going to Baleecha which was turned turtle and he got fracture and severe injuries due to which he died. The appellant company being the insurer of the involved vehicle was impleaded as respondent and it was prayed that the liability for payment of compensation may be fastened on all the respondents jointly and severely. 3. Notices were issued to the respondent No.8 and 9 and respondent No.8 submitted its reply to the application in which the factum of Nizamuddin (deceased) being employed by it and that he was given a salary of Rs.3,000/-and Rs.1,000/-by way of allowance was denied. The respondent No.9 also submitted his reply to the application in which he has also denied that Nizamuddin was employed on the involved vehicle as a driver and was taking a salary of Rs.3,000/-and Rs.1,000/-as allowance. The appellant company also submitted its reply in which the factum of involved vehicle being insured with it was admitted. However, appellant company denied that Nizamuddin was in the employment of respondents No.8 and 9 and the factum of accident was also denied. Thus, the insurance company prayed that claim application be dismissal qua the appellant. 4. The appellant company also submitted its reply in which the factum of involved vehicle being insured with it was admitted. However, appellant company denied that Nizamuddin was in the employment of respondents No.8 and 9 and the factum of accident was also denied. Thus, the insurance company prayed that claim application be dismissal qua the appellant. 4. As per pleadings of the claim petition, following four issues were framed: 5. The claimants in support of the claim petition, led evidence and exhibited documents. The learned Commissioner on the basis of the evidence and exhibited documents, decided issue No.1 and 2 in favor of the claimants and decided issue No.3 and 4 related to the quantum of compensation as well as the parties who were liable to pay compensation to the claimants in favor of the claimants and against respondent No.8 and 9 and they were held liable to pay the compensation amount of Rs.3,89,280/-jointly and severally. 6. Learned counsel for the appellant insurance company submits that the Commissioner has committed grave legal error while deciding the issue No.1 related to the fact that the deceased was an employee of respondent No.8 and 9 merely on the basis of statement of wife of the deceased Smt. Shehnaz Bano as well as one witness namely Abdul Zahid Khan whose testimony could not be believed in the absence of any documentary evidence. Learned counsel further submits that the Commissioner could not come to a finding in absence of any documentary evidence that the deceased died in the accident during of the course of employment under them. He further submits that the issue No.2 that the deceased was being paid a salary of Rs.3,000/-per month with Rs.1,000/-per month as allowances cannot be sustained in absence of any reliable evidence available on record. 7. Learned counsel for the appellant further submits that the Commissioner has again committed a grave legal error in deciding issue No.3 and 4 which related to the quantum of compensation and the liability for payment of the same by respondent No.8 and 9, in the absence of clear proof regarding the relationship of employer and employee between the owners and deceased. He also submits that fastening the liability for payment for interest on the appellant insurance company under Section 4-A(3) of the Act despite, the well settled legal position that in case of default of employer in making payment of compensation to the claimants within one month of the accident, the responsibility of payment of interest squarely falls on the employer and the appellant insurance company cannot be directed to make payment of interest for the fault of the employer. Learned counsel for the appellant insurance company places reliance on the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Shantabai Ananda Jagtap & Anr. v. Jayram Ganpati Jagtap [Civil Appeal No.5786/2012 decided on 04.07.2023] wherein it was held that if the relationship of employer and employee has not been proved before the Commissioner, the claimants may not be entitled to receive any compensation. The relevant para is reproduced as under: “14. The relationship of employer and employee has not been proved before the Commissioner. In our opinion, the same being the basic requirement to be fulfilled for claiming compensation under the 1923 Act, the appellants may not be entitled to receive any compensation.” 8. Learned counsel for the appellant also places reliance upon the judgment passed by Delhi High Court in the case of Maha Laxmi Hosiery v. Govind Singh & Anr. [FAO548/2016 and CM APPLs. 37377/2021 and 43984/2016 decided on 11.05.2022] wherein the observations made in the case of Automobile Association Upper India v. P.O. Labour Court II & Anr. reported in 2006 SCC OnLine Del 303. The relevant para of the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Delhi High Court in the case of Maha Laxmi Hosiery (supra.) is reproduced as under: “4. Mr. Kaushal Yadav, learned counsel for the appellant, while assailing the impugned order raised the following contentions:- i) That the workman has failed to discharge the onus of proving the employer-employee relationship; in this regard, reliance was placed on the Award dated 22.03.2011 passed by the Labour Court in ID No.389/09 and the judgment of a Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in Automobile Assoc. Upper India v. P.O. Labour Court II & Anr. reported as 2006 SCC OnLine Del 303. ii) That the reliance on the statement of Sh. Rakesh Sharma, a co-workman, was misplaced as he had deposed on the directions of the workman. Upper India v. P.O. Labour Court II & Anr. reported as 2006 SCC OnLine Del 303. ii) That the reliance on the statement of Sh. Rakesh Sharma, a co-workman, was misplaced as he had deposed on the directions of the workman. iii) That the learned Commissioner ought not to have placed reliance on the Inspectors' reports dated 09.06.2008 and 03.11.2008, as the same were not proved on record by the scribe of the reports but rather by the workman himself.” 9. Learned counsel for the respondents-claimants submits that the Commissioner has rightly passed the judgment dated 27.02.2015 after considering the overall evidence and exhibits placing on record. He further submits that the claimants has submitted the affidavit along with the papers regarding Police investigation and Post Mortem Report of deceased. He further submits that the witness Abdul Zahid Khan submitted in his affidavit that deceased Nizamuddin was driving the Auto for last two months which belongs to respondent No.8 and went with the deceased to the shop of respondent No.8 to take salary. 10. Learned counsel for the respondents-claimants further submits that the witness appearing for respondent No.8 has accepted in his cross examination that Auto No.RJ-27-PA-0143 has been registered in DTO Office on 29.08.2002 in the name of respondent No.8. He further submits that the Commissioner has rightly passed the judgment dated 27.02.2015 after considering the evidence placed on record and prayed that the instant misc. appeal deserves to be dismissed. 11. I have heard and considered the submissions advanced by the counsel representing the parties and have gone through the material available on record. 12. The appellant, in the instant appeal, has suggested the following questions of law, which reads as under; - “(I). Whether the learned commissioner in the absence of any reliable and documentary evidence available on record could have come to finding that there existed a relationship of employer and employee between the owner of the vehicle and the deceased? (II). Whether the learned commissioner merely on the oral statement of the wife of the deceased as well as one another witness who deposed before the commissioner that the deceased was employed by respondent no. 8 as driver on his vehicle without placing any documentary evidence on record could have come to a finding that the deceased was being paid a sum of Rs. 3,000/- per month as salary and Rs. 8 as driver on his vehicle without placing any documentary evidence on record could have come to a finding that the deceased was being paid a sum of Rs. 3,000/- per month as salary and Rs. 1,000/-per month as allowances and allow compensation to the claimants on the basis of such finding? (III). Whether the learned commissioner was justified in fastening the liability of payment of interest on the appellant for the default committed by the employer despite the well settled legal position in case of default of the employer and not of the insurance company?” 13. Insofar as the first question of law, as suggested by the appellant is concerned, this Court finds that the said questions have already been adjudicated by the Commissioner and while considering the Final Report (Exb. 1), FIR (Exb.2), charge-sheet (Exb.3), Property Seizure Memo (Exb. 4) and the Post-Mortem Report (Exb. 12), the Commissioner has observed that the deceased Nizamuddin died while driving the said auto, i.e. the offending vehicle. The Commissioner also observed that the said vehicle was registered in the name of respondent no. 8, Khushboo Auto Limited and it was accepted by the witness presented by the appellant that no agreement to sale has been produced by the appellant, which shows that the said vehicle was sold to any other person and therefore, in the light of these statements, the Commissioner held that the deceased Nizamuddin died while he was employed under respondent no. 8 and that, he died during the course of employment. The relevant extract of the finding arrived at by the Commissioner reads under: Thus this Court finds that the Commissioner has rightly taken into account the contents of the Final Report (Exb. 1), FIR (Exb.2), charge-sheet (Exb.3), Property Seizure Memo (Exb. 4) and the Post-Mortem Report (Exb. 12) and thus, this Court concurrs with the finding of the Commissioner that the deceased Nizamuddin died during the course of employment. 14. Subsequently, question no. 1), FIR (Exb.2), charge-sheet (Exb.3), Property Seizure Memo (Exb. 4) and the Post-Mortem Report (Exb. 12) and thus, this Court concurrs with the finding of the Commissioner that the deceased Nizamuddin died during the course of employment. 14. Subsequently, question no. II as suggested by the appellant in the instant appeal is a question of fact wherein the Court will have to re-appreciate the findings given by the Commissioner, regarding the age as well as the income of the deceased, Nizamuddin, which in the instant appeal cannot be gone into, inasmuch as per proviso to Section 30 of the Act of 1923, which inter-alia provides that no appeal can lie against any order unless a substantial question of law is involved. Section 30 of the Act of 1923 reads as under: “Section 30. Section 30 of the Act of 1923 reads as under: “Section 30. -(1) An appeal shall lie to the High Court from the following orders of a Commissioner, namely:-- (a) an order awarding as compensation a lump sum whether by way of redemption of a half-monthly payment lump sum; (aa) an order awarding interest or penalty under section 4A; (b) an order refusing to allow redemption of a half-monthly payment; (c) an order providing for the distribution of compensation among the dependants of a deceased *[employee], or disallowing any claim of a person alleging himself to be such dependant; (d) an order allowing or disallowing any claim for the amount of an indemnity under the provisions of sub-section (2) of section 12; or (e) an order refusing to register a memorandum of agreement or registering the same or providing for the registration of the same subject to conditions: Provided that no appeal shall lie against any order unless a substantial question of law is involved in the appeal, and in the case of an order other than an order such as is referred to in clause (b), unless the amount in dispute in the appeal is not less than ten thousand rupees or such higher amount as the Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, specify: Provided further that no appeal shall lie in any case in which the parties have agreed to abide by the decision of the Commissioner, or in which the order of the Commissioner gives effect to an agreement come to by the parties: Provided further that no appeal by an employer under clause (a) shall lie unless the memorandum of appeal is accompanied by a certificate by the Commissioner to the effect that the appellant has deposited with him the amount payable under the order appealed against. (2) The period of limitation for an appeal under this section shall be sixty days. (3) The provisions of section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963)], shall be applicable to appeals under this section.” In the light of express provisions mentioned in the Act of 1923, wherein the proviso to Section 30 clearly limits the scope of jurisdiction for an appeal only to the substantial questions of law, this Court finds that the appeal is not maintainable under the said proviso. 15. Furthermore, as far as question no. 15. Furthermore, as far as question no. III as suggested by the appellant is concerned, this Court finds that the Commissioner while dealing with the issue of determination of compensation, has clearly observed that the offending vehicle had been insured with the appellant and that an extra premium was also charged for worker’s liability as per the insurance policy. Thus, this Court deems it fit not to reappreciate the finding of the Commissioner, wherein it has been clearly stated that the accident took place when the offending vehicle was covered by the Insurance Policy wherein an extra premium was already charged for the worker’s liability. This Court also observes that the Commissioner has clearly mentioned that the appellant has failed to prove any kind violation of the policy conditions. The relevant extract of the finding arrived at by the Commissioner reads under: Therefore, this Court concurs with the finding of the Commissioner that in the absence of any evidence being led by the appellant to prove violation of policy condition and there being and extra premium charged, the appellant company has rightly been held jointly and severally liable. 16. This Court also finds that in the case of C. Manjamma & Anr. v. The Divisional Manager, The New India Assurance Co. Ltd. : 2022 (6) SCC 206 , the Hon’ble Apex Court has followed the decision rendered in Shakuntala Chandrakant Shreshti v. Prabhakar Maruti Garvali & Anr. : 2007 (11) SCC 668 and held that question of law would arise when the same is not dependent on examination of evidence and which does not require any fresh investigation of fact. It was also observed that a question of law would arise, when the finding is perverse or when no legal evidence is adduced to establish the jurisdictional facts and, therefore, in the present case this Court finds no substantial question of law for consideration. The relevant paragraph of the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of C. Manjamma (supra) reads as under: “12. Even in paragraph 42 of the decision in Shakuntala Chandrakant Shreshti (supra), this Court has made it clear that a question of law would arise when the same is not dependent on examination of evidence and which may not require any fresh investigation of fact. Even in paragraph 42 of the decision in Shakuntala Chandrakant Shreshti (supra), this Court has made it clear that a question of law would arise when the same is not dependent on examination of evidence and which may not require any fresh investigation of fact. A question of law would arise, of course, when the finding is perverse or when no legal evidence is adduced to establish the jurisdictional facts. The observations made by the High Court in the present case in paragraph 21 appear to be rather of assumptive nature than of specific conclusion on perversity. In other words, the view as taken by the Commissioner was the one based on the material placed on record, which basically established that the deceased was indeed employed as a driver on the vehicle; he was 30 years of age; and he died while on duty and his demise due to cardiac arrest was attributable to his job of driver. There had not been shown any other background aspect or any other clinching feature because of which death of the workman, a 30-year-old person, could be attributed to any other cause. That being the position, the view taken by the Commissioner had been a possible view of the matter in the given set of facts and circumstances; and there was no reason for the High Court to interfere with the same, particularly when the case did not involve any substantial question of law within the meaning of Section 30 of Employees Compensation Act, 1933.” The relevant discussion made by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Shakuntala Chandrakant Shreshti (supra) reads as under: “A question of law would arise when the same is not dependent upon examination of evidence, which may not require any fresh investigation of fact. A question of law would, however, arise when the finding is perverse in the sense that no legal evidence was brought on record or jurisdictional facts were not brought on record. We are not oblivious of the proposition of law as was stated by Frankfurter, J. in J.J.O’ Leary, Dy. Commnr., Fourteenth Compensation Distt. v. Brown-Pacific-Maxon Inc. [95 L. Ed 483 : 340 US 504 (1950)] that the court will not disturb a finding of an Administrative Tribunal when two views are possible and only because the appellate court can take a contrary view. Commnr., Fourteenth Compensation Distt. v. Brown-Pacific-Maxon Inc. [95 L. Ed 483 : 340 US 504 (1950)] that the court will not disturb a finding of an Administrative Tribunal when two views are possible and only because the appellate court can take a contrary view. But in the instant case, the Commissioner did not go into the jurisdictional facts not arrived at any finding based on any legal evidence in regard to the causal connection between the employment and the death.” Taking into account the above-mentioned judgments, this Court finds that the questions suggested by the appellants/claimants in the present appeal are not involving substantial questions of law and therefore, require no indulgence from this Court. 17. This Court also finds that the High Court has limited jurisdiction under Section 30 of the Act of 1923 to grant indulgence in an appeal against an order passed by the Commissioner, Workmen Compensation Act, to the extent of there being a substantial question of law involved. This court also takes into consideration the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Golla Rajanna Etc. Etc. v. The Divisional Manager and Another, Etc. : CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 11114-11119 OF 2016 decided on 23.11.2016, wherein it has been held under: “Under the scheme of the Act, the Workmen’s Compensation Commissioner is the last authority on facts. The Parliament has thought it fit to restrict the scope of the appeal only to substantial questions of law, being a welfare legislation. Unfortunately, the High Court has missed this crucial question of limited jurisdiction and has ventured to re-appreciate the evidence and recorded its own findings on percentage of disability for which also there is no basis. The whole exercise made by the High Court is not within the competence of the High Court under Section 30 of the Act.” 18. Thus, this Court observes that the contention raised by the counsel for the appellant regarding perverse finding given by the Commissioner is not acceptable because the Commissioner considering the documentary and oral evidence available on record like Final Report (Exb. 1), FIR (Exb.2), charge-sheet (Exb.3), Property Seizure Memo (Exb. 4) and the Post-Mortem Report (Exb. 12) has given a finding the deceased died while he was in the course of employment of respondent no. 1), FIR (Exb.2), charge-sheet (Exb.3), Property Seizure Memo (Exb. 4) and the Post-Mortem Report (Exb. 12) has given a finding the deceased died while he was in the course of employment of respondent no. 8 and at the time of the accident, the offending vehicle was already covered under the Insurance Policy whereby an extra premium was charged for the worker’s liability and that, there was no evidence produced by the appellant that there was a violation of the policy conditions. Thus, the findings arrived at by the Commissioner are correct finding based on evidence available on record. Furthermore, inasmuch as Section 30 of the Act of 1923 stipulates that an appeal against an order of the Commissioner, can lie only when a substantial question of law is raised, which is not the case before this Court, and thus, this Court deems it fit not to grant indulgence in the present appeal. 19. Accordingly and in view of above discussion, this Court finds no force in the instant appeal, the same is, therefore, dismissed. No costs.