JUDGMENT : Harisankar V. Menon, J. The unsuccessful additional plaintiffs 2 to 4 in O.S.No.1551 of 1991 on the file of the Principal Sub Judge, Thiruvananthapuram, are the appellants in this Regular First Appeal filed under Section 96 read with Order 41 Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC). The suit was originally filed by the appellants’ deceased father, Sri. E.M. Varkey, who was a contractor by profession. Pending the suit, Sri. E.M. Varkey passed away, and therefore the appellants herein, in their capacity as the legal representatives of the deceased, got themselves impleaded in the suit as per order dated 24.09.1993 in I.A.No.3981 of 1993 and I.A.No.3982 of 1993. The above suit stood dismissed by a judgment and decree dated 27.09.2006, and it is challenging the above judgment and decree that the captioned appeal is filed by the appellants herein. 2. The short facts necessary for the disposal of this appeal are as under: Sri. E.M. Varkey was a contractor by profession, and he had undertaken a contract for the work of “Sabarigiri Augmentation Scheme - construction of a Diversion Tunnel from Gavier to Meenar I – balance works” pursuant to an agreement dated 23.09.1981. The period for completion of the work was 16 months, which stood extended later, and ultimately the work was completed during October, 1986. The suit was presented alleging that the defendant committed a breach of contract and that huge amounts were payable to the plaintiffs, which were being wrongfully withheld. The above suit for realisation of money was tried by the Principal Sub Judge, Thiruvananthapuram. The Sub Judge framed as many as six issues for consideration. By the impugned judgment and decree, the Principal Sub Judge decided all the issues against the plaintiffs. It is in the above circumstances, that the plaintiffs are before this Court in the captioned Regular First Appeal. 3. On 25.02.2010, this Court admitted the appeal. Later, a mediation was attempted between the contesting parties through the Mediation Centre attached to this Court. However, on 31.07.2014, the Nodal Officer, Ernakulam Mediation Centre, attached to this Court, reported that the attempts at mediation had failed. That is how the appeal has been taken up for final hearing by this Court. 4. We have heard the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellants herein and the learned counsel appearing for the respondent Electricity Board. 5. However, on 31.07.2014, the Nodal Officer, Ernakulam Mediation Centre, attached to this Court, reported that the attempts at mediation had failed. That is how the appeal has been taken up for final hearing by this Court. 4. We have heard the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellants herein and the learned counsel appearing for the respondent Electricity Board. 5. The learned Senior Counsel for the appellants contends that the issue of limitation decided by the trial court was even without a proper issue being raised by the defendants in the written statement, that the issue of limitation was orally raised by the defendant at the time of the hearing, that the provisions of law relied on by the trial court for deciding the issue of limitation against the appellant herein was not correct and that the counsel for the defendant before the trial court was not sure as to which Article of Limitation Act was applicable in the facts and circumstances of the case, which fact has been recorded also by the trial court, that the suit was one filed within the time prescribed under Articles 54 or 113 read with Section 18 of the Limitation Act, 1963. The learned Senior Counsel further contends that the findings of the trial court on merits, on the various claims made in the suit were also erroneous. 6. Per contra, the learned counsel for the respondent Board points out that the question of limitation can be considered by the Court even without the defendant raising the said contention in the written statement since limitation is one touching the jurisdiction of the Court and that is why the trial court raised the preliminary issue “is the suit maintainable?” and the findings rendered by the trial court were justified. On the merits also, the learned counsel for the respondent-defendant seeks to sustain the findings contained in the impugned judgment of the trial court. 7. We have considered the rival contentions as well as the trial court records. 8. There are two zones of consideration in the captioned appeal – one regarding the question of limitation and the other regarding the findings rendered by the trial court on merits. 7. We have considered the rival contentions as well as the trial court records. 8. There are two zones of consideration in the captioned appeal – one regarding the question of limitation and the other regarding the findings rendered by the trial court on merits. It is only if we find that the findings rendered by the trial court on limitation are not correct, that the question of considering the various contentions raised by the contesting parties on the merits of the matter would arise. Therefore, we would consider the question of limitation and the contentions raised by the contesting parties as the preliminary issue in the captioned appeal. 9. The learned Senior Counsel mainly contends that the findings of the trial court with respect to the applicability of Article 18 or 55 of the Schedule of the Limitation Act were without any justification. The learned Senior Counsel fairly states that, even in the absence of a specific plea from the defendant, the trial court would be entitled to consider the question of limitation. But he cautions that, when the trial court proceeds to make consideration on the question of limitation, it ought to have framed an issue specifically on the question of limitation, in which event, the plaintiff would have got an opportunity to lead in evidence in support of the stand that the suit was one filed within time. He relies on Exts.A39, A61 and A62 documents and contends that, with reference to the said documents, the period of limitation would start to run only from the date of Ext.A62 dated 08.11.1989. Therefore, he contends that the suit filed on 17.12.1991 was within the period of limitation of three years under the statute. However, the said stand of the learned Senior Counsel for the appellants is challenged by the learned counsel for the defendants, pointing out that the limitation has to be reckoned with reference to 01.12.1988, the date on which the plaintiff placed the claim statement before the Chief Engineer and therefore, the suit was one filed beyond the period of three years under the statute. 10. The suit was one filed for recovery of an amount in excess of Rs.55 lakhs along with interest at 12% from the defendant. 10. The suit was one filed for recovery of an amount in excess of Rs.55 lakhs along with interest at 12% from the defendant. The provisions of Article 18 of Schedule I to the Limitation Act read as under: Description of suit Period of limitation Time from which period begins to run For the price of work done by the plaintiff for the defendant at his request, where no time has been fixed for payment. Three years When the work is done The provisions of Article 55 of Schedule I to the Limitation Act read as under: Description of suit Period of limitation Time from which period begins to run For compensation for the breach of any contract, express or implied, not herein specially provided for. Three years When the contract is broken or (where there are successive breaches) when the breach in respect of which the suit is instituted occurs or (where the breach is continuing) when it ceases. Article 18 of Schedule I to the Limitation Act, extracted above, would apply only in a situation where no time has been fixed for making payment in a given case. Similarly, Article 55 of Schedule I to the Limitation Act would apply in cases where the claim is for “compensation for breach of any contract”, with reference to the point when the contract is broken. A perusal of the plaint would reveal that the claims made by the plaintiffs were not with reference to Article 18 or Article 55 of Schedule I to the Limitation Act. The plaint was not with reference to any claim where no time has been fixed for making payment. Similarly, the plaintiff was not seeking compensation for breach of any contract by the defendant. On the other hand, the claim of the plaintiff was with reference to additional amounts pursuant to additional expenses paid to labourers due to enhancement of wages etc., pursuant to Government notification dated 30.03.1983 and other claims with reference to retention amount, refund of excess recovery etc. The plaint nowhere makes a claim for compensation. The first claim as regards minimum wages is seen raised by the plaintiff pursuant to Annexure A32 dated 30.12.1983. As regards the balance claims, they were raised pursuant to Ext.A61 dated 31.08.1989. A dispute can be said to have arisen only when there is a claim and denial of the same by the opposite party. The first claim as regards minimum wages is seen raised by the plaintiff pursuant to Annexure A32 dated 30.12.1983. As regards the balance claims, they were raised pursuant to Ext.A61 dated 31.08.1989. A dispute can be said to have arisen only when there is a claim and denial of the same by the opposite party. Here, it is seen that the claim is being raised on 31.08.1989 as seen from Ext.A61, which is rejected only on 08.11.1989, as evidenced by Ext.A62. Here, reference to Article 113 of Schedule I to the Limitation Act would be beneficial, and the same reads as under: Description of suit Period of limitation Time from which period begins to run Any suit for which no period of limitation is provided elsewhere in this Schedule Three years When the right to sue accrues 11. The above Article steps into operation only in circumstances where a suit is filed, for which, no period of limitation is prescribed elsewhere under the Schedule. As found by us, the suit was one filed claiming additional amounts and also for refund of certain figures. Under Article 113, the period of limitation starts to run with reference to the date on which the right to sue accrues. Here, the said right to sue has arisen by virtue of Ext.A62 dated 08.11.1989, and therefore, the period of limitation has to be considered with reference to that date, and therefore, the suit filed on 17.12.1991 is within a period of three years from 08.11.1989 and therefore, the findings rendered by the trial court on the question of limitation were not correct. 12. We may also refer to the judgment of the Apex Court in Aries and Aries v. Tamil Nadu Electricity Board [ (2018) 12 SCC 393 ], wherein an almost identical situation was considered by the Apex Court. Therein, the plaintiff instituted a suit for recovery of money on the basis of the contract executed between the plaintiff and the defendant Electricity Board. The suit was decreed partly by the trial court. Therein, the plaintiff instituted a suit for recovery of money on the basis of the contract executed between the plaintiff and the defendant Electricity Board. The suit was decreed partly by the trial court. However, in an appeal at the instance of the defendant, the High Court found that the claims made by the plaintiffs were for dues on account of the extra works executed, escalation charges, etc., and thereafter took the date of payment of the final bill as the relevant date for determining the question of limitation under Article 18 or 55 or 113 of the Limitation Act and found that the suit was barred by time. The matter was taken up before the Apex Court and the findings rendered by the Apex Court are as under: “10. Art. 18 of the Limitation Act, 1963 provides for filing of a suit for recovery of money for work done by the plaintiff, within three years from the date when the work is done, in a situation where no time has been fixed for payment. Art. 55 of the Limitation Act, 1963, on the other hand, provides for limitation of three years from the date of breach of a contract in a case of a suit for compensation for damages arising out of such breach. Art. 113 of the Limitation Act, 1963 is the residuary provision which provides for a suit to be instituted within three years from the date when the right to sue accrues. 11. In the present case, de hors the correspondences that had been exchanged by and between the parties after the date of final payment, i.e., 13th January, 1981, the aforesaid date of final payment would have been crucial determination of the period of limitation for filing the instant suit. However, in the present case, from the correspondences that had been exchanged after the date of final payment it clearly appears that the plaintiff after receipt of the payment on 13th January, 1981, reiterated its claim for additional payment on different counts including escalation and for extra works done. The defendant instead of rejecting the said claim entertained the same and kept the matter pending. Finally on 6th November, 1981 (Exhibit P2) the said claims were rejected. The defendant instead of rejecting the said claim entertained the same and kept the matter pending. Finally on 6th November, 1981 (Exhibit P2) the said claims were rejected. If the claims raised by the plaintiff were entertained and rejected finally on 6th November, 1981, it would be reasonable to assume that the cause of action for the suit in respect of the said rejected claims arose on 6th November, 1981 and the suit could have been filed at any point of time prior to the expiry of three years from the said date i.e. 6th November, 1981 in view of Art. 113 of the Limitation Act, 1963. The suit having been filed on 6th November, 1984, the same, therefore, will have to be considered to be within the period of limitation. The High Court, therefore, was not justified in holding the contrary.” 13. In Aries and Aries [ (2018) 12 SCC 393 ], the Apex Court found that it is the date on which the claims made by the plaintiff stood finally rejected by the defendant, which is to be taken as the relevant date, under Article 113 of the Limitation Act. Finding thus, the suit was found to have been filed within the period of limitation and the findings rendered by the High Court were set aside. The principle laid down in the above judgment applies squarely to the facts and circumstances of the case at hand. Here also the claim made by the plaintiff stood rejected only by A62 dated 08.11.1989 and therefore, with reference to that date, the suit was instituted within time. 14. We may now turn to the judgments relied on by the learned counsel for the respondent Board. 15. The learned counsel for the respondent relied on the judgment of the Apex Court in State of Gujarat v. Kothari and Associates [ (2016) 14 SCC 761 ]. However, a perusal of the facts of the said judgment relied on by the learned counsel for the respondent - defendant would show that therein the suit instituted was one for damages and therefore it was Article 55 of the Limitation Act, that applied. However, in the case at hand the suit was not one filed for damages as found above. Therefore, the above judgment would not apply to the facts and circumstances of the case at hand. However, in the case at hand the suit was not one filed for damages as found above. Therefore, the above judgment would not apply to the facts and circumstances of the case at hand. The second judgment relied on by the learned counsel for the respondent-defendant is Kamlesh Babu v. Lajpat Rai Sharma [ (2008) 12 SCC 577 ]. In that judgment, the Apex Court held that the trial court is having the power to consider the question of limitation even when there was no specific issue framed by the court. However, the above judgment would not apply to the facts of the case at hand, since the learned counsel for the appellants fairly conceded, as noticed earlier that he does not have a dispute regarding the above proposition. 16. Therefore, we hold that O.S.No.1551 of 1991 filed by the plaintiff was not barred by limitation as found in the impugned judgment and decree. 17. In such circumstances, we proceed to consider the various claims made by the plaintiffs before the trial court and the findings rendered by the trial court thereupon. 18. The first claim made by the plaintiff was for an amount of Rs.30,72,746.28 representing the additional expenses incurred by him pursuant to the enhancement in the minimum wages payable to the labourers on account of notification No.G.O.Rt.No.353/83/LBR dated 30.03.1983 published as SRO 425/1983. The said notification provided for revision of minimum wages payable to employees employed in stone breaking, stone crushing, building operations and construction and maintenance of roads in the State as specified in the schedule annexed thereto. The date of coming into effect of the said revision was fixed as 01.04.1983. The said notification is extracted hereunder for ready reference: “S. R. O. No. 425/83- In exercise of the powers conferred by clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 3 of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948 (Central Act 11 of 1948), read with sub- section (2) of section 5, the Government of Kerala after considering the objections and suggestions received on the draft proposals previously published under Notification No.36530/E1/78/LBR dated 4th May, 1981 in the Kerala Gazette Extraordinary No.357 dated the 7th May, 1981 as required under clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 5 of the said Act and after consulting the Minimum Wages Advisory Board constituted) under section 7 of the said Act and in supersession of Notification No. G.O.Rt. 547/E1/77/LBR dated the 4th May, 1977, published as S.R.O. No. 396/77 in the Kerala Gazette No. 273 dated the 5th May, 1977, hereby revise the minimum rates of wages payable to the employees employed in Stone breaking, stone crushing, building operations and construction and maintenance of roads in the State as specified in the schedule hereto annexed and fix the 1st day of April 1983, as the date from which the revised rates of wages shall come into force. SCHEDULE 1. The employment in the construction or maintenance of road or in building operations. Time rate Basic wages 1. Bricks Mason 20.85 2. Rubble Mason 20.85 3. Laterite Mason 20.85 4. Laterite Cutter 17.85 5. Brick moulder 16.85 6. Carpenter 17.85 7. Blacksmith 20.85 8. Fitter 17.85 9. Painter 17.85 10. Sawyer 19.85 11. Plumber 17.85 12. Wood Cutter 16.85 13. Boatman 13.50 14. Maikad or Unskilled Workers (a) Special unskilled 14.85 (b) Ordinary unskilled 12.00 (c) Adolescent shall be paid 3/4th basic wage of an adult worker. 2. Employment in stone breaking or stone crushing (a) Time rate Basic wage per day 1. Head Load worker Adolescent 2. Head Load helper Adult worker Rs.12 3. Lorry or Boat loading worker 3/4th of the wage of an adult worker” 19. The stand of the plaintiff was that the agreement was entered into and the minimum wages payable to the labourers were paid on the basis of the Government notification dated 15.07.1977 and the notification dated 30.03.1983 referred to above was issued when the work was in progress with effect from 01.04.1983, thereby increasing the wages on account of which the workers demanded more payment pursuant to the statutory notification as above, and the plaintiff was compelled to make payments at the enhanced rates. The plaintiff made several representations for reimbursement of such additional amounts paid pursuant to the enhancement in minimum wages, and the Chief Engineer of the Board, by his letter dated 30.01.1984, informed that the claim for reimbursement was being considered by the Board. However, in the written statement, the Board referred to a letter dated 15.10.1985 issued by the Secretary to the Board addressed to the Secretary, Power Department, Government of Kerala, seeking clarifications as regards the notification dated 30.03.1983 as regards the workers employed by the plaintiff herein. However, in the written statement, the Board referred to a letter dated 15.10.1985 issued by the Secretary to the Board addressed to the Secretary, Power Department, Government of Kerala, seeking clarifications as regards the notification dated 30.03.1983 as regards the workers employed by the plaintiff herein. It is the case of the Board that the Secretary to the Power Department, pursuant to his letter dated 28.04.1986, informed the Board that the notification applies only for workers engaged in stone breaking, stone crushing and building operations, as well as construction and maintenance of roads, and the work undertaken by the plaintiff “may include stone crushing as part of their labour”, but further opined that bringing the works undertaken by the plaintiff within the ambit of employment contemplated by the notification is not proper. Therefore, it was opined by the Power Secretary to the State Government that the claim made by the plaintiff herein is not maintainable. The Trial Court appears to have proceeded to decide the first claim as above against the plaintiff herein, solely on the basis of the opinion of the Power Secretary by concluding that the Board is not competent to take a decision ignoring the orders issued by the Government. 20. However, we notice that the applicability of the notification dated 30.03.1983 to the activity undertaken by the plaintiff is not to be decided by the Power Secretary. A reading of the notification dated 30.03.1983, extracted above, would show that the Power Secretary has no role to play therein. The notification only provides for revision of minimum wages payable to employees employed in certain types of activities as specified in the schedule thereto with effect from 01.04.1983. The activities are stated as stone breaking, stone crushing, building operations and construction and maintenance of roads within the State. The schedule attached thereunder specifically covers employment in stone breaking and stone crushing. In fact, the schedule to the notification is divided into various paragraphs. The first paragraph is with reference to the construction/maintenance of roads or with reference to “building operations”. The second paragraph is with reference to employment in stone breaking/stone crushing. Here, the activity undertaken by the plaintiff would definitely fall under building operations or at least in stone breaking/stone crushing. The first paragraph is with reference to the construction/maintenance of roads or with reference to “building operations”. The second paragraph is with reference to employment in stone breaking/stone crushing. Here, the activity undertaken by the plaintiff would definitely fall under building operations or at least in stone breaking/stone crushing. Even if the term “building operation” under paragraph 1 is held to be applicable only as against the 14 sub-items thereunder, the activity carried on by the plaintiff definitely fall under “stone breaking/stone crushing”. Even the letter dated 28.04.1986, relied on by the defendant Board, states that the activity undertaken by the plaintiff “may include stone crushing as part of the labour”. Therefore, we are of the opinion that the activities carried on by the plaintiff would definitely be attracted by the enhancement carried out by the Government notification dated 30.03.1983. We also find that the Power Secretary was not justified in issuing a clarification through a letter dated 28.04.1986 especially as he was not a statutory authority under the provisions of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948. Therefore, we find that the findings rendered by the trial court on the question of applicability of notification dated 30.03.1983 were not correct. The further finding of the Trial Court that the plaintiff did not adduce evidence to prove that he had paid the amount of Rs.30,72,746.28 was also without any justification insofar as right from the beginning, the plaintiff had pointed out that he had expended the above amounts towards the enhanced minimum wages, and this contention has not been denied anywhere by the defendants, including in Annexure A62. Therefore, the stand of the trial court, on the contrary, does not appear to be the correct position. Therefore, we hold that the plaintiff is entitled to a decree with respect to the amount of Rs.30,72,746.28 representing the enhanced minimum wages payable pursuant to the notification dated 30.03.1983. 21. The second claim raised by the plaintiff was for an amount of Rs.7,43,199/- representing reimbursement of cringe benefits made to his employees. However, the trial court made reference to clause E1-033 of the general conditions of contract, as per which any extra cost involved as a result of conciliation settlement is to be borne by the contractor. 21. The second claim raised by the plaintiff was for an amount of Rs.7,43,199/- representing reimbursement of cringe benefits made to his employees. However, the trial court made reference to clause E1-033 of the general conditions of contract, as per which any extra cost involved as a result of conciliation settlement is to be borne by the contractor. Relying on the said condition in the contract, as well as evidence of PW2 who deposed that the employees were employed by the plaintiff himself, the trial court found that the clauses in the general conditions of the contract are binding on both parties, and therefore, the defendant had no liability to reimburse the amount of Rs.7,43,199/- to the plaintiff herein. On a perusal of the general conditions of contract relied on by the trial court as well as the deposition of PW2, we do not find any illegality on the above findings of the trial court and therefore, the findings of the trial court on the above aspect are not interfered with. 22. The third claim raised by the plaintiff was for an amount of Rs.1,87,127/- representing the cost of the value of work shown as “extra item” for removal of consolidated muck, trimming and dewatering, etc. The plaintiff contends that the defendant accepted the item as per a communication dated 18.02.1987 and the payments ought to have been effected. The trial court found with specific reference to Clause EI-066 of the general conditions of the contract that it was for the contractor to include the whole of the works – permanent or temporary - and the failure on the part of the plaintiff to include the above works, would not permit the plaintiff to subsequently claim towards “extra item”. The trial court found that the benevolent attitude of the Board in accepting the above and subsequently requesting the plaintiff to come forward to sign a supplemental agreement was not acted upon by the plaintiff. This was also treated as a reason for rejecting the third claim. 23. We have perused the supporting documents as well as the rival contentions. We find that the trial court has specifically recorded that the plaintiff did not adduce any evidence to substantiate the claim before the court. This was also treated as a reason for rejecting the third claim. 23. We have perused the supporting documents as well as the rival contentions. We find that the trial court has specifically recorded that the plaintiff did not adduce any evidence to substantiate the claim before the court. It is also seen that the stand of the plaintiff that the claim was not disputed is not correct insofar as there was a specific denial of the said claim in the written statement. 24. Furthermore, as rightly found by the trial court, it was for the plaintiff to include the item of work originally and his failure to do so will not permit him to subsequently claim it under a different head - extra item. So also, we notice that there is a positive finding by the trial court that the plaintiff did not execute the supplemental agreement, as demanded by the defendant. Therefore, the findings on the third claim by the trial court are confirmed. 25. The fourth claim raised by the plaintiff was for Rs.1,00,285/- representing the value of the work done for forming the nitches. We notice that the trial court found that the plaintiff visited the site before executing the original agreement and therefore, it was for the plaintiff to have noticed the requirements for the above nature of the work also and included the same in the original agreement. However, this has not been done by the plaintiff. The above item of work claimed by the plaintiff cannot be considered to be an “extra item” since as rightly found by the trial court, this was forming part of the original work awarded to the plaintiff. Therefore, the finding as regards the fourth claim is also confirmed. 26. The fifth claim of the plaintiff was for an amount of Rs.22,000/- representing the alleged cost of Gelatine. However, we notice that the trial court made reference to the clauses contained in the general conditions of the contract which lay down that the defendant only agreed to supply the explosives ”to the extent possible”. Therefore, we do not find any illegality in the findings rendered by the trial court as regards the fifth claim at hand. 27. The sixth claim made by the plaintiff is for an amount of Rs.1,00,000/- towards the final bill. Therefore, we do not find any illegality in the findings rendered by the trial court as regards the fifth claim at hand. 27. The sixth claim made by the plaintiff is for an amount of Rs.1,00,000/- towards the final bill. The trial court found that only an approximate amount is shown as dues in the final bill by the plaintiff. We notice that the plaintiff ought to have raised the final bill, after considering the entire work carried out and the said amount cannot be a round figure as found by the trial court. The trial court also noticed that both sides have admitted that the plaintiff has received amounts as against the works done. Perhaps that might be the reason why only an approximate amount was shown in the final bill. We do not find any illegality in the findings rendered by the trial court and the trial court rightly rejected the sixth claim. 28. The seventh claim of the plaintiff was with respect to the retention amount of Rs.1,28,850/-. The trial court found that even though the breach of contract was on account of the fault of the plaintiff, insofar as the defendant has not pleaded and proved any loss on account of the breach of the contract by the plaintiff, the retention amount could be released. However, this claim was rejected on account of the limitation found against the plaintiff by the trial court. However, we find that the findings of the trial court as regards the limitation were not correct as aforesaid. Therefore, the finding regarding the seventh claim is set aside. There will be a decree in favour of the plaintiff for an extent of Rs.1,28,850/- representing the retention amount. 29. The eighth claim was with respect to an amount of Rs.12,83,567/- representing the interest at the rate of 12% per annum. This claim was not considered by the trial court on account of the limitation found against the plaintiff. Insofar as the findings on the question of limitation are decided in favour of the plaintiff, we hold that the appellants-plaintiffs would be entitled for interest at 12% with respect to the claims that have been accepted as aforesaid. In the result, the Regular First Appeal filed by the appellants would stand allowed partly, as indicated above.