ORDER 1. The appellant along with the three other accused persons, who were none other than his own mother, father and one individual named, Shankar, were charged for the offences under Sections 302 read with 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. The Trial Court rendered the conviction placing reliance on the evidence of PW 1 to PW-4, though PW-4 turned hostile insofar as the recovery is concerned. The different witnesses who adduced evidence on behalf of the appellant were not considered by the Trial Court. 2. On appeal, the High Court concurred with the view of the trial Court - which acquitted the other co-accused persons and the observation made while acquitting the other accused was based upon the very same testimony relied upon while convicting the appellant. While doing so, the High Court went into the evidence of the different witnesses and then held that they cannot be relied upon, as they were unnatural since after knowing about the alleged occurrence they did not take any further steps. 3. The learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant contended that based on the same set of evidence put forth, the co-accused have been acquitted. Though the principle of “false in uno, false in omnibus”, might not have any application to the courts in India, one has to scrutinize the evidence tendered by PW-1 and PW-4 more carefully. This is keeping in mind that the testimonies of all the witnesses have been disbelieved by the Court insofar as the co-accused are concerned. PW-1 in his zero report stated that the appellant has stabbed the deceased once in his stomach, but in his testimony before the court he changed his version by saying that it was done twice. His evidence is contradictory to that of PW-2, who is none other than his sister, to the extent of taking the deceased to the hospital. Furthermore, they did not speak about the enmity which could have been a possible motive. 4. Coming to the evidence of PW-2, the learned senior counsel submitted that it was PW-1 who told her about the occurrence. The evidence of PW-3 is contradictory to the evidence of PW-1. Furthermore, they did not speak about the enmity which could have been a possible motive. 4. Coming to the evidence of PW-2, the learned senior counsel submitted that it was PW-1 who told her about the occurrence. The evidence of PW-3 is contradictory to the evidence of PW-1. It is further submitted that the evidence of PW-4, with respect to recovery cannot be sustained as even the investigation officer (IO) stated that the recovery was made pursuant to the statement given by the accused, in accordance with Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, stating that the recovery was made from his room while the memo indicated that it was recovered from a well. 5. It is pertinent to mention that PW-4 turned hostile when he stated that he was not aware of the recovery pursuant to the statement made by the accused appellant. Furthermore, PW- 6 also stated that the recovery was made from near the bushes. The FSL report being inconclusive is not sufficient to conclude that there were traces of human blood in the recovered knife, which matches with the blood of the deceased. Furthermore, the auto-rickshaw driver who dropped off the deceased at the hospital has not been examined, and neither has the policeman who reached the place of occurrence immediately thereafter in the presence of PW-1, and who surprisingly did not lodge any report. 6. The learned counsel appearing for the State submitted that the High Court did take into consideration the evidence of the defence witnesses and appropriately discarded them. The evidence of PW-4, though can be treated as hostile insofar as the recovery is concerned, enures to the benefit of the prosecution’s case. Merely because the evidence of PW-1 to 4 was eschewed by the trial court in so far as the co-accused are concerned, the same cannot be applied to the case of the appellant. This principle has been upheld by this Court in a number of cases. 7. It is the specific case of the prosecution that all the accused jointly gathered and committed the said offence, which is the reason why the rigour of Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code was placed into service. It is the case of the prosecution that the remaining accused caught hold of the deceased with a common intention and while they physically attacked him, the appellant stabbed him. It is the case of the prosecution that the remaining accused caught hold of the deceased with a common intention and while they physically attacked him, the appellant stabbed him. As rightly submitted by the learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant, the recovery cannot be proved in the present case, as even the version of the prosecution has material contradictions. Considering the facts of the case, we are of the view that it is not advisable to rely upon the evidence tendered by PW-1 to PW-3, more so if it is the appellant who committed the offence and that too in the presence of PW-1 to PW-4 as it is improbable that he did not make any attempt to stop him from doing so. 8. The evidence of PW-1 also does not inspire confidence. While the Trial Court did not go into the evidence of the different witnesses who had deposed that PW-1 was with them, the High Court has discarded it on an irrelevant ground stating that they have been examined to show that PW-1 was with them and that they were informed about the occurrence. Non-examination of the auto-rickshaw driver and the policeman, in our considered view, weakens the case of the prosecution. We find material inconsistencies from the evidence tendered by PW-2 and PW-3. At best, it might be a case that falls within the purview of Section 304 Part-I IPC, however, we are of the view that even to attract the aforesaid offence there is insufficient evidence available on record. Certainly, this is a case where the appellant is entitled for the benefit of doubt particularly when the recovery has not been proved, and that the evidence of PW-1 to 4 cannot be relied upon to arrive at the conclusion that the charges levelled against the appellant stand proved. 9. In our considered view, both the Courts have not considered the relevant material from the correct perspective. Since we find that there are reasonable grounds for acquittal, and considering that the charges are not proved beyond reasonable doubt, we are inclined to acquit the appellant of all the charges. We set aside the impugned judgment accordingly. 10. The appeal is accordingly allowed. The appellant is directed to be released forthwith, unless required in any other case. 11. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.