JUDGMENT : 1. Petitioner has been held guilty for offence under Sections 279 and 304-A IPC by the court of Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate No.1, Alwar, in criminal case No.740/1994 vide judgment dated 09.04.2002 and while affirming the conviction of petitioner for such offences, the appellate Court being Special Judge, SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities Cases) and Additional Sessions Judge, Alwar, in Criminal Appeal No.34/2003 vide Judgment dated 03.05.2003, sentenced the petitioner as under:- (a) Sections 279 IPC- Two months simple imprisonment. (b) Section 304-A IPC- Six months simple imprisonment. Hence, feeling aggrieved by judgments dated 03.05.2003 and 09.04.2002, petitioner has filed this criminal revision petition under Section 397 r/w Section 401 Cr.P.C. 2. Briefly stated, facts of the present case are that the bus bearing No.RSB-2982, driven by the petitioner, came to be collided with a bicycle on 30.07.1991, on the main Delhi-Alwar highway and in this accident, bicycle rider namely Ghanshyam Singh and pillion rider Jagdish died. On the written report by one Gangaram, a FIR came to be registered wherein after investigation, charge-sheet was filed against the petitioner and then trial court read over accusation of charges for offence under Sections 279, 304-A IPC and on claiming no guilty by the petitioner, the criminal trial was commenced. During course of trial, only four witnesses for prosecution stepped into witness box and no witnesses appeared to prove the site map (Ex.P-2) so also to prove the postmortem reports (Ex.P-10 and P-11) of deceased Ghanshyam and Jagdish. On the basis of statements of prosecution witnesses PW-1 to PW-4 and plea of accused recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C., finally vide Judgment dated 21.03.1997, petitioner was convicted for ofences under Section 279, 304-A IPC and was sentenced for a maximum period of imprisonment of two years for offence under Section 304-A IPC and for a period of three month simple imprisonment for offence under Section 279 IPC. 3. Petitioner challenged the judgment dated 21.03.1997 by means of filing statutory appeal and the appellate Court clearly observed that there is no evidence of prosecution that petitioner was driving the bus with high speed, as PW-1 and PW-2 who were eye witnesses, accept in their cross-examination that bus was plying on the highway road with an ordinary speed like other vehicles. It was observed by the Appellate Court that to prove the guilt on the part of petitioner to drive the bus rashly or negligently, document of site map (Ex.P-2) has not been proved by the Investigation Officer who prepared the site map. Similarly, the postmortem reports (Ex.P-10 & P-11) have also not been proved. It was also observed that the plea of the petitioner accused under Section 313 Cr.P.C. was not recorded in proper manner and correct picture of evidence of prosecution witnesses was not projected before the accused, and same was also found faulty. Finally, the appellate Court vide its Judgment dated 11.12.1998, quashed the judgment of conviction dated 21.03.1997 passed by the trial Court, however in stead of acquitting the accused petitioner, remanded the matter to the trial Court giving further opportunity to the prosecution to prove the guilt of petitioner. The copy of judgment dated 11.12.1998 is available on record. 4. After remand, on the request of prosecution, learned trial Court issued summons to record statements of ASI Lekhraj who prepared the site map (Ex.P-2) as also to one Harish Manocha a jurist, who conducted the postmortem and prepared postmortem reports (Ex.P-10 & P-11). Only Harish Manocha appeared to produce his evidence as PW-5 but ASI Lekhraj did not turn up to give his evidence despite taking resort of all modes to summon him. Finally, the evidence of prosecution has to be closed by the trial Court. The noteworthy point is that site map (Ex.P-2) could not be proved by the prosecution by producing the person i.e. ASI, Lekhraj who prepared this map. 5. After closure of the prosecution evidence, trial Court recorded the plea of accused under Section 313 and vide Judgment dated 09.04.2002, held the petitioner guilty for offences under Sections 279, 304-A IPC and sentenced him for a period of two months for offence under Section 279 IPC and for a period of one year simple imprisonment for offence under Section 304-A IPC. 6. On filing the statutory appeal by the petitioner against the Judgment dated 09.04.2002, the appellate Court while affirming the conviction of petitioner, maintained the sentence of two months simple imprisonment for offence under Section 279 IPC, however reduced one year simple imprisonment period into the period of six months simple imprisonment for offence under Section 304-A IPC vide its judgment dated 03.05.2003. Both period of sentences were ordered to be run concurrently. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that in order to prove the petitioner guilty for offence under Sections 279 & 304-A IPC, it was required for prosecution to establish that before time of the accident on 30.07.1991, petitioner was driving the bus rashly or negligently that too with high speed and thereby hit the bicycle. He submits that the case of prosecution that the bus hit the bicycle by going towards wrong side does not stand prove by any evidence, as ASI Lekhraj did not appear to support the case of prosecution to prove the site map (Ex.P-2) and this shortfall in prosecution case, as observed by the appellate Court in the remand Judgment dated 11.12.1998 has not been fulfilled. He submits that out of the eye witness to the accident, witness Gangaram (PW-1) although stated in his chief examination that the bus came from opposite side with high speed and in order to save one tractor, it ran over upon Mr. Ghanshyam who died on the spot but in his cross-examination, PW-1 admits that the speed of bus was the same as it usually runs on the Delhi highway. Another witness Ramsingh (PW-2) has not deposed any evidence about speed of bus, however he also admits in his cross-examination that the bus was plying with the same speed as ordinarily bus run on Delhi Highway road. As far as third eye witness (PW-4) is concerned, he was declared hostile. The contention of learned counsel for the petitioner-accused is that merely on the basis of statements of PW-1 and PW-2, case of prosecution to held prove the guilt of petitioner to drive the bus, rashly or negligently cannot be believed. In addition to above, learned counsel for petitioner has pointed out that recording of plea of accused under Section 313 Cr.P.C. is also not in accordance with the accuracy of evidence of prosecution, due to which the proper defence of petitioner could not come on record. He submits that on the basis of totality of the prosecution evidence, no case to hold the guilt of petitioner for offence under Section 279, 304-A IPC is make out. Thus, impugned Judgments to hold the conviction of petitioner for such offences suffer from vice of perversity and both impugned Judgments deserve to be quashed. 8. He submits that on the basis of totality of the prosecution evidence, no case to hold the guilt of petitioner for offence under Section 279, 304-A IPC is make out. Thus, impugned Judgments to hold the conviction of petitioner for such offences suffer from vice of perversity and both impugned Judgments deserve to be quashed. 8. In alternative, learned counsel for the petitioner has urged that in case, this Court does not deem it just and proper to quash the concurrent fact findings of conviction, then at least the period of sentence of imprisonment of petitioner be reduced to the period already undergone, more particularly, considering the mitigating circumstances of the present case. He urged that the accident occurred way back on 30.07.1991 it means about 33 years ago and during this period, now petitioner has crossed the age of 60 years and he has been remained in Jail for a period of about 17 days as much as is also facing mental agony and trauma of his conviction and pending litigation, during this long period of 33 years. Hence, it has been prayed that in order to strike a balance, the substantive sentence of petitioner be suitably modified so as to serve a cause of justice. 9. Learned Public Prosecutor while supporting impugned Judgments has contended that the trial Court after appreciation of prosecution evidence as a whole has held the petitioner guilty for driving the bus rashly and negligently and thereby to commit accident with a bicycle wherein two persons died and the findings of the trial Court have been affirmed by the appellate Court. Therefore, in view of concurrent fact findings of proving the guilt of accused petitioner, the High Court should not enter into re-appreciation of the entire evidence of prosecution afresh and to draw an another conclusion. He submits that the punishment awarded against petitioner by the appellate Court, at least be maintained. 10. Heard. Considered. 11. At the out set, it is noteworthy that first Judgment of the trial Court dated 21.03.1997 was set aside by the appellate Court vide Judgment dated 11.12.1998. Appellate Court, after observing lacunas in the prosecution evidence, not to prove the site map (Ex.P-2) & postmortem reports (Ex.P-10 & P-11), remanded the matter to the trial Court giving further opportunity to prosecution to fill up such lacunas by producing concerned prosecution witnesses. Appellate Court, after observing lacunas in the prosecution evidence, not to prove the site map (Ex.P-2) & postmortem reports (Ex.P-10 & P-11), remanded the matter to the trial Court giving further opportunity to prosecution to fill up such lacunas by producing concerned prosecution witnesses. Observations made in the Judgment dated 11.12.1998, pointing out shortfalls of prosecution case, were never challenged, rather prosecution acted upon pursuant to the observations of remand Judgment dated 11.12.1998 passed by the appellate Court. After remand, postmortem reports (Ex.P-10 & P-11) although have been proved by the Jurist, Harish Manocha who appeared as PW-5 but still the site map (Ex.P-2) remained unproved, due to non-appearance of ASI Lekhraj, who prepared the site map. Such lacunas of prosecution evidence can not be cover up by statements of eye-witnesses PW-1 and PW-2. The document of site map although has been exhibited by PW-1 but his evidence falls short to prove the guilt on the part of petitioner to drive the bus rashly or negligently. The case of prosecution as projected in the site map (Ex.P-2) that bus hit the bicycle coming towards wrong side, has not been proved by the prosecution since the material witness, I.O. ASI, Lekhraj, did not appear to depose his evidence for no good reason and despite of issuing repeated summons, so also after adopting all other alternative mode by the trial Court to summon him. 12. It is also noteworthy that both courts, in judgments impugned dated 09.04.2002 and 03.05.2003, which have been passed after the remand of case, under Judgment dated 11.12.1998, has not pondered over the part of statements of PW-1 and PW-2, who in their cross-examination admit that the bus in question was plying with the same speed as ordinary vehicles ply at Delhi Highway road. It is fact on record that the accident was occurred on the main highway of Delhi-Alwar road. The case of prosecution that the petitioner was driving the bus with high speed, has not been proved. Any other overt or negligent act on the part of petitioner has not been highlighted by the prosecution. Both courts, merely by drawing assumptions, have held by hypothetically that since the bus hit the bicycle and mow down the bicycle rider, hence, there has been a presumption of negligence on the part of bus driver. Any other overt or negligent act on the part of petitioner has not been highlighted by the prosecution. Both courts, merely by drawing assumptions, have held by hypothetically that since the bus hit the bicycle and mow down the bicycle rider, hence, there has been a presumption of negligence on the part of bus driver. Thus, the findings to drive the bus rashly and negligently by petitioner are absolutely based on presumptions only and have not been passed on the basis of any cogent and substantive piece of evidence of prosecution. 13. Nevertheless, this Court is exercising its jurisdiction under Section 397/ 401 Cr.P.C. and it is settled proposition of law that in exercise of revisional jurisdiction, High Court is not required to embark upon the fruitless task of determining the factual issues afresh by re-appreciation of the evidence as a whole. Ordinarily, High Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction should not upset fact findings so recorded by the trial Court and affirmed by the appellate Court and the concurrent findings of fact should not be disturbed. To buttress such proposition of law, reference of two judgments of Hon’ble Supreme Court, in case of Manju Ram Kalita Vs. State of Assam [ (2009) 13 SCC 330 ] and Malkeet Singh Gill Vs. The State of Chattisgarh [ (2022) 8 SCC 204 ] would be suffice. Therefore, keeping in mind the narrow jurisdiction of the High Court, while exercising revisional jurisdiction against the concurrent fact findings of guilt of petitioner accused, this Court is refraining itself to quash the findings of two courts holding the petitioner guilty for driving the bus rashly and negligently. No further discussion on the issue of conviction of petitioner for driving the bus rashly or negligently and holding the petitioner guilt for offence under Sections 279, 304-A IPC is required. 14. Coming to the part of awarding sentence against the petitioner, in the present case, this Court does not find any jurisdictional error or illegality on the part of the trial Court and appellate Court for not awarding the benefit of probation to the petitioner, in the light of the judgment of the Apex Court in case of Dalbir Singh Vs. State of Haryana [ 2000 (5) SCC 82 ], however the prayer of petitioner to reduce his substantive period of sentence to the undergone may be considered. 15. State of Haryana [ 2000 (5) SCC 82 ], however the prayer of petitioner to reduce his substantive period of sentence to the undergone may be considered. 15. This Court is aware that the Apex Court has given various judgments on the point of sentencing the accused for offences under Sections 279 and 304-A IPC, depending upon different facts and circumstances. In few of judgments, the period of sentence has been allowed to be reduced, to the extent of period already undergone but there are other set of converse judgments as well, adversely commenting upon reduction of sentence period by the High Court, merely on account of long lapse of time because of pendency of appeal/ revision. Nevertheless, it depends on facts and circumstances of each case as to what would be just and proper sentence which would be commensurate to the nature and gravity of offence as well as to advance the cause of justice. 16. The Hon’ble Apex Court, in case of Dalbir Singh (supra), held that while considering the quantum of sentence to be imposed for offence of causing death by rash or negligent driven of automobiles, one of the prime considerations should be deterrence. A professional driver should not take a chance thinking that even if he is convicted, he would be dealt with leniently by the Court. 17. In a recent judgment delivered by the Apex Court in case of Uggarsain Vs. State of Haryana and Ors.[ (2023) 8 SCC 109 ], while dealing with principles for sentencing the accused, it was held that proportionality/balancing of aggravating and mitigating circumstances should guide the sentencing process. Giving reference to the previous judgments, it has been held that the sentence should “deter the criminal from achieving the avowed object to law” and the endevour should be to impose an “appropriate sentence”. The Court hold that the imposing “Meagre sentences” “merely on account of lapse of time”, would be corrective. The Apex Court, while referring to the dictum of the judgment delivered in case of Jameel V. State of U.P. [ (2010) 12 SCC 532 ], emphasized para 15 which is being extracted hereunder:- “ ………...law should adopt the corrective machinery or deterrence based on factual matrix. By deft modulation, sentencing process be stern where it should be, and tempered with mercy where it warrants to be. By deft modulation, sentencing process be stern where it should be, and tempered with mercy where it warrants to be. The facts and given circumstances in each case, the nature of the crime, the manner in which it was planned and committed, the motive for commission of the crime, the conduct of the accused, the nature of weapons used and all other attending circumstances are relevant facts which would enter into the area of consideration.” 18. In an another judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of State of Rajasthan V. Banwari Lal [(2022) 12 SCC 116], after giving adherence to large number of previous judgments of Hon’ble Supreme Court and high Courts, it was held and observed that “from the aforementioned observations, it is clear that the principle governing the imposition of punishment will depend upon facts and circumstances of each case. However, the sentence should be appropriate, adequate, just, proportionate and commensurate with the nature and gravity of the crime and manner in which the crime is committed. The gravity of the crime, motive for the crime, nature of the crime and all other attending circumstances have to be borne in mind while imposing the sentence. The Court can not afford to be casual while imposing the sentence, in as much as both the crime and the criminal are equally important in the sentencing process. Courts musts see that the public do not lose the confidence in the judicial system. Imposing inadequate sentences will do more harm to the justice system and may lead to a state where the victim loses confidence in the judicial system and resorts to the private vengeance” 19. In the afore-referred judgment of Banwari Lal (supra), the Apex Court referred and relied upon the verdict of the apex Court in case of Alister Anthony Pareira Vs. State of Maharashtra [ (2012) 2 SCC 648 ], wherein while dealing with convicts for offences under Section 304-A, 338 and 337 IPC comparing to the offence under Section 304-Part II in respect of sentencing process, in para 84, it was observed as under:- “Sentencing is an important task in the matters of crime. One of the prime objectives of the criminal law is imposition of appropriate, adequate, just and proportionate sentence commensurate with the nature and gravity of crime and the manner in which the crime is done. One of the prime objectives of the criminal law is imposition of appropriate, adequate, just and proportionate sentence commensurate with the nature and gravity of crime and the manner in which the crime is done. There is no straitjacket formula for sentencing an accused on proof of crime. The courts have evolved certain principles: the twin objective of the sentencing policy is deterrence and correction. What sentence would meet the ends of justice depends on the facts and circumstances of each case and the court must keep in mind the gravity of the crime, motive for the crime, nature of the offence and all other attendant circumstances.” 20. In an another verdict of the Apex Court, delivered in case of Sagar Lolienkar V. The State of Goa: Criminal Appeal NO.1415/2021 decided on 18th November, 2021, while affirming the conviction of accused appellant for offences punishable under Sections 279 and 304-A IPC, the substantive sentence of imprisonment was reduced to the period already undergone, simultaneously besides the fine, appellant was directed to deposit the some amount by way of compensation to the widow of deceased. The relevant portion of judgment reads as under:- “In the instant case, the appellant has been found to be guilty of offences punishable under Sections 279 and 304A IPC for driving rashly and negligently on a public street and his act unfortunately resulted in the loss of the precious human life. But it is pertinent to note that there was no allegation against the appellant that at the time of accident, he was under the influence of liquor or any other substance impairing his driving skills. It was a rash and negligent act simplicitor and not a case of driving in an inebriated condition which is, undoubtedly despicable aggravated offence warranting stricter and harsher punishment.” 21. In a recent judgment dated 03.01.2024, delivered in criminal Appeal NO.39 of 2024 in case of K. Dinesh Vs. It was a rash and negligent act simplicitor and not a case of driving in an inebriated condition which is, undoubtedly despicable aggravated offence warranting stricter and harsher punishment.” 21. In a recent judgment dated 03.01.2024, delivered in criminal Appeal NO.39 of 2024 in case of K. Dinesh Vs. The State of Karnataka & Anr by the Hon’ble Supreme Court reported in MANU/SCOR/0021/2024, the appellant who was bus driver and convicted for offence punishable under Section 279, 337 and 304-A IPC and was sentenced for a period of six months, his period of incarceration for four months and nine days was held to be adequate punishment and accordingly, the Hon’ble Supreme Court while granting no indulgence with the conviction of appellant, reduced the sentence to the one which is already undergone. 22. Coming to facts of the present case, it is not the case of prosecution that petitioner at the time of accident, was under influence of liquor or any other intoxic substance, impairing his driving skills nor prosecution could establish that the petitioner was plying the bus on the highway road from Alwar to Delhi with high speed but it is equally true that the petitioner has been held guilty for driving the bus rashly and negligently and presumption is that the accident occurred due to negligence on the part of bus driver, but still sole negligence of only bus driver may not be attributed and can not be assumed. It is unfortunate for the petitioner that in this accident two persons, riding on bicycle died. There is nothing on record to show that it was a repeated accident on the part of the petitioner or the petitioner has been held guilty for similar nature of offences in any another case either prior or post to the present case. The accident occurred way back on 30.07.1991, it means near about 33 years ago. As per record, the petitioner has already suffered incarceration for a period of about half month and as much as has also been facing mental agony and trauma of his conviction for a long period and litigation too has prolonged for 33 years. The accident occurred way back on 30.07.1991, it means near about 33 years ago. As per record, the petitioner has already suffered incarceration for a period of about half month and as much as has also been facing mental agony and trauma of his conviction for a long period and litigation too has prolonged for 33 years. Now, petitioner has certainly crossed the age of 60 years, hence, considering all such attending and mitigating circumstances holistically, the cause of justice does not demand to send the petitioner again into Jail in this advance age and after such a long lapse of period. The Judgment of Apex Court, referred above, too supports this view. Therefore, in the light of ratio decidendi, expounded by the Apex Court in catena of judgments, which have been referred hereinabove, and considering the mitigating circumstances of the present case, it would not be improper and unjust to reduce the sentence to the period already undergone by the petitioner, and in addition petitioner be directed to pay some compensation to legal heirs of both deceased. In the opinion of this Court, same would serve the cause of justice as also would strike a balance between the corrective theory and deterrence theory required to be followed in the sentencing process. 23. As a final result, the present revision petition is partly allowed and while upholding the conviction of petitioner for offences under Sections 279, 304-A IPC, the sentence awarded to petitioner in the impugned judgment stands modified in the following manner:- i) the substantive sentence of imprisonment of the petitioner is reduced to the period already undergone; ii) in addition, petitioner is directed to deposit a lump-sum compensation amount of Rs.20,000/- before the trial Court within a period of 90 days, which shall be disbursed to legal heirs of both deceased persons in equal ratio. 24. The petitioner is already on bail, hence he need not to surrender and his bail bonds stand canceled. 25. Record of the trial court be sent back.