JUDGMENT : Ananya Bandyopadhyay, J. 1. The instant revisional application is filed by the petitioner praying for quashing of the proceedings being C.R. Case No. 374/2006 under Section 7(ii)/16(1)(a)(i) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954, pending before the Court of the Learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Siliguri and all orders passed therein by the Learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Siliguri. 2. On the basis of a complaint lodged by the opposite party no.2 C.R. Case No. 374/2006 was registered before the Court of the Learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Siliguri, therein alleging commission of offences by the petitioner and one Biplab Saha punishable under Sections 7(ii)16(1)(a)(i) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954. 3. The allegations made in the said complaint in brief are to the effect that- a. On the 05.08.2006 at about 11 a.m., the Food Inspector went out for inspection at 1 No. Dabgram Colony, Siliguri and inspected the premises of M/S. Biplab Agency and seized three sealed bottles of sweetened carbonated water Pepsi having identical label declarations each of 600 ml for the purpose of analysis. b. The Food Inspector packed, fastened and sealed each of the three bottles and pasted a paper slip bearing the Code No. and Serial No. of the Local (Health) Authority: D-SGL, 825 duly signed by the L (H) A, Siliguri. c. One part of the said sample with a memorandum in Form VII was sent to the Public Analyst (F&W), W.B. Public Health Laboratory, Kolkata by registered parcel post on 07.08.2006. d. The remaining two parts of counter sample phials were sent along with two copies of Memorandum VII in a sealed packet to the LHA, Siliguri along with a forwarding memo on 07.08.2006 for safe custody. e. The vendor disclosed the name and address of the supplier from whom he purchased the said sweetened carbonated water (Pepsi). As such notice in Form VII was also issued to the supplier Pepsi Co India Holdings Pvt. Ltd., Maxinus Enterprises India(P)., Inshad Warehouse, 2½ mile Checkpost, P.O. Sevoke Road, Dist, Jalpaiguri by regd. Post along with a forwarding letter on 07.08.2006. f. The public analyst declared the sample as misbranded under his report number 177(4) dated 01.09.2006 stating that the label of the sample does not contain the name and complete address of importer in India as required under provision of Rule 32(c) (iii). Post along with a forwarding letter on 07.08.2006. f. The public analyst declared the sample as misbranded under his report number 177(4) dated 01.09.2006 stating that the label of the sample does not contain the name and complete address of importer in India as required under provision of Rule 32(c) (iii). Hence the sample is misbranded under Sub Clause(K) of Clause(IX) of Section 2 of the P.F.A. Act 1954. g. On receipt of the analysis report by the L(H)A, Siliguri the said L(H)A informed the complainant the result of analysis and directed the complainant in writing to prepare all necessary connected papers for launching prosecution in the Ld. Court of Addl. Chief Judicial Magistrate, Siliguri vide his Memo No. 309, dated 18.10.2006. h. The complainant with the consent from local (Health) Authority, Siliguri prepared complaints against:- i. Sri Biplab Saha, S/o Sri Sunil Saha – Vendor & Prop. M/s Biplab Agency, 1 No. Dabgram Colony, P.O. Siliguri, Dist. Darjeeling. ii. M/S Pepsi Co India Holdings(P) Ltd., C/O Maxinus Enterprise India (P) Ltd., Inshad Warehouse, 2½ Mile Checkpost, P.O. Sevoke Road, Dist. Jalpaiguri. 4. The Learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Siliguri was inter alia pleased to take cognizance and issue summons to the petitioner vide order dated 1.11.2006. 5. The Learned Advocate for the petitioner submitted that the entire complaint is misconceived and bereft of any cogent materials to justify the implication of the petitioner in connection with a criminal proceeding. The averments made in the said complaint are vague in nature and do not assign any specific overt act against the petitioner which will be evident from the following facts : a. The petitioner has been arrayed as accused in the instant proceedings without there being even a whisper as to its role and/or involvement in the commission of the alleged offence. b. The petitioner has been arrayed as accused in the instant proceedings merely by mentioning the name of the petitioner as ‘C/O Maxinus Enterprise India (P) Ltd., Inshad Warehouse, 2½ Mile Check post, P.O. Sevoke Road, Dist. Jalpaiguri. Maxinus Enterprise India (P) Ltd., is a separate legal entity altogether and cannot be clubbed and/or enjoined with the petitioner as has been sought to be done in the instant complaint. Jalpaiguri. Maxinus Enterprise India (P) Ltd., is a separate legal entity altogether and cannot be clubbed and/or enjoined with the petitioner as has been sought to be done in the instant complaint. c. In such circumstances, the instant proceedings against the petitioner cannot be sustained since it is arrayed as an accused by mere mention of name against the name and address of some other company. d. Contravention of Rule 32(c)(iii) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules, 1955 has inter alia been alleged in the instant complaint. The said rule reads as follows:- “(iii) where an article of food is imported into India, the package of food shall also carry the name and complete address of the importer in India.” e. The instant complaint has been filed solely on the basis of the opinion of the Public Analyst opining contravention of the abovementioned Rule alleging that the label of the sample does not contain the name and the complete address of the importer in India. f. The Government of the Republic of India and the Royal Government of Bhutan entered into an Agreement on Trade, Commerce and Transit between the two countries on 28th July, 2006 wherein Article 1 of the agreement clearly stated that there should be free trade and commerce between the territories of the Royal Government of Bhutan and the Government of the Republic of India. g. The said agreement inter alia stated as follows : “AGREEMENT ON TRADE, COMMERCE AND TRANSIT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDIA AND THE ROYAL GOVERNMENT OF BHUTAN The Government of the Republic of India and the Royal Government of Bhutan, Conscious of the age-old ties between India and Bhutan and with a desire to strengthen them, Convinced of the benefits which accrue to their people from the free trade and commerce between the two countries, expansion of the bilateral trade and collaboration in economic development. Have, in furtherance of the aforementioned objectives, agreed as follows :- ARTICLE-I There shall, as heretofore, be free trade and commerce between the territories of the Royal Government of Bhutan and the Government of the Republic of India. ARTICLE-II Notwithstanding Article –I, the Royal Government of Bhutan may, henceforth, impose such non-tariff restrictions on the entry into Bhutan of certain goods of Indian origin as may be necessary for the protection of industries in Bhutan. ARTICLE-II Notwithstanding Article –I, the Royal Government of Bhutan may, henceforth, impose such non-tariff restrictions on the entry into Bhutan of certain goods of Indian origin as may be necessary for the protection of industries in Bhutan. Such restrictions, however, will not be stricter than those applied to goods of third country origin. ARTICLE-III Notwithstanding Article-I, the Governments of the two countries may impose such non-tariff restrictions on entry into their respective territories of goods of third country origin as may be necessary. ARTICLE-IV In view of the free movement of goods flowing between the two countries and of the possibility of the flow one to the other of goods of third country origin, the Governments of the two countries shall have annual consultations. ARTICLE-V All exports and imports of Bhutan to and from countries other than India will be free from and not subject to customs duties and trade restrictions of the Government of the Republic of India. The procedure for such exports and imports and the documentation which are detailed in the Protocol to this Agreement, may be modified by mutual agreement from time to time. ARTICLE-VI Notwithstanding the foregoing provisions, either contracting party may maintain or introduce such measures or restrictions as are necessary for the purpose of : i. Protecting public morals. ii. Protecting human, animal and plant life. iii. Implementing laws relating to import and export of gold and silver bullion. iv. Safeguarding national treasures. And v. Safeguarding such other interests as may be mutually agreed upon. ARTICLE-VII Trade between India and Bhutan will continue to be transacted in Indian Rupees and Bhutanese Ngultrums. ARTICLE-VIII Each of the Governments agrees to provide appropriate refund to be mutually decided annually in respect of excise duties on goods of its origin exported to the other. ARTICLE-IX Merchant ships sailing under the flag of Bhutan shall be accorded treatment no less favorable than that accorded to ships of any other foreign country in respect of matters relating to navigation, entry into and departure from the Indian ports, use of ports and harbor facilities in India, as well as loading and unloading dues, taxes and other levies, except that the provisions of this Article shall not extend to coastal trade. ARTICLE-X The two Governments agree to enter into immediate consultations with each other at the request of either side in order to overcome such difficulties as may arise in the implementation of this Agreement satisfactorily and speedily. ARTICLE-XI This Agreement shall come into force with effect from the 29th July 2006 and shall remain in force for a period of ten years. This Agreement may be renewed by mutual consent to such changes and modifications as may be agreed upon between the two countries. IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned, being duly authorized thereto have signed the present Agreement. Done in two originals at New Delhi on the Twenty Eighth Day of July Two Thousand Six in the Hindi, Dzongkha and English languages. In case of conflict the English text shall prevail. FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDIA KAMAL NATH) MINISTER OF COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY FOR THE ROYAL GOVERNMENT OF BHUTAN LYONPO YESHEY ZIMBA) MINISTER FOR TRADE AND INDUSTRY” h. It has been further contended that in terms of the abovementioned agreement, in view of free trade and commerce between the two countries, any product manufactured in Bhutan when sold and/or supplied to India, cannot be termed and/or considered as an imported product in view of the fact that no Customs formalities are required to be followed for movement of the same from Bhutan to India and no Customs Duty is payable on the same either. i. The instant complaint against the petitioner is not maintainable since there has been no import of the sampled product and as such the name and address of importer was not required to be given upon the label of the sampled product in terms of Rule 32(c)(iii) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules,1955. j. Rule 32 (c)(iii) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules, 1955 has no manner of application in the instant case and as such there cannot be said to be commission of any offence by the petitioner due to the label of the sample not bearing the name and complete address of the importer in India. j. Rule 32 (c)(iii) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules, 1955 has no manner of application in the instant case and as such there cannot be said to be commission of any offence by the petitioner due to the label of the sample not bearing the name and complete address of the importer in India. k. It is pertinent to note that the present prosecution merely rests upon the opinion as formed by the Public Analyst which, essentially, is a subjective opinion formed by the Public Analyst to the effect that – “The label of the sample does not contain the name and complete address of importer in India as require under the provision of Rule 32(c)(iii). Hence the sample is misbranded under sub clauses (k) of clause (ix) of Section 2 of the P.F.A. Act, 1954.” l. Such opinion as formed by the Public Analyst is in complete disregard and/or being totally unaware of the existence of the aforesaid Agreement for free trade between the two countries and as such is erroneous. m. In such circumstances, the prosecution launched by the Food Inspector in the present case relying on an erroneous opinion of the Public Analyst is liable to quashed. It appears prima facie that Maxinus Enterprises Private Ltd. is a separate juristic entity and the said company has not been arraigned as an accused person in the complaint filed by the opposite party No. 2. Without any implication of Maxinus Enterprises Private Ltd. no role can be attributed to the petitioner company. 6. From the nature of the allegations and/or averments in the complaint prima facie the following legal infirmities appear which makes the complaint itself illegal as against the petitioner for the following reasons- a. The petitioner has been implicated indirectly under the “C/o. Maxinus Enterprises Private Ltd.” which is completely impermissible for attracting penal liability of an individual or an entity. It would further appear that not a single line has been attributed to the petitioner that it has committed any illegality in its individual capacity or has otherwise facilitated the commission of the alleged offence. b. Apart from mere mentioning of the name of the petitioner in the cause title to the complaint filed by the opposite party No.2 the entire set of allegations or factual matrix pertains to Maxinus Enterprises Private Ltd. which admittedly is a separate juristic entity. b. Apart from mere mentioning of the name of the petitioner in the cause title to the complaint filed by the opposite party No.2 the entire set of allegations or factual matrix pertains to Maxinus Enterprises Private Ltd. which admittedly is a separate juristic entity. For any act or omission on the part of the Maxinus Enterprises Private Ltd. the petitioner company cannot be imposed with any penal liability unless and until there is a specific averment regarding prior conspiracy or abetment or facilitation of the alleged offence on the part of the petitioner. However, such allegation also is absent in the complaint filed by the Opposite party No.2. c. The complaint has been filed for purported contravention of Rule 32(e)(iii) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules, 1955 which envisages as follows :- 3(c)(iii) Where an article of food is imported into India, the package of food shall also carry the name and complete address of the importer in India. PROVIDED that where any food article manufactured outside India is packed or bottled in India, the package containing the such food article shall also bear on the label, the name of the country of origin of the food article and the name and complete address of the importer and the premises of the packing or bottling in India. The purported contravention of this rule has been pointed out in the report of the Public Analyst dated 30th August, 2006 based on the claim that a bottle of carbonate Beverage which contained a label of “Pepsi” and depicted as “manufactured by Drangchu Beverage Phuentshiling, Bhutan” is lacking of claim and complete address of the importer in India as required under Rule 32(c)(iii) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rule, 1955. Therefore, the Public Analyst claimed the said Carbonate Beverage Bottles to be misprinted. However, in the light of the unimpeachable and overriding effect of the agreement on trade commerce and transit between the Government of India and the Royal Government of Bhutan dated 28th July, 2006 it is now established beyond all doubt that there would be no customs duty or any duty on supply of trade materials between India and Bhutan. However, in the light of the unimpeachable and overriding effect of the agreement on trade commerce and transit between the Government of India and the Royal Government of Bhutan dated 28th July, 2006 it is now established beyond all doubt that there would be no customs duty or any duty on supply of trade materials between India and Bhutan. It would further be clear from a perusal of the said agreement which is a public document of unimpeachable character that until and unless this agreement is modified by consent of both the countries the free trade between India and Bhutan shall continue till this date such agreement is in force. d. In the light of existence of such agreement of free trade the terms “export” and “import” as is understood in its normal parlance in respect of its dictionary meaning as well as the purport or legal meaning given to such terms in relevant statutory provisions would not apply in respect of supply of materials from Bhutan as there is a free trade agreement with it. There will be no legal distinction between supply of materials within India from one State to another and supply of materials from Bhutan to any State in India. e. Therefore, the question of non-disclosure of the name and complete address of the importer as required under Rule 32(c)(iii) of the Rule of 1955 would not attract any penal liability as there is no such law. Even if for the sake of argument the question of disclosure of the name of the importer is considered the liability if any is attracted against the Maxinus Enterprises Private Ltd. and such importer acting under its licence and not the petitioner as there can be no question of vicarious penal liability against the petitioner for any acts and omission of a third party. f. The report of the public analyst in disregard of the free trade agreement referred to above is therefore erroneous in nature and since public analyst report was the basis of the prosecution launched in the instant case against the petitioner the same is liable to be quashed. 7. The opinion of the Public Analyst is misconstrued on the very face of it. The sampled product is ‘carbonated water’ which was as such exempted from labeling requirements under Rule 32 at the relevant time. 7. The opinion of the Public Analyst is misconstrued on the very face of it. The sampled product is ‘carbonated water’ which was as such exempted from labeling requirements under Rule 32 at the relevant time. The relevant portion of Rule 32, as it stood at the relevant time, reads as under : “32 Package of food to carry a label – Every package of food shall carry a label and unless otherwise provided in these rules, there shall be specified on every label- (a) the name, trade name or description of food contained in the package; (b) the names of ingredients used in the product in descending order of their of their composition by weight or volume as the case may be : ..... ....... ...... .... ..... ....... ...... .... Provided also that the provisions of these rules shall not apply in respect of mineral water or packaged drinking water or carbonated water or liquid and powdered milk. .... .... .... .... .... .... .... .... The said product being carbonated sweetened water ‘Lehar Pepsi’ is covered under the definition of ‘carbonated water’ provided as item A.01.01 in Appendix B of the Rules. The relevant part of the definition is as follows : “Carbonated Water means potable water impregnated with carbon dioxide under pressure and may contain any of the following singly or in combination : Sugar, liquid glucose, dextrose monohydrate,.....” It is therefore submitted that in view of the abovementioned Proviso and the definition of ‘carbonated water’ provided as Item A.01.01 in Appendix B of the Rules, there cannot be any violation of Rule 32 since the sampled product, i.e., Lehar Pepsi, is ‘Carbonated Water’ and at the relevant time the proviso to Rule 32 clearly stated that the provisions of these rules shall not apply to ‘carbonated water’. Thus, in the present case, there cannot be any violation of Rule 32 since the product being ‘Carbonated Water’ on the date of sampling, i.e. 05.08.2006 was exempted from application of labeling requirements under Rule 32 until omitted by G.S.R. No. 491(E) dated 21st August, 2006 w.e.f. 20.8.2007. 8. Thus, in the present case, there cannot be any violation of Rule 32 since the product being ‘Carbonated Water’ on the date of sampling, i.e. 05.08.2006 was exempted from application of labeling requirements under Rule 32 until omitted by G.S.R. No. 491(E) dated 21st August, 2006 w.e.f. 20.8.2007. 8. The petitioner submitted that in this regard that a special statute being Food Safety and Standard Act, 2006 was brought into effect by the Parliament by application of which all other food related laws especially the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1955 has been repealed with effect from 24th August, 2006 and in the instant case the complaint on the basis of which cognizance was taken by the Learned Court below was filed on 1st November, 2006 based on a public analyst report prepared on 30th August, 2006 and finally the cognizance was taken by the Learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Siliguri by his order dated 1st November,2006 and process was issued against the petitioner on the self-same day. Therefore in the light of overriding and repealing provision of the Food Safety and Standard Act, 2006 the complaint filed under the provisions of Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1955 and the order of cognizance based on the same are both illegal in nature and therefore liable to be quashed. Food and Standard Act, 2006 lays down both substantive penal provision and self-content exhaustive procedure for initiation, investigation, enquiry, trial, search, seizure etc. in regard to all food and beverages related issues. Therefore, by virtue of such statute the provision of Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1955 stands eclipsed as on this date and the prosecution against the petitioner under the said provision is illegal and amounted to abuse of the process of law. 9. The purported sanction granted in connection with the instant case or prosecution appears to be illegal in as much as there is no exhibit of application of mind by the Assistant Chief Medical Officer of Health, Siliguri. The sanction order does not depict any reason for which the prosecution of the petitioner has been found to have been legitimate by the said public authority. The sanction order does not depict any reason for which the prosecution of the petitioner has been found to have been legitimate by the said public authority. It also transpires that in the sanction order there is no recording of any ground by the Assistant Chief Medical Officer of Health, Siliguri by virtue of which he claims to exercise the jurisdiction vested under Section 20 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954. The ACMO, Siliguri does not depict that he is the authorized officer especially empowered by regulation of the Central Government or the State Government to accord sanction in terms of Section 20 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954. In the light of the same it cannot be said that the sanctioning authority had requisite power to accord such sanction for prosecution. 10. The petitioner submitted that the order issuing process against the petitioner dated 1st November,2006 is otherwise grossly illegal in nature in as much as such process has been issued in gross violation of the mandatory provisions of Section 202 of the Code of Criminal Procedure which makes it mandatory that in respect of any accused which is found to be residing beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the Court issuing of process and enquiry envisaged under Section 202 of the Code of Criminal Procedure be complied with before issuing the process. However, in the instant case such procedure was not complied with which renders the issuance of process illegal in nature and liable to be set aside. 11. Section 2(ix)(k) of the said Act inter alia provides that an article of food shall be deemed to be misbranded if it is not labeled in accordance with the requirements of this Act or rules made there under. In the instant case, since there has been no import of the sampled product in view of the Agreement for free trade between the two countries, Rule 32(c)(iii) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules, 1955 had no manner of application and consequently, the sample cannot be termed to be ‘misbranded’ under sub clauses (k) of clause(ix) of Section 2 of the Act. 12. Section 7(ii) of the said Act inter alia provides that no person shall himself or any person on his behalf manufacture for sale, or store, sell or distribute any misbranded food. 12. Section 7(ii) of the said Act inter alia provides that no person shall himself or any person on his behalf manufacture for sale, or store, sell or distribute any misbranded food. In the instant case, the sample cannot be termed to be ‘misbranded’ under sub clauses (k) of clause(ix) of Section 2 of the Act and therefore Section 7(ii) of the said Act has no manner of application and consequently, the petitioner cannot be said to have committed any violation of Section 7(ii) of the said Act. 13. In the present case, since the sample cannot be termed as ‘misbranded’ under sub clauses (k) of clause (ix) of Section 2 of the Act, no offence under Section 16(1)(a)(i) of the said Act can be said to have been committed by the petitioner and as such the present complaint for commission of an offence under Section 16(1)(a)(i) of the said Act is not maintainable against the petitioner. In the instant case the facts disclosed in the complaint do not make out any contravention of the provisions of Section 7(ii)/16(1)(a)(i) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954. In such circumstances it would only be just and proper to quash the impugned proceedings. 17. The order issuing process against the petitioner dated 1st November,2006 is otherwise grossly illegal in nature in as much as such process has been issued in gross violation of the mandatory provisions of Section 202 of the Code of Criminal Procedure which makes it mandatory that in respect of any accused which is found to be residing beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the Court issuing of process and enquiry envisaged under Section 202 of the Code of Criminal Procedure be complied with before issuing the process. However, in the instant case such procedure was not complied with which renders the issuance of process illegal in nature and liable to be set aside. 18. The instant complaint against the petitioner is not maintainable since there has been no import of the sampled product and as such the name and address of importer was not required to be given upon the label of the sampled product in terms of Rule 32(c)(iii) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules, 1955. 19. 18. The instant complaint against the petitioner is not maintainable since there has been no import of the sampled product and as such the name and address of importer was not required to be given upon the label of the sampled product in terms of Rule 32(c)(iii) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules, 1955. 19. The Rule 32(c)(iii) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules, 1955 has no manner of application in the instant case and as such there cannot be said to be commission of any offence by the petitioner due to the label of the sample not bearing the name and complete address of the importer in India. There cannot be any violation of Rule 32 since the sampled product, i.e., Lehar Pepsi, is ‘Carbonated Water’ and at the relevant time the proviso to Rule 32 clearly stated that the provisions of these rules shall not apply to ‘carbonated water’. Thus, in the present case, there cannot be any violation of Rule 32 since the product being ‘Carbonated Water’ on the date of sampling, i.e., 05.08.2006 was exempted from application of labeling requirements under Rule 32 until omitted by G.S.R. No.491(E) dated 21st August,2006 w.e.f. 20.8.2007. 20. The present prosecution merely rests upon the opinion as formed by the Public Analyst whereas the scheme of the PFA and the Rules framed thereunder do not make it mandatory for the Public Analyst or the Central Food Laboratories (CFL) to give an opinion as part of his report. The report of analysis can be safely divided in two main parts-the result of analysis and the opinion of analyst based on the result. The first part, i.e., the result of analysis is integral to the report and compulsorily required to be stated in the report. The option of giving an opinion based on the results of analysis is left with the analyst. The law makes only the result of analysis legally admissible and binding and not the opinion of the analysts. Thus the very prosecution in the present case has been filed wrongly relying upon the opinion of the PA especially when it is not based upon the result of analysis and the opinion on misbranding is subjective opinion of the Public Analyst. Thus the very prosecution in the present case has been filed wrongly relying upon the opinion of the PA especially when it is not based upon the result of analysis and the opinion on misbranding is subjective opinion of the Public Analyst. The proceedings are initiated and are continuing merely basis the subjective opinion of Public Analyst which is not binding in nature nor is legally admissible, the present proceedings are therefore liable to be quashed. 21. In the instant case, since there has been no import of the sampled product in view of the Agreement for free trade between the two countries, Rule 32(c)(iii) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules, 1955 had no manner of application and consequently, the sample cannot be termed to ‘misbranded’ under sub clauses (k) of clause (ix) of Section 2 of the Act. 22. Since the sample cannot be termed to be ‘misbranded’ under sub clauses (k) of clause (ix) of Section 2 of the Act, section 7(ii) of the said Act has no manner of application and consequently, the petitioner cannot be said to have committed any violation of section 7(ii) of the said Act. 23. Since the sample cannot be termed as ‘misbranded’ under sub clauses(k) of clause (ix) of Section 2 of the Act, no offence under Section16(1)(a)(i) of the said Act can be said to have been committed by the petitioner and as such the charge for commission of an offence under Section 16(1)(a)(i) of the said Act is not maintainable against the petitioner. 24. Summoning of an accused in a criminal case is a serious matter. Criminal Law cannot be set into motion as a matter of course. The order of the Learned Magistrate summoning the accused must reflect that he has applied his mind to the facts of the case and the law applicable thereto. The Learned Magistrate also has to examine the nature of the allegations made in the complaint and the evidence both oral and documentary in support thereof and determine as to whether the same would be sufficient for the complainant to succeed in bringing home the charge of the accused. The Learned Magistrate also has to carefully scrutinize the evidence brought on record and then examine if any offence had been committed by any of the accused. The Learned Magistrate also has to carefully scrutinize the evidence brought on record and then examine if any offence had been committed by any of the accused. In the instant case it is apparent that the allegations made against the opposite party no.2 do not make out any contravention of the provisions as alleged and as such the Learned Magistrate has erroneously held that a prima facie case has been made out against the petitioner regarding commission of offences punishable under Sections 7(ii)/16(1)(a)(i) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954. In such circumstances the order issuing process against the petitioner needs to be set aside as also the proceedings is liable to be quashed. 25. Section 190 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides the requisite conditions for taking of cognizance by the Magistrates. Clause(a) to Section 190(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that a Learned Magistrate may take cognizance of any offence upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitute such offence. It is thus apparent that the complaint must contain such averments, which make out the basic ingredients of the offences. However, “the bundle of facts” as disclosed in the complaint of the proceedings impugned do not make out the basic ingredients of the offences punishable under Sections 7(ii)/16(1)(a)(i) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 and as such the cognizance taken by the Learned Magistrate is erroneous in itself, thereby rendering the proceedings impugned bad in law and liable to be quashed. 26. The petitioner has been arrayed as accused in the instant proceedings without there being even a whisper as to its role and/or involvement in the commission of the alleged offence. 27. The petitioner has been arrayed as accused in the instant proceedings merely by mentioning the name of the petitioner as ‘C/O Maxinus Enterprise India (P) Ltd., Inshad Warehouse, 2½ Mile Check Post, P.O. Sevoke Road, District Jalpaiguri. Maxinus Enterprise India (P) Ltd. is a separate legal entity altogether and cannot be clubbed and/or enjoined with the petitioner as has been sought to be done in the instant complaint. 28. The instant proceedings against the petitioner cannot be sustained since it is arrayed as an accused by mere mention of name against the name and address of some other company. 29. 28. The instant proceedings against the petitioner cannot be sustained since it is arrayed as an accused by mere mention of name against the name and address of some other company. 29. The instant complaint has been filed solely on the basis of the opinion of the Public Analyst opining contravention of Rule 32(c)(iii) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules, 1955 alleging that the label of the sample does not contain the name and the complete address of the importer in India. 30. The Government of the Republic of India and the Royal Government of Bhutan entered into an Agreement on Trade, Commerce and Transit between the two countries on 28th July, 2006 wherein Article I of the agreement clearly states that there shall be free trade and commerce between the territories of the Royal Government of Bhutan and the Government of the Republic of India. 31. The said agreement also clearly states that the Government of the Republic of India and the Royal Government of Bhutan, conscious of the age old ties between India and Bhutan and with a desire to strengthen them, convinced of the benefits which accrue to their people from the free trade and commerce between the two countries, expansion of the bilateral trade and collaboration in economic development, have in the furtherance of the aforementioned objectives, agreed in terms of various Articles stated therein. 32. In terms of the abovementioned agreement, since there is free trade and commerce between the two countries, any product manufactured in Bhutan when sold and/or supplied to India, cannot be termed and/or considered as an imported product in view of the fact that no Customs formalities are required to be followed for movement of the same from Bhutan to India and no Customs Duty is payable on the same either. 33. For the purposes of Trade and Commerce and movement of goods in between the countries, the territories of Bhutan is to be deemed as an extension of the territory of India and vice versa in view of the Agreement entered into by and between the two Governments. 34. 33. For the purposes of Trade and Commerce and movement of goods in between the countries, the territories of Bhutan is to be deemed as an extension of the territory of India and vice versa in view of the Agreement entered into by and between the two Governments. 34. The present prosecution merely rests upon the opinion as formed by the Public Analyst which, essentially, is a subjective opinion formed by the Public Analyst to the effect that “The label of the sample does not contain the name and complete address of importer in India as require under the provision of Rule 32(c)(iii). Hence the sample is misbranded under sub clauses (k) of clause (ix) of Section 2 of the P.F.A. Act, 1954”. 35. Such opinion as formed by the Public Analyst is in complete disregard and/or being totally unaware of the existence of the aforesaid Agreement for free trade between the two countries and as such is erroneous. In such circumstances, the prosecution launched by the Food Inspector in the present case relying on an erroneous opinion of the Public Analyst is liable to be quashed. 36. In the present case, the alleged infringing bottle/label has not been placed on record by the complainant. Since in the present case no such bottle is placed on record nor any reliance has been placed on the same, the prosecution cannot ever end in the conviction of the petitioner company and is thus liable to be quashed. 37. Section 13 of the Act deals with the report of Public Analyst. As per Section 13(1) of the Act, the Public Analyst is only required to submit the ‘result of analysis to the Local Health Authority (LHA)’. Section 13(2) contemplates that if the ‘result of analysis’ is to the effect that the article of food is ‘adulterated’, the LHA shall institute a prosecution. Section 13(5) postulates that the report of analyst is binding to the extent of “evidence of the facts stated therein”. Further the Proviso also says that the report “shall be final and conclusive evidence of the facts stated therein”. The result of analysis is the only part of the report of Public Analyst what is admissible in evidence and compulsorily required to be given by the analyst, the same is also prerequisite before a complaint is filed under the Act whereas the opinion of the PA is optional and non-mandatory. The result of analysis is the only part of the report of Public Analyst what is admissible in evidence and compulsorily required to be given by the analyst, the same is also prerequisite before a complaint is filed under the Act whereas the opinion of the PA is optional and non-mandatory. The opinion of the analyst cannot be termed as ‘evidence of facts’ and the same is not admissible as evidence under the law. The present case thus suffers from complete non-application of mind by the sanctioning authority as well as by the Learned Trial Court by mechanically prosecuting the petitioner merely relying upon the opinion of the public Analyst. It is thus left on this Hon’ble Court to determine whether the result of analysis constitutes any violation of the Act. 38. The sanction for prosecution granted in the instant case is not in accordance with law and is in violation of Section 20 of the said Act. Sanction as such is based only on the report of the Public Analyst which is an erroneous report. The sanction has been wrongly accorded basis which the present complaint has been filed, the present complaint and consequent order issuing process is therefore liable to be quashed and/or set aside. 39. The Impugned proceeding is otherwise bad in law and as such the same is liable to be quashed. 40. The Learned Advocate for the petitioner had relied upon the following decisions/circulars/rules:- i. Aradhna Soft Drinks Company and another Vs. State of Haryana and others, reported in 2014 SCC OnLine P&H 20540, ii. P. Robert Immanuel & another Vs. The State, rep. by the Food Inspector, reported in 2009 (2) MWN (Cr.) 446, iii. Pepsico India Holdings Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh (M.Cr. C. No. 6848/2011), iv. FSSAI Circular dated 02.08.2016 v. Pepci Co India Holdings Private Ltd. Vs. Union Of India, SCRA No. 2281 of 2008 (Gujarat H.C. d.o.d: 24.08.2018, vi. PepsiCo India Holdings Pvt. Ltd. Vs. State of Himachal Pradesh, Crl. Miscl. Petition (Main) U/S 482 Cr.P.C. No. 225 of 2019, vii. Bhole Baba Industries Vs. State of Rajasthan, S.B. Cr. Misc. (Petition) No. 6730/2017 dated 15.01.2018, viii. Rule 32-Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules, 1955, prior to year 2011 and year 2007, ix. Rectification process for cases of minor labeling defects-reg. (FSSAI Advisory dated 17.07.2018), x. T. Barai Vs. Henry Ah Hoe, reported in (1983) 1 SCC 177 . 41. Bhole Baba Industries Vs. State of Rajasthan, S.B. Cr. Misc. (Petition) No. 6730/2017 dated 15.01.2018, viii. Rule 32-Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules, 1955, prior to year 2011 and year 2007, ix. Rectification process for cases of minor labeling defects-reg. (FSSAI Advisory dated 17.07.2018), x. T. Barai Vs. Henry Ah Hoe, reported in (1983) 1 SCC 177 . 41. The Learned Advocate for the opposite party submitted that the bottle of carbonated beverage contained the lable of “Pepsi” without the address of the manufacturer since the present petitioner had been the manufacturer of the bottled carbonated beverage violation of the statutory provision under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954, is attracted in view of the Public Analyst’s Report and therefore, to quash the proceedings at a nascent stage will cause grave prejudice to the opposite party. 42. Section 7(ii) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 states as follows:- “7. Prohibition of manufacture, sale, etc., of certain articles of food. – No person shall himself or by any person on his behalf manufacture for sale, or store, sell or distribute – (ii) any misbranded food;” 43. Section 16 (1)(a)(i) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 states as follows:- “16. Penalties. – (1) Subject to the provisions of sub-section (1A) if any person – (a) Whether by himself or by any other person on his behalf, imports into India or manufactures for sale or stores, sells or distributes any article of food – (i) which is adulterated within the meaning of sub-clause (m) of clause (ia) of section 21 or misbranded within the meaning of clause (ix) of that section or the sale of which is prohibited under any provision of this Act or any rule made thereunder or by an order of the Food (Health) Authority;” 44. The Hon’ble Supreme Court held in Bal Kishan Thapar v. Municipal Corpn. of Delhi, reported in (1979) 2 SCC 459 the following:- “3. We have heard learned Counsel for the parties and have perused the judgment of the High Court and we are of the opinion that the contentions raised by the learned Counsel for the appellant is well founded and must prevail. We have perused the original label which described the preparation sold to the food inspectors. We have heard learned Counsel for the parties and have perused the judgment of the High Court and we are of the opinion that the contentions raised by the learned Counsel for the appellant is well founded and must prevail. We have perused the original label which described the preparation sold to the food inspectors. There is nothing to show that the appellant in any way tried to give an impression to the purchaser that either saccharin or some preparation of the type of saccharin was being sold so as to amount to misbranding as contemplated by Section 2(ix)(a) & (g) of the Act. All that the appellant purported to convey under the label was that the preparation sold was as sweet as saccharin but not as bitter as saccharin. This was intended merely to lay emphasis on the sweetness of the preparation when it was compared to the sweetness of saccharin. When the label clearly described the fact that the preparation was not as bitter as saccharin it clearly intended to convey that it was neither something like saccharin nor saccharin itself, in any form or of any type. Mr Sorabjee appearing for the respondent submitted that the use of the word saccharin itself amounts to misbranding and gives the impression that the preparation sold was saccharin or something akin to saccharin. We are unable to agree with this contention. In the facts and circumstances of the present case and the contents of the label and the description of the preparation, we are satisfied that there was no misbranding, nor was there any attempt on the part of the appellant to sell his preparation as saccharin or some sort of saccharin. Section 2(ix)(a) runs as follows: “Misbranded’ — an article of food shall be deemed to be misbranded — (a) if it is an imitation of, or is a substitute for, or resembles in a manner likely to deceive, another article of food under the name of which it is sold, and is not plainly and conspicuously labelled so as to indicate its true character.” 4. According to the Additional Solicitor General of India, the sale, by the appellant, of the preparation clearly falls within (iii) clause of sub-section (a) [sic third clause in sub-clause (a)], that is to say the preparation resembles saccharin so as to deceive a person who wanted to purchase the article of food known as saccharin. After having examined the label, its description and the contents of the tin and packets, sold to the food inspectors, we are unable to find any evidence of any intention on the part of the appellant to sell a preparation which resembles saccharin in any respect. The words, “as sweet as saccharin' were merely meant to convey one of the qualities of the preparation itself and not the quality of saccharin at all. That, by itself, would not attract the provision of Section 2(ix)(a) of the Act. It was then submitted that in one of the labels under the directions it was mentioned that the preparation was ‘para saccharin” which also shows that the appellant intended to pass on the preparation as some sort of saccharin. In the first place, the use of the word ‘para saccharin’ appears to be a mistake in the facts of the present case because this word is completely absent from the Hindi portion of the directions contained in the same label. Secondly, the word “para saccharin” would not indicate that the preparation sold was saccharin in any form or of any kind. It was just a way of describing it because according to the manufacturers the preparation was as sweet as saccharin. This was mentioned because saccharin being 500 times sweeter than sugar, the manufacturer wanted to convey that the preparation was also much sweeter than sugar and could be used for preparing soda water bottles. It is obvious that if any person who purchased the preparation was not conversant with the English language, he would not be misled at all. 5. Having regard to these circumstances we are of the opinion that the case of the appellant does not fall within the clauses (a) & (g) of Section 2(ix) of the Act and the High Court erred in law in convicting the appellant for misbranding under these provisions. For the reasons given above, the appeal is allowed.” 45. 5. Having regard to these circumstances we are of the opinion that the case of the appellant does not fall within the clauses (a) & (g) of Section 2(ix) of the Act and the High Court erred in law in convicting the appellant for misbranding under these provisions. For the reasons given above, the appeal is allowed.” 45. In Alkem Laboratories Ltd. v. State of M.P. reported in (2020) 20 SCC 174 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court held the following:- “19. However, upon a comparison of Section 2(ia) of the 1954 Act which defines “adulterated” and Section 2(ix) which defines “misbranded”, we find that there is an overlap between the two provisions. Section 2(ia)(a) includes within the definition of “adulterated” a case where a food article is “not of the nature, substance, or quality which it purports or is represented to be”. Whereas Section 2(i)(ix)(g) includes within the definition of “misbranded” the following: “2. (i)(ix)(g) if the package containing it, or the label on the package bears any statement, design or device regarding the ingredients or the substances contained therein, which is false or misleading in any material particular; or if the package is otherwise deceptive with respect to its contents.” Therefore for example, in cases where it is found that a food article contains an additional ingredient which is not advertised on its packaging, or vice versa, where a food article is found to be missing an ingredient which is purported to be included in the contents thereof in the labelling/packaging of the article; or where the food article has used an inferior quality substitute but the labelling purports to use the superior quality original ingredient, it would be a case of both adulteration and misbranding. 20. This is not an exhaustive list of examples, but it suffices to say that in certain situations, even for the purpose of proving the offence of “misbranding”, samples of the article would have to be taken according to the procedure prescribed under Sections 11 to 13 of the 1954 Act. This is because in such cases it would not be possible to conclude whether or not the manufacturer, marketer or vendor has put a deceptive label/package on the food article, without making a finding as to whether there has been any adulteration in the contents thereof. 21. This is because in such cases it would not be possible to conclude whether or not the manufacturer, marketer or vendor has put a deceptive label/package on the food article, without making a finding as to whether there has been any adulteration in the contents thereof. 21. The question which arises then is, what is the procedure to be followed in cases where proving “misbranding” requires testing of the relevant food samples, but the corresponding charge of “adulteration” has not been made? Section 13(2) is unfortunately silent in this regard. It is a settled principle of statutory interpretation that any ambiguity in a penal statute has to be interpreted in favour of the accused. It would be absurd and discriminatory for the prosecution to, on one hand, rely on the report of the Public Analyst under Section 13(1) for proving the offence of “misbranding”, and on the other hand, claim that the accused cannot avail of their right to challenge the said report as per Sections 13(2) and 13(3) because it is not a case of “adulteration”. In such a scenario, the word “adulterated” in Section 13(2) would have to be read as including “misbranded” insofar as it relates to the ingredients of the food article concerned, and the relevant clauses of Section 13 have to be complied with in their entirety. 22. Hence we are of the considered opinion that where examination of the contents/ingredients of the food article is integral to proving the offence “misbranding”, the procedure prescribed under Sections 11 to 13 of the 1954 Act has to be complied with, regardless of whether “adulteration” is alleged or not. This includes the right to obtain a second opinion from the Central Laboratory under Section 13(2). The same test would apply in respect of any other offence for which penalty is prescribed under the 1954 Act. 23. It is needless to say that this rule would not apply if proving the offence does not necessarily require sampling of the food article. For example, if the offence is one of “bearing the name of a fictitious individual or company as the manufacturer or producer of the article” under Section 2(ix)(h) it may not be necessary to analyse the contents of the food article to prove the offence so long as the prosecution is able to establish that the real manufacturer has deceptively concealed their identity. 24. 24. Applying the abovementioned test to the present case, it has to be seen whether first, the appellant was entitled to apply for testing of the Jelly by the Central Laboratory under Section 13(2); second, whether the denial of the right was the respondents' fault and third, whether such denial is prejudicial to the appellant's case. With respect to the first point, the respondents have relied upon the Public Analyst's Report which states that the Jelly contains “sugar/sucrose”, so as to institute a complaint for misbranding under Section 2(ix)(g) of the 1954 Act. This is because the label on the packaging claims that the Jelly is “sugarless”. Hence, the Public Analyst's finding on whether “sugar” as an ingredient is present in the Jelly sample is crucial to proving the offence of “misbranding” against the appellant. Thus, the appellant ought to have had the opportunity to make an application under Section 13(2) for a second opinion from the Central Laboratory on the contents of the Jelly sample. 25. With respect to the second point, we are of the view that Respondent 2 erred in not making query to the Retailer, at the first instance, about the marketer of the Jelly, as she was empowered to do under Section 14-A of the 1954 Act. If she had done so, the appellant could have been notified in 2008 itself that the Jelly is being taken for analysis. Even if this lapse is condoned, once the Retailer had intimated the respondents that the appellant was the marketer of the Jelly, they ought to have made more efforts in notifying the appellant of the alleged irregularity found in the Jelly sample, as per Section 13(2). We do not find merit in the respondents' submission that the delay in informing the appellant was because the appellant was deliberately avoiding service of notice. Even if the address produced by the Retailer was of the appellant's Indore Branch, the label on the packaging of the Jelly clearly indicated that the official address for communication would be “Alkem House, Senapati Bapat Marg, Lower Parel, Mumbai-400 013”. Hence even if no response was being received from the Indore branch, the respondents could have attempted to send the details of the Public Analyst's Report to the appellant's Mumbai address. Hence even if no response was being received from the Indore branch, the respondents could have attempted to send the details of the Public Analyst's Report to the appellant's Mumbai address. Thus it is clear that the appellant lost their chance to get the Jelly sample retested under Section 13(2) on account of the respondents' negligence.” 46. The complaint filed in the Court of Learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Siliguri, District-Darjeeling to take cognizance under Section 190 (i)(A) of the Cr.P.C., inter alia stated that the vendor/proprietor Shri Biplab Saha was the owner of a shop dealing with selling of sweetened carbonated water (Pepsi) brand. The said vendor on enquiry disclosed the name and address of the supplier from whom he purchased the sweetened carbonated water and as such notice in Form 6 was issued to the supplier M/s. Pepsi India Holdings (Pvt.) Ltd. in warehouse, two and a half mile check-post P.O.-Sevak Road, via Siliguri, District-Jalpaiguri. 47. The Public Analyst’s report declared the sweetened carbonated water to be misbranded because the label of the sample did not contain the name and complete address of importer in India as required under the provision of Rule 32 (C)(iii). 48. 47. The Public Analyst’s report declared the sweetened carbonated water to be misbranded because the label of the sample did not contain the name and complete address of importer in India as required under the provision of Rule 32 (C)(iii). 48. Rule 32 (C)(iii) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules, 1955 states as follows: “(c) (i) the name and complete address of the manufacturer and the manufacturing unit, if these are located at different places and in case the manufacturer is not the packer or bottler, the name and complete address of the packing or bottling unit as the case may be; (ii) where an article of food is manufactured or packed or bottled by a person or a company under the written authority of some other manufacturer or company, under his or its brand name, the label shall carry the name and complete address of the manufacturing or packing or bottling unit as the case may be, and also the name and complete address of the manufacturer or the company, for and on whose behalf it is manufactured or packed or bottled; (iii) where an article of food is imported into India, the package of food shall also carry the name and complete address of the importer in India: PROVIDED that where any food article manufactured outside India is packed or bottled in India, the package containing the such food article shall also bear on the label, the name of the country of origin of the food article and the name and complete address of the importer and the premises of the packing or bottling in India.] (d) the net weight or number or measure of volume of content, as the circumstances may require, except in the case of biscuits, breads, confectionery and sweets where the weight may be expressed in terms of either average net weight or minimum net weight.]” 49. The Rule as aforesaid mentions when an article of food is imported in India, the package of food shall also carry the name and complete address of the imported in India. The Public Analyst’s report stated the label to be of brand “Pepsi” (73/82) manufactured by Drangchu Beverage Phuentshiling, Bhutan. 50. The Rule as aforesaid mentions when an article of food is imported in India, the package of food shall also carry the name and complete address of the imported in India. The Public Analyst’s report stated the label to be of brand “Pepsi” (73/82) manufactured by Drangchu Beverage Phuentshiling, Bhutan. 50. In view of the agreement on trade commerce and transit between the Government of the Republic of India and the Royal Government of Bhutan certain benefits were to accrue to the people of India and Bhutan in terms of free trade and commerce between the two countries, expansion of the bilateral trade and collaboration of economic development. 51. In Article 5 of the said agreement, it has been stipulated that all exports and imports of Bhutan to and from countries other than India will be free from and not subject to customs duty and trade restrictions of the Government of the Republic of India. The procedure of such exports and imports of the documentation which are detailed in the protocol to this agreement may be modified by mutual agreement from time to time. 52. In the instant case, the sweetened carbonated drinks being named as “Pepsi” bore the label with an improper address as per the opinion of the Public Analyst. 53. The opposite party did not file any objection to the aforesaid treaty. 54. The PepsiCo India Holdings and Maxinus Enterprises India (P) are different entities. 55. The moot question to be decided in the instant case is whether the bottle containing the carbonated water was misbranded or not. 56. Section 2(ix)(a) of the aforesaid Act runs as follows:- “Misbranded’ — an article of food shall be deemed to be misbranded — (a) if it is an imitation of, or is a substitute for, or resembles in a manner likely to deceive, another article of food under the name of which it is sold, and is not plainly and conspicuously labelled so as to indicate its true character.” 57. The Public Analyst’s report determined the sample to be misbranded in the context of an incomplete name and address of importer in India and not with regard to the quality of the food neither there was any opinion with regard to the content being adulterated. 58. The Public Analyst’s report determined the sample to be misbranded in the context of an incomplete name and address of importer in India and not with regard to the quality of the food neither there was any opinion with regard to the content being adulterated. 58. Part VII of Packing and Labelling of Food of the PFA Rules 1955 under Rule 32, inter alia, stated “provided also that the provisions of these rules shall not apply in respect of mineral water or packaged drinking water or carbonated water or liquid and powder milk.” 59. Rule 32 as aforesaid with regard to Packing and Labelling of Foods mentioned certain procedure of packing and labelling of goods. The label had the name Pepsi (73/82) manufactured by Drangchu Beverage Phuentshiling, Bhutan and in view of the aforesaid proviso the carbonated water was exempted from the labeling requirements under Rule 32 at the relevant point of time. 60. In the facts and circumstances of the instant case, the petitioner cannot be held liable in the context of improper labeling by the agency being addressed at Bhutan without an averment in the complaint with regard to the criminal act of the petitioner in specific terms. Moreover, the other company being Maxinus Enterprises Private Ltd. is a separate juristic entity and the said company has not been arraigned as an accused person in the complaint filed by the opposite party No.2. Without any implication of Maxinus Enterprises Private Ltd. no role can be attributed to the petitioner company, which had not been called to answer its role in the capacity of the actual supplier or wholesaler or retailer. The ingredients of the carbonated drink was not found to be adulterated. 61. The complainant did not question the marketer or the retailer from whom the bottles were seized for testing. The petitioner whether had been the manufacturer selling the product in India or in Bhutan in accordance to the treaty was not examined. Moreover, the petitioner being the importer from Bhutan was not mentioned in the complaint to have exceeded its jurisdiction with illegal motive for wrongful gain has not been described in the complaint. 62. The petitioner whether had been the manufacturer selling the product in India or in Bhutan in accordance to the treaty was not examined. Moreover, the petitioner being the importer from Bhutan was not mentioned in the complaint to have exceeded its jurisdiction with illegal motive for wrongful gain has not been described in the complaint. 62. Under such circumstances where the role of the petitioner to have actively participated in the misbranding as alleged could not be prima facie established the proceedings to be allowed to continue before the Trial Court will result in the process of abuse of law and accordingly, the proceedings being C.R. Case No. 374/2006 under Section 7(ii)/16(1)(a)(i) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954, pending before the Court of the Learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Siliguri and all orders passed therein by the Learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Siliguri is quashed. 63. The criminal revisional application being CRR 3772 of 2014 is allowed. 64. Accordingly, CRR 3772 of 2014 stands disposed of. Connected application, if there be any, also stands disposed of. 65. There is no order as to costs. 66. Let the copy of this judgment be sent to the learned trial court as well as the police station concerned for necessary information and compliance. 67. All parties shall act on the server copy of this judgment duly downloaded from the official website of this court.