JUDGMENT : HARISANKAR V. MENON, J. These connected writ petitions are filed by a claimant under Rule 51A of Chapter XIV-A of the Kerala Education Rules, 1959 (‘KER’ for short) and the Manager of the School in which the claimant was originally working. (For convenience, the parties and Exhibits are referred to, as described in W.P.(C) No.20700of2019) 2. The petitioner had joined the service in the 5th respondent School as an HSA (Natural Science) as per Ext.P1. In the year 2007, the petitioner had to be retrenched from service on account of a division fall and therefore, she became entitled for the benefits under Rule 51A, Note-2, Chapter XIVA of KER. Thereafter, she is working as Cluster Coordinator, by virtue of certain packages formed by the Government. 3. During the year 2012, in the month of July, there arose a vacancy in the 5th respondent School in the cadre of UPSA. Against the said vacancy, the 7th respondent stood appointed from the open market. Thereupon, the said appointment had to be approved by the District Educational Officer -the 4th respondent. When the said application for approval reached the 4th respondent, by Ext.P3, the 4th respondent rejected the said approval, finding that the petitioner was entitled for appointment as a UPSA by virtue of her claim under Rule 51A, Note-2 of Chapter XIV-A of KER. The said proceedings at Ext.P3 was appealed by the Manager/5th respondent before the 3rd respondent. Ext.P4 is the resultant order issued by the 3rd respondent, by which the appeal stood rejected. 4. As against the said order at Ext.P4, the petitioner submitted an application to the Government for appropriate orders with regard to the appointment of the petitioner. The Government issued Ext.P5 order, finding that the petitioner required to be appointed insofar as the relinquishment letter, pointed out by the Manager, could not be acted upon by virtue of Note-2 of Rule 51A of Chapter XIV-A of KER. 5. The proceedings at Ext.P5 was challenged by the 5th respondent before this court by filing W.P.(C) No.20586 of 2016. The said writ petition was considered along with two other writ petitions filed by the 7th respondent and the petitioner and by Ext.P6 judgment, this Court found that insofar as the 7th respondent was not heard before the impugned order was issued, the same requires to be set aside. The said writ petition was considered along with two other writ petitions filed by the 7th respondent and the petitioner and by Ext.P6 judgment, this Court found that insofar as the 7th respondent was not heard before the impugned order was issued, the same requires to be set aside. Therefore, the impugned order was set aside and the Government directed to consider the revision filed by the petitioner afresh after hearing the Manager as well as the 7th respondent. 6. Later the issue was reconsidered at the hands of the Government by Ext.P7. By an order dated 07.06.2019, the Government again found that the petitioner is entitled for the benefits under Rule 51A, Note-2 referred above. 7. Finding thus, the stand taken by the Manager as well as the 7th respondent was rejected. Against the said proceedings, it is pointed out that the 7th respondent filed a review application before the Government, in which the Government issued Ext.P8 order. In the said order, the Government found that the petitioner herein had opted for the benefits under Rule 30 Chapter XXX of KER and availed the benefit of provident fund closure of her account by relinquishing her claim for continuance as a teacher and therefore, the petitioner is not entitled to the benefits under Rule 51A, Note-2 referred above. It is challenging the proceedings at Ext.P8 that the petitioner-Rule 51A claimant-has filed W.P.(C) No.20700 of 2019. 8. It is also to be noticed that the order at Ext.P7 dated 07.06.2019 has been independently challenged by the Manager by filing W.P.(C) No.23550 of 2019. 9. In W.P.(C) No.20700 of 2019, the 5th respondent filed a counter affidavit, producing Ext.R5(a), a letter by which the petitioner had relinquished her claim for continuance in the 5th respondent School as against any future vacancy that may arise. The manager has also produced Ext.R5(b) application for closure of the GPF account submitted by the petitioner dated 15.02.2010. 10. The first respondent has also filed a counter affidavit essentially supporting the finding in Ext.P8 order. 11. I heard Smt.P.A.Jenzia, learned Counsel for the petitioner, Sri.V.Philip Mathews learned Counsel for the 5th respondent/Manager and Senior Counsel Sri.Kurian George Kannanthanam, representing the 7th respondent herein. 12. Learned Counsel for the petitioner contends as under; (i) The petitioner had not relinquished her claim for continuance as a teacher in the 5th respondent School. 11. I heard Smt.P.A.Jenzia, learned Counsel for the petitioner, Sri.V.Philip Mathews learned Counsel for the 5th respondent/Manager and Senior Counsel Sri.Kurian George Kannanthanam, representing the 7th respondent herein. 12. Learned Counsel for the petitioner contends as under; (i) The petitioner had not relinquished her claim for continuance as a teacher in the 5th respondent School. The application at Ext.R5(a) relied on by the Manager is one obtained forcefully from her. (ii) The petitioner is entitled for the benefits under Rule 51A Note-2 of Chapter XIV-A of KER and the said claim can be relinquished only by following certain procedure, relying on the principles laid down by this Court in Vinayaraj v. State of Kerala [ 2014 (1) KLT 709 ]. (iii) She also points out that Ext.P8 itself was not maintainable insofar as Rule 93 does not visualise a review petition presented against revisional order and it is only as regards an original order, review can be entertained. 13. Sri.V.Philip Mathews, learned Counsel for the 5th respondent points out as under; (i) Ext.R5(a) is filed by the petitioner which clearly proves that the petitioner has relinquished her claim and therefore the benefits under Rule 51A is not available thereafter. (ii) The Counsel also relies on paragraph 4 of Ext.P6 judgment to contend that this Court had set aside the original order and therefore, directed a fresh consideration of the matter, in which event subsequent order issued at Ext.P7 can be reviewed under Rule 93A. (iii) The Counsel also points out that the petitioner herein is even as of now working as the Cluster Coordinator and is also getting salary whereas the 7th respondent is continuing from 2012 onwards without any salary. Therefore, the Counsel contends that the petitioner is not entitled for any relief in this writ petition. 14. Sri.Kurian George Kannanthanam, learned Senior Counsel, representing the 7th respondent points out as under; (i) The 7th respondent was appointed against a vacancy which arose in the year 2012. (ii) The claim of the petitioner for the benefits under Rule 51A is to be considered with reference to July, 2012. (iii) Rule 51A claim can be made only by a ‘teacher’. (iv) Learned Senior Counsel elaborates the said contentions pointing out that the petitioner’s status as a ‘teacher’ has ceased to exist once she opted for the benefits flowing out of Rule 30 Chapter XXX of KER. (iii) Rule 51A claim can be made only by a ‘teacher’. (iv) Learned Senior Counsel elaborates the said contentions pointing out that the petitioner’s status as a ‘teacher’ has ceased to exist once she opted for the benefits flowing out of Rule 30 Chapter XXX of KER. Learned Senior Counsel also points out that the provisions of KER does not define who is a 'teacher’, however the meaning of the said term has to be taken from the other clauses of the provisions. 15. I have considered the rival submissions and the connected records. 16. Two issues arise for consideration in these writ petitions. The first issue is as to whether the petitioner is entitled for the benefits flowing out of Rule 51A, Note-2 of Chapter XIV-A of KER. Rule 51A of Chapter XIV-A of KER reads as under; “51A. Qualified teachers who are relieved as per Rule 49 or 52 or on account of termination of vacancies shall have preference for appointment to future vacancies in the same or higher or lower category of teaching posts, for which he is qualified that may arise if there is no claimant under rule 43 in the lower category in schools under the same Educational Agency or an Educational Agency to which the school may be subsequently transferred provided they have not been appointed in permanent vacancies in schools under any other Educational Agency. Provided that a teacher who was relieved under rule 49 or rule 52 shall not be entitled to preference for appointment under this rule unless such teacher has a minimum continuous service of one academic year as on the date of relief: Provided further that preference shall be given to teachers from Teachers Bank for appointment in vacancies as specified in Rule 7 of Chapter XXI. Note.1xxxx Note 2. Manager should issue an order of appointment to the teacher by Registered post acknowledgment due and give a period of 14 (fourteen) clear days to the teacher to join duty. If the teacher does not join duty in time the Manager should give a further notice to the teacher stating that another person would be appointed instead and that the preferential right under this rule would be forfeited if not exercised within another 7 (seven) clear days. If the teacher does not join duty in time the Manager should give a further notice to the teacher stating that another person would be appointed instead and that the preferential right under this rule would be forfeited if not exercised within another 7 (seven) clear days. If nothing is heard during that time also, the preferential right under the rule will be regarded as forfeited].” Here, a reading of Rule 51A would make it clear that qualified teachers who are relieved as per Rule 49/ 52 or on account of termination of vacancies would be having a preference for appointment as against a future vacancy. However, the provisions under Rule 51A have to be read in full. Rule 51A is essentially in two parts. The first part entitles a qualified teacher to have a claim against future vacancies. In the latter portion, the said claim is qualified by saying that the claim would be lost if they have been appointed in any other vacancies. Therefore the statute itself recognises the fact that once a teacher gets appointed in another school she /he would lose the benefits. At this juncture, reference to Rule 30, Chapter XXX would be relevant. The said Rule reads as under; “30. Final withdrawal or Accumulations in the Fund:-(1) When a subscriber quits the service, the amount standing to his credit in the Fund shall be-come payable to him: Provided that a subscriber who has been dismissed, removed or compulsorily retired from the service and is subsequently reinstated in the service shall, if required to do so by the Government, repay any amount paid to him from the Fund in pursuance of this rule, with interest thereon in the manner provided in the proviso to the rule 31. (2) The amount repaid by a subscriber under the proviso to sub-rule (1) shall be credited to his account in the Fund. (3) A subscriber holding a post in an officiating or temporary capacity may either withdraw the amount on the termination of his post or leave it in the Fund to be withdrawn at the time he finally quits service. Note I. When a subscriber quits service for appointment in Government service his balance in the Fund shall be transferred to the Government Provident Fund with the concurrence of the Account Officer of that Fund. Note 2. Note I. When a subscriber quits service for appointment in Government service his balance in the Fund shall be transferred to the Government Provident Fund with the concurrence of the Account Officer of that Fund. Note 2. When a subscriber to the Kerala Aided School Employees Provident Fund quits Aided School Service for appointment in a Private College, the balance at his credit in the Kerala Aided School Employee's Provident Fund shall be transferred to the Kerala Private College Teacher's Provident Fund.” (underlining supplied) A reading of Rule 30 Chapter XXX shows that when a subscriber to the Fund ‘quits the service’, the subscriber is entitled for the entire amount standing to his credit and she or he can get the entire payment from out of the balance. In the case at hand, Ext.R5(b) application has been presented by the petitioner on 15.02.2010 for claiming the benefits as available to the petitioner under Rule 30, Chapter XXX. Therefore, it can be safely concluded that the petitioner had ‘quit the service’. When the petitioner has quit the service, then the question is whether she is entitled for the benefits under Rule 51A?. 17. In my opinion, a situation where a teacher is quitting the service is also covered by virtue of the latter portion of Rule 51A and therefore, the benefits under Rule 51A cannot be claimed by the claimant after such quitting. What is covered under Note-2 is the forfeiture of the claim for appointment whereas what is covered under Rule 30 to Chapter XXX is the quitting from service. A teacher who has decided to quit the service and has actually quit the service falls out the purview of Rule 51A to Chapter XIVA to the KER. Therefore, I hold that the petitioner is not entitled for the benefits flowing out of Rule 51A as claimed by her. 18. The second issue for consideration is as to whether the 7th respondent could have entertained a review petition against the findings at Ext.P7. 19. Learned Counsel would contend that the review petition under Rule 93 can be presented only when the same is filed against an original order and here, what was being presented by the 7th respondent was against the revisional order and therefore it ought not to have been entertained. 19. Learned Counsel would contend that the review petition under Rule 93 can be presented only when the same is filed against an original order and here, what was being presented by the 7th respondent was against the revisional order and therefore it ought not to have been entertained. However, it is to be noticed that the Manager/the 5th respondent has independently challenged the findings contained in Ext.P7 order by filing W.P.(C) No.23550 of 2019. 20. Consequently, I hold that the consideration of the issue as to whether the petition under Rule 93A could be entertained in the case at hand, is just academic. 21. Therefore, I find that the appointment of the 7th respondent in W.P.(C) No.20700 of 2019 is valid. I hold that the petitioner in W.P.(C) No.20700 of 2019 is not entitled for the claims under Rule 51A. Resultantly , W.P.(C) No.20700 of 2019 is dismissed and W.P.(C) No.23550 of 2019 would stand allowed, setting aside Ext.P9 impugned order. Needless to say that consequential orders as regards the regularization of the appointment of the 7th respondent would be issued by the 4th respondent, as expeditiously as possible, at any rate, within a period of three months from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment.