JUDGMENT : Hon'ble Mayank Kumar Jain, J. 1. Heard Mr. Manish Tiwari, learned Senior Counsel for the applicant, Ms. Swati Agrawal Srivastava, learned Counsel for the opposite party no. 2, learned Additional Government Advocate for the State. 2. Perused the record. 3. Present application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. has been filed for quashing the charge-sheet dated 23.09.2019 along with cognizance order dated 20.11.2019 as well as the entire proceedings of Case No. 2197 of 2019 in Case Crime No. 87 of 2019, under Sections 406, 323, 506 I.P.C. P.S. Knowledge Park, District Gautam Budha Nagar, pending in the court of learned Civil Judge, F.T.C., Gautam Budha Nagar. It is also prayed to stay the further proceeding of aforesaid case during pendency of the present application. 4. The case of the prosecution as set out in the first information report is as under :- (i) The informant Venugopal Subramanium Kartik lodged an F.I.R. against the applicant with the allegation that on the basis of an oral agreement in the year 2013, between the first informant and the applicant, it was agreed that the first informant would lend Rs. 55,00,000/-to the applicant. The applicant would pay Rs. 6,00,000/-as interest per annum on the aforesaid amount. (ii) The entire principal amount of Rs. 55,00,000/-was to be refunded in the span of five years. (iii) The first informant transferred Rs. 55,00,000/-through RTGS from the joint account held in his and his spouse’s name. (iv) The applicant did not pay the interest as agreed upon. Whenever the first informant demanded his money along with agreed interest, she would promise that she would return the money in near future. (v) On 12.02.2019, the first informant along with his wife approached the applicant to refund their money. The applicant started using abusive language against them. 2-3 unknown persons were also present there. The applicant along with them started assaulting the first informant and his wife. They also threatened to kill them if they approach the applicant ever again to ask for money. (vi) Thus, the applicant committed fraud and usurped the money of the first informant. She committed criminal breach of trust and dishonestly misappropriated the money. 5. Mr. Manish Tiwari, learned Senior Counsel for the applicant submitted that all the allegations made in the FIR are false and baseless. Master mind behind the entire story is Suchitra Sharma, who is husband of the applicant. She committed criminal breach of trust and dishonestly misappropriated the money. 5. Mr. Manish Tiwari, learned Senior Counsel for the applicant submitted that all the allegations made in the FIR are false and baseless. Master mind behind the entire story is Suchitra Sharma, who is husband of the applicant. The dispute between the applicant and her husband is the genesis behind the present proceedings. In order to furnish financial consideration for the purchase of a property, the applicant took loan from the informant and in a timely and routine manner remitted the installments as and when it became due. It is further submitted that when the applicant was in need of some money to meet financial obligation, her husband Suchitra Sharma volunteered to help her out and as such it is he who had approached the informant and proposed that in case the opposite party no. 2 advances the said loan to the applicant, the applicant would be willing to keep her jewellery, which would cover a major portion of the loan amount as security with him and balance amount shall be returned by the applicant at the earliest. The applicant through her husband asked opposite party no. 2 to keep her jewellery with him in part satisfaction of the loan availed and the balance amount of money was returned by the applicant through her husband in cash, therefore, no outstanding amount remains accruable against the applicant. The husband of the applicant returned the amount of Rs. 5,00,000/-in December, 2015 and further amount of Rs. 5,00,000/- in March, 2016 in full and final settlement of the loan. 6. Learned Senior Counsel for the applicant vehemently argued that the present proceedings have been initiated after a lapse of almost six years. It is also submitted that the husband of the applicant Suchitra Sharma was booked under Section 151 Cr.P.C. on account of assaulting the applicant. The applicant filed a complaint against her husband as Case No. 2332 of 2018 in which her husband has been summoned to face trial under Sections 323, 504, 506, 427 I.P.C. Besides this, the applicant had also initiated proceedings under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 against him. The husband of the applicant is hands in glove with opposite party no. 2. He is eyeing the property of the applicant and her Yoga Institute to usurp the said property. The husband of the applicant is hands in glove with opposite party no. 2. He is eyeing the property of the applicant and her Yoga Institute to usurp the said property. He filed a civil suit bearing Case No. 734 of 2018 (Suchitra Sharma vs. Smt. Rashmi and others) against the applicant which is pending. 7. Learned Senior Counsel for the applicant made a straight forward argument that the transaction is admitted, however, the reason for transaction as stated by the informant is not admitted. The transaction was a friendly loan because the applicant and opposite party no. 2 were having cordial relations with each other. A friendly loan does not bear any interest and is always without consideration. The informant is not a money lender and she does not have license of money lending. 8. It is vehemently argued on behalf of the applicant that no offence under Section 405 I.P.C. is made out against the applicant. No money was entrusted by the first informant to the applicant. The essential ingredients of Section 405 I.P.C. are missing in the case of prosecution. 9. Sri Tiwari further submitted that if the story, as narrated by the prosecution, is taken as a gospel truth, the cause of action arose to the applicant when the first instalment of interest to the tune of Rs. 6,00,000/-as alleged, was not paid by the applicant. But he remained silent and did not take any legal recourse. The cognizance in all sections taken against applicant is barred under the provision of Section 468 Cr.P.C. since limitation for the same has lapsed. Lastly, learned Senior Counsel submitted that on the face of record it is apparent that learned trial court while taking the cognizance of the offence on the basis of charge sheet did not applied its judicial mind. Order sans application of mind. The cognizance order is passed on a printed proforma and the details are filled in blank space. Cognizance and summoning order is bad in law. 10. Per contra, Ms. Swati Agrawal Srivastava, learned Counsel for opposite party No. 2 opposed the contentions made by learned Counsel for the applicant and submitted that the transactions of Rs. 55,000,00/-between the informant and the applicant is an admitted fact. The first informant and the applicant were having cordial relations. On the basis of an oral agreement the money was lent to the applicant. 55,000,00/-between the informant and the applicant is an admitted fact. The first informant and the applicant were having cordial relations. On the basis of an oral agreement the money was lent to the applicant. It was a loan transaction. The informant kept waiting under a belief that the applicant will return the money in time. She dishonestly misappropriated the money. She betrayed the trust of informant and thus she committed criminal breach of trust. 11. It is further submitted that there was an oral agreement that the applicant would pay Rs. 6,00,000/-per year as interest apart from the principal amount to the first informant. It is also submitted that since period for returning the amount was 5 years therefore the complainant remained silent. He was confident that the applicant would comply with the terms and conditions of the transaction. The dishonest intention of the applicant is drawn that in spite of admitting the transaction of loan to the tune of Rs. 55,00,000/-she is now taking a legal defence that claim of opposite party No. 2 is barred by limitation. 12. Ms. Agrawal further submitted that so far as the proceedings which are referred by the applicant in his application are concerned, they relate to personal dispute between the applicant and Suchitra Sharma, which is irrelevant to the present proceedings. The F.I.R. has been lodged against the applicant with the allegation that she misappropriated huge amount of Rs. 55,00,000/-since 2013. So far as the argument that there is a delay in lodging the F.I.R. is concerned, no delay is caused since the cause of action is continuous in nature. It continues against the applicant till the time the said loan along with interest is not paid. Therefore, the claim of the first informant is not barred by the limitation. It is further submitted that the provision of Section 468 Cr.P.C. is to be read with the provision of Section 469 (b) Cr.P.C. 13. Learned Counsel for opposite party no. 2 further submitted that all the essential ingredients of the provisions contained in section 405, 504 and 506 are made out against the applicant. The complainant extended loan for the applicant's Yoga Center upon the request of the applicant and under a belief that her representation is true. The applicant has misappropriated the said loan and has usurped the money of the first informant. The amount was entrusted to the applicant. The complainant extended loan for the applicant's Yoga Center upon the request of the applicant and under a belief that her representation is true. The applicant has misappropriated the said loan and has usurped the money of the first informant. The amount was entrusted to the applicant. She dishonestly misappropriated the said amount and further refused to return the same along with interest to opposite party no. 2. The applicant applied the loan amount to set up a Yoga Centre. Till today, the applicant is enjoying financial returns from the said property. 14. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Pramod Suryabhan Pawar VS State of Maharashtra and another, (2019) 9 SCC 608 has considered the principles, scope, and ambit of the powers of the Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and held that: "6. Section 482 is an overriding section which saves the inherent powers of the court to advance the cause of justice. Under Section 482 the inherent jurisdiction of the court can be exercised (i) to give effect to an order under CrPC; (ii) to prevent the abuse of the process of the court; and (iii) to otherwise secure the ends of justice. The powers of the court under Section 482 are wide and the court is vested with a significant amount of discretion to decide whether or not to exercise them. The court should be guarded in the use of its extraordinary jurisdiction to quash an FIR or criminal proceeding as it denies the prosecution the opportunity to establish its case through investigation and evidence. These principles have been consistently followed and reiterated by this Court. In Inder Mohan Goswami v. State of Uttaranchal, (2007) 12 SCC 1 : (2008) 1 SCC (Cri) 259, this Court observed : (SCC p. 10, paras 23-24): "23. This Court in a number of cases has laid down the scope and ambit of courts' powers under Section 482 CrPC. Every High Court has inherent powers to act ex debito justitiae to do real and substantial justice, for the administration of which alone it exists, or to prevent abuse of the process of the court. Inherent power under Section 482 CrPC can be exercised: (i) to give effect to an order under the Code; (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of the court, and (iii) to otherwise secure the ends of justice. 24. Inherent power under Section 482 CrPC can be exercised: (i) to give effect to an order under the Code; (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of the court, and (iii) to otherwise secure the ends of justice. 24. Inherent powers under Section 482 CrPC though wide have to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with great caution and only when exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid down in this section itself. Authority of the court exists for the advancement of justice. If any abuse of the process leading to injustice is brought to the notice of the court, then the court would be justified in preventing injustice by invoking inherent powers in absence of specific provisions in the statute." 7. Given the varied nature of cases that come before the High Courts, any strict test as to when the court's extraordinary powers can be exercised is likely to tie the court's hands in the face of future injustices. This Court in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 426 conducted a detailed study of the situations where the court may exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction and laid down a list of illustrative examples of where quashing may be appropriate. It is not necessary to discuss all the examples, but a few bear relevance to the present case. The Court in Bhajan Lal [State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 426] noted that quashing may be appropriate where: (SCC pp. 378-79, para 102) "102. … (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2). *** (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge." 8. *** (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge." 8. In deciding whether to exercise its jurisdiction under Section 482, the Court does not adjudicate upon the veracity of the facts alleged or enter into an appreciation of competing evidence presented. The limited question is whether on the face of the FIR, the allegations constitute a cognizable offence. As this Court noted in Dhruvaram Murlidhar Sonar v. State of Maharashtra, (2019) 18 SCC 191 : 2018 SCC OnLine SC 3100, (Dhruvaram Sonar) : (SCC para 13) "13. It is clear that for quashing the proceedings, meticulous analysis of factum of taking cognizance of an offence by the Magistrate is not called for. Appreciation of evidence is also not permissible in exercise of inherent powers. If the allegations set out in the complaint do not constitute the offence of which cognizance has been taken, it is open to the High Court to quash the same in exercise of its inherent powers." 15. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Mohammad Wajid and Another Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others, reported in 2023 SCC OnLine SC 951 observed that:- “34. At this stage, we would like to observe something important. Whenever an accused comes before the Court invoking either the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) or extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution to get the FIR or the criminal proceedings quashed essentially on the ground that such proceedings are manifestly frivolous or vexatious or instituted with the ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance, then in such circumstances the Court owes a duty to look into the FIR with care and a little more closely. We say so because once the complainant decides to proceed against the accused with an ulterior motive for wreaking personal vengeance, etc., then he would ensure that the FIR/ complaint is very well drafted with all the necessary pleadings. The complainant would ensure that the averments made in the FIR/complaint are such that they disclose the necessary ingredients to constitute the alleged offence. The complainant would ensure that the averments made in the FIR/complaint are such that they disclose the necessary ingredients to constitute the alleged offence. Therefore, it will not be just enough for the Court to look into the averments made in the FIR/complaint alone for the purpose of ascertaining whether the necessary ingredients to constitute the alleged offence are disclosed or not. In frivolous or vexatious proceedings, the Court owes a duty to look into many other attending circumstances emerging from the record of the case over and above the averments and, if need be, with due care and circumspection try to read in between the lines. The Court while exercising its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the CrPC or Article 226 of the Constitution need not restrict itself only to the stage of a case but is empowered to take into account the overall circumstances leading to the initiation/registration of the case as well as the materials collected in the course of investigation…...” 35. In State of Andhra Pradesh v. Golconda Linga Swamy, (2004) 6 SCC 522 , a two-Judge Bench of this Court elaborated on the types of materials the High Court can assess to quash an FIR. The Court drew a fine distinction between consideration of materials that were tendered as evidence and appreciation of such evidence. Only such material that manifestly fails to prove the accusation in the FIR can be considered for quashing an FIR. The Court held: “5. …Authority of the court exists for advancement of justice and if any attempt is made to abuse that authority so as to produce injustice, the court has power to prevent such abuse. It would be an abuse of the process of the court to allow any action which would result in injustice and prevent promotion of justice. In exercise of the powers court would be justified to quash any proceeding if it finds that initiation or continuance of it amounts to abuse of the process of court or quashing of these proceedings would otherwise serve the ends of justice. When no offence is disclosed by the complaint, the court may examine the question of fact. When a complaint is sought to be quashed, it is permissible to look into the materials to assess what the complainant has alleged and whether any offence is made out even if the allegations are accepted in toto.” 6. When no offence is disclosed by the complaint, the court may examine the question of fact. When a complaint is sought to be quashed, it is permissible to look into the materials to assess what the complainant has alleged and whether any offence is made out even if the allegations are accepted in toto.” 6. In R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab, AIR 1960 SC 866 : 1960 Cri LJ 1239, this Court summarised some categories of cases where inherent power can and should be exercised to quash the proceedings : (AIR p. 869, para 6) (i) where it manifestly appears that there is a legal bar against the institution or continuance e.g. want of sanction; (ii) where the allegations in the first information report or complaint taken at its face value and accepted in their entirety do not constitute the offence alleged; (iii) where the allegations constitute an offence, but there is no legal evidence adduced or the evidence adduced clearly or manifestly fails to prove the charge. 7. In dealing with the last category, it is important to bear in mind the distinction between a case where there is no legal evidence or where there is evidence which is clearly inconsistent with the accusations made, and a case where there is legal evidence which, on appreciation, may or may not support the accusations. When exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court would not ordinarily embark upon an enquiry whether the evidence in question is reliable or not or whether on a reasonable appreciation of it accusation would not be sustained. That is the function of the trial Judge. Judicial process, no doubt should not be an instrument of oppression, or, needless harassment. Court should be circumspect and judicious in exercising discretion and should take all relevant facts and circumstances into consideration before issuing process, lest it would be an instrument in the hands of a private complainant to unleash vendetta to harass any person needlessly. At the same time the section is not an instrument handed over to an accused to short-circuit a prosecution and bring about its sudden death…..” 16. The transaction of Rs. 55,00,000/-made by opposite party No. 2 to the applicant through RTGS is an admitted fact. It ia also an admitted fact that the applicnat and opposite party no. 2 were having cordial relations. The transaction of Rs. 55,00,000/-made by opposite party No. 2 to the applicant through RTGS is an admitted fact. It ia also an admitted fact that the applicnat and opposite party no. 2 were having cordial relations. The said loan was accorded on the basis of a verbal agreement, therefore, the statement recorded during investigation becomes relevant. 17. The statement of opposite party no. 2 was recorded by the investigating officer. In his statement, he stated that a verbal agreement took place between him and the applicant to transfer Rs. 55,00,000/-for her business. The said amount was to be returned after five years. It was also agreed that the applicant would pay Rs. 6,00,000/-as interest per year to him. The said amount was transferred to the bank account of the applicant from a bank account jointly held by him and his wife. 18. Statements of witness Subhashri Kartik, who happens to be the wife of the first informant, Suchitra Sharma, the husband of the applicant, Dr. Yogesh Pal Singh were also recorded by the investigating officer. All these witnesses supported the version of the prosecution. 19. The provision contained under Section 405 I.P.C. is reproduced here as under:- “405. Criminal breach of trust.— “Whoever, being in any manner entrusted with property, or with any dominion over property, dishonestly misappropriates or converts to his own use that property, or dishonestly uses or disposes of that property in violation of any direction of law prescribing the mode in which such trust is to be discharged, or of any legal contract, express or implied, which he has made touching the discharge of such trust, or wilfully suffers any other person so to do, commits "criminal breach of trust".” 20. The offence under Section 405 I.P.C. is a continuing offence. As per the version of the first information report, a sum of Rs. 55,00,000/-was entrusted to the applicant on the basis of a verbal agreement. Since there was a promise to return money, therefore, prima facie, it appears that there was an entrustment of the property to the applicant. The applicant neither refunded the principal amount nor paid Rs. 6,00,000/-as interest per annum as agreed upon. 21. Section 468 Cr.P.C. Provides thus:- 468. Bar to taking cognizance after lapse of the period of limitation. Since there was a promise to return money, therefore, prima facie, it appears that there was an entrustment of the property to the applicant. The applicant neither refunded the principal amount nor paid Rs. 6,00,000/-as interest per annum as agreed upon. 21. Section 468 Cr.P.C. Provides thus:- 468. Bar to taking cognizance after lapse of the period of limitation. “(1) Except as otherwise provided elsewhere in this Code, no Court shall take cognizance of an offence of the category specified in sub-section (2), after the expiry of the period of limitation. (2) The period of limitation shall be – (a) six months, if the offence is punishable with fine only; (b) one year, if the offence is punishable with imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year; (c) three years, if the offence is punishable with imprisonment for a term exceeding one year but not exceeding three years. (3)[For the purposes of this section, the period of limitation, in relation to offences which may be tried together, shall be determined with reference to the offence which is punishable with the more severe punishment or, as the case may be, the most severe punishment.] [Inserted by Act of 1978, Section 33 (w.e.f. 18-12-1978).]” 22. Section 469 Cr.P.C. is reproduced as under:- 469. Commencement of the period of limitation. “(1) The period of limitation, in relation to an offender, shall commence, -(a)on the date of the offence; or (b) where the commission of the offence was not known to the person aggrieved by the offence or to any police officer, the first day on which such offence comes to the knowledge of such person or to any police officer, whichever is earlier; or (c) where it is not known by whom the offence was committed, the first day on which the identity of the offender is known to the person aggrieved by the offence or to the police officer making investigation into the offence, whichever is earlier. (2) In computing the said period, the day from which such period is to be computed shall be excluded.” 23. In view of the above prepositions of the law, it is the case of the prosecution that opposite party no. 2 continued to demand his money back with interest from the applicant from time to time. The cause of action finally arose to opposite party no. In view of the above prepositions of the law, it is the case of the prosecution that opposite party no. 2 continued to demand his money back with interest from the applicant from time to time. The cause of action finally arose to opposite party no. 2 when on 12.02.2019, he demanded his money alongwith interest, however, the applicant started using abusive language against opposite party no. 2 and his wife and also threatened them with life. Opposite party no. 2 lodged the FIR against the applicant when the intention of the applicant to not return the money became apparent to him. 24. The limitation would be calculated from the date of making demand of money on 12.02.2019. Thus, the cause of action being continuing in nature, the claim of opposite party no. 2 is not barred by limitation. No evidence is brought on record by the applicant that Rs. 5,00,000/-each on two occasions were returned to opposite party no. 2 by her husband. 25. In view of the above, this Court is of the opinion that prima facie evidence is available on record which indicate that the applicant has committed an offence under Sections 405, 504, 506 I.P.C. The claim of the applicant as well as the cognizance of the offence is not barred by limitation. Thus, the present application deserves to be dismissed. 26. The application is dismissed. 27. Interim order, granted earlier on 18.1.2020, is hereby vacated.