JUDGMENT : Heard Sri Anoop Trivedi, learned Senior counsel for the appellant assisted by Sri Abhinava Krishna Srivastava and Sri K.R. Singh alongwith Sri Rahul Chaudhary, for the contempt applicant. 2. This contempt appeal is directed against an order passed by the learned Contempt Court dated 14.3.2024, holding the appellant guilty of contempt of an order passed by this Court on 12.12.2017 in Writ-B No. 59193 of 2017. The order passed by the contemnor dated 18.7.2022 is held to be in deliberate disobedience of the Writ Court's order. The matter has been directed to be listed on 23.4.2024 for framing of charge against the appellant. 3. An objection is taken, at the outset, to the maintainability of this appeal by Shri K.R. Singh, appearing for the applicant/respondent, who submits that the appeal under Section 19 of the Act of 1971 would be maintainable only against an order of punishment and not otherwise. He submits that the Contempt Court has only passed an order for framing of charge against which the appeal would not lie. 4. In order to deal with the issue of maintainability of appeal, it would be necessary to refer to some of the basic facts. It transpires that one Arjun Dev Kehar instituted an Original Suit No. 414 of 1991 for injunction against the Kanpur Development Authority in respect of the subject-matter of suit property. This suit was decreed on 3.10.1996. The operative portion of the judgement of the trial Court reads as under : 5. The aforesaid decree of the trial Court has attained finality with dismissal of first appeal; second appeal as well as SLP before the Supreme Court on 7.3.2008. It is thereafter that an application was moved for mutation by the plaintiff, which was allowed. Name of Arjun Dev Kehar was duly recorded. It is alleged that the plots, which were subject-matter of injunction granted by the Civil Court were then purchased by a company and its name was also mutated. The mutation entry in favour of the plaintiff and the transferee was challenged in a revision before the Board of Revenue under Section 219 of the U.P. Land Revenue Act with the delay of 9 years. This revision has been dismissed on 17.10.2017. The order of rejection of revision came to be challenged by the Kanpur Development Authority in Writ-B No. 59193 of 2017. This revision has been dismissed on 17.10.2017. The order of rejection of revision came to be challenged by the Kanpur Development Authority in Writ-B No. 59193 of 2017. This Court dismissed the writ petition on 12.12.2017, after noticing the basic facts and the controversy raised before this Court. For the sake of convenience, we deem it appropriate to reproduce the order passed by the Writ Court dismissing the writ : ''Brief facts giving rise to this petition are that one Arjun Dev, predecessor in interest of respondents 4 and 5, instituted an Original Suit No. 414 of 1991 against the petitioner - Kanpur Development Authority (in short KDA) for permanent prohibitory injunction to restrain KDA from demolishing the constructions of the plaintiff existing over plot Nos. 1104, 1105, 1107, 1110, 1111, 1112, 1113, 1115, 1106, 1109, 1116 and 1280 (fully described in the plaint) and not to interfere in the possession of the plaintiff. The plaintiff's case was that since the time of his ancestor he was in possession on the basis of zamindari patta of the year 1942 and that the defendant without any right had issued demolition notice. The defendant contested the suit by claiming that the land had been acquired vide award dated 30.12.1968; that possession was obtained much earlier by Nagar Mahapalika, which was subsequently transferred to KDA and that plaintiff had no right. By judgment and decree dated 3.10.1996, the Court of 3rd Additional Civil Judge (Sr. Div.), Kanpur Nagar decreed plaintiff's suit. While deciding the suit it had framed number of issues. Issue No. 2 was in respect of possession and title of the plaintiff whereas Issue No. 5 was as to whether the disputed land was acquired under award dated 30.12.1968. Both the issues were decided in favour of the plaintiff and it was specifically held that the defendant had failed to prove that the disputed land was acquired. The judgment of the trial Court was affirmed by the first appellate Court vide judgment and decree dated 28.4.2001 passed by 8th Additional District Judge, Kanpur Nagar on an appeal preferred by the petitioner. Thereafter, a time barred second appeal was preferred before this Court. By order dated 20.9.2007, this Court rejected the delay condonation application and consequently the appeal was dismissed as barred by limitation. Thereafter, a time barred second appeal was preferred before this Court. By order dated 20.9.2007, this Court rejected the delay condonation application and consequently the appeal was dismissed as barred by limitation. Against the order dated 20.9.2007, a Special Leave to Appeal was preferred before the Apex Court, which was dismissed by order dated 7.3.2008. In the meantime, on the strength of the Civil Court decree, the Additional District Magistrate (Land Acquisition)/Special Land Acquisition Officer (KDA), Kanpur Nagar, (respondent No. 2) addressed a letter dated 29.7.2005 (at page 257 of the paper-book) to the Tehsildar Sadar Kanpur Nagar, by way of Parwana Amaldaramad, to incorporate the name of decree holder in the records by way of correction of entry. Thereafter, by way of letter dated 16.12.2008 (at page 256 of the paper-book), a reminder was sent and, pursuant thereto, it appears, the decree holder's name was recorded on 1.1.2009. Thereafter, from the record (recital in the order dated 17.10.2017, at page 306) it appears that the land was declared abadi vide order dated 22.6.2010. Against the letter /order dated 16.12.2008, the petitioner filed revision, purportedly, under Section 219 of the U.P. Land Revenue Act, 1901, in the year 2017, with a delay of nearly 9 years, before the Board of Revenue at Lucknow (in short Board). It is this revision which has been dismissed vide impugned order dated 17.10.2017. The Board dismissed the revision, inter alia, on the ground that it was not maintainable inasmuch as: (a) after declaration of land as abadi, the Board ceases to have jurisdiction; and (b) the order challenged is an administrative order passed by the land acquisition officer in compliance of a decree affirmed up to the supreme Court against the revisionist and therefore if the revisionist has any grievance on basis of new material or evidence then it may take recourse to remedy before competent Court having jurisdiction. The learned counsel for the petitioner claimed that the Civil Court decree is a nullity because the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to deal with the subject-matter in dispute inasmuch as only the revenue Court had jurisdiction therefore the Civil Court decree would not be binding and otherwise also in an injunction suit there was no occasion to declare title. The learned counsel for the petitioner claimed that the Civil Court decree is a nullity because the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to deal with the subject-matter in dispute inasmuch as only the revenue Court had jurisdiction therefore the Civil Court decree would not be binding and otherwise also in an injunction suit there was no occasion to declare title. He further pointed out that, in between, Arjun Dev had instituted a suit under Section 229-B of the UP ZA & LR Act which was withdrawn by him. He submitted that suit under 229-B was instituted in the year 2001 and was withdrawn in the year 2008. He submitted that even otherwise the respondent No. 2 had no jurisdiction to issue Parwana Dakhal without there being any proceeding for correction of records. The learned counsel for the contesting respondents 4 and 5 supported the view taken by the Board and submitted that the decree of the Civil Court has become final; that the petitioner never raised any dispute as regards jurisdiction of the Civil Court; and as no issue as regards jurisdiction of Civil Court was raised therefore now such an issue cannot be raised by the petitioner who is bound by the decree. I have given thoughtful consideration to the submissions of the learned counsel for the parties. The plea as regards the Civil Court decree being without jurisdiction seems not to have been raised before the Civil Court in the suit proceeding. The judgment of the trial Court does not reflect that any such plea was raised at the first instance in the written statement. Further, no issue in that regard appeared to have been framed. By insertion of sub-section (1-A) in Section 331 of the U.P. Z.A. & L.R. Act (in short the Act), vide U.P. Act No. 4 of 1969, the plea as regards Civil Court's jurisdiction being barred by Section 331 of the Act, if not raised at the earliest possible opportunity and in all cases before settlement of issues, cannot be entertained by any appellate or revisional Court. Accordingly, it cannot be said that the decree of the Civil Court as against the petitioner, in the given circumstances, would be null and void. Moreover, such a claim cannot be entertained in summary proceeding arising from a mutation order. Accordingly, it cannot be said that the decree of the Civil Court as against the petitioner, in the given circumstances, would be null and void. Moreover, such a claim cannot be entertained in summary proceeding arising from a mutation order. In so far as withdrawal of the suit by the plaintiff filed under Section 229-B of the Act is concerned, it will not amount to decree in favour of the petitioner because by that time already a Civil Court decree was operating against the petitioner. Under the circumstances, the Board was justified in dismissing the revision which was otherwise also highly belated by leaving it open to the petitioner to ventilate its grievance, if otherwise permissible, before Court of competent jurisdiction. It is made clear that any observation made in this order should not be construed as any opinion expressed on the availability, or not, of right to maintain any suit or proceeding by either the petitioner or any other party in respect of their right, if any, over the land in dispute. Subject to above, the petition is dismissed.'' 6. It is worth noticing that Kanpur Development Authority then filed a suit for declaration of invalidity of decree passed by the Civil Court in Original Suit No. 414 of 1991. This suit as well as appeal in respect thereof have been dismissed. The matter arising out of it is pending before this Court in second appeal. 7. The appellant before this Court was the Additional District Magistrate (Land Acquisition) Kanpur Nagar, at the appropriate point of time when an application of Kanpur Development Authority was entertained by him and an order came to be passed by him on 18.7.2022 acknowledging that an application for mutation has been filed by the Kanpur Development Authority. This communication was forwarded to the concerned Tehsildar for effecting mutation in terms of the application and a copy of revenue entry was to be furnished to the officer concerned. It is this order which is alleged to be an act of contempt on part of the appellant. The contempt petition has been filed by M/s Diviniti Homes (P) Ltd., which claims to have purchased the property from Arjun Dev Kehar. It is this order which is alleged to be an act of contempt on part of the appellant. The contempt petition has been filed by M/s Diviniti Homes (P) Ltd., which claims to have purchased the property from Arjun Dev Kehar. While entertaining the contempt petition, a further opportunity was granted to the appellant by the Contempt Court on 21.2.2023 to comply with the order of the Writ Court dated 12.12.2017 in Writ-B No. 59193 of 2017. 8. Record reveals that on 31.1.2023 itself the appellant superannuated. An application therefore has been moved before the Contempt Court stating that he is not in a position to pass any further orders as he has already retired. Attention of the Contempt Court was also invited to the fact that the order passed by the appellant on 18.7.2022 had been challenged in revision before the Board of Revenue by the contempt applicant. Initially the order was stayed but subsequently the revision was dismissed as withdrawn and thereafter the Diviniti Homes (P) Ltd. filed a revision, which has since been allowed on 5.1.2024. The order passed by the appellant on 15.7.2022 has been set aside. Name of the contempt applicant has been recorded in respect of the property in question. It is on the strength of these facts that the appellant asserted before the Contempt Court that having retired from the post of A.D.M. (Land Acquisition), as well as the subsequent developments, as per which the revisional forum has already quashed his order, the contempt petition itself may not proceed any further since there was no deliberate disobedience of this Court's order, otherwise. It was also submitted that this Court had merely dismissed the writ petition and therefore the only contempt, which could have been instituted, was for disobedience of the decree passed by the Civil Court in Original Suit No. 414 of 1991 or the order passed by the competent revenue Court and contempt petition was not maintainable under Section 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as 'Act of 1971'). The petition was otherwise not filed under Section 10 of the Act of 1971. 9. Learned Contempt Court in paragraph 7 has noticed that the contemnor/opposite party has already retired. The Court has observed as under in paragraph Nos. 8, 9 and 10 of the order dated 14.3.2024 : ''8. The petition was otherwise not filed under Section 10 of the Act of 1971. 9. Learned Contempt Court in paragraph 7 has noticed that the contemnor/opposite party has already retired. The Court has observed as under in paragraph Nos. 8, 9 and 10 of the order dated 14.3.2024 : ''8. Considering the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the applicant, learned senior counsel appearing for the opposite party and going through the record, it is evident that on 16.6.2022, the opposite party was intimated about the past litigation, alongwith all orders, but still the opposite party, under the garb of his power and position, has overreached the orders passed by this Court as well as other Courts, having very well aware about the earlier orders passed by this Court as well as the Apex Court. The record also reveals that the opposite party, in spite of having full knowledge of the order dated 12.12.2017 passed by this Hon'ble Court in Writ B No. 59193/2017, the order dated 3.10.1996 passed by the Additional Civil Judge (SD), Court No. 3, Kanpur Nagar in Original Suit No. 414/1991, the order dated 28.4.2001 passed by the Additional District Judge, Court No. 8, Kanpur Nagar in Civil Appeal No. 286 of 1998, the order dated 20.9.2007 passed by this Court in Second Appeal (Defective) No. 161 of 2004 as well as the order dated 7.3.2008 passed by the Apex Court in Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No. 2364 of 2008, has deliberately defy the order of the Courts. 9. In the compliance affidavit filed by the opposite party, not even a single word has been whispered as to how, in spite of having full knowledge about the various orders and the past litigation between the parties, as stated above, he has passed the ex parte order dated 18.7.2022 expunging the name of applicant from the revenue records and mutating the name of Nagar Mahapalika, Kanpur. 10. In view of the above, list this case on 23.4.2024 for framing the charges against the opposite party, on which date the opposite party, i.e., Shri Satyendra Kumar Singh, shall remain present in person.'' 10. 10. In view of the above, list this case on 23.4.2024 for framing the charges against the opposite party, on which date the opposite party, i.e., Shri Satyendra Kumar Singh, shall remain present in person.'' 10. On behalf of the appellant it is submitted that the Contempt Court has already rejected the defence of the appellant, that contempt was not maintainable nor the proceedings could have progressed further against the appellant in view of the fact that he had already superannuated. It is, therefore, submitted that to this extent the order passed by the Contempt Court can be challenged in an appeal. Section 19 of the Act of 1971 provides for appeal and reads as under : ''19. Appeals.- (1) An appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt- (a) where the order or decision is that of a single Judge, to a Bench of not less than two Judges of the Court; (b) where the order or decision is that of a Bench, to the Supreme Court: Provided that where the order or decision is that of the Court of the Judicial Commissioner in any Union territory, such appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court. (2) Pending any appeal, the appellate Court may order that- (a) the execution of the punishment or order appealed against be suspended; (b) if the appellant is in confinement, he be released on bail; and (c) the appeal be heard notwithstanding that the appellant has not purged his contempt. (3) Where any person aggrieved by any order against which an appeal may be filed satisfies the High Court that he intends to prefer an appeal, the High Court may also exercise all or any of the powers conferred by sub-section (2). (4) An appeal under sub-section (1) shall be filed- (a) in the case of an appeal to a Bench of the High Court, within thirty days; (b) in the case of an appeal to the Supreme Court, within sixty days, from the date of the order appealed against.'' 11. The question, as to in what circumstances an appeal would lie under Section 19 of the Act of 1971, has been examined by a Full Bench of this Court in Sadhna Upadhyay Advocate v. State of U.P.; 2008(7) ADJ 336 (FB). The question, as to in what circumstances an appeal would lie under Section 19 of the Act of 1971, has been examined by a Full Bench of this Court in Sadhna Upadhyay Advocate v. State of U.P.; 2008(7) ADJ 336 (FB). After referring to the previous judgment on the issue the Full Bench observed as under in paragraph Nos. 76 to 81 : ''76. At this juncture, we would like to refer to the scope of the appeal as understood under criminal law. In The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 appeals are provided for under Chapter XXIX. Section 372 of the Criminal Procedure Code declares that no appeal shall lie unless otherwise provided under the Act. Section 373 provides for appeal from orders requiring surety or refusal to accept or rejecting surety for keeping peace or good behaviour. Then comes an appeal against conviction. This provision clearly spells out that appeal would lie against conviction in a trial held by the subordinate Court in which a sentence of imprisonment is for more than seven years. Further Sections 325 and 360 have also been made appealable. The provision of appeal is not attracted in certain cases where the accused has pleaded guilty. Section 376 spells out that no appeal shall lie in petty cases as referred to therein. Section 377 provides for an appeal by the State against the sentence awarded while convicting a person on the ground of its inadequacy and appeal is also provided for against acquittal under Section 378 and under Section 379 against the order of the High Court in certain cases. The aforesaid appeals have been broadly provided for under chapter XXIX. It would be seen that appeals are provided for specifically either against conviction or acquittal or in some cases as provided for under Section 373 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The language used in the criminal procedure code is in contrast to the language used under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act. Section 19 of the Act speaks of ''any order or decision'', therefore, the Legislature has consciously and carefully incorporated the words which are entirely different from the language employed under the criminal procedure code. The language used in the criminal procedure code is in contrast to the language used under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act. Section 19 of the Act speaks of ''any order or decision'', therefore, the Legislature has consciously and carefully incorporated the words which are entirely different from the language employed under the criminal procedure code. In our opinion the words used in Section 19 of the Act are of much wider import and cannot be said to be restricted to the remedy of appeal only in cases of an order of punishment or conviction. To our mind, the Legislature even though gave a restricted right of appeal, yet never intended to deny the opportunity of appeal where the proceedings under challenge were either without jurisdiction or was in violation of mandatory procedure or otherwise in violation of the fundamental rights guaranteed under the Constitution. This issue with which we are presently concerned, was not subject-matter of discussion or even adjudication in the case of D.N.Taneja (supra). 77. The scheme of the provisions contained in Section 19 indicate the intention of the legislature to provide for an appeal against any ''order or decision'' The said words have been used in sub-section 1 and 2 of Section 19, but there appears to be a departure in sub-section 3 thereof. The word '' decision'' has been consciously omitted in Section 19(3) and the ''intention to file an appeal'' is made open against ''any order''. The Court has to adopt an interpretation of the word used in a statute which serves the object and purpose for which the statute was enacted and the provisions incorporated. 78. The question is, can it be said that the right of appeal under Section 19 is confined only against an order of conviction. If that were the intention, then what would have been the purpose of use of separate connotations in Section 19(1) and (2) as compared to Section 19(3). 79. Section 19(3) provides for an opportunity to an aggrieved person to approach the Court for protection if he ''intends to file an appeal'' against ''any order''. This can be in the event a person has been ordered to be taken into immediate custody. 79. Section 19(3) provides for an opportunity to an aggrieved person to approach the Court for protection if he ''intends to file an appeal'' against ''any order''. This can be in the event a person has been ordered to be taken into immediate custody. Such an order can be passed upon conviction or even at the stage of cognizance as a measure of interim custody pending proceedings initiated under Section 14 in a matter of ex-facie contempt. Thus there can can be a stage even prior to punishment when an aggrieved person may require the protections as provided for in Section19 (2). This may take the shape of stay of an order of custody passed pending proceedings. An appeal, in such a situation would therefore be available as a matter of right under Section 19 itself. To our mind the legislature appears to have taken care of such a situation and has therefore consciously used the word '' any order'' while providing for a statutory right of appeal. This right of appeal would however be not available against a pure interlocutory order not affecting vital rights nor would it be available to a person not aggrieved. 80. The assumption of jurisdiction, which if not possessed by a Court, would directly attract the principle of patent incompetence. A Court cannot proceed to hear a dispute or decide a lis about which no authority is conferred by the Statute but what if the Court assumes such a jurisdiction ? Would it not be a conscious decision to proceed to exercise the jurisdiction to punish for contempt ? Can it be said, in such a situation that the order does not amount to a conviction or award of punishment, as such, an appeal would not lie ? The appellant herself has described the initiation and cognizance of the matter as a case of Arrogated Jurisdiction. 81. In our opinion, the jurisdiction to proceed to punish for a contempt commences with the cognizance taken. If the cognizance is incompetent or without jurisdiction, it affects the rights of the contemner and it is open to the contemner to question the order on the ground of lack of competence or patent lack of jurisdiction. The contemner cannot be compelled to wait for the entire trial to end in conviction or punishment.'' (Emphasis supplied by us)'' 12. If the cognizance is incompetent or without jurisdiction, it affects the rights of the contemner and it is open to the contemner to question the order on the ground of lack of competence or patent lack of jurisdiction. The contemner cannot be compelled to wait for the entire trial to end in conviction or punishment.'' (Emphasis supplied by us)'' 12. Sri K.R. Singh, learned counsel for the respondent has placed reliance upon paragraph 11 of the Division Bench Judgement of this Court in Dr. Ashwini Kumar Singh v. Dr. Sandeep Kumar and others; 2020(8) ADJ 237 , which is reproduced hereinafter : ''11. The Order impugned is an order framing a charge smplicitor, which cannot be said to have vitally affected the rights of the contemnor. Contempt proceedings are quasi criminal in nature. While framing a charge, it is inevitable for the Court to delve into the merits of the case which does not affect any substantive rights of the contemnor as opportunity is given to the contemnor to controvert and raise its defence against the proposed charge. Thus, order framing charge simpliciter is only a reflection of a prima facie opinion of the Court as to the alleged contempt. Howsoever emphatic the order framing the charge be, the fact is that at the end of the day it remains only an order framing a charge and not an order of punishment.'' 13. We have considered the respective submissions on the aspect of maintainability of the present appeal. Section 19 of the Act of 1971 clearly indicates that an appeal shall lie as a matter of right from any order or decision of High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. Sub-section (2) of Section 19 of the Act of 1971 also provides that pending any appeal, the appellate Court may order the execution of the punishment or order appealed against to be suspended. However, if the order or decision appealed against is an interlocutory order then such an appeal would not lie. 14. There are two distinct line of judgments by the Supreme Court on the issue as to when an appeal would lie under Section 19 of the Act of 1971. This aspect has been noticed by the Supreme Court in Parents Association of Students v. M.A. Khan and another, (2009) 2 SCC 641 . 14. There are two distinct line of judgments by the Supreme Court on the issue as to when an appeal would lie under Section 19 of the Act of 1971. This aspect has been noticed by the Supreme Court in Parents Association of Students v. M.A. Khan and another, (2009) 2 SCC 641 . The Court observed as under in paragraphs 11 and 12 of the judgment : ''11. The controversy as regards exercise of jurisdiction of the appellate Court under Section 19 of the Contempt of the Courts Act is a vexed one. Whereas one line of decisions beginning from Baradakanta Mishra v. High Court of Orissa [ (1975) 3 SCC 535 : 1975 SCC (Cri) 99] till Midnapore Peoples' Coop. Bank Ltd. [ (2006) 5 SCC 399 ] is that an appeal would be maintainable only when an order of punishment has been made, in R.N. Dey v. Bhagyabati Pramanik [ (2000) 4 SCC 400 ] it has been held to be maintainable if the jurisdiction is exercised by any Court under the Contempt of Courts Act. 12. The question, we may notice, has been referred to a three-Judge Bench in Dharam Singh v. Guljari Lal [SLP (C) No. 18852 of 2005 decided on 19-9-2005.]. We, therefore, need not decide the larger question, namely, maintainability of the appeal under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 vis-à-vis maintainability of the special appeal under the Letters Patent of the High Court, since the matter has been referred to a larger Bench.'' 15. The issue was again examined by the Supreme Court in Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Share Holders Welfare Association v. S.C. Sekar and others In Civil Appeal Nos. 7129-7930 of 2008. In para 43 and 44 the Court has observed as under : ''43. We may repeat that it may be a different matter if the Court while passing an order decided some disputes raised before it by the contemnor asking it to drop the proceedings on one ground or the other. Thus, in a given situation, an appeal would be maintainable even against a notice to show-cause. Here even such a notice has not been issued and thus the question of satisfying the Court by showing cause that the contemnors/respondents had not committed any contempt did not arise. Allegations had not been made against the Chairman of the meeting. Thus, in a given situation, an appeal would be maintainable even against a notice to show-cause. Here even such a notice has not been issued and thus the question of satisfying the Court by showing cause that the contemnors/respondents had not committed any contempt did not arise. Allegations had not been made against the Chairman of the meeting. The contempt proceedings had been initiated only against the Managing Director of the Bank. 44. Although we need not go into the larger question of maintainability of the appeal in view of the fact that the matter has been referred to the Three Judge Bench in Dharam Singh v. Gulzari Lal and others (SLP (Civil) No. 18852 of 2005), but prima facie, in view of the decision of this Court in Purshottam Das (supra) there cannot be any doubt that in a situation where order has been passed adverse to the interest of the alleged contemnor an appeal would be maintainable particularly where a judgment has been passed by a Court which is beyond its jurisdiction.'' 16. We are informed that the reference in the case of Dharam Singh v. Guljari Lal SLP © No. 18852 of 2005 has not been answered and the SLP has been got dismissed as withdrawn. 17. Whether an appeal would lie only against an order of punishment or would be maintainable even otherwise, in terms of the language employed in Section 19 of the Act of 1971 as per which any order or decision passed in exercise of contempt jurisdiction would be amenable to appeal has apparently not been resolved by the Supreme Court. Our attention has not been invited to any authoritative pronouncement on the issue by the Supreme Court after reference was made in Dharam Singh (supra). The Full Bench of this Court in Sadhna Upadhyay (supra) has also noticed the contrasting opinions expressed in two distinct line of judgments by the Supreme Court on the issue. It is thereafter that the Court has relied upon the express language of Section 19 of the Act of 1971 as well as the statutory scheme to hold that an appeal would lie if a decision is taken in exercise of contempt jurisdiction which is not interlocutory in nature. We are of the considered opinion that the view expressed by the Full Bench of our Court in Sadhna Upadhyay (supra) is binding upon us. We are of the considered opinion that the view expressed by the Full Bench of our Court in Sadhna Upadhyay (supra) is binding upon us. Even otherwise we wholly subscribe to the reasoning assigned by the Full Bench of our Court in Sadhna Upadhyay (supra) which does not limit the remedy of appeal to an order of punishment. We are also informed that other High Courts have also taken the view similar to the view taken by our Court in Full Bench judgement in Sadhna Upadhyay (supra). 18. Learned counsel for the appellant has placed reliance upon a Division Bench judgment of Madhya Pradesh High Court in Dinesh Shahara v. IDBI Bank (Contempt Appeal No. 2 of 2023) wherein also the issue relating to maintainability of contempt appeal came to be examined by the Court. After referring to series of judgments the M.P. High Court held as under : ''33. A close analysis of the law laid down by the Apex Court and the High Courts as well the provisions of Section 19 of the Act, 1971, we are clearly of the view that any order which is not an interlocutory order but by which the High Court proceeds to exercise its jurisdiction for contempt, would be appealable. In the present case, the appellant/Contemnor was clearly discharged from the clutches of the provisions of the Act, 1971 as the process of the issuance of the contempt became infructuous upon the submission of the Audit Report to the respondent/Bank and the same has been recorded by the Learned Single Bench of this Court vide order dated 14.11.2022. 34. In view of the the facts and circumstances of the case as well as looking to the various pronunciation of the Apex Court and High Courts, this Court is of the considered opinion that an appeal under Section 19(1) of the Act of 1971 is maintainable where some bone of contention is decided and adverse finding is recorded by the High Court in exercise of jurisdiction to punish for contempt and it affects the substantive right of the contemnor.'' 19. In Sarojani Nagar Jhuggi Jhopri Vikas Samiti v. Suresh Kumar and others (Neutral Citation No. 2022/DHC/004674), the Division Bench of Delhi High Court observed that for an appeal to be maintainable under Section 19 of the Act of 1971 there has to be a definite finding against the contemnor or else there cannot be any right of appeal. In para 8 the Delhi High Court held as under: ''In view thereof, for an appeal to be maintainable under Section 19 of the Act there has to be a definite finding against a contemnor, or else there cannot be any right of appeal under Section 19 of the Act. The law of contempt is very clear. A plain reading of the Act reveals that the provision of appeal is extremely limited and according to us 'regulated'. The availability and maintainability of an appeal under Section 19 of the Act is dependent upon a contemnor being guilty or being punished under the Act and in no other case. The present case is not of that kind.'' 20. In light of the above referred judgements it can safely be deduced that appeal under Section 19 of the Act of 1971 cannot be restricted to imposition of punishment upon the contemnor alone. It is otherwise settled that an appeal is a creature of statute. Statute itself therefore would be the safest guide to determine its scope. Any order passed or decision taken by the Court in exercise of jurisdiction to punish for contempt would thus be amenable to appeal, under Section 19 of the Act of 1971, if it finally determines the lis pending before the Court. Holding the contemnor guilty of contempt would be one such order. 21. In the facts of the present case learned Contempt Judge has held that the contemnor appellant has deliberately defied the writ Court's order dated 12.12.2017 dismissing the writ. Finding has thus been returned in exercise of contempt jurisdiction that appellant has committed contempt. The conclusion arrived at by the Court in paragraph 8 of its order cannot be treated to be a prima facie view, in view of the language employed in the order itself. This decision thus cannot be said to be interlocutory in nature. In our view an appeal would lie against such order under Section 19 of the Act of 1971. 22. This decision thus cannot be said to be interlocutory in nature. In our view an appeal would lie against such order under Section 19 of the Act of 1971. 22. We may clarify that before proceeding to frame charges for contempt the Court would otherwise be required to arrive at a prima facie satisfaction that the act or omission of contemnor, amounts to wilful act of disobedience or contempt. Such prima facie satisfaction is merely intended to proceed with the contempt, by framing charge, and no final decision is taken at that stage. No appeal would thus be maintainable against an interlocutory order for summoning the contemnor for framing charge. This, however, is not the situation here. The contemnor has already appeared and offered his defence with the prayer to drop the contempt proceedings which has not only been turned down by the contempt Court but the appellant has been held guilty of defying the Court's order. An appeal therefore would lie against it. We, therefore, overrule the respondent's objection to the maintainability of this appeal. 23. On merits question arise as to whether a retired Government servant could have been proceeded against in contempt, despite his retirement, particularly when it is shown that he was incapable of availing the subsequent opportunity granted by the contempt Court on 21.2.2023 to comply with the previous order. The fact that contemnor had retired on 31.1.2023 and he was incompetent to pass any fresh order was relevant in determining as to whether his action was deliberate or not. Other question to be decided would be as to whether the order of the writ Court, dismissing the writ petition, could have been made the basis for initiation of contempt inasmuch as the primary order, of which the disobedience could be alleged, was the order passed either by the Civil Court or by the revenue Court. It would have to be seen whether contempt proceedings could be initiated under Section 10 of the Contempt of Courts Act or under Section 12 of the Act. This is a jurisdictional issue and goes to the root of the matter. What is the import of the decree passed in original suit No. 414 of 1991 would also require consideration. 24. Admit. 25. Notice on behalf of opposite party is already accepted by Sri K.R. Singh alongwith Rahul Chaudhary. This is a jurisdictional issue and goes to the root of the matter. What is the import of the decree passed in original suit No. 414 of 1991 would also require consideration. 24. Admit. 25. Notice on behalf of opposite party is already accepted by Sri K.R. Singh alongwith Rahul Chaudhary. He prays for and is allowed three weeks' time to file a counter-affidavit. Rejoinder-affidavit, if any, may be filed within a week thereafter. 26. List on 29.5.2024. 27. Till then the effect and operation of the order passed by the Contempt Court dated 14.3.2024 shall be kept in abeyance.