JUDGMENT : Murali Purushothaman, J. The 2nd petitioner is the mother of the 1st petitioner. The 1st petitioner while working as Junior Accountant in the service of the erstwhile Idukki District Co-operative Bank, Vattavada Branch, Idukki District (now Kerala State Co-operative Bank (Kerala Bank)) was suspended from service on 29.08.2017, pending enquiry, on the basis of an FIR registered against him at Kattappana Police Station on 20.08.2017 for the alleged commission of offences punishable under Section 21 (c) of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (for short 'NDPS Act'). The 1st petitioner was arrested on 01.09.2017 and remanded to custody. 2. After the trial, the 1st petitioner was found guilty of the offences charged against him and was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for ten years and a fine of Rupees one lakh fifty thousand was imposed on him, by the Special Court for NDPS cases, Thodupuzha by judgment dated 08.01.2021. During the trial, he was under judicial custody. He has preferred an appeal before this Court and has been enlarged on bail on 11.09.2023. 3. After the conviction, the Chief Executive Officer of the Bank, presenting himself as the competent disciplinary authority, issued Ext.P2 memorandum of charges dated 30.03.2022 and statement of imputation of misconduct against the 1st petitioner, through the Superintendent, Viyyoor Central Jail where he was undergoing imprisonment. In Ext.P2 memo of charges, it is stated that the Special Court for NDPS cases, Thodupuzha, by judgment dated 08.01.2021, found the 1st petitioner guilty of the charges framed under Section 21 (c) of the NDPS Act for having possessed and transported commercial quantity of ganja oil and convicted and sentenced him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for ten years and to pay a fine of Rupees One lakh fifty thousand and he has thereby committed an offence involving moral turpitude, an act of misconduct which is in gross violation of Regulation 55 (1) (1) of the Staff Regulations of the Bank and Section 10 (1) (b) (i) of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949. It was therefore proposed to initiate suitable disciplinary action against him and he was asked to submit explanation within 15 days as to why further action under the Staff Regulations of the Bank, the Banking Regulation Act and the Kerala Co-operative Societies Rules, 1969 shall not be taken against him. 4. It was therefore proposed to initiate suitable disciplinary action against him and he was asked to submit explanation within 15 days as to why further action under the Staff Regulations of the Bank, the Banking Regulation Act and the Kerala Co-operative Societies Rules, 1969 shall not be taken against him. 4. Later, the 1st respondent, the General Manager of the Bank, issued Ext.P1 order dated 26.09.2023, stating that the Board of Directors of the Bank, by resolution No.1973(4) dated 12.04.2023, had resolved to dismiss the 1st petitioner from service based on his conviction in the NDPS case, and that the 1st petitioner, Accountant (under suspension), is provisionally dismissed from service with effect from 29.08.2017, the date of suspension and requiring to submit his explanation within 15 days, failing which final orders would be passed. 5. According to the 1st petitioner, he received Ext.P2 memo of charges and statement of imputations only on 04.10.2023 and he submitted Ext.P2 (a) representation seeking extension of time to submit explanation. However, the same was rejected by Ext.P3 communication of the General Manager dated 13.10.2023 informing that he was given sufficient opportunities to submit explanation to the proposed punishment of dismissal by intimation through various modes including publication in newspapers and no further time can be granted. On the same day, Ext.P4 order was passed by the General Manager confirming the provisional order dismissing the 1st petitioner with effect from 29.08.2017. 6. After release from prison, the 1st petitioner preferred Ext.P5 representation dated 30.03.2024 before the General Manager for payment of subsistence allowance. The 2nd petitioner, his mother also preferred Ext.P6 representation claiming subsistence allowance for him. It is stated that the 1st respondent has not so far responded to Exts.P5 and P6. 7. Aggrieved by Ext.P4 order of dismissal of the 1st petitioner from service and non payment of subsistence allowance due to him during the period of suspension, the petitioners have preferred this writ petition. The petitioners have also sought for direction to reinstate the 1st petitioner in service with back wages and attendant benefits and to disburse the arrears of subsistence allowance for the period from 29.08.2017 to 13.10.2023. 8. It is contended that the entire disciplinary action initiated against the 1st petitioner including suspension is in violation of the provisions contained in Rule 198 of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Rules, 1969. 8. It is contended that the entire disciplinary action initiated against the 1st petitioner including suspension is in violation of the provisions contained in Rule 198 of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Rules, 1969. It is further contended that an employee can be dismissed only prospectively and not retrospectively and the order of dismissal will be effective only from the date of dismissal, and the 1st petitioner is entitled to subsistence allowance from the date of suspension till the date of dismissal. It is also stated that the 1st petitioner was kept under suspension exceeding the period of one year, ie; for more than 6 years without the prior approval of the Registrar. 9. At the time of admission of the writ petition on 12.04.2024, this Court passed an order directing the respondents to pay subsistence allowance as per Rules if eligible, within a period of one month. Pursuant to the said order, the 1st respondent passed an order rejecting the request of the 1st petitioner for subsistence allowance by Ext.P7 communication dated 09.05.2024. Since respondents 1 and 2 did not enter appearance, this Court, by order dated 19.07.2024, issued an interim direction to the respondents to grant subsistence allowance to the 1st petitioner for the period from 29.08.2017 to 13.10.2023, within a period of two weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of the order. 10. Respondents 1 and 2 entered appearance through counsel and filed a counter affidavit in the writ petition as well as an interlocutory application supported by a separate affidavit to vacate the order dated 19.07.2024 passed by this Court. Accordingly, this Court passed an order on 09.08.2024 keeping in abeyance the order dated 19.07.2024. 11. In the counter affidavit filed on behalf of respondents 1 and 2, it is stated that the 1st petitioner while working as Junior Accountant in the service of the Bank was arrested and detained in police custody for offences punishable under the NDPS Act and that, after the trial, he was found guilty of the offences charged against him, and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for ten years with a fine of Rupees one lakh fifty thousand by the Special Court, Thodupuzha by its order dated 08.01.2021. On coming to know of the arrest and detention of the 1st petitioner for serious offences involving moral turpitude, he was placed under suspension with effect from 29.08.2017 pending enquiry. On coming to know of the arrest and detention of the 1st petitioner for serious offences involving moral turpitude, he was placed under suspension with effect from 29.08.2017 pending enquiry. Later, consequent to his conviction for offences involving moral turpitude, he was dismissed from service with effect from 29.08.2017, after giving due notice. It is further stated that the order of dismissal has become final and conclusive. Referring to Section 10 (1) (b) (i) of the Banking Regulations Act, 1949, it is contended that an employee convicted by a criminal court for offence involving moral turpitude cannot be continued in the service of the Bank. It is stated that since the order of dismissal was issued following his conviction by a criminal court for offence involving moral turpitude, holding of domestic enquiry is not mandatory. As regards subsistence allowance, it is contended that, a person, who was in judicial custody pending trial or a person convicted for an offence of serious nature involving moral turpitude, is not entitled for subsistence allowance and the petitioners cannot seek the indulgence of this Court for exercising its discretionary jurisdiction. It is further contended that the 1st petitioner has been dismissed with retrospective effect and on dismissal, the employee forfeits all his service benefits. Finally, it is contended that since subsistence allowance is payable to an employee and not to a dependent, the 2nd petitioner has no locus standi to file the writ petition. 12. Heard Smt. Anitha Mathai Muthirenthy, the learned counsel for the petitioners, Sri. P.C. Sasidharan, the learned Standing Counsel for respondents 1 and 2 and Sri. Dheeraj, the learned Government Pleader for the 3rd respondent, the Registrar of Co-operative Societies. 13. Sri. P.C. Sasidharan refers to Section 2 (f) of the Kerala Payment of Subsistence Allowance Act, 1972 and contends that 'suspension' is defined as an interim decision of an employer as a result of which an employee is debarred temporarily from attending his office and performing his function in the establishment where he is employed, and since the 1st petitioner was debarred from attending his office and performing his function due to his arrest and remand to judicial custody, and not due to any action of the management, he is not entitled to subsistence allowance. It is contended that the Kerala Payment of Subsistence Allowance Act will not apply in a case of conviction. Sri. It is contended that the Kerala Payment of Subsistence Allowance Act will not apply in a case of conviction. Sri. P.C. Sasidharan submits that it is the implied condition in service law that future good conduct is a condition for grant of pension, and dismissal from service entails forfeiture of all service benefits. It is also contended that a person convicted for offences under the NDPS Act cannot be shown any indulgence by this Court and this is not a normal situation where an employee is placed under suspension pending disciplinary proceedings. It is also contended that the 1st petitioner has not approached the authorities under the Payment of Subsistence Allowance Act before filing the writ petition. Sri.P.C.Sasidharan also relied on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Krishnakant Raghunath Bibhavnekar v. State of Maharashtra and others [1997 KHC 799 : (1997) 3 SCC 636 : AIR 1997 SC 1434 ] wherein it has been held that when a Government servant is prosecuted for commission of defalcation of public funds and later acquitted of offences, he cannot be made entitled to reinstatement with grant of all consequential benefits as a matter of course, as the act of reinstatement may undermine the constitutional animation of public faith and credit given to public acts. 14. Smt. Anitha would contend that when the order of dismissal has been passed in violation of the statutory provisions, writ petition challenging the order of dismissal is maintainable. It is further contended that since the 1st petitioner was confined to prison he could not approach the authorities for payment of subsistence allowance earlier and after he was released from prison on bail, he made request for subsistence allowance which was rejected during the pendency of the writ petition. Smt.Anitha contends that though the 1st petitioner was suspended pending enquiry, no enquiry was conducted and the memo of charges was issued only after the conviction. Relying on the decision of this Court in Parappuram Milk Producers Co-operative Society v. Deputy Director, Department of Dairy Development [1999 KHC 60], she would contend that an employee can be dismissed only prospectively and not retrospectively and that an order dismissing an employee retrospectively will be deemed to be effective only from the date of dismissal. Relying on the decision of this Court in Parappuram Milk Producers Co-operative Society v. Deputy Director, Department of Dairy Development [1999 KHC 60], she would contend that an employee can be dismissed only prospectively and not retrospectively and that an order dismissing an employee retrospectively will be deemed to be effective only from the date of dismissal. It is also contended by Smt. Anitha that the 2nd petitioner is a dependent of the 1st petitioner and the 1st petitioner has to maintain her, for which subsistence allowance has to be paid. 15. As regards the challenge against Ext.P4 order of dismissal, the Kerala Co-operative Societies Act and Rules, 1969 provides for hierarchy of remedies. Against an order of dismissal, there is a remedy by way of appeal under Rule 198 (4) of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Rules and further remedy before the Co-operative Arbitration Court under Section 69 (2) (d) of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Act, 1969 and an appeal to the Co-operative Tribunal under Section 82 of the Act. He has also a remedy under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. In the light of the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Annamma K. A. v. Secretary, Cochin Cooperative Society Ltd. [ (2018) 2 SCC 729 : AIR 2018 SC 422 : ILR 2018 (1) Ker. 225 : 2018 (1) KHC 258 : 2018 (1) KLT 414 ], the Kerala Co–operative Societies Act, 1969 and the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, both possess and enjoy the concurrent jurisdiction to decide any service dispute arising between the Co - operative Society's employee and his employer and that it is the choice of the employee concerned to choose any one forum out of the two forums available to him under the two Acts to get his service dispute decided, subject to satisfying the test laid down under the Industrial Disputes Act that the employee concerned is a "workman", the dispute raised by him is an "industrial dispute" and the Co-operative Society (employer) is an "Industry" as defined under the Industrial Disputes Act. Thus, the 1st petitioner has got efficacious statutory remedies against the order of dismissal. If any of such remedies is foreclosed by limitation, then he cannot invoke the power of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution and bypass the statutory restrictions. Thus, the 1st petitioner has got efficacious statutory remedies against the order of dismissal. If any of such remedies is foreclosed by limitation, then he cannot invoke the power of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution and bypass the statutory restrictions. Therefore, I am not inclined to entertain the challenge against the order of dismissal in this writ petition. 16. As regards payment of subsistence allowance to an employee of a Co-operative Society, other than the Secretary, Manager or the Chief Executive Officer, Rule 198 (6) of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Rules provides that, an employee under suspension shall be entitled to subsistence allowance payable under the Kerala Payment of Subsistence Allowance Act, 1972. The 1st petitioner being a Junior Accountant will come within the ambit of 'employee' under Rule 198 (6) of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Rules. Section 2 (f) of the Kerala Payment of Subsistence Allowance Act, 1972 defines the term 'suspension' as follows : “(f) "suspension" means an interim decision of an employer as a result of which an employee is debarred temporarily from attending his office and performing his functions in the establishment where he is employed, such restriction being imposed on the employee on the ground either that a disciplinary proceeding has already been, or is shortly to be, instituted against him or that a criminal proceeding in respect of an offence alleged to have been committed by him is under investigation or trial;” (underlining supplied) The definition of "suspension" refers to an interim decision by an employer, which temporarily bars an employee from attending work and performing his duties in the establishment where he is employed. This restriction is imposed either because a disciplinary proceeding has been or is about to be initiated against him, or because a criminal proceeding related to an alleged offence by him is under investigation or trial. The order placing the 1st petitioner under suspension has not been produced by the petitioner and is conspicuously absent among the documents produced along with the counter affidavit filed by respondents 1 and 2. However, the counter affidavit states that the 1st petitioner was placed under suspension pending enquiry. A memo of charges was issued to the 1st petitioner and the enquiry culminated in his dismissal. However, the counter affidavit states that the 1st petitioner was placed under suspension pending enquiry. A memo of charges was issued to the 1st petitioner and the enquiry culminated in his dismissal. Thus, it can be seen that, the interim decision of the employer debarring the 1st petitioner from attending the work and performing his duties was due to disciplinary proceeding contemplated against him as well as for the reason that criminal proceeding against him was under investigation. Thus, the suspension of the 1st petitioner by the Bank on 29.08.2017 comes within the ambit of the definition 'suspension' under the Kerala Payment of Subsistence Allowance Act, 1972. The contention of respondents 1 and 2 that the suspension was not due to any action of the management cannot therefore be sustained. 17. Section 3 of the Kerala Payment of Subsistence Allowance Act, 1972 reads as follows:- “3. Payment of subsistence allowance.— (1) Whenever an employee is placed under suspension, he shall be paid by the employer for the period during which he is under suspension subsistence allowance of an amount equal to fifty per centum of the wages which the employee was drawing immediately before such suspension” Provided that,- (a) where the period of suspension exceeds ninety days the amount of subsistence allowance shall, for the period exceeding ninety days, be seventy-five per cent of the wages; and (b) where the period of suspension exceeds one hundred and eighty days, the amount of subsistence allowance shall, for the period exceeding one hundred and eighty days, be equal to the wages which the employee was drawing immediately before such suspension. Provided further that an employee shall not be entitled to any subsistence allowance if he accepts employment during the period of suspension in any establishment other than the establishment where he had been working immediately before his suspension. (2) An employee shall not in any event be liable to refund or forfeit any part of the subsistence allowance admissible to him under sub-section (1), but when an employee is exonerated of the charge which caused his suspension, the subsistence allowance paid to him for any period shall be adjusted against the full wages admissible to him for the same period. (3) Where any employee has been placed under suspension before the commencement of this Act and such suspension is in force at such commencement, he shall be deemed to have been placed under suspension on the date of such commencement.” Section 3 provides that when an employee is suspended, he is entitled to receive 50% of his last drawn wages as subsistence allowance during the suspension period. If the suspension lasts more than 90 days, the allowance increases to 75% of the wages for the period beyond 90 days. If the suspension extends beyond 180 days, the employee is entitled to full amount of his last drawn wages as subsistence allowance for the period exceeding 180 days. Thus, an employee of a Co-operative Society placed under suspension shall be entitled to subsistence allowance as provided under Section 3 of the Kerala Payment of Subsistence Allowance Act, 1972. The only prohibition or restriction is, he shall not accept employment elsewhere during the suspension period. It is also pertinent to note that, Section 3(2) provides that the employee cannot in any event be required to refund or forfeit any part of the subsistence allowance admissible to him under Section 3(1). Therefore, subsistence allowance cannot be denied to the 1st petitioner, for the reason that he has been convicted by a criminal court for an offence involving moral turpitude and that the 2nd respondent Bank has dismissed him from service on account of such conviction. Though dismissal from service on account of conviction for an offence involving moral turpitude may entail forfeiture of his service benefits like pension and gratuity, that cannot forfeit the subsistence allowance payable to him during the period of his suspension as the only situation where the employee will be disentitled for the said allowance is when he takes up an employment in any establishment other than the one where he had been working immediately before his suspension. The 1st petitioner was in judicial custody during the period of suspension and the respondents have no case that he was employed elsewhere. 18. It is contended by Sri. P.C. Sasidharan that subsistence allowance is payable to an employee and since the 1st petitioner was in judicial custody there was no necessity for payment of subsistence allowance. A person works and earns to maintain himself and the members of his family. 18. It is contended by Sri. P.C. Sasidharan that subsistence allowance is payable to an employee and since the 1st petitioner was in judicial custody there was no necessity for payment of subsistence allowance. A person works and earns to maintain himself and the members of his family. During suspension, he is not permitted to work and is paid only subsistence allowance which is less than his salary. With this amount he has to maintain himself and the members of his family. In State of Maharashtra v. Chandrabhan, [1983 KHC 470 : (1983) 3 SCC 387 : AIR 1983 SC 803 ], the Hon'ble Supreme Court while striking down the second proviso to Rule 151(i)(ii)(b) of the Bombay Civil Service Rules which provided for payment of subsistence allowance at the rate of Re.1/- per month to a Government servant who is convicted by a competent Court and sentenced to imprisonment and whose appeal against the conviction and sentence is pending, as void as it offends Articles 14, 16 and 21 of the Constitution held that, if the civil servant under suspension, pending a departmental enquiry or a criminal trial started against him, is entitled to subsistence allowance at the normal rate which is a bare minimum required for the maintenance of the civil servant and his family, he should undoubtedly get it even pending his appeal filed against his conviction by the trial Court, and his right to get the normal subsistence allowance pending consideration of his appeal against his conviction should not depend upon the chance of his being released on bail and not being lodged in prison on conviction by the Trial Court. Whether he is lodged in prison or released on bail on his conviction pending consideration of his appeal, his family requires the bare minimum by way of subsistence allowance. The Court observed that subsistence allowance is required to support the civil servant and his family not only during the trial of the criminal case started against him but also during the pendency of the appeal. The Court observed in paragraph 20 as follows : "20. The Court observed that subsistence allowance is required to support the civil servant and his family not only during the trial of the criminal case started against him but also during the pendency of the appeal. The Court observed in paragraph 20 as follows : "20. The learned Judges of the Division Bench have found in the judgment under appeal that the object and purpose of the main R.151 is to provide for subsistence allowance pending suspension of the civil servant and that the subsistence allowance mentioned in the main Rule and the second proviso means a bare minimum which can reasonably be provided for a civil servant who is kept under suspension and without work and therefore not entitled to full wages. If the civil servant under suspension, pending a departmental enquiry or a criminal trial started against him, is entitled to subsistence allowance at the normal rate which is a bare minimum required for the maintenance of the civil servant and his family, he should undoubtedly get it even pending his appeal filed against his conviction by the Trial Court, and his right to get the normal subsistence allowance pending consideration of his appeal against his conviction should not depend upon the chance of his being released on bail and not being lodged in prison on conviction by the Trial Court. Whether he is lodged in prison or released on bail on his conviction pending consideration of his appeal, his family requires the bare minimum by way of subsistence allowance. Subsistence allowance provided for in the second proviso at the nominal rate of Re. 1 per month is illusory and meaningless. The contention of the appellant that even the nominal sum of Re. 1 per month is subsistence allowance for a civil servant under suspension is as unreasonable as the contention of the appellant that what should be the subsistence allowance for a civil servant under suspension is for the authority empowered to frame rules under Art.309 of the Constitution to consider and that the civil servant who has entered service is bound by the second proviso. The sum of Re.1 per month can never sustain a civil servant for even a day much less for a month." (underlining supplied by this Court) 19. The sum of Re.1 per month can never sustain a civil servant for even a day much less for a month." (underlining supplied by this Court) 19. In Fakirbhai Fulabhai Solanki v Presiding Officer and another [1986 KHC 808 : (1986) 3 SCC 131 : AIR 1986 SC 1168 ], the Hon'ble Supreme Court while dealing with denial of subsistence allowance during a proceedings before an Industrial Tribunal observed as follows:- “... An order of suspension by itself does not put an end to the employment. The workman continues to be an employee during the period of suspension and it is for this reason ordinarily the various standing orders in force in several factories and industrial establishments provide for payment of subsistence allowance which is normally less than the usual salary and allowance that are paid to the workman concerned. An order of suspension no doubt prevents the employee from rendering his service but it does not put an end to the relationship of master and servant between the management and the workman. When an application is made under S.33(3) of the Act the workman is entitled to defend himself before the Tribunal. In those proceedings it is open to him to show that the domestic enquiry held against him was not in accordance with law and principles of natural justice and the action proposed to be taken against him by the management is unjust and should not be permitted. Sometimes it may be necessary to either of the parties to lead evidence even before the Tribunal. The proceedings before the Tribunal very often take a long time to come to an end. In this very case the proceedings were pending before the Tribunal for nearly six years. Most of the workmen are not in a position to maintain themselves and the members of their families during the pendency of such proceedings. In addition to the cost of maintenance of his family the workman has to find money to meet the expenses that he has to incur in connection with the proceedings pending before the Tribunal. In this case the appellant was in receipt of salary and allowances till the end of the disciplinary enquiry. In addition to the cost of maintenance of his family the workman has to find money to meet the expenses that he has to incur in connection with the proceedings pending before the Tribunal. In this case the appellant was in receipt of salary and allowances till the end of the disciplinary enquiry. But from 13-8-1979 he was not paid even the barest subsistence allowance till August 5, 1985 when the Tribunal passed its order / award on the application of the management and the complaint of the appellant. It is true that in the instant case the Tribunal granted the application of the management and rejected the complaint of the appellant. It was also quite possible that the Tribunal could have rejected the application of the management and upheld the complaint of the appellant in which case the appellant would have been entitled to continue to be an employee under the management of the factory and the disciplinary enquiry held against him would have had no effect at all. Because it is difficult to anticipate the result of the application made before the Tribunal it is reasonable to hold that the workman against whom the application is made should be paid some amount by way of subsistence allowance to enable him to maintain himself and the members of his family and also to meet the expenses of the litigation before the Tribunal. And if no amount is paid during the pendency of such an application it has to be held that the workman concerned has been denied a reasonable opportunity to defend himself in the proceedings before the Tribunal. Such denial leads to violation of principles of natural justice and consequently vitiates the proceedings before the Tribunal under sub-section (3) of S.33 of the Act and any decision given in those proceedings against the workman concerned. No material has been placed before us in this case to show that the appellant had sufficient means to defend himself before the Tribunal.” (underlining supplied by this Court) Subsistence allowance is paid to enable the employee to maintain himself and the members of his family. If subsistence allowance is denied, not only the concerned employee but also his entire family suffers grave adversities. Even if he is confined in prison during the period of his suspension, his family requires the bare minimum by way of subsistence allowance. If subsistence allowance is denied, not only the concerned employee but also his entire family suffers grave adversities. Even if he is confined in prison during the period of his suspension, his family requires the bare minimum by way of subsistence allowance. Therefore, an employee who is placed under suspension by an interim decision of the employer either because a disciplinary proceeding has been or is about to be initiated against him, or because a criminal proceeding related to an alleged offence by him is under investigation or trial, is entitled to subsistence allowance even during his judicial custody. There is no restriction or prohibition under the Kerala Payment of Subsistence Allowance Act, 1972 for payment of subsistence allowance to a person who is confined in prison either as an under-trial prisoner or under a sentence of imprisonment. The order of suspension ceases to be in force on reinstatement in service or on dismissal. Whenever an employee in an establishment covered by the Kerala Payment of Subsistence Allowance Act, 1972 is placed under suspension, he is entitled to subsistence allowance during the period of suspension. A suspended employee can be denied subsistence allowance only under the circumstances enumerated in the second proviso to Section 3(1) of the Kerala Payment of Subsistence Allowance Act, namely, when he accepts employment in any establishment other than the establishment where he had been working immediately before his suspension. Even if it is assumed that the dismissal order will operate retrospectively, that cannot forfeit or take away the subsistence allowance admissible to him under Section 3 (1) of the Kerala Payment of Subsistence Allowance Act. Here it is also pertinent to refer to Rule 57 of Part I of Kerala Service Rules which provides that an officer who is detained in custody, whether on a criminal charge or otherwise, for a period exceeding 48 hours, or is undergoing imprisonment shall be deemed to be under suspension with effect from the date of commencement of the detention or imprisonment, as the case may be, and shall not be allowed to draw any pay and allowances during such period of suspension other than any subsistence allowance and other allowances that may be granted in accordance with Rule 55 until he is reinstated in service. The said Rule which is applicable to the Secretary, Manager or the Chief Executive Officer of the Co-operative Society also does not prohibit payment of subsistence allowance to such employees when detained in custody. 20. The respondents cannot contend that the 1st petitioner did not make any claim for subsistence allowance and the claim after a long lapse of time cannot be entertained. The Kerala Payment of Subsistence Allowance Act, 1972 is a beneficial legislation. Labour and welfare legislations require a liberal interpretation. When an employee is placed under suspension, in contemplation of disciplinary proceeding against him or for the reason that criminal proceeding against him is under investigation, the order of suspension must state his entitlement to subsistence allowance during the period of suspension, as it is a right conferred on the suspended employee. Right to life includes the right to minimum subsistence allowance during suspension. Denial of subsistence allowance would amount to denial of right to life guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. 21. It is true that offence relating to peddling, possessing, consuming or dealing in any manner with narcotic drugs is a grave offence which adversely affects the social fabric of the society and impressionable youth. However, this should not be a reason to deny the employee subsistence allowance admissible to him during the period of suspension. The decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Krishnakant Raghunath Bibhavnekar (supra) relied on by Sri. Sasidharan cannot apply to the facts of the present case. In the said case, the Hon'ble Supreme Court was considering whether a government servant who is prosecuted for the defalcation of public funds and later acquitted of the offenses is entitled to reinstatement with all consequential benefits as a matter of course. The question as to the entitlement of subsistence allowance was not an issue as the appellant therein was paid subsistence allowance pending trial. 22. The 2nd petitioner is the mother of the 1st petitioner. She is stated to be dependent on the 1st petitioner. The 1st petitioner has a moral as well as a statutory obligation under the Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007 to maintain the 2nd petitioner. This writ petition can be maintained even without the 2nd petitioner on the party array. Accordingly, this writ petition is allowed in part. The 1st petitioner has a moral as well as a statutory obligation under the Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007 to maintain the 2nd petitioner. This writ petition can be maintained even without the 2nd petitioner on the party array. Accordingly, this writ petition is allowed in part. There will be a direction to respondents 1 and 2 to pay subsistence allowance to the 1st petitioner in terms of Section 3 of the Kerala Payment of Subsistence Allowance Act, 1972 for the period from 29.08.2017 to 13.10.2023, within a period of two months from the date of receipt of a copy of the judgment. It will be open to the 1st petitioner to avail any other remedy as may be available in law against the order of dismissal.