JUDGMENT : B. SYAMSUNDER, J. 1. The plaintiffs in O.S. No. 87 of 2010 on the file of Senior Civil Judge’s Court, Gooty are the appellants. The respondent is the defendant in the suit. Originally, the suit was instituted by the appellants against the respondent to declare original of Ex.A2/registered Gift Deed, dated 13.03.2006 executed by their father in favour of the respondent in respect of suit schedule property as null and void, and to cancel the said Gift Deed. 2. The appellants and the respondent hereinafter referred to as plaintiffs and defendant as arrayed before the trial Court. 3. The plaintiffs instituted the suit against the defendant, stating that the plaint schedule property is joint family property of themselves and their father late Mr. P. Balarami Reddy. The said property is open site situated at Tadipatri town. It is the contention of the plaintiff that themselves and their father were coparceners of Hindu Joint Family and each of them are having equal rights over suit schedule property. It is also the contention of the plaintiffs that their father had purchased the plaint schedule property with joint family funds in an auction, sale held by the Co-operative Department in EP No. 12 of 1978-79 in execution of the decree No. 111/77-78, dated 29.08.1978, accordingly original of Ex.A1/sale certificate was issued in favour of their father on 28.04.1981. It is also the contention of the plaintiffs that their father was an agriculturist having ancestral property and with the yield derived from the joint family funds, their father had purchased the suit schedule property, due to that their father had no separate income to purchase the same. The plaintiffs submit that recently they came to know that their father gifted the suit schedule property to the defendant under registered Gift Deed, dated 13.03.2006, but the possession was not delivered as stipulated in the Gift Deed. They also stated that as the plaint schedule property is the joint family property of themselves and their father, their father alone had no right to execute Ex.A2/Gift Deed in favour of the defendant without their consent being coparceners, due to that the defendant will not get any right or title over the same under original of Ex.A2/Gift Deed, which is not valid.
It is the contention of the plaintiffs that it is averred in original of Ex.A2/Gift Deed that the defendant is the daughter of their father Mr. P. Balarami Reddy, but in fact the defendant is not the daughter of Mr. P. Balarami Reddy, but she is brother’s daughter of Mr. P. Balarami Reddy. They submit that the defendant was not residing in India as on the date of Ex.A2/Gift Deed, dated 13.03.2006, but she was residing at United States of America, and they came to know that the family members of the defendant induced their father and got executed original of Ex.A2/Gift Deed in favour of the defendant. They submit that their father died recently, leaving them as his legal heirs, and their mother pre-deceased him and then they issued Ex.A3/legal notice, dated 28.01.2010 to the defendant to cancel original of Ex.A2/Gift Deed, who issued Ex.A5/reply notice with false grounds. Hence, the suit. 4. The defendant filed written statement, resisting the claim of the plaintiffs’ inter-alia, stating that Mr. P. Balarami Reddy had executed registered Gift Deed, dated 13.03.2006 voluntarily with love and affection towards her, who is no other than her Senior Paternal Uncle which is aware of the same by the plaintiffs by the date of execution of Gift Deed, dated 13.03.2006. She submits that she was present at Tadipatri on the date of execution of Gift Deed, and she accepted the same. It is also the contention of the defendant that Mr. P. Balarami Reddy being ‘Kartha’ of Hindu Joint Family executed Gift Deed in her favour in respect of the suit schedule property, which is also binding on the plaintiffs, and the plaintiffs have no right to question the same. She admitted that Mr. P. Balarami Reddy had purchased the suit schedule property in the auction held by Tadipatri Co-operative Town Bank Limited, Tadipatri and obtained Sale Deed on 28.04.1991. It is the contention of the defendant that now the value of the suit schedule property is Rs.25 to Rs.30 lakhs, due to that the plaintiffs are contemplating to knock away the property and filed the present suit with false allegations. She prays to dismiss the suit. 5. The trial Court basing on the above pleadings, settled the following issues: “1.
She prays to dismiss the suit. 5. The trial Court basing on the above pleadings, settled the following issues: “1. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to declare the Gift Deed, dated 13.03.2006 executed by their father, in favour of the defendant, in respect of suit schedule property, is null and void and consequently is liable to be cancelled? 2. Whether the Court Fee paid by the plaintiffs is not correct as set out in the written statement? 3. To what relief?” 6. The parties went to trial. On behalf of the plaintiffs, PW-1 and PW-2 were examined. Exs.A1 to A5 were marked. On behalf of the defendant, the defendant herself was examined as DW-1, and got marked Ex.B1. 7. On appreciation of oral and documentary evidence, the trial Court decreed the suit with costs, declaring the Gift Deed, dated 13.03.2006 executed by the father of the plaintiffs Mr. P. Balarami Reddy, in favour of the defendant in respect of the suit schedule property is null and void and cancelled the same. 8. Aggrieved by the Judgment and Decree passed by the trial Court, the defendant presented A.S. No. 99 of 2012 on the file of VI Additional District Judge (Fast Track Court), Gooty, which was allowed by the First Appellate Court, and dismissed the suit filed by the plaintiffs. 9. In these circumstances, this Second Appeal is presented. 10. I have heard learned Counsel for the appellants/plaintiffs Mr. S.Krishna Reddy as well as learned Senior Counsel Mr. P.Veera Reddy, representing Smt Sodum Anvesha, learned Counsel for the respondent/defendant. 11. The learned Counsel for the appellants would submit that the plaint schedule property is ancestral property of the plaintiffs and their father, due to that the father of the plaintiffs has no right to execute Gift Deed in favour of the defendant in respect of the plaint schedule property without consent of the plaintiffs. He would further submit that the recitals of Ex.A2/Gift Deed shows that the defendant is wrongly described as daughter of donor, which itself shows that the Gift Deed has been created by the relatives of the defendant by inducing the father of the plaintiffs.
He would further submit that the recitals of Ex.A2/Gift Deed shows that the defendant is wrongly described as daughter of donor, which itself shows that the Gift Deed has been created by the relatives of the defendant by inducing the father of the plaintiffs. He argued that the ‘Kartha’ of Hindu Joint Family has no right to execute Gift Deed in favour of third party, except for pious obligation and love and affection not comes under pious obligation or religious purpose, due to that Gift Deed executed by the father of the plaintiffs is not valid document. It is the contention of the learned Counsel for the appellants that the defendant categorically admitted in her cross-examination as DW-1 that the father of the plaintiffs purchased plaint schedule property with the income of joint family, and it is also admitted in her Ex.A5/reply notice that the plaintiffs and donor are lived in one joint family and they are coparceners of Hindu Joint Family, due to that admitted facts need not be proved, and judicial admission is best piece of evidence to come to the conclusion that plaint schedule property is joint family property of the plaintiffs and their father, due to that the father of the plaintiffs alone has no right to execute Gift Deed in favour of the defendant, as admittedly she is not a daughter of donor. He further argued that the trial Court by relying on the ratio laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court, rightly decreed the suit, which erroneously set-aside by the First Appellate Court. He relied on following precedent law: 1. Avtar Singh and Others vs. Gurdial Singh and Others, 2006 (12) SCC 552 , wherein it is held that Section 58 of the Evidence Act postulates that things admitted need not be proved. 2. Ahmedsaheb (Dead) by LRs. vs. Sayed Ismail, (2012) 8 SCC 516 , wherein it is held that as per Sections 17 and 58 of the Indian Evidence Act admission made either in pleadings or orally, it is the best evidence needs no further corroboration. 3. Vathsala Manickavasagam and Others vs. N. Ganesan and Another, (2013) 9 SCC 152 , wherein it is held that admission constitutes substantial piece of evidence for proving facts incorporated therein. 4.
3. Vathsala Manickavasagam and Others vs. N. Ganesan and Another, (2013) 9 SCC 152 , wherein it is held that admission constitutes substantial piece of evidence for proving facts incorporated therein. 4. Bhagwat Sharan (Dead through Legal Representatives) vs. Purushottam and Others, (2020) 6 SCC 387 , wherein it is held that admission made by a party is only a piece of evidence and not conclusive proof of what he stated therein. 5. Tamil Nadu Mercantile Bank Ltd. vs. Sunita Industries, Hyderabad and Others, 2016 (1) ALD 56 (DB), wherein it is held by the Hon’ble Division Bench of this Court that judicial admission is conclusive in nature needs no further proof. 6. Prahlad Pradhan and Others vs. Sonu Kumhar and Others, (2019) 10 SCC 259 , wherein it is held at Para No. 4, which reads as under: “4. The Courts below have found on the basis of the evidence adduced by the parties, that the appellants had failed to prove that the suit property was the self-acquired property of Mangal Kumhar. The burden to prove that the suit property was the self-acquired property of Mangal Kumhar was on the Appellant purchasers. Reliance is placed on this Court’s judgment in Adiveppa v. Bhimappa, (2017) 9 SCC 586 : (2017) 4 SCC (Civ) 678, wherein it was held that: (SCC p.589, Para 19) “19. It is a settled principle of Hindu Law that there lies a legal presumption that every Hindu family is joint in food, worship and estate and in the absence of any proof of division, such legal presumption continues to operate in the family. The burden, therefore, lies upon the member who after admitting the existence of jointness in the family properties asserts his claim that some properties out of entire lot of ancestral properties are his self-acquired property. (See Mulla, Hindu Law, 22nd Edn. Article 23 “Presumption as to coparcenary and self-acquired property.” Pp. 346 and 347.)” (Emphasis supplied) 7. Adiveppa and Others vs. Bhimappa and Another, (2017) 9 SCC 586 , wherein it is held at Para No. 19, which reads as under: “19. It is a settled principle of Hindu Law that there lies a legal presumption that every Hindu family is joint in food, worship and estate and in the absence of any proof of division, such legal presumption continues to operate in the family.
It is a settled principle of Hindu Law that there lies a legal presumption that every Hindu family is joint in food, worship and estate and in the absence of any proof of division, such legal presumption continues to operate in the family. The burden, therefore, lies upon the member who after admitting the existence of jointness in the family properties asserts his claim that some properties out of entire lot of ancestral properties are his self-acquired property. (See Mulla, Hindu Law, 22nd Edn. Article 23 “Presumption as to coparcenary and self-acquired property.” pp. 346 and 347.)” 8. Ammathayee Alias Perumalakkal and Another vs. Kumaresan Alias Balakrishnan and Others, AIR 1967 SC 569 , wherein it is held at Para No. 8, which reads as under: “8. Hindu law on the question of gifts of ancestral property is well settled. So far as moveable ancestral property is concerned, a gift out of affection may be made to a wife, to a daughter and even to a son, provided the gift is within reasonable limits. A gift for example of the whole or almost the whole of the ancestral moveable property cannot be upheld as a gift through affection: (See Mulla’s Hindu Law, 13th Edn. p. 252, Para. 225). But so far as immovable ancestral property is concerned, the power of gift is much more circumscribed than in the case of moveable ancestral property. A Hindu father or any other managing member has power to make a gift of ancestral immovable property within reasonable limits for “pious purposes” (See Mulla’s Hindu Law, 13th Ed. Para-226, p.252). Now what is generally understood by “pious purpose” is gift for charitable and/or religious purposes. But this Court has extended the meaning of “pious purposes” to cases where a Hindu father makes a gift within reasonable limits of immovable ancestral property to his daughter in fulfilment of an antenuptial promise made on the occasion of the settlement of the terms of her marriage and the same can also be done by the mother in case the father is dead: [See Kamala Dev v. Bachu Lal Gupta, 1957 SCR 452 : AIR 1957 SC 434 ].” 9. K.C. Laxmana vs. K.C. Chandrappa and Another, 2022 (1) ALT Online (SC) 6942 (DB), wherein it is held at Para No. 13, which reads as under: “13.
K.C. Laxmana vs. K.C. Chandrappa and Another, 2022 (1) ALT Online (SC) 6942 (DB), wherein it is held at Para No. 13, which reads as under: “13. In the instant case, it is admitted by the second defendant that the settlement deed dated 22.03.1980 (Ex.P1) is, in fact, a gift deed which was executed by the first defendant in favour of the second defendant ‘out of love and affection’ and by virtue of which the second defendant was given a portion of the joint family property. It is well-settled that a Hindu father or any other managing member of a HUF has power to make a gift of ancestral property only for a ‘pious purpose’ and what is understood by the term ‘pious purpose’ is a gift for charitable and/or religious purpose. Therefore, a deed of gift in regard to the ancestral property executed ‘out of love and affection’ does not come within the scope of the term ‘pious purpose’. It is irrelevant if such gift or settlement was made by a donor, i.e. the first defendant, in favour of a done who was raised by the donor without any relationship, i.e. the second defendant. The gift deed in the instant case is not for any charitable or religious purpose.” He prays to allow the appeal, and decree the suit. 12. The learned Senior Counsel, representing the respondent would submit that the respondent is no other than younger brother’s daughter of donor, due to that out of love and affection, he executed registered Gift Deed in favour of the respondent in respect of plaint schedule property, which the donor purchased under original of Ex.A1. He would further submit that by mistake it is mentioned in original of Ex.A2 that the respondent is daughter of donor, which also discussed by the learned First Appellate Judge. He argued that the donor and his brothers were living together, due to that he treated the respondent as his daughter and gifted small extent of property and he is having several properties, but due to increase in the value of plaint schedule property, the appellants have filed suit in the year 2010, which is 4 years after execution of Gift Deed in favour of the respondent.
It is the contention of the learned Senior Counsel for the respondent that the link document is also in possession of the respondent, who was present on the date of execution of registered Gift Deed in her favour. He argued that when the plaintiffs are pleading that plaint schedule property is joint family property, which is said to be purchased out of joint family nucleus, the burden is on them to prove the same, as though there is presumption of joint family and there is no presumption that joint family is possessing joint family property. He argued that no evidence was placed by the plaintiffs that there was inducement on the part of family of the respondent to execute registered Gift Deed, which failed to prove by the appellants. He relied on following precedent law: 1. Bhagwat Sharan (Dead through Legal Representatives) vs. Purushottam and Others, (2020) 6 SCC 387 , wherein it is held that the law is well settled that the burden is on the person who alleges that the property is a joint property of a Hindu Undivided Family to prove the same. It is also held that there is no presumption of a property being joint family property only on account of existence of a joint Hindu family. 2. D.S. Lakshmaiah and Another vs. L. Balasubramanyam and Another, (2003) 10 SCC 310 , wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court held at Para No. 18, which reads as under: “18. The legal principle, therefore, is that there is no presumption of a property being joint family property only on account of existence of a joint Hindu family. The one who asserts has to prove that the property is a joint family property. If, however, the person so asserting proves that there was nucleus with which the joint family property could be acquired, there would be presumption of the property being joint and the onus would shift on the person who claims it to be self-acquired property to prove that he purchased the property with his own funds and not out of joint family nucleus that was available.” 3.
Rangammal vs. Kuppuswami and Another, (2011) 12 SCC 220 , wherein it is held that the onus is on the plaintiff to positively establish its case on the basis of the material available and it cannot rely on the weakness or absence of defence to discharge the onus, and suit has to be tried on the basis of the pleadings of the contesting parties.” He prays to dismiss the appeal. 13. This Second Appeal was admitted on the following substantial question of law: “Whether the Kartha of an undivided joint Hindu family can gift a part of the family property without the consent of the other coparceners?” 14. As per Section 100 of Code of Civil Procedure (In short ‘CPC’), this Court can interfere with the Judgment of the Appellate Court, if it is satisfied that case involves a substantial question of law. 15. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Chandrabhan (Deceased) through LRs. and Others vs. Saraswati and Others in Civil Appeal No. NIL of 2022 (Arising out of S.L.P. (C) No. 8736 of 2016) Judgment dated 22.09.2022, explained the scope of Section 100 of CPC and laid down the principles relating to Section 100 of CPC at Para No. 33 of the Judgment, which reads as under: “33. The principles relating to Section 100 of the CPC relevant for this case may be summarised thus: (i) An inference of fact from the recitals or contents of a document is question of fact. But the legal effect of the terms of a document is a question of law. Construction of a document involving the application of any principle of law, is also a question of law. Therefore, when there is a misconstruction of a document or wrong application of a principle of law in constructing a document, it gives rise to a question of law. (Emphasis supplied) (ii) The High Court should be satisfied that the case involves a substantial question of law, and not a mere question of law. A question of law having a material bearing on the decision of the case (that is, a question, answer to which effects the rights of parties to the suit) will be a substantial question of law, if it is not covered by any specific provisions of law or settled legal principle emerging from binding precedents and involves a debatable legal issue.
A substantial question of law will also arise in a contrary situation, where the legal position is clear, either on account of express provisions of law or binding precedents, but the Court below has decided the matter, either ignoring or acting contrary to such legal principle. In the second type of cases, the substantial question of law arises not because the law is still debatable, but because the decision rendered on a material question, violates the settled position of law. (iii) The general rule is that the High Court will not interfere with findings of facts arrived at by the Courts below. But it is not an absolute rule. Some of the well-recognised exceptions are where (i) the Courts below have ignored material evidence or acted on no evidence; (ii) the Courts have drawn wrong inferences from proved facts by applying law erroneously; or (iii) the Courts have wrongly cast the burden of proof. When we refer to “decision based on no evidence” it not only refers to cases where there is a total dearth of evidence, but also refers to any case, where the evidence, taken as a whole, is not reasonably capable of supporting the finding.” 16. It is also settled law that if Judgment of First Appellate Court is based on no evidence, or misreading the evidence or is recorded against any provision of law without acting judicially, such ground can constitute a substantial question of law within the meaning of Section 100 of CPC. 17. In the present case, there is no dispute that the plaintiffs are son and daughter of late Mr. P. Balarami Reddy, who admittedly executed original of Ex.A2/registered Gift Deed in favour of the defendant in respect of plaint schedule property on 13.03.2006. The plaintiffs have also issued Ex.A3/legal notice dated 28.01.2010 to the defendant to cancel the original of Ex.A2/Gift Deed, on the ground that their father executed Gift Deed in her favour in respect of joint family property without their consent.
The plaintiffs have also issued Ex.A3/legal notice dated 28.01.2010 to the defendant to cancel the original of Ex.A2/Gift Deed, on the ground that their father executed Gift Deed in her favour in respect of joint family property without their consent. For which, the defendant gave Ex.A5/reply notice, dated 05.06.2010, wherein she has stated that “the contention of your client Poreddy Janardhan Reddy S/o P. Balarami Reddy of Tadipatri town that himself and one Sujatha are the son and daughter of late Balarami Reddy and was lived in one joint family and they are the coparceners of Hindu joint family as contended in Para 1 are all true and correct.” 18. It is the contention of the defendant in her reply notice that the plaint schedule property is self-acquired property of late Sri Balarami Reddy, who is her Senior Paternal Uncle, as wife of donor died about 20 years ago, the defendant extended good services to donor, due to that he gifted the plaint schedule property to her. It is no doubt true that though there is presumption of joint family, and there is no such presumption that joint family is having joint family properties. But PW-1 and PW-2 have categorically deposed that their father was an agriculturist having ancestral properties, out of nucleus from joint family properties, he purchased the plaint schedule property, due to that the plaint schedule property is an ancestral property of themselves and their father, due to that they are coparceners. For which, the defendant as DW-1 categorically admitted in her cross-examination that “it is true P. Balarami Reddy had purchased the suit schedule property with the income of joint family. It is true Ex.B1 was executed by Balarami Reddy in favour of Prathapa Reddy for consideration. It is true the plaintiffs 1 and 2 and their father are joint family members.” It is suggested to PW-1 in cross-examination that as if donor had purchased the property when he was joint with his brothers, which is not the contention of the defendant in her written statement. When the defendant has categorically admitted in her evidence, which amounts to judicial admission, which needs no further proof to show that the plaint schedule property is joint family property of Mr. P. Balarami Reddy, as admission is the best piece of evidence, and Section 58 of Indian Evidence Act postulates that things admitted need not be proved.
When the defendant has categorically admitted in her evidence, which amounts to judicial admission, which needs no further proof to show that the plaint schedule property is joint family property of Mr. P. Balarami Reddy, as admission is the best piece of evidence, and Section 58 of Indian Evidence Act postulates that things admitted need not be proved. So, the admission made by DW-1 in her evidence is the best evidence, needs no further corroboration requiring the plaintiffs to prove that the plaint schedule property is joint family property of themselves and their father. 19. It is also held by the Hon’ble Apex Court in D.S. Lakshmaiah and another case, referred supra relied on by the learned Senior Counsel for the respondent that when person who asserts that it is a joint family property and proves that there was nucleus with which the joint family property acquired the same, there would be presumption of the property being joint and the onus would shift on the person who claims it to be self-acquired property to prove that he purchased the property with his own funds and not out of joint family nucleus that was available. In the present case, when the defendant has stated in Ex.A5/reply notice that it is self-acquired property of donor and when she categorically admitted in her cross-examination that the plaint schedule property purchased by the donor from joint family income, it is for her to prove that the plaint schedule property is self-acquired property of donor, due to that he is having absolute rights to execute original of Ex.A2/Gift Deed in her favour, which the defendant failed to prove, and in view of categorical admission of DW-1 in her evidence that the plaint schedule property is purchased out of joint family income, no further proof is required that the plaint schedule property is joint family property, and admittedly the plaintiffs are coparceners along with donor. There is no dispute with regard to the ratio laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the decisions relied on by the learned Senior Counsel for the respondent, but in the present case in view of admission by DW-1 in her evidence that the plaint schedule property is purchased by donor from joint family income, no further proof is required that the plaint schedule property is joint family property. 20.
20. As per Section 256 of Hindu Law, according to Mitakshara law as applied in all the states, no coparcener can dispose of his undivided interest in coparcenary property by gift. Such transaction being void altogether, there is no estoppel or other kind of personal bar which precludes the donor from asserting his right to recover the transferred property. He may, however, make a gift of his interest with the consent of other coparceners. (vide commentary of Hindu Law by Mulla, 23rd Edition, page 398) 21. Though, a father can make gift of ancestral immovable property with reasonable limits, keeping in view the total extent of the property hold by the family in favour of his daughter at the time of her marriage, or long after her marriage, it is not permissible to execute gift deed in respect of coparcenary property, as Kartha is not entitled to alienate the coparcenary property by gift without the consent of other coparceners. As rightly contended by the learned Counsel for the appellants/plaintiffs that gift of coparcenary property by Karta other than pious purpose to his brother’s daughter is not valid, and as per the ratio laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in K.C. Laxmana case referred supra by the learned Counsel for the appellants, wherein it is held that a deed of gift in regard to the ancestral property executed out of love and affection to third party does not come within the scope of the term ‘pious purpose.’ The facts of K.C. Laxmana case referred supra are similar to the facts of the present case. In the said case, the registered Gift Deed executed by father in favour of third party is challenged by the son by filing a suit for partition and separate possession, and for declaration that the gift deed, which is declared not valid by the Hon’ble Apex Court, wherein it is also discussed Article 109 of Limitation Act, which provides period of limitation seeking set-aside the alienation of ancestral property by the father in Mitakshara law is 12 years when the alienee takes possession of the property. 22.
22. In the present case, admittedly the plaintiffs are coparceners and children of donor, who challenged the Gift Deed dated 13.03.2006 executed by their father in respect of joint family property in favour of the defendant, by filing suit on 03.06.2010, which is within the period of limitation as per Article 109 of Limitation Act. The Hon’ble Apex Court also discussed the law of limitation for challenging alienation by the father in K.C. Laxmana case and held that Article 109 is applicable for challenging the alienation by the father governed by MItakshara law, and Article 58 has no application. As suit is filed within a period of 12 years, which is not barred. As per Section 31 of Specific Relief Act, 1963 “any person against whom a written instrument is void or voidable, and who has reasonable apprehension that such instrument, if left outstanding may cause him serious injury, may sue to have it adjudged void or voidable and the Court may, in its discretion, so adjudge it and order it to be delivered up and cancelled......” 23. In the present case also, the plaintiffs, who are coparceners along with donor can challenge the Gift Deed executed by their father in respect of joint family and coparcenary property, as admittedly the original of Ex.A2/Gift Deed dated 13.03.206 executed by the donor without the consent of other coparceners, i.e. plaintiffs herein. Both the plaintiffs have got right to challenge original of Ex.A2/Gift Deed executed by their father in favour of the defendant. When admittedly, the plaint schedule property is joint family property, wherein the plaintiffs are having interest and right over the same, their father being Kartha of Hindu joint family has no right to alienate the joint family property without the consent of other joint family members and coparceners. 24. The learned First Appellate Judge based his decision on surmises and conjectures, and it is not the case of the defendant as per her pleadings and evidence that all brothers were joint and the donor treated her as his daughter, and executed Gift Deed. In fact, the recitals in Ex.A2/Gift Deed shows that the defendant is the daughter of the donor is admittedly not correct, who is his brother’s daughter.
In fact, the recitals in Ex.A2/Gift Deed shows that the defendant is the daughter of the donor is admittedly not correct, who is his brother’s daughter. It is also categorically stated by the defendant in her written statement that the donor being Kartha of Hindu joint family has executed Gift Deed, which the plaintiffs have no right to question the same. It is also stated that except the suit schedule property, the other properties were devolved on the plaintiffs, which admission of the defendant in her pleadings also support the contention of the plaintiffs that the plaint schedule property is joint family property and the donor as Kartha of joint family property executed registered Gift Deed in favour of the defendant without the consent of the plaintiffs. The learned First Appellate Judge observed that the donor might have executed Ex.A2/Gift Deed in favour of the defendant in lieu of her and her parents’ service to him as a widower and to the plaintiffs since they have no mother to look after. It is not the case of the defendant that her mother has looked after the welfare of the donor, as the wife of the donor said to be died about 20 years ago. It is the contention of the defendant in Ex.A5/reply notice that the donor lost his wife about 20 years ago, thereafter she extended good services to the donor, due to that reason he gifted the plaint schedule property. 25. A perusal of Ex.A2/Gift Deed show that the defendant was aged 28 years on the date of Gift Deed, and when the wife of the donor died about 20 years back, it is not known how she extended services to the donor when she was only aged about 8 years by that time. It is not the contention of the defendant that her mother rendered services to the donor, which observed by the First Appellate Court without any pleadings and evidence. It is also not the contention of the defendant that the donor has treated the defendant as her daughter.
It is not the contention of the defendant that her mother rendered services to the donor, which observed by the First Appellate Court without any pleadings and evidence. It is also not the contention of the defendant that the donor has treated the defendant as her daughter. It is not discussed by the learned First Appellate Judge how the ratio laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Thimmaiah and Others vs. Ningamma and Another, 2000 (3) CCC 339 (SC) and the ratio laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Thamma Venkata Subbamma (Died) by LRs vs. Thamma Rattnamma and Others, AIR 1987 SC 1775 are not applicable, wherein it is categorically held that without the consent of other coparceners, the Kartha has no right to execute Gift Deed, and it is void. The donor under Ex.A2/Gift Deed being Kartha of undivided Joint Hindu Family has no right to execute Gift Deed in respect of part of joint family property without the consent of other coparceners, which failed to consider by the First Appellate Court, and set-aside the well reasoned Judgment and Decree passed by the trial Court. 26. The learned trial Judge rightly declared that original of Ex.A2/Gift Deed dated 13.03.2006 as null and void. Therefore, in the circumstances the discussion held supra, accepting the contention of the appellants, the Second Appeal has to be allowed setting aside the Judgment and Decree of the First Appellate Court, restoring the Judgment and Decree of the trial Court. 27. The substantial question of law framed in the present Second Appeal is answered in favour of the appellants, against the respondent. 28. In the result, this Second Appeal is allowed. Consequently, Judgment and Decree passed by the First Appellate Court in AS No. 99 of 2012, dated 22.01.2013 on the file of VI Additional District Judge (Fast Track Court), Gooty are hereby set-aside. The Judgment and Decree in OS No. 87 of 2010, dated 03.09.2012 on the file of Senior Civil Judge, Gooty are restored. The learned trial Judge shall follow the procedure laid down under Section 31 (2) of Specific Relief Act, 1963 by sending the copy of Decree to the Registration Department to record the fact of cancellation of registered Gift Deed, dated 13.03.2006. In the circumstances, parties are directed to bear their own costs through-out. 29. As a sequel, pending miscellaneous petitions, if any, shall stand closed.
In the circumstances, parties are directed to bear their own costs through-out. 29. As a sequel, pending miscellaneous petitions, if any, shall stand closed. The Interim Orders granted earlier, if any, shall stand vacated.