JUDGMENT : T. MALLIKARJUNA RAO, J. 1. The Appeal, under Section 96 of the Code of the Civil Procedure, is filed by the Appellant/3rd Defendant challenging the decree and Judgment dated 27.08.2012 in O.S. No. 799 of 2002 passed by the learned III Additional Senior Civil Judge, Vijayawada (for short ‘the trial court’). Respondent No. 1 is the Plaintiff, who filed the suit in O.S. No. 799 of 2002 seeking recovery of Rs.9,11,817/- with subsequent interest on the principal amount of Rs.7,26,000/- from the date of the suit till the date of realisation and for costs. Respondents 2 and 3 are Defendants 1 and 2 in the said suit. 2. It is expedient to refer to the parties as they are initially arrayed in the suit to mitigate any potential confusion and better comprehend the case. 3. The factual matrix, necessary and germane for adjudicating the contentious issues between the parties inter se, may be delineated as follows: 1st Defendant is the firm, and Defendants 2 and 3 are the working partners of the 1st Defendant firm. While so, 2nd Defendant, on behalf of 1st Defendant firm, borrowed Rs.6,00,000/- from the Plaintiff on 01.09.2000 for their business purpose, agreeing to repay the same with interest at 21% p.a., with yearly rests and executed pronote. Subsequently, on 01.09.2001, the 2nd Defendant, on behalf of the 1st Defendant firm, re-written and executed a suit promissory note for Rs.7,26,000/- towards consideration of the earlier promissory note. Despite several demands made by Plaintiff, the Defendants did not choose to repay the amount. Finally, Plaintiff issued a legal notice to the Defendants, calling them to discharge the debt. But Defendants 1 and 2 received the notice, whereas the 3rd Defendant got it returned. 4. The 1st Defendant submitted a written statement conceding to nearly all the assertions presented in the Plaintiff’s case. The contention put forth was that Defendants 2 and 3 transformed their business into a partnership firm. The 3rd Defendant, who verified the transactions during his presence in India, also indicated granting a General Power of Attorney (G.P.A.) to his father, K.V. Apparao, for managing the business transactions. Subsequently, the 3rd Defendant revoked the G.P.A. issued to his father and issued a new one in favour of the current G.P.A. characterized as a chronic litigant. It is alleged that the 3rd Defendant deliberately evades responsibility for the incurred liability. 5. Subsequently, the 3rd Defendant revoked the G.P.A. issued to his father and issued a new one in favour of the current G.P.A. characterized as a chronic litigant. It is alleged that the 3rd Defendant deliberately evades responsibility for the incurred liability. 5. In the written statement, the 2nd Defendant admitted the Plaintiff’s case but contended that with the consent of the 3rd Defendant and his G.P.A. holder only, he executed a promissory note; the Plaintiff, in collusion with the 3rd Defendant, filed this false suit. 6. The 3rd Defendant refuted the plaint averments in the written statement and contended that the suit is collusive between the Plaintiff and 2nd Defendant; 1st Defendant is a fictitious partnership form; he is not at all partner of 1st Defendant firm; 2nd Defendant created the documents; the Plaintiff cannot lend such huge amounts; he has not executed any G.P.A. in favour of his father; the Plaintiff is no other than the 2nd Defendant’s daughter-in-law; he has been in the U.S.A., since 1992 and therefore, the question of 3rd Defendant being partner of 1st Defendant firm does not arise; 2nd Defendant created pronote with the help of attestors who are his close relatives; 2nd Defendant misused the faith reposed by him and his father and got filed this false and vexatious suit to cause wrongful loss to him; the suit is not instituted correctly. 7. The 2nd Defendant filed a rejoinder denying the material allegations in the 3rd Defendant’s written statement. 8. Based on the above pleadings, the trial Court framed the following issues: (1) Whether the 1st Defendant partnership firm is a fictitious firm? (2) Whether the 3rd Defendant is not a partner of 1st Defendant? (3) Whether the suit pronote is true, valid and binding on 3rd Defendant? (4) Whether the letter dt.01.09.2001 is fabricated one? (5) Whether the Plaintiff is entitled for the suit claim? (6) To what relief? The trial Court also framed the following additional issues: (1) Whether the suit pronote is true, valid and binding upon the Defendants? (2) Whether the Plaintiff is entitled for the suit amount? (3) To what relief? 9. During the trial, on behalf of the Plaintiff, PW.s 1 to 4 were examined and marked Exs.A.1 to A.8. On behalf of the Defendants, DWs.1 and 2 were examined and marked Exs.B.1 to B.73 documents. 10. (2) Whether the Plaintiff is entitled for the suit amount? (3) To what relief? 9. During the trial, on behalf of the Plaintiff, PW.s 1 to 4 were examined and marked Exs.A.1 to A.8. On behalf of the Defendants, DWs.1 and 2 were examined and marked Exs.B.1 to B.73 documents. 10. After completing the trial and hearing the arguments of both sides, the trial Court decreed the suit against Defendants 1 to 3 with costs for Rs.9,11,817/- and with subsequent interest at 12% p.a., on the principal amount of Rs.7,26,000/- from the date of suit till the date of decree and after that at 6% p.a., from the date of decree till realization. 11. I have heard learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the respective parties at length and have reviewed the Judgment and findings recorded by the learned trial Court while dismissing the suit. I have also re-appreciated all the evidence on record, including the deposition of relevant witnesses examined by both sides. 12. Sri Y. Subrahmanyam, the learned Counsel representing the Appellant/3rd Defendant, put forth an argument asserting that the inclusion of the alleged partnership firm in the suit constitutes a misjoinder. This is grounded in the absence of a partnership firm as of the date of Ex.B.1 pronote. It was contended that Plaintiff failed to substantiate the existence of the D.1 firm on the date of Ex.B.1 and the involvement of the 3rd Defendant as a working partner in the purported D.1 firm. The contention challenges the trial court’s finding, deeming the admission of the Plaintiff’s case by D.1 and D.2 and establishing the suit transaction as false, erroneous and untenable. Furthermore, it was argued that no legal precedent established that the actions or liabilities undertaken by one co-proprietor bind another co-proprietor, and legal action could be initiated on that basis. The assertion posits that the suit claim is collusive between the Plaintiff and the 2nd Defendant, resulting in the Appellant being erroneously implicated and held liable for the claim. The argument also disputes the admissibility of Ex.A.7, the copy of the partnership deed, asserting that it contravenes the mandatory provisions of Section 63 of the Evidence Act. Additionally, references were made to Exs.B.19 and B.23, indicating the 3rd Defendant’s participation in business deals on behalf of S.C. Entertainments in the American market. The argument also disputes the admissibility of Ex.A.7, the copy of the partnership deed, asserting that it contravenes the mandatory provisions of Section 63 of the Evidence Act. Additionally, references were made to Exs.B.19 and B.23, indicating the 3rd Defendant’s participation in business deals on behalf of S.C. Entertainments in the American market. It was clarified that while the 3rd Defendant assisted his maternal uncle/2nd Defendant in importing English movies, he did not function as a partner in the firm S.C. Entertainments. Exs.B.6 to 9, 56, 66, 68, and 72 were cited to establish that D.2 is the proprietor of D.1 firm. The argument also challenges the trial court’s observation that the 3rd Defendant failed to rebut the presumption regarding the receipt of consideration, deeming it incorrect and erroneous. Ultimately, it was asserted that the instant suit is initiated at the behest of D.2, with the Plaintiff merely serving as a nominal lender. The trial court’s reliance on Ex.A.7 and Ex.B.2 to decree the suit was deemed erroneous, leading to the conclusion that the trial court’s decree and Judgment should be set aside. 13. Sri Venkata Rama Rao Kota learned Counsel representing the 1st Respondent/Plaintiff, and Sri Venkateswarlu Kolla, learned Counsel representing the Respondents 2 and 3/Defendants 1 and 2, argued that the trial Court correctly appreciated the case facts and reached a correct conclusion. The reasons given by the trial Court do not require any interference. 14. Concerning the pleadings in the suit, the findings recorded by the trial Court and in the light of the rival contentions and submissions made before this Court, the points that would arise for determination are: (1) Is the trial Court justified in holding that the suit promissory note Ex.A1 is true, valid and supported by consideration? (2) Is the trial Court justified in holding that the 1st Defendant’s partnership firm is not fictitious and the 3rd Defendant is a firm partner? (3) Does the decree and Judgment passed by the Trial Court need any interference? POINT NOS. 1 & 2: 15. Notably, the 3rd Defendant has applied vide I.A. No. 1 of 2023, under section 151 of C.P.C. seeking to receive the additional documents. After hearing from both sides, this Court dismissed the application by recording reasons and passed a separate Order. 16. POINT NOS. 1 & 2: 15. Notably, the 3rd Defendant has applied vide I.A. No. 1 of 2023, under section 151 of C.P.C. seeking to receive the additional documents. After hearing from both sides, this Court dismissed the application by recording reasons and passed a separate Order. 16. Adverting to the contentions canvassed, it is necessary to look at the pleadings once again before embarking on the discussion regarding oral and documentary evidence. The Plaintiff’s case that the 1st Defendant is the firm, Defendants 2 and 3 are the working partners of the 1st Defendant firm, the 2nd Defendant, on behalf of the 1st Defendant firm borrowed Rs.6,00,000/-from Plaintiff on 01.09.2000 for their business purpose, agreeing to repay the same with interest and executed Ex.B.1 promissory note, is not disputed by 2nd Defendant. 17. Subsequently, on 01.09.2001, 2nd Defendant, on behalf of 1st Defendant firm, executed Ex.A.1 promissory note for Rs.7,26,000/- towards renewal of earlier promissory note (Ex.B.1), which 2nd Defendant does not dispute. Per the 3rd Defendant’s case, the 1st Defendant is a fictitious partnership firm, and he is not at all the partner of the 1st Defendant firm, and the 2nd Defendant created the documents. The Plaintiff’s case is supported by evidence of PW-2 (V.Madhusudhana Rao), PW-3 (P.Subramanyeswara Rao) and PW-4 (R.Chandrasekhar Rao). The PW-1’s evidence, coupled with Ex.A.1 document, shows that PWs.2 and 3 attested the promissory note and PW-4 scribed the promissory note. Nothing is elicited in the cross-examination of PWs.2 to 4 to discredit their evidence regarding the execution of Ex.A.1 promissory note by 2nd Defendant on behalf of 1st Defendant firm. 18. It is not in dispute that one K.V. Apparao is the 3rd Defendant’s father and Plaintiff is the 2nd Defendant’s daughter-in-law. The Plaintiff also examined PW-4 to prove that he typed Ex.B.2 letter per the directions of the 3rd Defendant’s father. Ex.B.2 letter, dated 26.01.2002, shows that Sri K.V. Apparao as G.P.A. holder of K.Ravi Kiran/3rd Defendant/Appellant, addressed it to B.B.Visveswara Rao, working partner/3rd Respondent/2nd Defendant. The Plaintiff also examined PW-4 to prove that he typed Ex.B.2 letter per the directions of the 3rd Defendant’s father. Ex.B.2 letter, dated 26.01.2002, shows that Sri K.V. Apparao as G.P.A. holder of K.Ravi Kiran/3rd Defendant/Appellant, addressed it to B.B.Visveswara Rao, working partner/3rd Respondent/2nd Defendant. It reads as follows: As per the directions of my son and principal Sri Ravi Kiran, working partner of S.C. Entertainments and with your consent today I took over the records obtained from S.C. Entertainment as detailed below from the Office of S.C. Entertainment at Gandhi Nagar, Vijayawada-3 to my residence, for verification of all the transactions done since 1998, by Sri Ravi Kiran at leisure at residence: (1) Correspondence files with Government Departments and 3rd Parties from 1998 to till date. (2) Vouchers, cash books, Daybooks, Ledgers, etc. from 1998 to till date. (3) The partnership deed dt.06.09.2000 was executed and was signed by me on behalf of Ravi Kiran as G.P.A. holder and yourself. (4) Minutes book of S.C. Entertainment since 1998. (5) Agreement entered by you with 3rd parties in India on behalf of S.C. Entertainment since 1998. 19. The Ex.B.2 letter indicates that the 3rd Defendant serves as a working partner of S.C. Entertainment, and his father took charge of the records to verify all transactions conducted since 1998. However, the 3rd Defendant asserts that he has not executed a General Power of Attorney (G.P.A.) in favour of his father, K.V. Apparao. It is pertinent to note that DW.2 (K. Sriramachandra Rao) is shown to be the G.P.A. holder of the 3rd Defendant. During cross-examination, DW.2 unequivocally acknowledged that before him, the G.P.A. holder for the 3rd Defendant was his father, K.V. Apparao. It is worth highlighting, at this juncture, that the trial court emphasized that Ex.B.46, a ledger extract of CA No. 13780 dated 03.08.2006, Ex.B.48, ledger extracts of CA No. 13894 and 13895 dated 04.08.2006, Ex.B.68, a certified copy of the Judgment in STC No. 98 of 2004 on the file of I ACMM, Vijayawada, and Ex.B.70, a certified copy of the Judgment in STC No. 178 of 2004 on the file of I ACMM, Vijayawada, reveal that the Apparao as mentioned above-obtained documents from the Copyist Department on behalf of the 3rd Defendant. 20. The 3rd Defendant refrained from providing testimony to support his claim that his father never served as his General Power of Attorney (G.P.A.) holder. 20. The 3rd Defendant refrained from providing testimony to support his claim that his father never served as his General Power of Attorney (G.P.A.) holder. Additionally, he did not present his father as a witness to elucidate the contents of the Ex.B.2 letter, establishing the 3rd Defendant’s role as a working partner. The 3rd Defendant did not execute the Ex.A.1 promissory note. As rightly highlighted by the trial court, the burden lies with the Plaintiff to establish that the 3rd Defendant is a working partner in the 1st Defendant firm. To substantiate this claim, Plaintiff relied on the partnership deed (Ex.A.7), asserting that the 2nd Defendant and the father, who also served as the G.P.A. holder for the 3rd Defendant, executed the Ex.A.3 document. The 3rd Defendant chose not to testify or present his father as a witness to confirm that he did not execute the original Ex.A.7 partnership deed as the G.P.A. holder. Moreover, the 3rd Defendant failed to introduce evidence demonstrating that Ex.A.7 did not bear his father’s signature. The PW-4’s testimony supports the Plaintiff’s case regarding the execution of the Ex.A.7 partnership deed by the 3rd Defendant’s father in his capacity as the G.P.A. holder. 21. A serious objection has been raised questioning the admissibility of Ex.A.7 partnership deed on the ground that it is a Photostat copy of the document relied on by Plaintiff in O.S. No. 65 of 2004 on the file of IV Additional Senior Civil Judge’s Court, Vijayawada. It is not compared with the original; it is a copy and is not admissible in evidence. The trial Court is not supposed to mark Ex.A.7 document. In support of the said contention, learned Counsel for the 3rd Defendant/Appellant relied on the following decisions: (i) In K. Shivalingaiah vs. B.V. Chandra, AIR 1993 Kar. 29 wherein the High Court of Karnataka held that: Before an original document is produced and marked in the case, the Court is entitled to issue a certified copy of the same, and such certified copy, regarding the provision contained in Section 63 of the Evidence Act, is admissible. (ii) In Badrunnisa Begum vs. Mohamooda Begum, 2001 (3) ALD 11 wherein the composite High Court of Andhra Pradesh held that: Therefore, Section 63 of the Evidence Act lays down what can be termed secondary evidence and Section 65 lays down which situations secondary evidence can be led. (ii) In Badrunnisa Begum vs. Mohamooda Begum, 2001 (3) ALD 11 wherein the composite High Court of Andhra Pradesh held that: Therefore, Section 63 of the Evidence Act lays down what can be termed secondary evidence and Section 65 lays down which situations secondary evidence can be led. Section 65(a) does not in any way make a copy of a copy admissible in evidence as it is barred under Section 63. (iii) In U. Sree vs. U. Srinivas, (2013) CLT 70 (SC) wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court referred the decision of H. Siddiqui (Dead) by LRs. vs. A. Ramalingam, (2011) 4 SCC 240 and observed as follows: While dealing with Section 65 of the Evidence Act, this Court opined though the said provision permits the parties to adduce secondary evidence. Yet, such a course is subject to a large number of limitations. In a case where the original documents are not produced at any time, nor has any factual foundation been laid for giving secondary evidence, it is not permissible for the Court to allow a party to adduce secondary evidence. Thus, secondary evidence relating to the contents of a document is inadmissible until the original’s non-production is accounted for to bring it within one or other of the cases provided for in the Section. The secondary evidence must be authenticated by foundational evidence that the alleged copy is, in fact, a true copy of the original. It has been further held that the mere admission of a document in evidence does not amount to its proof. Therefore, it is the obligation of the Court to decide the question of the admissibility of a document in secondary evidence before making an endorsement thereon. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the U. Sree vs. U. Srinivas case referred to supra, further observed that: 18. In the case at hand, the learned Family Judge has really not discussed anything relating to foundational evidence. The High Court has only mentioned that the secondary evidence was admissible when the letter was summoned and there was a denial. In our considered opinion, such a view is neither legally sound nor in consonance with the pronouncements of this Court, and, accordingly, we have no hesitation in dislodging the finding on that score. The High Court has only mentioned that the secondary evidence was admissible when the letter was summoned and there was a denial. In our considered opinion, such a view is neither legally sound nor in consonance with the pronouncements of this Court, and, accordingly, we have no hesitation in dislodging the finding on that score. (iv) In Smt. J. Yashoda vs. Smt. K. Shobha Rani, AIR 2007 SC 1721 wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that: Learned Single Judge held that the documents which were sought to be received and marked as secondary evidence are photocopies. It was noted that it may be a fact that the original of the documents are not available with the parties, but at the same time, the requirement of Section 63 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (in short the ‘Act’) is that a document can be received as evidence under the head of secondary evidence only when the copies made from or compared with the original are certified copies or such other documents as enumerated in the above Section. The High Court found the photocopies cannot be received as secondary evidence in terms of Section 63 of the Act, and they ought not to have been received as secondary evidence. Since the documents in question were admittedly photocopies, there was no possibility of the documents being compared with the originals. xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx The admitted facts in the present case are that the original was with one P.Srinivas Rao. Only when the conditions of Section prescribed in Section 65 are satisfied can documents be admitted as secondary evidence. In the instant case, clause (a) of Section 65 has not been satisfied. Therefore, the High Court’s order does not suffer from any infirmity to warrant interference. (v) In R.V.E. Venkatachala Gounder vs. Arulmigu Viswesaraswami and V.P. Temple, (2003) 8 SCC 752 the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that: 20............However, the present one is a case which calls for the correct position of law to be made precise. Ordinarily, an objection to the admissibility of evidence should be taken when it is tendered and not subsequently. (v) In R.V.E. Venkatachala Gounder vs. Arulmigu Viswesaraswami and V.P. Temple, (2003) 8 SCC 752 the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that: 20............However, the present one is a case which calls for the correct position of law to be made precise. Ordinarily, an objection to the admissibility of evidence should be taken when it is tendered and not subsequently. The objections as to the admissibility of documents in evidence may be classified into two classes: (i) an objection that the document which is sought to be proved is itself inadmissible in evidence, and (ii) where the objection does not dispute the admissibility of the document in evidence but is directed towards the mode of proof alleging the same to be irregular or insufficient. In the first case, merely because a document has been marked as “an exhibit” an objection as to its admissibility is not excluded and is available to be raised even at a later stage or even in Appeal or revision. In the latter case, the objection should be taken when the evidence is tendered, and once the document has been admitted in evidence and marked as an exhibit, the objection that it should not have been admitted in evidence or that the mode adopted for proving the document is irregular cannot be allowed to be raised at any stage after the marking of the document as an exhibit. The latter proposition is a rule of fair play. The crucial test is whether an objection if taken at the appropriate point of time, would have enabled the party tendering the evidence to cure the defect and resort to such mode of proof as would be regular. The omission to object becomes fatal because, by his failure, the party entitled to object allows the party tendering the evidence to act on the assumption that the opposite party is not serious about the mode of proof. X 22. On the other hand, learned Counsel for Defendants 1 and 2 relied on the decision in Ajodhya Prasad Bhargava vs. Bhawani Shanker Bhargava and Another, AIR 1957 All. X 22. On the other hand, learned Counsel for Defendants 1 and 2 relied on the decision in Ajodhya Prasad Bhargava vs. Bhawani Shanker Bhargava and Another, AIR 1957 All. 1 wherein the full bench of Allahabad High Court held that: The party producing these documents can be permitted under Sec. 21 of the Indian Evidence Act to use them as substantive evidence in the case without drawing in cross-examination the attention of the opponent to those admissions, provided the opponent, when appearing as a witness, makes no statement at all contradictory to the admissions contained in the documents but if the opponent, in his statement in Court, gives evidence contradicting that contained in the admissions, the admissions cannot be used as substantive evidence unless his attention is drawn in cross-examination to those admissions. *** *** *** X, In order to appreciate the difference that exists between the nature of evidence, sought to be embraced by the two sections, three prominent features of admission as a piece of evidence should be steadily kept in mind. These features may be enumerated at the very outset as follows: (1) An admission constitutes a substantive piece of evidence in the case for that reason and can be relied upon for proving the truth of the facts incorporated therein. (2) An admission has the effect of shifting the onus of proving to the contrary on the party against whom it is produced with the result that it casts an imperative duty on such party to explain it. In the absence of a satisfactory explanation, it is presumed to be true. (3) An admission, in order to be competent and to have the value and effect referred to above, should be clear, certain and definite, and not ambiguous, vague or confused. 23. Considering the established legal principles, I turn to the admissibility of the Ex.A.7 document. As evidenced by Ex.A.7, it constitutes a certified copy of an unregistered partnership deed. The content of the Ex.B.2 letter indicates that the 3rd Defendant possessed the original partnership deed. It is undisputed that the copy of the partnership deed was introduced as secondary evidence in O.S. No. 65 of 2004 before the IV Additional Junior Civil Judge, Vijayawada, wherein all the Defendants in the present case were parties. The content of the Ex.B.2 letter indicates that the 3rd Defendant possessed the original partnership deed. It is undisputed that the copy of the partnership deed was introduced as secondary evidence in O.S. No. 65 of 2004 before the IV Additional Junior Civil Judge, Vijayawada, wherein all the Defendants in the present case were parties. It is also acknowledged that, dissatisfied with the admission of the partnership deed in the suit O.S. No. 65 of 2004, a Civil Revision Petition No. 605 of 2007 was filed, and this Court upheld the trial court’s decision. Given the circumstances of the case, the Plaintiff in the current proceeding obtained a certified copy of the partnership deed, which was duly allowed to be presented as evidence in the present proceedings. 24. It is crucial to note that by retaining the original partnership deed with the 3rd Defendant’s father, the 3rd Defendant has forfeited the right to contest the authenticity of the certified copy of the document. At this juncture, the 3rd Defendant is precluded from challenging the admissibility of the document, especially considering that Defendants 2 and 3 were parties in the proceedings of O.S. No. 65 of 2004. The order passed in C.R.P. No. 605 of 2007 is binding on both parties. Given these circumstances, it is impermissible for the 3rd Defendant to raise objections regarding the admissibility of the document during the Appeal arguments. This is particularly noteworthy as the 3rd Defendant failed to raise such an objection before the trial court. 25. The PW-4’s evidence indicates that he filled the blanks in Ex.A.1 promissory note and typed Ex.A.2 letter per the directions of K.V. Apparao, 3rd Defendant’s father. Ex.A.2 letter dated 01.09.2021 reads as follows: This is to inform you that M/s. S.C. Entertainment (Shanmugha Cine Entertainment) is a Partnership Firm. Sri B.B. Viswara Rao, S/o Koteswara Rao and Sri K. Ravi Kiran S/o K.V. Appa Rao are the Partners. 26. The 2nd Defendant has relied on Ex.B.3, the balance sheet of S.C. Entertainment dated 10.04.2002, as evidence. According to the 2nd Defendant, it bears the signature of the 3rd Defendant’s father, a contention supported by the PW-4’s testimony. Surprisingly, the 3rd Defendant chose not to examine his father to refute the presence of his signature on the document. 26. The 2nd Defendant has relied on Ex.B.3, the balance sheet of S.C. Entertainment dated 10.04.2002, as evidence. According to the 2nd Defendant, it bears the signature of the 3rd Defendant’s father, a contention supported by the PW-4’s testimony. Surprisingly, the 3rd Defendant chose not to examine his father to refute the presence of his signature on the document. The trial court noted that the 3rd Defendant never denied the authenticity of Exs.B.2 to B.4 and Ex.B.5, the office copy of the meeting notice dated 11.11.2002. These documents, bearing the signature of the 3rd Defendant’s father, substantiate the Plaintiff’s and 2nd Defendant’s claim that the 3rd Defendant is a partner in the 1st Defendant’s firm. Additionally, the trial court relied on Ex.B.19, an identification badge issued by the American Film Festival to the 3rd Defendant featuring his photo. The evidence of DW.2, the G.P.A. Holder of the 3rd Defendant, revealed his lack of knowledge about issuing the identification badge (Ex.B.19) to the 3rd Defendant as a representative of the 1st Defendant firm for the Film Festival in the U.S.A. Though it is contended on behalf of the 3rd Defendant that he assisted his maternal uncle/2nd Defendant in importing English movies as he did not come forward to state those facts on oath, this Court is not inclined to place reliance on submissions made during the hearing. Ex.B.23, a deal memo dated 18.01.1999, also designates the 3rd Defendant as the director of the 1st Defendant firm. Notably, the 3rd Defendant has not contended that he served as the director of another firm, and Ex.B.23 pertains explicitly to the 1st Defendant’s firm. As emphasized by the trial court, DW.2 acknowledged that Ex.B.23 reflects a deal between Bunavista Film Sales and Ravi Kiran/3rd Defendant as a director. Importantly, these documents were relevant as they pertained prior to the Ex.A.1 transaction. As correctly noted by the trial court, the 3rd Defendant failed to explain the aforementioned documents. 27. Furthermore, Exs.B.14 to B.23 and B.43 reveal that the 3rd Defendant engaged in transactions with film companies. However, the 3rd Defendant failed to provide substantial evidence demonstrating that these transactions were not conducted on behalf of S.C. Entertainment. The trial court thoroughly examined these documents, accepted the Plaintiff’s case, and concluded that the 3rd Defendant is a working partner in the 1st Defendant’s firm. However, the 3rd Defendant failed to provide substantial evidence demonstrating that these transactions were not conducted on behalf of S.C. Entertainment. The trial court thoroughly examined these documents, accepted the Plaintiff’s case, and concluded that the 3rd Defendant is a working partner in the 1st Defendant’s firm. Notably, the 3rd Defendant examined his Power of Attorney holder, DW.2, as a witness. However, DW.2 lacks personal knowledge about the suit transaction, as the G.P.A. was granted to him on 14.09.2002. Notably, he admitted to not visiting the 2nd Defendant’s house from 1998 to 2002 and did not verify the records of the 1st Defendant’s firm in his capacity as the power of attorney for the 3rd Defendant. 28. Furthermore, DW.2 is unaware of the 3rd Defendant’s involvement with the American Film Maker in 1998, attendance at A.F.M., films purchased, or the amounts paid by the 3rd Defendant for attending A.F.M. The 2nd Defendant was not the G.P.A. holder of the 3rd Defendant during the suit transactions. Consequently, no evidence was presented on behalf of the 3rd Defendant to refute the suit transactions asserted by the Plaintiff and the 2nd Defendant. 29. The trial court’s astute observation, echoed by the Counsel for the 2nd Defendant, aptly emphasizes that documents such as Exs.B.14 to B.23 and B.26 illustrate the 3rd Defendant’s representation as a partner of the 1st Defendant firm. Despite being fully capable of explaining these documents, the 3rd Defendant chose not to testify. The absence of the 3rd Defendant’s father, who acted as a G.P.A. further deprived the Court of vital insights into the suit transactions and the execution of various documents on behalf of the 3rd Defendant. To preempt such a situation, a new G.P.A. was provided to DW.2, the brother of K.V. Apparao. Notably, the Ex.B.3 balance sheet, tendered by the 3rd Defendant’s father in his capacity as a G.P.A. holder, unequivocally signifies that the 3rd Defendant is a partner in the 1st Defendant firm and substantiates the debt owed to the Plaintiff. It is crucial to acknowledge that the documents on record consistently indicate the 3rd Defendant’s partnership in the 1st Defendant’s firm. His father routinely represented him in India, signing all documents on his behalf. Regrettably, the 3rd Defendant refrained from taking the witness stand to establish whether he had indeed not granted a G.P.A. in favour of his father. It is crucial to acknowledge that the documents on record consistently indicate the 3rd Defendant’s partnership in the 1st Defendant’s firm. His father routinely represented him in India, signing all documents on his behalf. Regrettably, the 3rd Defendant refrained from taking the witness stand to establish whether he had indeed not granted a G.P.A. in favour of his father. Despite raising several objections disputing the suit transaction, the 3rd Defendant’s failure to testify means that these objections remain unsubstantiated claims without supporting evidence. Ignoring the above referred documentary evidence makes it difficult to accept the Appellant’s case as the 2nd Defendant subscribed his signature as Proprietor in Exs.B.6, B.7 and B.72 documents. 30. In Indian Bank, Chittoor vs. V.R. Venkataraman, 2003 SCC Online A.P. 1160 the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that: 10. The Supreme Court has categorically stated in the aforesaid decision that presumption has to be drawn under Section 114 of the Evidence Act against a party who did not enter into the witness box to prove the case set up by him. Such a presumption has to be drawn under Section 114 of the Evidence Act insofar as the 2nd Defendant is concerned. Hence, it is rightly contended by the learned Counsel for the Appellant that presumption has to be drawn for the non-examination of the 2nd Defendant, and the version raised in her pleading has to be disbelieved. 31. In Iswar Bhai C. Patel and Bachu Bhai Patel vs. Harihar Behera and Another, AIR 1999 SC 1341 the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that: Having not entered the witness box and not presented himself for cross-examination, an adverse presumption has to be drawn against him based on principles contained in illustration (g) of Section 114 of the Evidence Act. 32. The 3rd Defendant’s failure to enter the witness box and testify in support of the pleaded facts is a notable omission. By choosing not to state the facts pleaded in the written statement on oath before the Trial Court and avoiding cross-examination, the 3rd Defendant has created a void in his defence. This absence of testimony becomes a significant factor in favor of accepting the claims made by the Plaintiff and the 2nd Defendant regarding the 3rd Defendant’s status as a working partner. This absence of testimony becomes a significant factor in favor of accepting the claims made by the Plaintiff and the 2nd Defendant regarding the 3rd Defendant’s status as a working partner. Legal precedent, as established in various decisions by different High Courts and the Privy Council, particularly starting from the case of Sardar Gurbakhsh Singh vs. Gurdial Singh, (1927) 29 Bom. L.R. 1392 holds that when a party to the suit refrains from appearing in the witness box, presenting the case on oath, and subjecting themselves to cross-examination, a presumption may arise that the case set up by that party is not correct. This principle adds weight to the Plaintiff’s and the 2nd Defendant’s contention that the 3rd Defendant is indeed a genuine working partner. 33. When the documents relied on by Plaintiff and the 2nd Defendant are shown to be signed by the G.P.A. of the 3rd Defendant, it is for the 3rd Defendant and his G.P.A. to show how and in what circumstances the documents are signed or manipulated. 34. In Civil cases, the preponderance of probability constitutes a sufficient ground for decision if the facts and circumstances are such that no reasonable man would draw a particular inference from them or if the degree of probability in the case is such that as to include any hypothesis besides the one to be proved then the party who relies on a particular theory cannot be said to have discharged the onus of proof of establishing that theory. But, if there is evidence strongly prepondering in favour of any one of the two theories set up, the Court is entitled to act upon it. 35. It is the bounden duty of a party personally knowing the facts and circumstances, to give evidence on his behalf and to submit to cross-examination, and his non-appearance as a witness would be the strongest possible circumstance that will discredit the truth of his case. The fact that the 3rd Defendant neither came to the box himself nor called any witnesses to contradict evidence given on oath against him shows that these facts cannot be denied. What was prima facie against him became conclusive proof by his failure to deny it. The fact that the 3rd Defendant neither came to the box himself nor called any witnesses to contradict evidence given on oath against him shows that these facts cannot be denied. What was prima facie against him became conclusive proof by his failure to deny it. The explanation of any admission or conduct on the part of a party must, if the party is alive and capable of giving evidence, come from him, and the Court would not imagine an explanation which a party himself has not chosen to give. 36. Applying the principles stated above to the instant case, it would be found that the Appellant had abstained from the witness box and had not made any statement on oath in support of his pleading set out in the written statement. It may not be out of place to mention that there is no conflict of interest between 3rd Defendant and his father. Therefore, an adverse inference has to be drawn against him; what he stated in the written statement was incorrect. In these circumstances, the trial Court was fully justified in decreeing the suit of Plaintiff/Respondent No. 1 and passing a decree against the Appellant/3rd Defendant. 37. It is noteworthy that the 3rd Defendant has not taken any legal action against his father to validate the partnership deed and other documents acknowledging the 3rd Defendant as a partner of the 1st Defendant firm. Even if the partnership deed is set aside, the documents above undeniably establish that the 3rd Defendant is one of the working partners of the 1st Defendant firm. Another concerning factor is the 3rd Defendant’s decision not to testify or call upon his father, who possessed first-hand knowledge of the case facts, to substantiate his claims. Instead, the 3rd Defendant chose to examine DW.2, who lacked intimate knowledge about the suit transaction. From this, it can be reasonably inferred that the 3rd Defendant did not contest the Plaintiff’s case effectively, as he failed to present witnesses with personal knowledge of the facts. Additionally, the 3rd Defendant neglected to produce documentary evidence to refute the claims made by the Plaintiff and the 2nd Defendant. This further strengthens the case of the Plaintiff and the 2nd Defendant presented regarding the 3rd Defendant’s status as a working partner in the 1st Defendant’s firm. 38. Additionally, the 3rd Defendant neglected to produce documentary evidence to refute the claims made by the Plaintiff and the 2nd Defendant. This further strengthens the case of the Plaintiff and the 2nd Defendant presented regarding the 3rd Defendant’s status as a working partner in the 1st Defendant’s firm. 38. The trial Court has referred to sections 28 and 69 of the Indian Partnership Act in fixing the liability of the 3rd Defendant as a partner of the 1st Defendant firm. For better appreciation, sections 28 and 69 of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932 are extracted hereunder: 28. Holding out: (1) Anyone who by words spoken or written or by conduct represents himself or knowingly permits himself to be represented, to be a partner in a firm, is liable as a partner in that firm to anyone who has on the faith of any such representation given credit to the firm, whether the person representing himself or represented to be a partner does or does not know that the representation has reached the person so giving credit. (2) Where after a partner’s death, the business is continued in the old firm name, the continued use of that name or the deceased partner’s name as a part thereof shall not of itself make his legal representative or his estate liable for any act of the firm done after his death. 69. Effect of non-registration: (1) No suit to enforce a right arising from a contract or conferred by this Act shall be instituted in any court by or on behalf of any person suing as a partner in a firm against the firm or any person alleged to be or to have been a partner in the firm unless the firm is registered. The person suing is or has been shown in the Register of Firms as a partner. (2) No suit to enforce a right arising from a contract shall be instituted in any Court by or on behalf of a firm against any third party unless the firm is registered and the persons suing are or have been shown in the Register of Firms as partners in the firm. (2) No suit to enforce a right arising from a contract shall be instituted in any Court by or on behalf of a firm against any third party unless the firm is registered and the persons suing are or have been shown in the Register of Firms as partners in the firm. (3) The provisions of sub-section (1) and (2) shall also apply to a claim of set-off or other proceedings to enforce a right arising from a contract but shall not affect: (a) the enforcement of any right to sue for the dissolution of a firm or for accounts of a dissolved firm, or any right or power to realise the property of a dissolved firm, or (b) the powers of an official assignee, receiver or Court under the Presidency-towns Insolvency Act, 1909 (3 of 1909) or the Provincial Insolvency Act, 1920 (5 of 1920) to realise the property of an insolvent partner. 39. By invoking sections 28 and 69 of the Indian Partnership Act of 1932, the trial court correctly concluded that all partners in the firm, even if unregistered, bear liability to third parties. The execution of Ex.A.1 on behalf of the 1st Defendant firm, including the firm’s stamps and seal, underscores the firm’s involvement. The available evidence establishes that the 3rd Defendant served as the director of the 1st Defendant firm, and the Plaintiff successfully demonstrates that the 1st Defendant firm is not fictitious. Crucially, the 3rd Defendant falls short of establishing that the Ex.B.2 letter, addressed by his father acting as a G.P.A. is fabricated. A thorough reassessment of all the evidence leads to the conclusion that the trial court appropriately evaluated the evidence. Based on the PW-1’s credible testimony, supported by documentary evidence, it is determined that the suit transaction outlined in Ex.A.1 is genuine, valid, and binding on Defendants 1 to 3. Consequently, they are severally liable for the suit amount along with costs. Thus, Points 1 and 2 are resolved accordingly. POINT NO. 3: 40. After careful consideration, the trial Court correctly appreciated the evidence. There is no reason for this Court to arrive at a different conclusion than the one arrived at by the trial Court. I think that the trial Court’s findings are correct, and the Appellant/3rd Defendant has shown no justifiable reasons for arriving at different conclusions. I agree with the conclusion reached by the trial Court. 41. There is no reason for this Court to arrive at a different conclusion than the one arrived at by the trial Court. I think that the trial Court’s findings are correct, and the Appellant/3rd Defendant has shown no justifiable reasons for arriving at different conclusions. I agree with the conclusion reached by the trial Court. 41. Accordingly, the Points are answered in favour of the Plaintiff by holding that the Trial Court is justified in holding that the Defendants executed the suit promissory note and received the consideration amount. Given the preceding discussion, the view taken by the trial court does not call for any interference, and this Appeal fails and is hereby dismissed. The impugned Decree and Judgment passed by the trial court is upheld. 42. As a result, the Appeal is hereby dismissed without costs by confirming the Decree and Judgment in O.S. No. 799 of 2002, dated 27.08.2012, passed by the learned V Additional Senior Civil Judge (Fast Track Court), Vijayawada. 43. Consequently, miscellaneous petitions pending, if any, in this Appeal shall stand closed.