JUDGMENT : 1. The petitioner is aggrieved and has challenged his detention ordered by the respondent No.2 vide Order No. PSA/109 dated 21-05-2023, whereby the petitioner has been placed under preventive detention with a view to prevent him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. 2. The subjective satisfaction drawn by respondent No.2 is founded on the grounds of detention prepared on the basis of dossier supplied by Senior Superintendent of Police, Kathua, and served upon the detenue at the time of execution of the detention order. 3. The petitioner is shown to be involved in as many as ten different FIRs registered in the years 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020 and 2021 at Police Station Rajbagh Kathua and Police Station Ramnagar, Udhampur. The petitioner is allegedly involved in the commission of offences under Sections 323/341/325/147/148/120-B/201/34/427/382/457/363/ 376/109/307 RPC and 4/25/4/27 Arms Act. It is mentioned in the grounds of detention that because of his persistent and continuous involvement in the criminal activities, the petitioner has created a sense of insecurity, terror and scare in the area and is disturbing communal harmony of the area. It is stated that the action taken against the detenue under the substantive law has not proved fruitful in deterring the detenue from indulging in continuous criminal acts. Though a close surveillance is being kept on the detenue but he has failed to mend his criminal acts and is reportedly engaged in prejudicial activities. It is also stated that out of ten FIRs registered against the detenue, in eight FIRs he has been granted bail by the competent Court whereas in two FIRs i.e. FIR Nos. 200/2021 and 101/2019 the detenue is absconding and is still at large. 4. The impugned order of detention is challenged by the petitioner primarily on the following grounds:- (i) That the impugned order suffers from non-application of mind. The respondent No.2 has, in the order of detention, referred to alleged commission of various offences and registration of FIRs, but has not spelled out how the involvement of the petitioner in the commission of different offences has the potential of disturbing the public order. The respondent No.2 has, in the order of detention, referred to alleged commission of various offences and registration of FIRs, but has not spelled out how the involvement of the petitioner in the commission of different offences has the potential of disturbing the public order. The respondent No.2 has thus failed to make a distinction between what is prejudicial to public order and what is only a problem of law and order; (ii) That the respondent No.2 has, in the grounds of detention, mentioned that petitioner has succeeded in securing bail in almost eight FIRs registered against him, and, on being released has again indulged in criminal activities. However, the respondent No.2 has not made any mention as to whether the prosecution ever sought cancellation of bail of the petitioner on the ground that he, while being on bail in a case, has again committed the crime; (iii) That the petitioner was not provided with the requisite material relied upon by the respondent No.2 to draw subjective satisfaction as a result whereof the petitioner was deprived of his right to make an effective representation to the Government against his detention; (iv) That the respondent No.2 has stated in the grounds of detention that in FIR No. 101/2019 the investigation is still going on, whereas the fact remains that charge sheet in FIR No. 101/2019 has been presented in the competent Court and even the statements of the prime two witnesses have been recorded during the trial. This shows total non-application of mind of the respondent No.2 while ordering the detention of the petitioner. (v) That there is unexplained delay of almost 11 months in executing the order of detention. It is true that the Detenue Authority has, in the grounds of detention, mentioned that detenu, who is wanted in two FIRs, is absconding. However, efforts made by the police to nab him have not been indicated. If the detenu could be apprehended and detained under PSA, it remains to be explained as to why he could not be arrested in two FIRs he is wanted in. One FIR is in respect of commission of offence under Section 376 RPC. The detenu, once, apprehended, could have been dealt with under ordinary criminal law. The satisfaction arrived at by the Detaining Authority is, thus, vitiated by non-application of mind. 5. Respondents have filed the counter affidavit of respondent No.2- District Magistrate. One FIR is in respect of commission of offence under Section 376 RPC. The detenu, once, apprehended, could have been dealt with under ordinary criminal law. The satisfaction arrived at by the Detaining Authority is, thus, vitiated by non-application of mind. 5. Respondents have filed the counter affidavit of respondent No.2- District Magistrate. The plea of the petitioner is contested primarily on the ground that the consistent and persistent unlawful activities of the petitioner have given sense of insecurity to the people of the area and have the potential of endangering the human life, disturbing the public peace and tranquility so as to bring the activities of the petitioner within the sweep of ‘public order’. The respondents have also produced the original record to demonstrate that all the procedural requirements were duly followed while executing the order of detention. 6. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the material on record, I am of the considered opinion that the impugned order of detention is not sustainable in law and, therefore, cannot be up-held. 7. It is true that as per the dossier supplied by the Superintendent of Police, Kathua, the petitioner is shown to be involved in ten different FIRs registered at Police Station Rajbagh, Kathua and Police Station Ramnagar, Udhampur respectively. The FIRs are in respect of different offences ranging from Sections 323 to Section 307 RPC and 4/25 Arms Act. One of the FIR is also registered for commission of offences under Section 363/376/109 RPC. From the reading of grounds of detention, it is not discernible as to how the activities of the petitioner are found prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. As is rightly contended by Ms. Watali, the learned for the petitioner, the petitioner may have, by his activities, posed a problem of law and order for the law enforcement agencies, but the criminal activities attributed to him do not have the potential of disturbing the public peace and tranquility so as to bring the activities of the petitioner within the sweep of ‘public order’. 8. The distinction between law and order and public order has been elaborately explained by this Court in Khursheed Ahmad Bhat v. UT of J&K and Ors, [WP(Crl) No.324/2022 decided on 20.09.2022]. The relevant paragraphs of the judgment are reproduced hereunder:- “8. 8. The distinction between law and order and public order has been elaborately explained by this Court in Khursheed Ahmad Bhat v. UT of J&K and Ors, [WP(Crl) No.324/2022 decided on 20.09.2022]. The relevant paragraphs of the judgment are reproduced hereunder:- “8. From perusal of grounds of detention, it clearly transpires that the petitioner has been put under preventive detention primarily for his involvement in FIR No.123/2022. The allegations contained in the aforesaid FIR, which is made basis of the detention order, even if taken to be true on their face value, do not constitute an act which has the potentiality of disturbing the public order. The term “law and order” and “Public order” look deceptively similar but both have different connotations. While former is a continual ongoing term, the latter is more temporal in nature. In the case of public order, the community or the public at large is affected by a particular action whereas the act or acts that affect only few individuals may be a case of law and order. Mere contravention of law such as indulging in cheating or criminal breach of trust certainly affects “law and order” but before it can be said to affect public order, it must affect the community or public at large. The nature of criminal act, the manner in which it is committed and its impact are some of the factors that determine whether a particular act would fall within the realm of “public order” or ‘law and order’. What is alleged in the FIR, which is sole basis of putting the detenue under preventive detention, clearly falls within the ambit of term “Law and Order”. Unless the criminal act attributed to the detenue has the effect of disturbing the even tempo of life of community or public at large, it would remain in the realm of “Law and order” and thus cannot be made the basis of preventive detention. 9. To understand the concept better, here is an example: when two drunkards quarrel and fight in the public street, there is disorder but not public disorder. They can be dealt with under powers of maintenance of law and order but cannot be detained for disturbing public order. However, where two fighters are of rival communities and one of them tries to raise communal passions, the problem is still of law and order but raises apprehension of public disorder. 10. They can be dealt with under powers of maintenance of law and order but cannot be detained for disturbing public order. However, where two fighters are of rival communities and one of them tries to raise communal passions, the problem is still of law and order but raises apprehension of public disorder. 10. Recently in Banka Sneha Sheela v. State of Telangana and ors, (2021) 9 SCC 415 , Hon’ble the Supreme Court was confronted with a case of preventive detention ordered by the State of Telangana on almost similar grounds. There were as many as five FIRs all registered against the detenue therein under Sections 420, 406 and 506 IPC and in all the FIRs the detenue was granted anticipatory bail. The detention was ordered primarily on the ground that remaining at large of the detenue would be detrimental to public order. The Hon’ble the Supreme Court, in paragraphs No. 14, 15 and 19 has held thus:- 14. There can be no doubt that for ‘public order’ to be disturbed, there must in turn be public disorder. Mere contravention of law such as indulging in cheating or criminal breach of trust certainly affects ‘law and order’ but before it can be said to affect ‘public order’, it must affect the community or the public at large. 15. There can be no doubt that what is alleged in the five FIRs pertain to the realm of ‘law and order’ in that various acts of cheating are ascribed to the Detenu which are punishable under the three sections of the Indian Penal Code set out in the five FIRs. A close reading of the Detention Order would make it clear that the reason for the said Order is not any apprehension of widespread public harm, danger or alarm but is only because the Detenu was successful in obtaining anticipatory bail/bail from the Courts in each of the five FIRs. If a person is granted anticipatory bail/bail wrongly, there are well-known remedies in the ordinary law to take care of the situation. The State can always appeal against the bail order granted and/or apply for cancellation of bail. If a person is granted anticipatory bail/bail wrongly, there are well-known remedies in the ordinary law to take care of the situation. The State can always appeal against the bail order granted and/or apply for cancellation of bail. The mere successful obtaining of anticipatory bail/bail orders being the real ground for detaining the Detenu, there can be no doubt that the harm, danger or alarm or feeling of security among the general public spoken of in Section 2(a) of the Telangana Prevention of Dangerous Activities Act is make believe and totally absent in the facts of the present case. 19. To tear these observations out of context would be fraught with great danger when it comes to the liberty of a citizen under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. The reason for not adopting a narrow meaning of “public order” in that case was because of the expression “in the interests of” which occurs to Article 19(2) to 19(4) and which is pressed into service only when a law is challenged as being unconstitutional for being violative of Article 19 of the Constitution. When a person is preventively detained, it is Article 21 and 22 that are attracted and not Article 19. Further, preventive detention must fall within the four corners of Article 21 read with Article 22 and the statute in question. To therefore argue that a liberal meaning must be given to the expression ‘public order’ in the context of a preventive detention statute is wholly inapposite and incorrect. On the contrary, considering that preventive detention is a necessary evil only to prevent public disorder, the Court must ensure that the facts brought before it directly and inevitably lead to a harm, danger or alarm or feeling of insecurity among the general public or any section thereof at large.” 11. Earlier Hon’ble the Supreme Court in the case of Rekha v. State of T. N, (2011) 5 SCC 244 also discussed the nature and scope of preventive detention. Paragraphs No. 29 and 30 of the judgment are relevant and, therefore, set out below:- “29. Preventive detention is, by nature, repugnant to democratic ideas and an anathema to the rule of law. No such law exists in the USA and in England (except during war time). Paragraphs No. 29 and 30 of the judgment are relevant and, therefore, set out below:- “29. Preventive detention is, by nature, repugnant to democratic ideas and an anathema to the rule of law. No such law exists in the USA and in England (except during war time). Since, however, Article 22(3)(b) of the Constitution of India permits preventive detention, we cannot hold it illegal but we must confine the power of preventive detention within very narrow limits, otherwise we will be taking away the great right to liberty guaranteed by Article 21 of the Constitution of India which was won after long, arduous and historic struggles. It follows, therefore, that if the ordinary law of the land (the Penal Code and other penal statutes) can deal with a situation, recourse to a preventive detention law will be illegal. 30. Whenever an order under a preventive detention law is challenged one of the questions the court must ask in deciding its legality is: was the ordinary law of the land sufficient to deal with the situation? If the answer is in the affirmative, the detention order will be illegal. In the present case, the charge against the detenu was of selling expired drugs after changing their labels. Surely the relevant provisions in the Penal Code and the Drugs and Cosmetics Act were sufficient to deal with this situation. Hence, in our opinion, for this reason also the detention order in question was illegal.” 12. This case is fully covered by the Banka Sneha Sheela (supra). The allegations in the FIR registered against the detenue may be a problem of law and order but would not certainly come within the purview of the term “public order”. There is nothing mentioned in the grounds of detention to demonstrate that the activities of the detenue, on the basis of which the FIR for cheating and fraud came to be registered against him, had an impact of disturbing even the tempo of life of the community or had the effect of affecting the public at large. The offences with which the detenue has been charged in the FIR are substantive offences and the ordinary law of the land is sufficient to deal with the detenue, if he is ultimately found guilty of the allegations leveled against him in the FIR. The offences with which the detenue has been charged in the FIR are substantive offences and the ordinary law of the land is sufficient to deal with the detenue, if he is ultimately found guilty of the allegations leveled against him in the FIR. The apprehension of the detaining authority that the detenue was likely to get bail and in that event, his remaining at large would be detrimental to the maintenance of peace and public order, cannot be basis of putting the detenue under preventive detention. The detaining authority as also the State machinery is well within its rights to oppose the bail and, if granted, take remedial measures by way of approaching the higher forum. The simplicitor case of cheating and fraud, without having wider ramifications, cannot be made the basis of issuing the detention order in the name of maintaining the public order.” 9. Therefore, the situation prejudicial to the maintenance of “public order” arises when the activities of the detenue are such as may have the tendency to disturb even tempo of life of the community and public at large. It is not the criminal act in itself, howsoever heinous it may be, but the manner in which such criminal act is committed and the impact it has on the public at large are the factors which determine as to whether a particular criminal act is only a criminal act simpliciter or an act prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. 10. The offence directed against an individual or a group of persons, may be, on several occasions, cannot be branded as criminal activity prejudicial to the maintenance of public order unless the manner in which such offence is committed and impact it leaves on the public at large has the potential of disturbing even the tempo of public life. A single act committed in a diabolic manner, impacting the spectators and passers by, may be sufficient to constitute an activity prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. 11. From perusal of the grounds of detention served upon the petitioner, it is difficult to arrive at a conclusion that the criminal activities, the petitioner is shown to have indulged in, over a period of time, have created terror among the peace loving people. 11. From perusal of the grounds of detention served upon the petitioner, it is difficult to arrive at a conclusion that the criminal activities, the petitioner is shown to have indulged in, over a period of time, have created terror among the peace loving people. Except that single line in the grounds of detention that the petitioner has created a sense of insecurity, terror and scare in the area, there is nothing stated in the grounds as to the manner the petitioner carries his activities and impact of his activities, if any, on the tempo of life of public at large. The police has registered several FIRs for the commission of offences by the petitioner and has also submitted charge sheet before the competent Court of law after investigation. The petitioner is set at liberty by the competent Court by granting him bail in almost all the matters. It is not the case of the respondents that the prosecution has moved an application for cancellation of bail even in a single case. If, despite registration of several FIRs and presentation of charge sheets again him, the petitioner is not deterred from repeating his activities, the fault lies with the law and order agencies who have failed to contain the activities of the alleged criminals like the petitioner. It is for the prosecution to explain as to how and under what circumstances the petitioner has been bailed out in even cases registered under Section 307 RPC. Either the investigation conducted has remained faulty or the prosecution has not been conducted effectively, which has resulted in grant of bail to the petitioner. There is subtle distinction between activities which are prejudicial for maintenance of public order and activities prejudicial for maintenance of law and order. If the activities are prejudicial to the maintenance of law and order, the person indulging in such activities should be dealt with under ordinary law and not that he should be detained under the preventive detention law. 12. In a nut shell, I am of the considered opinion that the threat posed by the alleged activities of the petitioner is a clear law and order problem to be taken care of by the law enforcing agencies and is clearly not a case where the activities attributed to the petitioner could be termed as prejudicial to the maintenance of ‘public order’. 13. 13. For the foregoing reasons and without going into the other grounds of challenge urged by the petitioner, I find merit in this petition and the same is, accordingly, allowed. The impugned order of detention is quashed with a direction to the respondents to release the detenue forthwith, if not required in any other case.