ORDER : 1. The present Appeal From Order is preferred being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the order dated 05.09.2022 passed by the trial Court below Exh.6/7 in Civil Suit No.3037 of 2015, whereby, the trial Court has granted the application below Exh.6/7 and prayer in terms of para 7(A) of the notice of motion application. 2. It is observed in the order dated 05.09.2022 that the defendants are restrained from assigning or transferring the suit property to his men, servants, agents or any other persons till final disposal of the suit and the same is under challenge by filing the present appeal from order on 11.10.2022, it is relevant to note that though the appeal from order is filed on 11.10.2022, it was actually registered on 07.11.2023. Considering this factual background in mind, the present appeal from order is taken up for hearing. 3. Heard learned advocate Mr. Chirag A. Prajapati for the appellant. 4. On 01.12.2023, the Coordinate Bench of this Court has passed the following order: “Learned advocate Mr. Chirag A. Prajapati for the appellant seeks time for taking appropriate instructions from the appellant. Stand over to 22.01.2024.” 5. On inquiry, learned advocate Mr. Chirag Prajapati has submitted that the said instructions were regarding something else and not for the withdrawal of the appeal from order, therefore, though the earlier order passed by the Coordinate Bench indicates the same, however, the present appeal from order is argued and actually the same is considered on merits. 6. Learned advocate Mr. Prajapati has drawn my attention towards the fact that in the agreement to sell, the term is stipulated within six months plaintiff-respondent herein has to pay the amount of the consideration. At the time of execution of the agreement to sell, the plaintiff has paid Rs.3 lakhs in cash and Rs.1 Lakh by way of cheque. The remaining amount is not paid. Thereafter, within six months, as per the term of agreement to sell, the plaintiff-respondent herein was not able to pay the remaining amount in question and thereafter, notice correspondence has taken place. Learned advocate has drawn my attention towards the notice correspondence and has submitted that from the notice correspondence also, the plaintiff in the suit is not in a position to pay the amount immediately as she has prayed that she has to take loan for further payment. Learned advocate has drawn my attention towards the notice correspondence and has submitted that from the notice correspondence also, the plaintiff in the suit is not in a position to pay the amount immediately as she has prayed that she has to take loan for further payment. He has also drawn my attention towards the findings of the trial Court, whereby, the trial Court has found that the agreement is still in existence. Learned advocate Mr. Prajapati has submitted that the trial Court has wrongly considered this aspect and has committed error in finding that the agreement is still in existence as the period of six months stipulated for the payment is over and therefore, agreement could not be considered in existence and therefore, he has submitted that the trial Court has given erroneous findings. He has further submitted that there is no readiness and willingness shown by the plaintiff as required under the law and therefore, also Court has committed error in granting injunction. 6.1 Learned advocate Mr. Prajapati has further submitted that the appellant-original defendant is an Auto Rickshaw driver and the respondent-original plaintiff, from her conduct cannot be considered that she is ready and willing to perform her obligation. He has relied on the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Shenbagam & Ors. Vs. K.K. Rathinavel rendered in Civil Appeal No.150 of 2022, more particularly, para 36 of that judgment. He has also relied on the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Katta Sujatha Reddy Vs. M/s Siddamsetty Infra Projects Pvt. Ltd. rendered in Civil Appeal No.5822 of 2022, more particularly, the observations made in para 79 of that judgment. He has submitted that in view of this, the order passed by the trial Court is bad in the eye of law and therefore, he prays to exercise jurisdiction of this Court under Order 43 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (C.P.C.) by interfering with the impugned order. 7. I have considered the submissions made at the bar. It transpires that there is notarized agreement to sell executed between the parties on 16.03.2015 for the property in question, whereby, it is stated that the plaintiff has agreed to purchase the property in question i.e. Plot No.33 in Gayatri Park Co-Op. 7. I have considered the submissions made at the bar. It transpires that there is notarized agreement to sell executed between the parties on 16.03.2015 for the property in question, whereby, it is stated that the plaintiff has agreed to purchase the property in question i.e. Plot No.33 in Gayatri Park Co-Op. Housing Society Ltd. and description of the property is also mentioned and whereby, total consideration is fixed for Rs.43,50,000/-, against which Rs.4,00,000/- (Rs.3 lakhs in cash and Rs.1 Lakh by way of cheque) is paid by the plaintiff to the defendant. It is also stipulated that within six months the remaining amount is required to be paid. It is also further stipulated that on payment of such amount and as the plaintiff was required to avail loan, the defendant has to provide necessary documents. Considering all these conditions, it seems that, thereafter, there is sale deed which could not be executed and after entering into notice correspondence, the Civil Suit No.3037 of 2015 is preferred by the plaintiff-respondent herein on 29.12.2015 before the City Civil Court, Ahmedabad, by seeking the prayers made in the suit, whereby, the application for interim injunction is filed vide Exhs.6 and 7. The said suit is pending since 2015 and vide order dated 05.09.2022, the trial Court passed order below Exhs.6 and 7. Learned advocate has tried to contend that after a period of six months, the agreement in question cannot be considered in existence as there is specific condition that the plaintiff has to pay the remaining amount within the stipulated time and therefore, the trial Court has committed error in eye of law. I have considered this contention as well as the judgments relied on by the learned advocate, whereby, the learned advocate has harped that there is no readiness and willingness on the part of the concerned party. 8. At this stage, it is apt to consider the judgment which is cited at the bar in the case of Shenbagam (supra), more particularly, para 36 of that judgment. There is no dispute or quarrel about the ratio laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court, the Court has to consider that time is not of the essence in an agreement for the sale of immovable property. There is no dispute or quarrel about the ratio laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court, the Court has to consider that time is not of the essence in an agreement for the sale of immovable property. In deciding whether to grant the remedy of specific performance, specifically in suits relating to sale of immovable property, the courts must be cognizant of the conduct of the parties, the escalation of the price of the suit property, and whether one party will unfairly benefit from the decree. In the present case, considering the fact that the payment is made by the plaintiff at the relevant point of time and thereafter, looking to the correspondence between the parties, it cannot be said that the plaintiff has no prima facie case. The conduct of the plaintiff who has filed the suit of the agreement to sell which is executed in the year 2015 and suit is also filed in 2015, cannot be considered as unjust or improper conduct. It also transpires that the plaintiff has also paid the huge amount by way of earnest money of Rs.4 Lakhs. The execution of the agreement is not disputed and there is specific condition in the agreement that plaintiff wants to avail the loan, and therefore, if loan is not available, within the stipulated time of six months, the sale deed could not be executed but, thereafter also, the plaintiff has shown readiness and willingness which transpires from the correspondence between the parties who executed the sale deed after availing the loan as required and by getting necessary documents from the defendant. 9. The trial Court has considered the aspect of prima facie case as well as factor of balance of convenience and irreparable loss by considering the facts by giving brief reasons but those reasons are possible and convincing reasons. The conduct of the plaintiff is also not required to be doubted at this stage. One more judgment which is cited by the learned advocate for the appellant in the case of Katta Sujatha Reddy (supra) is also on the same issue, there is no quarrel about the legal proposition. The conduct of the plaintiff is also not required to be doubted at this stage. One more judgment which is cited by the learned advocate for the appellant in the case of Katta Sujatha Reddy (supra) is also on the same issue, there is no quarrel about the legal proposition. Considering the facts of the present case that the suit is pending since 2015, the notice of motion is decided in the year 2022, now thereafter, the present appeal from order is preferred in the year 2022, which came to be registered by the Registry in the year 2023 as the office objections were not removed for almost more than a year or so. Now, it is not appropriate for the appellant-original defendant to contend that by efflux of time due to price escalation, the appellant would suffer, the plaintiff is not at fault as she had immediately filed the suit in the year 2015, the notice of motion decided in the year 2022, thereafter also, the appellant is not vigilant to proceed with the matter though it is filed in the year 2022 and it transpires that on the earlier occasion also, the Coordinate Bench of this Court has not agreed with the submissions made at the bar and therefore, the time was taken by the learned advocate for the appellant to take necessary instructions. In any condition, I am not convinced with the arguments advanced by the learned advocate for the appellant, as the trial Court has not committed any error of law or on the facts of the case. No arbitrariness or capriciousness is found and the discretion is used by giving proper reasons by the concerned Court while deciding the application below Exhs.6/7. 10. It is fruitful to refer to the provisions of Order 39 Rule 1 and 2 as well as Order 43 Rule 1 of the C.P.C., which read as under: “ORDER 39 RULE 1 AND 2: 1. 10. It is fruitful to refer to the provisions of Order 39 Rule 1 and 2 as well as Order 43 Rule 1 of the C.P.C., which read as under: “ORDER 39 RULE 1 AND 2: 1. Cases in which temporary injunction may be granted.— Where in any suit it is proved by affidavit or otherwise— (a) that any property in dispute in a suit is in danger of being wasted, damaged or alienated by any party to the suit, or wrongfully sold in execution of a decree, or (b) that the defendant threatens, or intends, to remove or dispose of his property with a view to [defrauding] his creditors, [(c) that the defendant threatens to dispossess, the plaintiff or otherwise cause injury to the plaintiff in relation to any property in dispute in the suit,] the Court may by order grant a temporary injunction to restrain such act, or make such other order for the purpose of staying and preventing the wasting, damaging, alienation, sale, removal or disposition of the property 1 [or dispossession of the plaintiff, or otherwise causing injury to the plaintiff in relation to any property in dispute in the suit] as the Court thinks fit, until the disposal of the suit or until further orders. 2. Injunction to restrain repetition or continuance of breach. —(1) In any suit for restraining the defendant from committing a breach of contract or other injury of any kind, whether compensation is claimed in the suit or not, the plaintiff may, at any time after the commencement of the suit, and either before or after judgment, apply to the Court for a temporary injunction to restrain the defendant from committing the breach of contract or injury complained of, or any breach of contract or injury of a like kind arising out of the same contract or relating to the same property or right. (2) The Court may by order grant such injunction, on such terms as to the duration of the injunction, keeping an account, giving security, or otherwise, as the Court thinks fit. ORDER 43 RULE 1: 1. (2) The Court may by order grant such injunction, on such terms as to the duration of the injunction, keeping an account, giving security, or otherwise, as the Court thinks fit. ORDER 43 RULE 1: 1. Appeal from orders.- An appeal shall lie from the following orders under the provisions of section 104, namely- (a) an order under rule 10 of Order VII returning a plaint to be presented to the proper Court [except where the procedure specified in rule 10A of Order VII has been followed]; (c) an order under rule 9 of Order IX rejecting an application (in a case open to appeal) for an order to set aside the dismissal of a suit; (d) an order under rule 13 of Order IX rejecting an application (in a case open to appeal) for an order to set aside a decree passed ex-parte. *** (f) an order under rule 21 of Order XI; *** (i) an order under rule 34 of Order XXI on an objection to the draft of a document or of an endorsement; (j) an order under rule 72 or rule 92 of Order XXI setting aside or refusing to set aside a sale; (ja) an order rejecting an application made under sub-rule (1) of rule 106 of Order XXI, provided that an order on the original application, that is to say, the application referred to in sub-rule (1) of rule 105 of that Order is appealable. (k) an order under rule 9 of Order XXII refusing to set aside the abatement or dismissal of a suit; (l) an order under rule 10 of Order XXII giving or refusing to give leave; *** (n) an order under rule 2 of Order XXV rejecting an application (in a case open to appeal) for an order to set aside the dismissal of a suit; (na) an order under rule 5 or rule 7 of Order XXXIII rejecting an application for permission to sue as an indigent persons: (p) orders in interpleader-suits under rule, rule 4 or rule 6 or Order XXXV; (q) an order under rule 2, rule 3 or rule 6 of Order XXXVIII; (r) an order under rule 1, rule 2 [rule 2A], rule 4 or rule 10 of Order XXXIX; (s) an order under rule 1 or rule 4 of Order XL; (t) an order of refusal under rule 19 of Order XLI to re- admit, or under rule 21 of Order XLI to re-hear, an appeal; (u) an order rule 23 [or rule 23A] of Order XLI remanding a case, where an appeal would lie from the decree of the Appellate Court; (w) an order under rule 4 of Order XLVII granting an application for review.” 11. It is apt to refer to the ratio laid down in the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court rendered in the case of Wander Ltd. v. Antox India (P) Ltd., reported in 1990 Supp SCC 727, more particularly, para 14, which reads as under: “14. The appeals before the Division Bench were against the exercise of discretion by the Single Judge. In such appeals, the appellate court will not interfere with the exercise of discretion of the court of first instance and substitute its own discretion except where the discretion has been shown to have been exercised arbitrarily, or capriciously or perversely or where the court had ignored the settled principles of law regulating grant or refusal of interlocutory injunctions. An appeal against exercise of discretion is said to be an appeal on principle. Appellate court will not reassess the material and seek to reach a conclusion different from the one reached by the court below if the one reached by that court was reasonably possible on the material. An appeal against exercise of discretion is said to be an appeal on principle. Appellate court will not reassess the material and seek to reach a conclusion different from the one reached by the court below if the one reached by that court was reasonably possible on the material. The appellate court would normally not be justified in interfering with the exercise of discretion under appeal solely on the ground that if it had considered the matter at the trial stage it would have come to a contrary conclusion. If the discretion has been exercised by the trial court reasonably and in a judicial manner the fact that the appellate court would have taken a different view may not justify interference with the trial court's exercise of discretion. After referring to these principles Gajendragadkar, J. In Printers (Mysore) Private Ltd. v. Pothan Joseph [ (1960) 3 SCR 713 : AIR 1960 SC 1156 ] : (SCR 721) “... These principles are well established, but as has been observed by Viscount Simon in Charles Osenton & Co. vs. Jhanaton [1942 AC 130] ‘...the law as to the reversal by a court of appeal of an order made by a judge below in the exercise of his discretion is well established, and any difficulty that arises is due only to the application of well settled principles in an individual case’.” The appellate judgment does not seem to defer to this principle.” 12. In light of the aforesaid aspects, the view taken by the trial Court is possible view and therefore, no interference is called to exercise powers of this Court and therefore, the present Appeal From Order is required to be dismissed. 13. Accordingly, the present Appeal From Order is dismissed. 14. In view of the dismissal of the main matter, connected civil application does not survive and the same stands disposed of accordingly.