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Gujarat High Court · body

2024 DIGILAW 1131 (GUJ)

Keshu Savdas v. Deputy Collector and Prant Officer

2024-05-06

DEVAN M.DESAI

body2024
ORDER : 1. The captioned Civil Applications are filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 for condonation of delay of 1151 days caused in preferring the First Appeal. 2. Heard learned advocates for the respective parties. 3. Challenge is made by the applicants against the judgment and decree dated 30.06.2018 passed by the learned 2nd Additional Senior Civil Judge, Jamnagar in Land Reference Case Nos. 35 and 36 of 2011 in group Land Acquisition Reference Case Nos. 35 to 37 of 2011. 4. The original claimants filed Land Reference cases under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1984 (for short ‘the Act’) for enhancement of compensation awarded by the Special Land Acquisition Officer on 09.09.2010. 4.1 The lands of the claimants situated in village Khoja Beraja, Tal & Dist. Jamnagar were acquired for the purpose of construction of Padana Patiya to Changa Patiya Road Scheme. The Notification under Section 4 sub-section (1) of the said Act was issued in the official Gazette on 21.05.2008. The Land Acquisition Officer by his order dated 09.09.2008 awarded the compensation at the rate of Rs. 8/- to Rs. 11/- per square meters. 4.2 Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the said Award of compensation, claimants filed application under Section 18 of the said Act for enhancement of compensation before the learned 2nd Additional Senior Civil Judge, Jamnagar, which came to be dismissed vide order dated 30.06.2018. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the said decision, the applicants are before this Court. 5. Learned advocate Mr. Tejas Satta for the applicants has contended that the delay caused in filing the Appeal is not intentional and the applicants have explained the delay sufficiently. Learned advocate for the applicants has relied upon Paras 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 to 12 of the memo of application. The same are reproduced herein-below: “2. The applicant submits that after the pronouncement of judgment, the advocate for the applicant initially did not inform to the applicant about the judgment but the applicant came to meet the advocate of the Reference Court after Diwali in the month of November, 2018 where he informed to the applicant that the matter is decided by the Reference Court. Therefore, the applicant at that time showed his grievance. Therefore, the applicant at that time showed his grievance. The advocate advised him for preferring an appeal before the Hon’ble High Court and also mentioned that he would inform the applicant after inquiring about the same. 3. The applicant submits that, the applicant was waiting for the information by the advocate of the Reference Court but he did not contact the applicant. The applicant went to meet the advocate of the Reference Court after Uttrayan in the month of January, 2019. The advocate told the applicant that due to busy schedule of his, he could not contact the advocate of Hon’ble High Court. So, he asked for a few days time and would promptly inform him back about the same. 4. The applicant submits that, the advocate of the Reference Court contacted the applicant to meet him for further procedure to file an appeal before the Hon’ble High Court in the month of March, 2019. 5. The applicant submits that, the applicant went to meet the advocate of the Reference Court in the month of May, 2019. There, the advocate informed him the procedure and gave him the name and address of advocate of the Hon’ble High Court. 6. The applicant submits that, the applicant was sick for some time and so could meet the advocate of the Hon’ble High Court in the month of August, 2019. But at that time the advocate of the High Court was not available, so the applicant could not meet the advocate. 7. The applicant submits that, due to monsoon season the appellant was engaged in cultivation activities therefore again the applicant could meet the advocate of the Hon’ble High Court in the month of November, 2019. But the applicant did not have all the important and relevant documents. So the advocate of the Hon’ble High Court asked him to collect the papers from the advocate of the Reference Court and meet him again. 8. The applicant submits that, he went to collect the remaining relevant papers from the advocate of the Reference Court in the month of December, 2019 for collecting the relevant papers but at that time as his clerk was not available, the advocate of the Reference Court asked the applicant to come later. 9. 8. The applicant submits that, he went to collect the remaining relevant papers from the advocate of the Reference Court in the month of December, 2019 for collecting the relevant papers but at that time as his clerk was not available, the advocate of the Reference Court asked the applicant to come later. 9. The applicant humbly submits that, the applicant could not go to meet the advocate of the reference court as he was busy for some time with one social activity so the applicant again came to meet the advocate of the Reference Court in the month of February, 2020 for collecting the relevant papers. At that time the applicant received the relevant papers from the advocate of the Reference Court. 10. The applicant submits that, he went to meet the advocate of the Hon’ble High court in the month of March 2020 and he submitted the papers of the matter to the advocate of the High Court for further process. He was informed by the advocate of the High Court to collect the certified copies of the Judgment and award passed by the Hon’ble Land Reference Court. 11. The applicant submits that, the applicant approached the advocate of the reference court in the month of June 2020 pursuant to the advice of the advocate of High Court. The advocate of Reference told the applicant that he will be supply the certified copy of the Judgment and Award to the advocate of the High Court. 12. The applicant submits that, the applicant came to inquire about the status of his First Appeal recently. At that time, the advocate told the applicant that since he had no direct contact with the applicant, the matter is not filed because of the non-payment of Court fee and expenses. The applicant submits that, he was under the impression that the court fee is not initially required to be paid in the compensation matter and also the certified copy was not supplied by the advocate of the reference court to the advocate of the High Court.” 6. The applicant submits that, he was under the impression that the court fee is not initially required to be paid in the compensation matter and also the certified copy was not supplied by the advocate of the reference court to the advocate of the High Court.” 6. Learned advocate for the applicants submitted that the applicants came to know about the order being passed by the learned Reference Court in the month of November, 2018 and thereafter the applicants from time to time contacted the learned Advocate, who appeared in the Reference Cases till June, 2020 and recently when the applicants tried to inquire about the status of the First Appeals, learned Advocate told the applicants that in absence of any direct contact with the applicants, the matters are not filed because of non-payment of Court fees and expenses. 7. Learned advocate for the applicants has relied upon the following decisions: (i) Ningappa Thotappa Angadi (Dead) through Legal Representatives vs. Special Land Acquisition Officer and Another, (2020) 19 SCC 599 (ii) Huchanagouda vs. Assistant Commissioner and Land Acquisition Officer and Another, (2020) 19 SCC 236 (iii) K. Subbarayudu vs. Special Deputy Collector (Land Acquisition), 2017 (0) AIJEL-SC 60761 (iv) Jagmalbhai Lakhamanbhai vs. State of Gujarat in Civil Application No. 2359 of 2022 and allied matters on 30.09.2022 8. By relying upon the decision of K. Subbaryudu (supra), learned advocate for the applicants has submitted that the delay may be condoned subject to waiver of the interest for the delayed period. It is further submitted that the application for condonation of delay is required to be considered liberally and to achieve the purpose of substantial justice, delay may be condoned. It is further submitted that there is no fault of the applicants in not filing the Appeal within the stipulated period of limitation. It is further submitted that the applicants have acted vigilantly and there is no ill-intention on the part of the applicants. The applicants being poor agriculturists. Since they have lost their land, a liberal approach may be adopted in condoning the delay. 9. Per contra, learned advocate Ms. Sejal Mandavia for respondent No. 2, vehemently objected and submitted that the explanations given in the applications, are not sufficient and the same are very vague and general. 9.1 Learned advocate for respondent No. 2 has placed reliance upon the averments made in the Affidavit-in-reply. 9. Per contra, learned advocate Ms. Sejal Mandavia for respondent No. 2, vehemently objected and submitted that the explanations given in the applications, are not sufficient and the same are very vague and general. 9.1 Learned advocate for respondent No. 2 has placed reliance upon the averments made in the Affidavit-in-reply. It is submitted that the judgment and award of the learned Reference Court is of 30th June, 2018 and on the even date, the award was drawn. The applicants admitted in the application that they came to know about the impugned judgment and award in the month of November, 2018. It is also submitted that the applicants have explained the cause for not filing the appeal from the year 2019 till June, 2020 but after June, 2020 till filing of the appeal, there is no explanation for not filing the Appeal. 9.2 Learned advocate for respondent No. 2 has relied upon the following decisions: (i) Office of the Chief Post Master General and Others vs. Living Media India Ltd. and Another, AIR 2012 SC 1506 (ii) Pathpati Subba Reddy (Died) by LRs. and Others vs. The Special Deputy Collector (LA) (iii) Lingeswaran vs. Thirunagalingam, 2022 Live Law (SC) 227 10. It is also contended by the learned Assistant Government Pleader Mr. Thakkar for respondent No. 1 that the cause which is mentioned in the application is not sufficient to exercise the discretionary power vested in the Court. It is further submitted that in the applications for condonation of delay, after June 2020, there is no explanation as to why the Appeal could not be filed. 11. This Court has considered the averments made in the applications and submissions canvassed by the learned advocate for the parties. The Notification under Section 4 of the Act was issued and published in the official Gazette on 21.05.2008 for the lands situated at village Khoja Barajia Tal: & District Jamnagar, which were acquired for the purpose of construction of Padana Patiya to Changa Patiya Road Scheme. The Special Land Acquisition Officer vide order dated 09.09.2008 awarded the compensation to the original claimant/s at the rate of Rs. 8/- to Rs. 11/- per sq. meters. The said award came to be challenged by the original claimants by filing application under Section 18 of the Act for determining the just and adequate amount of compensation. The Special Land Acquisition Officer vide order dated 09.09.2008 awarded the compensation to the original claimant/s at the rate of Rs. 8/- to Rs. 11/- per sq. meters. The said award came to be challenged by the original claimants by filing application under Section 18 of the Act for determining the just and adequate amount of compensation. The decision of the learned Reference Court came on 30.06.2018, whereby the Reference Application came to be dismissed without interfering in the Award. 12. On perusal of the application, it is not the case of the applicants that, they were not aware about the impugned judgment and award dated 30.06.2018. As a matter of fact, the applicants have stated in the application that, in the month of November, 2018 after Diwali period, the applicants came to know about the impugned judgment and award through their Advocates, who appeared before the Reference Court. It is also an averment in the application that the applicants were also advised to prefer an Appeal before the High Court. It further transpires from the application that the applicants thereafter on random occasions contacted the concerned learned Advocate; however, for different reasons which are mentioned in Paras 2 to 12 of the applications, the appeal could not be filed. 13. It is pertinent to observe that the Certified Copy of the impugned judgment and award was applied on 15.11.2021 and Certified copy was ready for delivery on 02.12.2021. However, the applicants obtained the Certified Copy on 18th December, 2021. It is an undisputed fact which has surfaced on record that, on 18.12.2021, the applicants were having Certified Copy of the impugned judgment and award. There is no worth name explanation explaining as to why after receiving the Certified Copy of the impugned judgment and award, the applicants did not prefer any appeal. One of the reason, which is mentioned in Para 12 of the application that, upon inquiry about the status of the First Appeal, the applicants found that for want of Court Fees and expenses, the appeal was not filed by the learned Advocate. One of the reason, which is mentioned in Para 12 of the application that, upon inquiry about the status of the First Appeal, the applicants found that for want of Court Fees and expenses, the appeal was not filed by the learned Advocate. But as per the say of the applicants in para-11 of the application that in the month of June 2020, the applicants approached the learned advocate of the learned Reference Court and the concerned Advocate, who told the applicants that he will supply the Certified Copy of the impugned judgment and award to the concerned learned Advocate of the High Court. The conduct which has surfaced on the record is that after June 2020, the applicants remained absolutely inactive and negligent in inquiring whether any appeal has been preferred or not against the impugned judgment and award. As a matter of fact, as observed earlier, the Certified Copy of the impugned judgment and award was applied on 15.11.2021 and the Certified Copies were delivered on 18.12.2021. Hence, the story which has been tried to canvass before this Court that in the month of June 2020, learned advocate, who appeared in the Reference Court assured the appellants to supply the Certified Copy of the judgment and award to the learned advocate of the High Court falls flat. By considering the averments made in the applications an illusion has been tried to create that the applicants remained vigilant in approaching the learned advocate, who appeared before the learned Reference Court. In my view, no sufficient cause has been either pleaded or shown by the applicants whereby this Court can exercise the discretionary powers for condoning the delay. The averments made in the applications for condonation of delay are very vague. More particularly, the applicants remained silent from 20.06.2020 till 08.11.2023 i.e. the date on which the applications for condonation of delay were presented. For availing the benefit of discretionary reliefs, the applicants must come with clean hands and must explain the delay in detailed rather than pleading vague and casual averments. 14. In my view, the decisions relied upon by the learned advocate for the applicants are not applicable in the facts of the present case. 15. In the case of Office of Chief Postmaster (supra), in Para 12, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed as under: “12. 14. In my view, the decisions relied upon by the learned advocate for the applicants are not applicable in the facts of the present case. 15. In the case of Office of Chief Postmaster (supra), in Para 12, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed as under: “12. It is not in dispute that the persons concerned were well aware or conversant with the issues involved including the prescribed period of limitation for taking up the matter by way of filing a special leave petition in this Court. They cannot claim that they have a separate period of limitation when the Department was possessed with competent persons familiar with court proceedings. In the absence of plausible and acceptable explanation, we are posing a question why the delay is to be condoned mechanically merely because the Government or a wing of the Government is a party before us. Though we are conscious of the fact that in a matter of condonation of delay when there was no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bona-fide, a liberal concession has to be adopted to advance substantial justice, we are of the view that in the facts and circumstances, the Department cannot take advantage of various earlier decisions. The claim on account of impersonal machinery and inherited bureaucratic methodology of making several notes cannot be accepted in view of the modern technologies being used and available. The law of limitation undoubtedly binds everybody including the Government.” 15. In the case of Subba Reddy (supra), in Paras 12, 13, 14, 15, 16 and 26, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed as under: “12. In view of the above provision, the appeal which is preferred after the expiry of the limitation is liable to be dismissed. The use of the word ‘shall’ in the aforesaid provision connotes that the dismissal is mandatory subject to the exceptions. Section 3 of the Act is peremptory and had to be given effect to even though no objection regarding limitation is taken by the other side or referred to in the pleadings. In other words, it casts an obligation upon the court to dismiss an appeal which is presented beyond limitation. This is the general law of limitation. Section 3 of the Act is peremptory and had to be given effect to even though no objection regarding limitation is taken by the other side or referred to in the pleadings. In other words, it casts an obligation upon the court to dismiss an appeal which is presented beyond limitation. This is the general law of limitation. The exceptions are carved out under Sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) of the Limitation Act but we are concerned only with the exception contained in Section 5 which empowers the courts to admit an appeal even if it is preferred after the prescribed period provided the proposed appellant gives ‘sufficient cause’ for not preferring the appeal within the period prescribed. In other words, the courts are conferred with discretionary powers to admit an appeal even after the expiry of the prescribed period provided the proposed appellant is able to establish ‘sufficient cause’ for not filing it within time. The said power to condone the delay or to admit the appeal preferred after the expiry of time is discretionary in nature and may not be exercised even if sufficient cause is shown based upon host of other factors such as negligence, failure to exercise due diligence etc. 13. It is very elementary and well understood that courts should not adopt an injustice-oriented approach in dealing with the applications for condonation of the delay in filing appeals and rather follow a pragmatic line to advance substantial justice. 14. It may also be important to point out that though on one hand, Section 5 of the Limitation Act is to be construed liberally, but on the other hand, Section 3 of the Limitation Act, being a substantive law of mandatory nature has to be interpreted in a strict sense. In Bhag Mal alias Ram Bux and Others vs. Munshi (Dead) by LRs. and Others, (2007) 11 SCC 285 it has been observed that different provisions of Limitation Act may require different construction, as for example, the court exercises its power in a given case liberally in condoning the delay in filing the appeal under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, however, the same may not be true while construing Section 3 of the Limitation Act. It, therefore, follows that though liberal interpretation has to be given in construing Section 5 of the Limitation Act but not in applying Section 3 of the Limitation Act, which has to be construed strictly. 15. It is in the light of the public policy upon which law of limitation is based, the object behind the law of limitation and the mandatory and the directory nature of Section 3 and Section 5 of the Limitation Act that we have to examine and strike a balance between Section 3 and Section 5 of the Limitation Act in the matters of condoning the delay. 16. Generally, the courts have adopted a very liberal approach in construing the phrase ‘sufficient cause’ used in Section 5 of the Limitation Act in order to condone the delay to enable the courts to do substantial justice and to apply law in a meaningful manner which sub-serves the ends of justice. In Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag and Others vs. Katiji and Others, (1987) 2 SCC 107 : AIR 1987 SC 1353 this Court in advocating the liberal approach in condoning the delay for ‘sufficient cause’ held that ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late; it is not necessary to explain every day’s delay in filing the appeal; and since sometimes refusal to condone delay may result in throwing out a meritorious matter, it is necessary in the interest of justice that cause of substantial justice should be allowed to prevail upon technical considerations and if the delay is not deliberate, it ought to be condoned. Notwithstanding the above, howsoever, liberal approach is adopted in condoning the delay, existence of ‘sufficient cause’ for not filing the appeal in time, is a condition precedent for exercising the discretionary power to condone the delay. The phrases ‘liberal approach’ or ‘justice oriented approach’ and cause for the advancement of ‘substantial justice’ cannot be employed to defeat the law of limitation so as to allow stale matters or as a matter of fact dead matters to be revived and re-opened by taking aid of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. 26. The phrases ‘liberal approach’ or ‘justice oriented approach’ and cause for the advancement of ‘substantial justice’ cannot be employed to defeat the law of limitation so as to allow stale matters or as a matter of fact dead matters to be revived and re-opened by taking aid of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. 26. On a harmonious consideration of the provisions of the law, as aforesaid, and the law laid down by this Court, it is evident that: (i) Law of limitation is based upon public policy that there should be an end to litigation by forfeiting the right to remedy rather than the right itself. (ii) A right or the remedy that has not been exercised or availed of for a long time must come to an end or cease to exist after a fixed period of time. (iii) The provisions of the Limitation Act have to be construed differently, such as Section 3 has to be construed in a strict sense whereas Section 5 has to be construed liberally. (iv) In order to advance substantial justice, though liberal approach, justice-oriented approach or cause of substantial justice may be kept in mind but the same cannot be used to defeat the substantial law of limitation contained in Section 3 of the Limitation Act. (v) Courts are empowered to exercise discretion to condone the delay if sufficient cause had been explained, but that exercise of power is discretionary in nature and may not be exercised even if sufficient cause is established for various factors such as, where there is inordinate delay, negligence and want of due diligence. (vi) Merely some persons obtained relief in similar matter, it does not mean that others are also entitled to the same benefit if the court is not satisfied with the cause shown for the delay in filing the appeal. (vii) Merits of the case are not required to be considered in condoning the delay. (viii) Delay condonation application has to be decided on the parameters laid down for condoning the delay and condoning the delay for the reason that the conditions have been imposed, tantamounts to disregarding the statutory provision.” 16. In the case of Lingeswaran (supra), in Paras 5 and 5.1, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed as under: “5. We are in complete agreement with the view taken by the High Court. In the case of Lingeswaran (supra), in Paras 5 and 5.1, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed as under: “5. We are in complete agreement with the view taken by the High Court. Once it was found even by the learned trial Court that delay has not been properly explained and even there are no merits in the application for condonation of delay, thereafter, the matter should rest there and the condonation of delay application was required to be dismissed. The approach adopted by the learned trial Court that, even after finding that, in absence of any material evidence it cannot be said that the delay has been explained and that there are no merits in the application, still to condone the delay would be giving a premium to a person who fails to explain the delay and who is guilty of delay and laches. At this stage, the decision of this Court in the case of Popat Bahiru Goverdhane vs. Land Acquisition Officer, (2013) 10 SCC 765 is required to be referred to. In the said decision, it is observed and held that the law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes. The Court has no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. The statutory provision may cause hardship or inconvenience to a particular party but the Court has no choice but to enforce it giving full effect to the same. 5.1 In the case of Maniben Devraj Shah vs. Municipal Corporation of Brihan Mumbai, (2012) 5 SCC 157 , in paragraph 14, it is observed and held as under: “The law of limitation is founded on public policy. The limitation Act, 1963 has not been enacted with the object of destroying the rights of the parties but to ensure that they approach the court for vindication of their rights without unreasonable delay. The idea underlying the concept of limitation is that every remedy should remain alive only till the expiry of the period fixed by the legislature. At the same time, the courts are empowered to condone the delay provided that sufficient cause is shown by the applicant for not availing the remedy within the prescribed period of limitation.” 17. The idea underlying the concept of limitation is that every remedy should remain alive only till the expiry of the period fixed by the legislature. At the same time, the courts are empowered to condone the delay provided that sufficient cause is shown by the applicant for not availing the remedy within the prescribed period of limitation.” 17. In view of the aforesaid decisions and in the facts and circumstances of the case involved in the present case, I am of the view that the applicants remained negligent and have not remained vigilant in challenging the decision of the learned Reference Court and in absence of sufficient cause being shown, the captioned Civil Applications lacks merit. Resultantly, the same is rejected. No order as to costs.