JUDGMENT : J.J. MUNIR, J. This writ petition is directed against an order of termination of the petitioner from service dated 03.01.2019 passed by the General Manager, Allahabad U.P. Gramin Bank (now known as Aryavrat Bank) and the appellate order dated 21.02.2019 passed by the Chairman, Allahabad U.P. Gramin Bank, Banda affirming the departmental punishment aforesaid. 2. The petitioner was appointed as an Assistant Manager with the Allahabad U.P. Gramin Bank[‘Bank’ for short] on 17.04.2015 and joined service at the Regional Office of the Bank at Mahoba. The petitioner says that he performed his duties from 20.04.2015 to 21.01.2016, without complaint. He was transferred from the Regional Office, Mahoba to the Branch Panwari, Mahoba vide order dated 02.01.2016. The petitioner was directed to join duties on 04.01.2016 at Branch Panwari. The petitioner joined duties on 04.01.2016 and discharged his obligations until 26.06.2017 at the said branch. On 27.06.2017, the petitioner was transferred from the Panwari Branch to Branch Gahrauli, Mahoba. The petitioner says that he was taken seriously ill and admitted on 28.06.2017 to the care of Dr. A.A. Jafri, where he remained an indoor patient until 13.07.2017. Once certified fit, he approached the Regional Manager of the Bank at Mahoba, who issued a transfer order dated 27.07.2017, permitting him to join as Assistant Manager at Branch Gahrauli. The petitioner submitted his joining report on 28.07.2017 along with the fitness certificate. He was permitted to join duties in compliance with the transfer order dated 27.07.2017. He says that after joining at Branch Gahrauli, he has continuously discharged his duties as the Branch Manager. The petitioner performed his duties as the Branch Manager from 28.07.2017 to 04.05.2018 at Branch Gahrauli. He was, thereafter, transferred vide order dated 04.05.2018 to the Regional Office of the Bank at Bahraich. 3. While proceeding to join at Bahraich on 04.05.2018, the petitioner was taken seriously ill. He was hospitalized the same day by his family members and relatives, again in the hospital at Kalyanpur, Kanpur under the care of Dr. A.A. Jafri. The fact was intimated to the Regional Manager, Regional Office, Mahoba and further, from time to time, the petitioner asserts that he kept the Regional Manager informed about his illness caused by liver infection. After regaining his health, he went to join his duty at the Regional Office, Bahraich. A.A. Jafri. The fact was intimated to the Regional Manager, Regional Office, Mahoba and further, from time to time, the petitioner asserts that he kept the Regional Manager informed about his illness caused by liver infection. After regaining his health, he went to join his duty at the Regional Office, Bahraich. The petitioner has annexed on record applications sent to the Regional Manager, intimating him of his illness and requesting leave as Annexure-5. These applications are dated 04.04.2018, 20.05.2018, 21.06.2018 and 16.07.2018. 4. While the petitioner was undergoing treatment at the Kalyanpur Hospital, he was served with a charge-sheet dated 23.05.2018 by registered post sent on his residential address. The charges against petitioner number three and can be better understood by a reference to each of these, as set out in the statement of imputation accompanying the formal charges. The formal charge-sheet and the statement of imputation was served under a covering memo dated 23.05.2018. These charges read : "main bhi pareshan hun bank transfer policy ko lekar paise lekar transfer karte hne ye sab log tabhi to kuch khaas log apne ghar ki sabse najdeek branch me bethe huye hne aur hun sab naye joining ke ladke bas inki politics ka shikaar ho jate ine aur yeh sab janha man karta hai hamara transfer kar dete kynuki hum ne unhe transfer ke badle paise ni diye hne agar aisa karenge to ye bahut galat hai iska samarthan ni karna chahiye". 5. It appears that the petitioner did not, or as he says, could not file a reply to the charge-sheet, owing to his illness. The inquiry proceeded ex- parte. An Inquiry Report dated 24.10.2018 was submitted to the Disciplinary Authority. It is the petitioner’s case that in consequence of the inquiry report, the Disciplinary Authority passed the impugned order dated 03.01.2019, terminating his services. The petitioner says that during the period of time that the inquiry was held, he was bed-ridden and an indoor patient. It was beyond his control to contest proceedings before the Inquiry Officer. The Inquiry Officer, therefore, denied opportunity to the petitioner and proceeded ex-parte with the inquiry, on the foot of which, the Disciplinary Authority has passed the impugned order, terminating his services. The aforesaid assertion finds place in paragraph No. 12 of the writ petition. 6. It was beyond his control to contest proceedings before the Inquiry Officer. The Inquiry Officer, therefore, denied opportunity to the petitioner and proceeded ex-parte with the inquiry, on the foot of which, the Disciplinary Authority has passed the impugned order, terminating his services. The aforesaid assertion finds place in paragraph No. 12 of the writ petition. 6. The petitioner, aggrieved by the impugned order, filed a departmental appeal under Section 49 of the Allahabad U.P. Gramin Bank (Officers and Employees) Service Regulations, 2010 along with a fitness certificate dated 20.01.2019 before the Chairman of the Bank. The petitioner says that the Appellate Authority dismissed his appeal vide order dated 20.02.2019, without application of mind. He has raised a grievance that the Appellate Authority did not grant him opportunity by fixing a date to appear and be heard in support of the appeal. It is also averred that the punishment imposed is grossly disproportionate to the misconduct alleged against the petitioner. 7. A notice of motion was issued on 16.05.2019 to the respondents, in response to which, a counter affidavit has been filed on behalf of the Bank. The petitioner has filed a rejoinder. The parties having exchanged affidavits when the matter came up on 12.10.2023, it was formally admitted to hearing, which proceeded forthwith. During the hearing, it was argued on behalf of the petitioner that no show-cause notice, popularly called a second show-cause, along with a copy of the inquiry report was served upon the petitioner before the impugned order punishing him was passed by the Disciplinary Authority. Accordingly, the Court adjourned the hearing to 03.11.2023 and directed production of the original records of the inquiry, including the second show cause, if issued. The matter was further and finally heard on 03.11.2023, when judgment was reserved. 8. Heard Mr. Panchu Ram Maurya, learned Counsel for the petitioner and Mr. Amrish Sahai, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents. 9. We have perused the original records produced by Mr. Amrish Sahai, learned Counsel. 10. It has been argued by learned Counsel for the petitioner that the inquiry is procedurally flawed, because no second show cause, that is to say, show-cause notice along with a copy of the inquiry report was furnished to the petitioner. 9. We have perused the original records produced by Mr. Amrish Sahai, learned Counsel. 10. It has been argued by learned Counsel for the petitioner that the inquiry is procedurally flawed, because no second show cause, that is to say, show-cause notice along with a copy of the inquiry report was furnished to the petitioner. Instead, the inquiry report was submitted to the Disciplinary Authority, who proceeded to pass the impugned order, terminating the petitioner’s services, which has resulted in prejudice to the petitioner, inasmuch as, if the inquiry report had been provided to the petitioner, he could have shown to the Disciplinary Authority documents and papers, which, on account of the ex-parte inquiry, the petitioner could not produce before the Inquiry Officer in his defence. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has argued that he had consistent medical records with him, showing him to have been an indoor patient and receiving treatment for ‘Amoebic Liver Anorexia’, on account of which, he could not appear at the inquiry and contest the proceedings. It is next submitted that the inquiry proceedings are also bad on account of being ex-parte, inasmuch as neither the Inquiry Officer nor the respondents have taken into consideration various emails, communications and applications sent by the petitioner that he was critically ill and admitted to medical care for his liver infection. In the circumstances, the Inquiry Officer should have adjourned the inquiry proceedings, enabling the petitioner to recover and defend himself. It is, in the last, argued that the punishment imposed, in any case, is shockingly disproportionate, because the first two charges are in respect of unauthorized absence, which was on account of the petitioner’s serious medical indisposition. The petitioner says that it was liver infection that kept him hospitalized and under treatment. He submits that his absence from the said period of time instead of being dealt as a misconduct, should have been considered for sanction of appropriate medical or sick leave under the rules, or may be leave without pay, in case the petitioner exceeded the total leave account or sick leave as well. The other charge relates to posting a message showing resentment on the internal website of the Bank, regarding the Bank’s uneven handling of transfers of employees. The other charge relates to posting a message showing resentment on the internal website of the Bank, regarding the Bank’s uneven handling of transfers of employees. Even if the post be attributed to the petitioner, it was nothing more than an act of indiscretion, which does not call for a punishment as harsh as termination from service. The punishment is, in the submission of learned Counsel, decidedly one that falls in the category of shockingly disproportionate. 11. Mr. Sahai, on the other hand, has argued that the petitioner came up with false and baseless allegations of corruption against the Regional Manger and attempted to tarnish the Bank's image on their website. It is a serious misconduct. It is also argued that the petitioner is a habitual delinquent and disobeys the decision of the Management. He denied receiving his relieving order and left the Bank on 27.06.2018 unauthorizedly, without informing anyone. He absented from duty from 28.06.2017 to 27.07.2017. He did not reply to the charge-sheet and deliberately absented from the inquiry proceedings. The Disciplinary Authority got a notice of the inquiry published in two newspapers, to wit, Dainik Jagran and The Times of India on 17.12.2018, granting him a last opportunity, when all earlier efforts to serve him through post and other means failed. 12. It is also argued that the petitioner has failed to produce any bills and records relating to his hospitalization or tests done to diagnose liver infection. It is urged that the medical certificates produced from a particular doctor is unreliable, because it is not accompanied by other documents relating to the tests undertaken by the doctor to reach his diagnosis. 13. It is next submitted that so far as the question of the punishment being disproportionate is concerned, that is a matter which essentially lies in the domain of the Disciplinary Authority and the Court may not interfere with it, unless the punishment is shockingly disproportionate. Considering the charges against the petitioner that have been held proved at the inquiry, it cannot be said that the punishment awarded is shockingly disproportionate. 14. Upon hearing learned Counsel for parties and looking into the original records of the inquiry, this Court finds that it is not a case where the Inquiry Officer has gleaned through the charge-sheet and expressed opinion by accepting the charges as proof of themselves. 14. Upon hearing learned Counsel for parties and looking into the original records of the inquiry, this Court finds that it is not a case where the Inquiry Officer has gleaned through the charge-sheet and expressed opinion by accepting the charges as proof of themselves. The proceedings of the inquiry, that have been produced, show that the documents to prove the petitioner's misconduct were properly introduced as evidence through a Presenting Officer before the Inquiry Officer relative to each charge and marked as exhibits. These were duly considered by the Inquiry Officer to hold the petitioner guilty of all the three charges. No doubt, the inquiry went ex-parte, but that is a course of action which is to be adopted if the delinquent does not appear. The material on record shows that the Inquiry Officer made multiple efforts to serve the petitioner through registered post and other means, including publication, but the petitioner chose not to appear and defend himself at the inquiry. Therefore, the petitioner's case that he was proceeded with against ex-parte, without sufficient cause, does not commend to us. 15. The other reason, which the petitioner assigns for his absence, is ailment and treatment, that kept him away from the inquiry. He has urged that it was beyond his control, suffering as he was from liver infection, to appear and defend himself at the inquiry. So far as the said submission is concerned, this Court is constrained to notice that there are only two certificates the petitioner has relied on to support his case of medical indisposition. Both these documents are certificates issued by a certain Dr.A.A. Jafri. One of the certificates is dated 13.07.2017, and the other, dated 20.01.2019. A perusal of the certificates, photostat copy whereof have been annexed, does not show that these certificates have been issued out of a regular book of certificates maintained by the doctor, bearing a serial or memo number. The certificates are no more than the endorsements of the fact that the petitioner was treated by the doctor for Amoebic Liver Anorexia. The petitioner has, however, not produced, as rightly argued by Mr. Sahai, any documents of various medical diagnostic tests, that are invariably done by a doctor in a condition of the kind that the petitioner describes. The certificates are no more than the endorsements of the fact that the petitioner was treated by the doctor for Amoebic Liver Anorexia. The petitioner has, however, not produced, as rightly argued by Mr. Sahai, any documents of various medical diagnostic tests, that are invariably done by a doctor in a condition of the kind that the petitioner describes. If he were indeed treated for liver infection, that kept him away from the respondents and his duty for so long, it would certainly have entailed a number of medical investigations, all of which would be evidenced by medical test reports. There would also be bills raised for the treatment and the medical tests done. There is no document of that kind to support Dr. Jafri's certificates. 16. In the rejoinder affidavit, there are a host of other certificates/prescriptions from Dr. Jafri, being certificates dated 18.05.2018, 04.05.2018, 01.06.2018, 01.07.2018, 15.07.2018, 04.08.2018, 04.09.2018, 04.10.2018, 03.11.2018, 03.12.2018 and 02.01.2019. Surprisingly, apart from these certificates, some of which are not certificates but prescriptions, there are no corresponding documents of medical investigation undertaken, as already remarked. There are no record of bills raised or settled in the expenditure involved on treatment. The findings of the Inquiry Officer, therefore, treating the petitioner ex- parte, cannot be faulted. 17. So far as the issue of the second show cause is concerned, we are of opinion that normally, a show-cause notice along with a copy of the inquiry report ought to be given, which has not been done in this case. The requirement to serve a copy of the Inquiry Report upon the employee, enabling him to show cause before the Disciplinary Authority, is an important facet of natural justice. But as held by the Supreme Court in Managing Director, ECIL Hyderabad and others v. B. Karunakar and others, (1993) 4 SCC 727 , adherence to requirements of natural justice is not a matter of mere formality. The prejudice occasioned to the employee by non- furnishing of a copy of the Inquiry Report must be shown. In B. Karunakar (supra) it was held : 31. The prejudice occasioned to the employee by non- furnishing of a copy of the Inquiry Report must be shown. In B. Karunakar (supra) it was held : 31. Hence, in all cases where the enquiry officer's report is not furnished to the delinquent employee in the disciplinary proceedings, the Courts and Tribunals should cause the copy of the report to be furnished to the aggrieved employee if he has not already secured it before coming to the Court/Tribunal and give the employee an opportunity to show how his or her case was prejudiced because of the non-supply of the report. If after hearing the parties, the Court/Tribunal comes to the conclusion that the non- supply of the report would have made no difference to the ultimate findings and the punishment given, the Court/Tribunal should not interfere with the order of punishment. The Court/Tribunal should not mechanically set aside the order of punishment on the ground that the report was not furnished as is regrettably being done at present. The courts should avoid resorting to short cuts. Since it is the Courts/Tribunals which will apply their judicial mind to the question and give their reasons for setting aside or not setting aside the order of punishment, (and not any internal appellate or revisional authority), there would be neither a breach of the principles of natural justice nor a denial of the reasonable opportunity. It is only if the Court/Tribunal finds that the furnishing of the report would have made a difference to the result in the case that it should set aside the order of punishment. Where after following the above procedure, the Court/Tribunal sets aside the order of punishment, the proper relief that should be granted is to direct reinstatement of the employee with liberty to the authority/management to proceed with the inquiry, by placing the employee under suspension and continuing the inquiry from the stage of furnishing him with the report. ..... 18. In Union Bank of India v. Vishwa Mohan, (1998) 4 SCC 310 , it was held by the Supreme Court : 9. ...... As stated earlier, the appellant had in his possession the enquiry report/findings when he filed the statutory appeal as well as the writ petition in the High Court. ..... 18. In Union Bank of India v. Vishwa Mohan, (1998) 4 SCC 310 , it was held by the Supreme Court : 9. ...... As stated earlier, the appellant had in his possession the enquiry report/findings when he filed the statutory appeal as well as the writ petition in the High Court. The High Court was required to apply its judicial mind to all the circumstances and then form its opinion whether non-furnishing of the report would have made any difference to the result in the case and thereupon pass an appropriate order. In para 31, this Court in Managing Director, ECIL [ (1993) 4 SCC 727 : 1993 SCC (L&S) 1184 : (1993) 25 ATC 704] has very rightly cautioned: (SCC p. 758) “The Court/Tribunal should not mechanically set aside the order of punishment on the ground that the report was not furnished as is regrettably being done at present. The courts should avoid resorting to short cuts.” 10. In our considered view, the High Court has failed to apply its judicial mind to the facts and circumstances of the present case and erroneously concluded that non-supply of the enquiry report/findings has caused prejudice to the respondent. 19. In Haryana Financial Corporation and another v. Kailash Chandra Ahuja, (2008) 9 SCC 31 , their Lordships of the Supreme Court, repelling a similar plea of vitiation of the order of punishment due to non-supply of a copy of the inquiry report, held: 21. From the ratio laid down in B. Karunakar [ (1993) 4 SCC 727 : 1993 SCC (L&S) 1184 : (1993) 25 ATC 704] it is explicitly clear that the doctrine of natural justice requires supply of a copy of the inquiry officer's report to the delinquent if such inquiry officer is other than the disciplinary authority. It is also clear that non-supply of report of the inquiry officer is in the breach of natural justice. But it is equally clear that failure to supply a report of the inquiry officer to the delinquent employee would not ipso facto result in the proceedings being declared null and void and the order of punishment non est and ineffective. It is for the delinquent employee to plead and prove that non-supply of such report had caused prejudice and resulted in miscarriage of justice. It is for the delinquent employee to plead and prove that non-supply of such report had caused prejudice and resulted in miscarriage of justice. If he is unable to satisfy the court on that point, the order of punishment cannot automatically be set aside. 20. This Court is of opinion that normally and invariably, there is much material in the findings carried in the Inquiry Report, which need be brought to the notice of the delinquent, with opportunity to him to rebut the same before the Disciplinary Authority takes its decision. The ‘prejudice rule’ requires no more than this that if the Court were to ask the employee when a complaint about the non-furnishing of a show-cause notice along with a copy of the Inquiry Report is made, as to what is the plausible defence that the delinquent may offer, he must show to the Court that he has a plausible defence, which he would have raised, if opportunity were given by means of a show cause along with a copy of the Inquiry Report. Here, looking to the petitioner's conduct and whatever was pointed out, we hardly find anything which the petitioner can come up with to show cause. In the rejoinder affidavit too, to explain his long ailment, which led to a long absence and also absence from the inquiry, all that the petitioner could produce were bald certificates or bald prescriptions from Dr. Jafri. There is no other evidence aliunde about the petitioner's liver ailment, the sheet anchor of his defence to explain his long absence, both from the employer's Establishment and also the inquiry. 21. In the circumstances, we do not think that the provision of second show cause along with a copy of an inquiry report would have led the petitioner to come up with a plausible defence, that might have led the Disciplinary Authority to a different conclusion. The fact that no prejudice has been caused in this case, going by settled law, is an opinion of ours, and not of the Disciplinary Authority. No doubt, the respondents should have supplied a copy of the Inquiry Report, but, on the facts here, we find that it has not led to any prejudice to the petitioner. 22. The last submission, that the penalty awarded is disproportionate, is also not acceptable. No doubt, the respondents should have supplied a copy of the Inquiry Report, but, on the facts here, we find that it has not led to any prejudice to the petitioner. 22. The last submission, that the penalty awarded is disproportionate, is also not acceptable. The proportionality of punishment is essentially a matter which lies in the domain of the Disciplinary Authority. It is not for this Court to substitute its opinion for the Disciplinary Authority’s. In Ranjit Thakur v. Union of India and others, (1987) 4 SCC 611 , the Doctrine of Proportionality to the punishment imposed by a Court Marshal was invoked and the scope was explained by the Supreme Court in the following words : 25. Judicial review generally speaking, is not directed against a decision, but is directed against the “decision-making process”. The question of the choice and quantum of punishment is within the jurisdiction and discretion of the court-martial. But the sentence has to suit the offence and the offender. It should not be vindictive or unduly harsh. It should not be so disproportionate to the offence as to shock the conscience and amount in itself to conclusive evidence of bias. The doctrine of proportionality, as part of the concept of judicial review, would ensure that even on an aspect which is, otherwise, within the exclusive province of the court-martial, if the decision of the court even as to sentence is an outrageous defiance of logic, then the sentence would not be immune from correction. Irrationality and perversity are recognised grounds of judicial review. ..... 23. The question was considered by the Supreme Court in Chief Executive Officer, Krishna District Cooperative Bank Limited and another v. K. Hanumantha Rao and another, (2017) 2 SCC 528 , where it was observed : 7.2. Even otherwise, the aforesaid reason could not be a valid reason for interfering with the punishment imposed. It is trite that courts, while exercising their power of judicial review over such matters, do not sit as the appellate authority. Decision qua the nature and quantum is the prerogative of the disciplinary authority. It is not the function of the High Court to decide the same. It is trite that courts, while exercising their power of judicial review over such matters, do not sit as the appellate authority. Decision qua the nature and quantum is the prerogative of the disciplinary authority. It is not the function of the High Court to decide the same. It is only in exceptional circumstances, where it is found that the punishment/penalty awarded by the disciplinary authority/employer is wholly disproportionate, that too to an extent that it shakes the conscience of the court, that the court steps in and interferes. 7.2.1. No doubt, the award of punishment, which is grossly in excess to the allegations, cannot claim immunity and remains open for interference under limited scope for judicial review. This limited power of judicial review to interfere with the penalty is based on the doctrine of proportionality which is a well-recognised concept of judicial review in our jurisprudence. The punishment should appear to be so disproportionate that it shocks the judicial conscience. (See State of Jharkhand v. Kamal Prasad, (2014) 7 SCC 223 : (2014) 2 SCC (L&S) 386.) It would also be apt to extract the following observations in this behalf from the judgment of this Court in Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangthan v. J. Hussain, (2013) 10 SCC 106 : (2013) 2 SCC (L&S) 833 : (SCC pp. 110-12, paras 8-10) “8. The order of the appellate authority while having a relook at the case would, obviously, examine as to whether the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority is reasonable or not. If the appellate authority is of the opinion that the case warrants lesser penalty, it can reduce the penalty so imposed by the disciplinary authority. Such a power which vests with the appellate authority departmentally is ordinarily not available to the court or a tribunal. The court while undertaking judicial review of the matter is not supposed to substitute its own opinion on reappraisal of facts. (See UT of Dadra & Nagar Haveli v. Gulabhia M. Lad, (2010) 5 SCC 775 : (2010) 2 SCC (L&S) 101.) In exercise of power of judicial review, however, the court can interfere with the punishment imposed when it is found to be totally irrational or is outrageous in defiance of logic. This limited scope of judicial review is permissible and interference is available only when the punishment is shockingly disproportionate, suggesting lack of good faith. This limited scope of judicial review is permissible and interference is available only when the punishment is shockingly disproportionate, suggesting lack of good faith. Otherwise, merely because in the opinion of the court lesser punishment would have been more appropriate, cannot be a ground to interfere with the discretion of the departmental authorities. 9. When the punishment is found to be outrageously disproportionate to the nature of charge, principle of proportionality comes into play. It is, however, to be borne in mind that this principle would be attracted, which is in tune with the doctrine of Wednesbury [Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corpn., (1948) 1 KB 223 : (1947) 2 All ER 680 (CA)] rule of reasonableness, only when in the facts and circumstances of the case, penalty imposed is so disproportionate to the nature of charge that it shocks the conscience of the court and the court is forced to believe that it is totally unreasonable and arbitrary. This principle of proportionality was propounded by Lord Diplock in Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil Service, 1985 AC 374 : (1984) 3 WLR 1174 : (1984) 3 All ER 935 (HL) in the following words: (AC p. 410 D-E) “... Judicial review has, I think, developed to a stage today when without reiterating any analysis of the steps by which the development has come about, one can conveniently classify under three heads, grounds upon which administrative action is subject to control by judicial review. The first ground I would call “illegality”, the second “irrationality” and the third “procedural impropriety”. This is not to say that further development on a case by case basis may not in course of time add further grounds. I have in mind particularly the possible adoption in the future of the principle of “proportionality”.…’ 10. An imprimatur to the aforesaid principle was accorded by this Court as well in Ranjit Thakur v. Union of India, (1987) 4 SCC 611 : 1988 SCC (L&S) 1 : (1987) 5 ATC 113. Speaking for the Court, Venkatachaliah, J. (as he then was) emphasising that “all powers have legal limits” invoked the aforesaid doctrine in the following words: (SCC p. 620, para 25) “25. … The question of the choice and quantum of punishment is within the jurisdiction and discretion of the Court Martial. Speaking for the Court, Venkatachaliah, J. (as he then was) emphasising that “all powers have legal limits” invoked the aforesaid doctrine in the following words: (SCC p. 620, para 25) “25. … The question of the choice and quantum of punishment is within the jurisdiction and discretion of the Court Martial. But the sentence has to suit the offence and the offender. It should not be vindictive or unduly harsh. It should not be so disproportionate to the offence as to shock the conscience and amount in itself to conclusive evidence of bias. The doctrine of proportionality, as part of the concept of judicial review, would ensure that even on an aspect which is, otherwise, within the exclusive province of the Court Martial, if the decision of the court even as to sentence is an outrageous defiance of logic, then the sentence would not be immune from correction. Irrationality and perversity are recognised grounds of judicial review.’” 7.2.2. No such finding is arrived at by the High Court to the effect that the punishment awarded to Respondent 1 was shockingly disproportionate. 24. Considering the totality of the charges and the conduct of the petitioner, which includes not only unexplained and unauthorized absence for a total period of about eight months, but also his conduct in remaining away from the Bank’s reach, all during the process of inquiry and also the charge held proved relating to posting on the internal website of the Bank, the allegations accusing the Bank’s Establishment of being dishonest in the matter of transfers and postings of their officials, cannot lead to the inference, in our opinion, that the punishment imposed is one that is shockingly disproportionate. It is not our province virtually to think as a primary decision maker and substitute our wisdom for the Disciplinary Authority’s. 25. In the considered opinion of this Court, there is no good ground to interfere with the impugned orders. 26. In the result, this petition fails and stands dismissed. 27. There shall be no orders as to costs. 28. Let the original records be returned to Mr. Amrish Sahai, learned Counsel, for its safe and onward transmission to the respondents.