JUDGMENT : P.G. Ajithkumar, J. Respondents No.1 and 2 in OA(EKM) No.984 of 2024 pending before the Kerala Administrative Tribunal (Additional Bench), Ernakulam are the petitioners. They seek to set aside Exts.P2 and P6 and to declare Annexure A12 order legal and valid. Exts.P2 and P6 are two interim orders issued by the Tribunal. 2. Respondents No.1 and 2 filed O.A.(EKM) No.984 of 2024. In that original application filed under Section 19 of the Kerala Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 (for short “the Act”) they sought, inter alia, to quash Annexure A12 order to the extent it relates to respondents No.3 to 44. It is seen that respondents No.45 to 47 got themselves impleaded. Annexure A12 is an order issued by the 1st petitioner ordering transfer of Senior Veterinary Surgeon and Assistant Director in the Animal Husbandry Department. List No.1 in Annexure A12 is concerning promotion of Veterinary Surgeons. List No.2 is concerning transfer of Senior Veterinary Surgeon/Assistant Director on administrative ground. List No.3 in it relates to transfer of Veterinary Surgeons, Senior Veterinary Surgeons and Assistant Directors. 3. Respondent No.1 claims it is the only registered association of Kerala Government Veterinary Officers working under the Directorate of Animal Husbandry. The 2nd respondent is a Senior Veterinary Surgeon, who aspires to get a transfer in the next general transfer. The respondents challenge Annexure A12 order on many grounds; the essential grounds are the following : (i) Annexure A1 is the guidelines issued by the Government in regard to the general transfer of Government employees in various departments. The Kerala Administrative Tribunal by various orders directed the Animal Husbandry Department to implement Annexure A1. As per Annexure A6 the Kerala Administrative Tribunal specifically directed the 2nd petitioner to initiate proceedings for the general transfer, 2023 in tune with the guidelines contained in Annexure A1. The Tribunal subsequently as per Annexure A8 dated 22.11.2023 directed the 2nd petitioner to complete the process of online transfer within six weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of that order. That order was issued in modification of Annexure A6 order dated 10.03.2023. Inspite of the said direction, the petitioners did not effect general transfers in terms of Annexure A1; instead effected transfers as per Annexure A12; (ii) The Kerala Administrative Tribunal, in fact, has directed to effect interim transfers, if any, only in accordance with the queue list. That order was issued in modification of Annexure A6 order dated 10.03.2023. Inspite of the said direction, the petitioners did not effect general transfers in terms of Annexure A1; instead effected transfers as per Annexure A12; (ii) The Kerala Administrative Tribunal, in fact, has directed to effect interim transfers, if any, only in accordance with the queue list. But the petitioners in total disregard of the said directions ordered transfer of respondents No.3 to 44 in terms of Annexure A12; and (iii) Since transfers are effected other than by way of general transfer, that resulted negation of the right of other incumbents to get postings at the places, which they aspire to. The transfers effected as per Annexure A12, particularly concerning respondents No.3 to 44 are therefore illegal and violative of the provisions in Annexure A1. 4. The Tribunal granted Ext.P2 order dated22.07.2024 invoking the provisions of Section 24 of the Act directing not to implement transfers as per List No.III in Annexure A12 for a period of one month. The petitioners entered appearance and filed M.A.No.1155 of 2024 seeking to vacate the said interim order. A reply-statement was also filed. The Tribunal as per Ext.P6 declined to vacate the interim order dated 22.07.2024. The said order reads as follows : “The 1st respondent filed reply-statement as well as MA (EKM) No.1155/2024 seeking to vacate the interim order dated 22.07.2024. Prima facie this Tribunal is not convinced to vacate the interim order. However, the Original Application is posted for hearing on 19.08.2024. The applicant shall file rejoinder if any. The additional respondents shall file reply-statement.” 5. Heard the learned Senior Government Pleader, learned counsel for respondent Nos.1 and 2 and the learned counsel for other party respondents. 6. The learned counsel for respondents No.1 and 2, at the very outset, raised a contention that this original petition, which is one filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, is not maintainable. Two reasons stated are; the petition was signed not by competent persons, and the affidavit on behalf of the 1st petitioner is sworn to by an incompetent person. Yet another contention raised is that the affidavit does not contain necessary averments. Two reasons stated are; the petition was signed not by competent persons, and the affidavit on behalf of the 1st petitioner is sworn to by an incompetent person. Yet another contention raised is that the affidavit does not contain necessary averments. In the above regard, the learned Senior Government Pleader would submit that since the Under Secretary, who signed the petition, was duly authorised by the Secretary to the Government, he was competent to sign the petition and swear the affidavit. 7. As per Rule 146 of the Rules of the High Court of Kerala, 1971 an original petition filed under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India shall be signed by the party and also the counsel. Form No.10 in the Rules is also indicative of the same. When the 1st petitioner is the State of Kerala, represented by the Principal Secretary and the 2nd petitioner is the Director of Animal Husbandry. The question is whether they themselves should have signed the petition. The learned Senior Government Pleader contends that Rule 2(c) in Rules of Business, Government of Kerala (Part I) says that the Secretary to the Government includes a Special Secretary, Additional Secretary, Joint Secretary and a Deputy Secretary. Rule 12 enables even an Under Secretary to the Government to sign an instrument on behalf of the Government. Accordingly, it is contended that the Under Secretary is empowered to sign the petition and swear the affidavit on behalf of the Secretary. 8. In Sudheer C. B. v. State of Kerala [2010 (1) KHC 39] a Division Bench of this Court held that as per the Rules of Business of Kerala, the Secretary, the Additional Secretary, the Joint Secretary, the Deputy Secretary and the Under Secretary can take decisions on behalf of the Government. It was further held that their decisions would be that of the Government, in view of the authoritative pronouncement of the Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in A. Sanjeevi Naidu v. State of Madras [ 1970 (1) SCC 443 ]. 9. A Secretary to the Government includes as per Rule 2(c) in the Rules of Business a Special Secretary, Additional Secretary, Joint Secretary and a Deputy Secretary. 9. A Secretary to the Government includes as per Rule 2(c) in the Rules of Business a Special Secretary, Additional Secretary, Joint Secretary and a Deputy Secretary. If a petition is signed by a Special Secretary, Additional Secretary, Joint Secretary or a Deputy Secretary in a case where the Secretary is the party, that will be sufficient compliance of Rule 146 of the Rules of the High Court of Kerala. In view of Rule 12 of the Rules of Business the powers of a Secretary can be delegated to an Under Secretary, including to sign an instrument on behalf of the Government. When such a delegation is permitted as per Rule 12 of the Rules of Business and in the view of the law laid down by the Apex Court in Sanjeevi Naidu [ 1970 (1) SCC 443 ] an Under Secretary can certainly be authorised to sign a petition filed before the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. 10. The next question is as to what shall be the mode of authorisation. The Rules of the High Court of Kerala does not contain a provision in that regard. Section 141 of the Code creates a bar for application of the provisions of the Code to the proceedings before the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and, for that matter, to the proceedings Article 227 also. However, the definition of the term “verified” in Rule 5(11)of the Rules of the High Court of Kerala insists that verification shall be as prescribed in Order VI Rule 15 of the Code. As per Rule 15 of Order VI a party or some other person proved to the satisfaction of the Court to be acquainted with the facts of the case can verify the pleadings. How such an authorised person signs the pleadings is delineated in Rule 23 of the Civil Rules of Practice, 1971. As per Rule 15 of Order VI a party or some other person proved to the satisfaction of the Court to be acquainted with the facts of the case can verify the pleadings. How such an authorised person signs the pleadings is delineated in Rule 23 of the Civil Rules of Practice, 1971. Rule 23 reads,- “Singing or verification by agent.- If any proceeding which under any provision of law or these rules, is required to be signed or verified by a party, is signed or verified by any other person on his behalf, a written authority in this behalf signed by the party, except in the case of persons under disability, shall be filled in Court, with an affidavit by such person verifying the signature of the party, and stating the reasons for the inability of the party to sign or verify the proceeding.” 11. Although the said Rule does not apply as such, cue can be taken from it to lay down the requirements when a representative signs the petition. Hence, in a case where a Secretary to the Government has to sign a petition or affidavit to be filed before the High Court, he may authorise an Under Secretary only if he is acquainted with the facts of the case. A written authority issued by the Secretary shall be filed along with an affidavit sworn to by the Under Secretary concerned and stating that he is acquainted with the facts of the case. It is made clear that the Under Secretary can sign the petition as a representative alone and the party bound by the decision of the Court shall be the Secretary. 12. Insofar as the 2nd petitioner - Director of Animal Husbandry is concerned, the authorisation can be only to an authority empowered to represent the Director, like Additional Director, etc. In his case also if an authorised representative signs the petition and affidavit, the aforementioned procedure shall be followed. 13. Coming to the affidavit filed in this case along with the petition, it was by the Under Secretary. As rightly pointed out by the learned counsel for respondents No.1 and 2, the affidavit filed by the Under Secretary on behalf of the 1st petitioner is in a standard form filled with details of the deponent. That is quite inappropriate and highly deprecable. As rightly pointed out by the learned counsel for respondents No.1 and 2, the affidavit filed by the Under Secretary on behalf of the 1st petitioner is in a standard form filled with details of the deponent. That is quite inappropriate and highly deprecable. Be that as it may, in terms of the direction of this Court dated 16.08.2024 both the petitioners submitted duly sworn in affidavits. Therefore the defect that occurred while filing the original petition had been cured. 14. The learned counsel for respondents No.1 and 2 in the above context would submit that when the rule insists on to do a thing in a particular manner, the same shall be done in that way and not otherwise. He places reliance in this regard on A.R. Antulay v. Ramdas Sriniwas Nayak [ (1984) 2 SCC 500 ] where the Apex Court held that where a statute requires to do a certain thing in a certain way, the thing must be done in that way or not at all. Other methods of performance are necessarily forbidden. 15. In the matters of procedure there cannot be such a strict approach. When Rules 37 and 146 of the Rules of the High Court of Kerala say petitions/pleadings shall be signed by the party, and if it is insisted that the party alone can sign, even a power of attorney would not be able to sign the petition. That cannot be the intent of the said provisions. As held by the Apex Court in Charles K. Skaria v. Dr. C. Mathew [ (1980) 2 SCC 752 ] procedure is not the handmaid but the mistress and form not as subservient to substance but as superior to the essence. Viewed in the light of the above, the objection raised by the learned counsel for respondents No.1 and 2 against maintainability of this petition is overruled. 16. The Tribunal as per Annexures A6 and A8 orders directed the 2nd petitioner to effect general transfer in the Animal Husbandry Department in online mode and following the provisions of Annexure A1 guidelines. Viewed in the light of the above, the objection raised by the learned counsel for respondents No.1 and 2 against maintainability of this petition is overruled. 16. The Tribunal as per Annexures A6 and A8 orders directed the 2nd petitioner to effect general transfer in the Animal Husbandry Department in online mode and following the provisions of Annexure A1 guidelines. The contention of the learned counsel for respondents No.1 and 2 is that since the said specific directions were blatantly violated while issuing Annexure A12 transfer order, those respondents were well within their right to seek relief of quashing List No. 3 in the said order which is relating transfers and not concerning promotion or transfer involving administrative convenience. 17. The petitioners would contend that respondents No.1 and 2 did not have the right or authority to file an original application and therefore it is not maintainable. Firstly, the 1st petitioner, being an association, is not a person aggrieved coming within the purview of Section 19 of the Act. Secondly, the 2nd respondent is not a person affected by the transfers in terms of Annexure A12, but only an aspirant of transfer in the next general transfers. His apprehension is that if the vacancies in Malappuram District are filled, he would not be able to get a transfer in the next general transfer in that District. It is stated that he is not an aggrieved entitled to invoke Section 19 of the Act. 18. The learned counsel for respondents No.1 and 2 would submit that no plea of maintainability was raised before the Tribunal and therefore it cannot be raised first time before this Court. Such a plea was not seen raised in the reply-statement. In that regard, the learned counsel relies on Deepak Tandon v. Rajesh Kumar Gupta [ (2019) 5 SCC 537 ], in which the Apex Court held that if the plea is not taken in the pleadings by the parties and no issue on such plea was, therefore, framed and no finding was recorded either way by the Trial Court or the First Appellate Court, such plea cannot be allowed to be raised by the party for the first time in the third Court whether in appeal, revision or writ, as the case may be, for want of any factual foundation and finding. It is more so when such a plea is founded on factual pleadings and requires evidence to prove, i.e., it is a mixed question of law and fact and not a pure jurisdictional legal issue requiring no probe on facts. 19. In Deepak Tandon [ (2019) 5 SCC 537 ], the matter was concerning a petition for eviction under a Rent Control Statute. The maintainability of the petition was depended upon the factual aspects also. In that context, the Apex Court held that the question of maintainability could not be raised first time before the High Court. Here, the question is purely legal. Can a person other than the aggrieved file an original application under Section 19 of the Act? Going by the law laid down in the above decisions itself such a question being a pure jurisdictional legal issue can be raised at any time. 20. Apart from the maintainability aspect, the petitioners contended that the transfers were ordered on administrative convenience and also facilitating the promotions to take effect. If transfers in list No. 3 are not taken place, the promotions and consequent transfers could not happen. It is also pointed out that as the transfers stand stayed, many of the officers are unable to draw their monthly salary even. In the above context, the learned Senior Government Pleader invited our attention to the following decisions where principles of law were enunciated by the Apex Court regarding the scope of interference by the court with the orders of transfer of employees. (1) State of Uttar Pradesh v. Gobardhan Lal [ (2004) 11 SCC 402 ]; (2) S.K. Nausad Rahaman and Others v. Union of India [ (2022) 12 SCC 1 ]; (3) Rajendra Roy v. Union of India [ (1993) 1 SCC 148 ]; (4) National Hydroelectric Power Corporation Ltd. v. Shri Bhagwan [ (2001) 8 SCC 574 ]; and (5) Shilpi Bose v. State of Bihar [1991 Supp.(2) SCC 659]. 21. We do not propose to go into the proposition of law laid down in those decisions in detail since the challenge is against interim orders alone. But, we look at the principle only to decide the challenge to Exts.P2 and P6. 21. We do not propose to go into the proposition of law laid down in those decisions in detail since the challenge is against interim orders alone. But, we look at the principle only to decide the challenge to Exts.P2 and P6. That, it has often been reiterated that the order of transfer made even in transgression of administrative guidelines cannot be interfered with, unless the order is shown to be vitiated by mala fides or is made in violation of any statutory provision. It was also emphasised that the courts should not interfere with a transfer order which are made in public interest and for administrative reasons, unless the transfer orders are made in violation of any mandatory statutory rule or on the ground of mala fide. 22. It was also highlighted that a Government servant holding a transferable post has no vested right to remain posted at one place or the other, he is liable to be transferred from one place to the other. Transfer orders issued by the competent authority do not violate any of his legal rights. Even if a transfer order is passed in violation of executive instructions or orders, the Courts ordinarily should not interfere with the order instead affected party should approach the higher authorities in the Department. If the courts continue to interfere with day to day transfer orders issued by the Government and its subordinate authorities, there will be complete chaos in the Administration which would not be conducive to public interest. 23. In the above background the question, can an association be an aggrieved person in the matters of transfer shall be considered. It is averred in the original application that the 1st respondent is the only registered and recognised association in the Animal Husbandry Department. If so, it has to represent all the Veterinary Surgeons, Assistant Directors and such officers in the Department. The learned counsel, who appeared on behalf of respondent Nos.10, 12 and 22 submitted that they were opposing the original application. If so, it cannot be said that the 1st petitioner is acting for the protecting rights of all its members. 24. An application under Section 19 of the Act can be made subject to the other provisions of the Act, by a person aggrieved by any order pertaining to any matter within the jurisdiction of a Tribunal. If so, it cannot be said that the 1st petitioner is acting for the protecting rights of all its members. 24. An application under Section 19 of the Act can be made subject to the other provisions of the Act, by a person aggrieved by any order pertaining to any matter within the jurisdiction of a Tribunal. As per Section 15 of the Act, the Tribunal has jurisdiction in relation to matters concerning recruitment, and all service matters concerning a person appointed to any civil service. Section 19 of the Act confers the right to approach the Tribunal only on a person who is aggrieved by any order pertaining to any matter within the jurisdiction of a Tribunal. Section 20 of the Act reinforces the entitlement of a person aggrieved alone having the competence to approach the Tribunal by indicating that the said person ought to have also exhausted the alternate remedies available to him under the relevant service rules as to redressal of his grievance. 25. On a conjoint reading of Sections 19 and 20 of the Act, it is possible to say that in the matters connecting to transfers, right to approach the Tribunal is confined to only a person who is personally aggrieved by on order of transfer. In other words, only a person who is holding a post and who is aggrieved by an connecting to his transfer alone has the locus standi to approach the Tribunal to challenge that order. Viewed so, it cannot be said that either respondent No. 1 or respondent No. 2 is a person aggrieved by Annexure 12 order. 26. The learned counsel for respondents No.1 and 2 would urge that the right of associations to initiate class action and espouse grievance of its members has been recognised by the Apex Court and this Court in a slew of decisions. Therefore, the right of the 1st petitioner to file O.A. (EKM) No.984 of 2024 cannot be assailed. The learned counsel places reliance on Akhil Baratiya Soshit Karmachari Sangh (Railway) v. Union of India [ (1981) 1 SCC 246 ], Union of India v. All India Naval Clerks Association [judgment dated 17.01.2012 in W.P.(C) No.21384 of 2007] and Union of India v. All India Loco Running Staff Association [Judgment dated 20.03.2020 in O.P.(CAT) No.39 of 2013] in order to fortify his contentions. 27. 27. In Akhil Baratiya Soshit Karmachari Sangh [ (1981) 1 SCC 246 ] the Apex Court considered the question whether an unrecognised association could approach the Apex Court under Article 32 of the Constitution of India in order to redress the grievance of its members. the Apex Court held that such a class action is very much possible. But, the said principle laid down in regard to the right to invoke the jurisdiction of constitutional courts cannot be applied to the present case. Here, the jurisdiction sought to be invoked is a strictly statutory one. The parameters under Section 19 of the Act, which enables only an aggrieved person to file an application before the Tribunal. When the grievance espoused is concerning transfer, the general proposition cannot be applied since the scope of interference to the orders of transfer by the courts is very limited. therefore, respondents No.1 and 2 cannot avail the help of the said principle to file an application under Section 19 of the Act. 28. In All India Naval Clerks Association [W.P.(C) No.21384 of 2007] what was sought to be agitated before the Tribunal was regarding denial of service benefits. the denial of benefit of a scheme which entitled employees to claim ACP was called in question. The application filed by the association in that regard was entertained, however, with a caveat that at least one of the aggrieved employee has joined as an applicant, and thereby the requirements of Rule 4(5)(b) of the Central Administrative Tribunal Procedure Rules, 1987 was complied with. Thus, the right of an association to file an application before the Administrative Tribunal was not recognised as an unqualified right in the said decision. 29. In All India Loco Running Staff Association [O.P.(CAT) No.39 of 2013] the question whether an association could file an application before the Tribunal did not arise for consideration. The question was more about territorial jurisdiction and therefore the said decision is also not available to the help of respondents No.1 and 2. 30. No much dilation is required to hold that the persons aggrieved by Annexure A12 order are only the individual officers, who are involved in the transfer. The statutory right created under the provisions of Section 19 read with Section 15 of the Act does not clothe an association with a right to challenge orders of transfer. 30. No much dilation is required to hold that the persons aggrieved by Annexure A12 order are only the individual officers, who are involved in the transfer. The statutory right created under the provisions of Section 19 read with Section 15 of the Act does not clothe an association with a right to challenge orders of transfer. A three Judge Bench of the Apex Court in Dr. Duryodhan Sahu v. Jitendra Kumar Misra [ (1998) 7 SCC 273 ] held that the basic idea as evident from the various provisions of the Act is that the Tribunal should quickly redress the grievances in relation to service matters. The definition of "service matters" found in Section 3(q) shows that in relation to a person, the expression means all service matters relating to the conditions of his service. The significance of the word “his" cannot be ignored. Section 3(b) defines the word "application" as an application made under Section 19. The latter Section refers to "person aggrieved". It was further held that in order to bring a matter before the Tribunal, an application has to be made and the same can be made only by a person aggrieved by any order pertaining to any matter within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. Hence, under the garb of collective bargain, an association cannot question orders of transfer before the Administrative Tribunal. 31. Inasmuch as the 2nd petitioner is concerned, he is not aggrieved by Annexure A12. A transfer is not a vested right of a public servant. His apprehension that he may not get a posting in Malappuram District in the ensuing general transfer is not a reason enabling him to file an application under Section 19 of the Act. In Gopabandhu Biswal v. Krishna Chandra Mohanty [ (1998) 4 SCC 447 ] the Apex considered whether persons having only a chance of promotion in future are ‘persons aggrieved’. Although the Apex Court considered that question to decide the right to file a review petition, it was in the backdrop of the provisions of Section 19 of the Act. It was held that a chance of promotion in future does not confer any legal right on the persons and they could not be considered as parties aggrieved. The further observation is that, however leniently one may construe the term 'party aggrieved', a person not directly affected cannot be a considered as a person aggrieved. It was held that a chance of promotion in future does not confer any legal right on the persons and they could not be considered as parties aggrieved. The further observation is that, however leniently one may construe the term 'party aggrieved', a person not directly affected cannot be a considered as a person aggrieved. Viewed so, the 2nd respondent has no locus to file an application challenging Annexure A12. 32. In the said circumstances, the prima facie finding can only be that O.A.(EKM) No.984 of 2024 filed by respondents No.1 and 2 is not maintainable. In view of our prima facie finding that the original application is not maintainable, the order of stay as per Ext.P2 is liable to be set aside. As a consequence, Ext.P6 order becomes inoperative. The original petition is allowed accordingly. We, however, make it clear that the views taken by us herein before do not any way relieve the petitioners from implementing the guidelines in Annexure A2 or from obeying the directions issued by the Tribunal in that regard.