JUDGMENT : S. Manu, J. 1. Appellants are the respondents in W.P. (C) No. 19299 of 2021. The respondent herein approached this Court by filing the writ petition praying mainly for a direction to the 2nd appellant to calculate, sanction and disburse the amount as per the Adjudicator's decision with respect to the disputes notified as per claim (m) and (n) in Ext.P7 and decided by the Adjudicator by Ext.P12 within a time frame and for interest on the said amount. 2. The petitioner, a partnership firm engaged in civil construction works was awarded with a work by the Kerala State Electricity Board Limited (KSEBL). Name of the work is “DRIP-Idukki Hydro Electric Project-Rehabilitation including remedial measures and basic facilities-improvement of approach roads to Idukki and Cheruthoni Dam – (part-II works)”. Agreement was executed on 16.6.2016. The agreement contains an adjudication clause. As per the said clause if the parties to the contract notified a dispute, same shall be referred to an Adjudicator at the first instance. Whenever the Adjudicator takes decisions, either party may refer the decision of the Adjudicator for arbitration within 28 days of the Adjudicator's decision. If no reference is made for arbitration within 28 days, the decision of the Adjudicator will be final and binding. 3. After completing the works on 14.2.2018 the respondent notified a dispute on 08.01.2019 before the Adjudicator. The dispute included 25 claims under separate and distinct heads. The Adjudicator, by Ext.P7, decided claims under (m) and (n) in favour of the respondent. The respondent referred the remaining matters for arbitration by the Arbitral Tribunal. KSEBL did not choose to approach the Arbitral Tribunal against the claims decided in favour of the respondent. Before the Arbitral Tribunal, the 2nd appellant filed a defence statement. However, no counter claim against granting of claims under (m) and (n) in favour of the respondent was raised. On 06.02.2021, the Arbitral Tribunal passed an award. The respondent preferred the writ petition aggrieved by non-quantification and disbursal of the claims allowed in its favour by the Adjudicator. The appellants resisted the writ petition. According to the appellants, the Adjudicator's proceedings were null and void since the contractors' complaints were submitted much beyond 14 days’ time limit under Clause 24 of the agreement. The respondent preferred the writ petition aggrieved by non-quantification and disbursal of the claims allowed in its favour by the Adjudicator. The appellants resisted the writ petition. According to the appellants, the Adjudicator's proceedings were null and void since the contractors' complaints were submitted much beyond 14 days’ time limit under Clause 24 of the agreement. It was also contended that the Adjudicator failed to consider claims (m) and (n) in a proper manner and the decision of the Adjudicator cannot be implemented as there is no quantification of the amount to be paid. Further contention of the appellants is that the Adjudicator's decision is no more relevant as the Arbitral Tribunal has passed an award subsequently. According to the appellants, if the decision rendered by the Adjudicator in favour of a party is not accepted by other party, the dispute would not get crystallized and the parties will have to go by the arbitration clause. Decision rendered by the Adjudicator is only a procedural order preceding the arbitration proceedings. The appellants never accepted the authority of the Adjudicator as well as his decision. The defence statement preferred before the Arbitral Tribunal clearly shows that the appellants never accepted the decision of the Adjudicator. The appellants therefore contended that the prayer in the writ petition cannot be allowed and the writ petition is liable to be dismissed. 4. The learned Single Judge after hearing both sides held that if any of the parties had any grievance against the decision of the Adjudicator, the remedy was to refer the matter for arbitration within a period of 28 days. The learned Single Judge found that the KSEBL did not challenge the decision of the Adjudicator with respect to claims (m) and (n) by referring the same for arbitration. Plea of the appellants that the respondent ought to have sought the approval of the Arbitrator regarding the claims decided by the Adjudicator in their favour was rejected by the learned Judge. Writ Petition was allowed and the appellants herein were directed to quantify the claims in terms of money by calling upon the respondent herein or the authorised representatives and to pay the same within a period of 60 days from the date of receipt of certified copy of the judgment, failing which the amount will carry interest at the rate of 7.5%. 5. 5. Before us, the learned Standing Counsel for the KSEBL Sri. B. Premod forcefully contended that the judgment of the learned Single Judge is erroneous and the decision of the Adjudicator sought to be enforced by the respondent is void and not binding on the appellants. He reiterated the contentions we have noted in the previous paragraphs. The learned counsel for the respondent Sri. C.S. Ajith Prakash opposed the submissions of the learned Standing Counsel and contended that the judgment rendered by the learned Single Judge is perfectly right. He submitted that the appellants are bound to honour the decision of the Adjudicator and reiterated the contentions raised in the writ petition. 6. Bone of contention is regarding the effect of the clauses in the agreement regarding disputes, especially about Clause 25. The said Clause is therefore extracted hereunder: “25. Procedure for Disputes 25.1 The Adjudicator shall give a decision in writing within 28 days of receipt of a notification of a dispute. 25.2 The Adjudicator shall be paid daily at the rate specified in the Contract Data together with reimbursable expenses of the types specified in the Contract Data and the cost shall be divided equally between the Employer and the Contractor, whatever decision is reached by the Adjudicator. Either party may refer a decision of the Adjudicator to an Arbitrator within 28 days of the Adjudicator's written decision. If neither party refers the dispute to arbitration within the above 28 days, the Adjudicator's decision will be final and binding. 25.3 The arbitration shall be conducted in accordance with the arbitration procedure stated in the Special Conditions of Contract.” 7. The highlighted component of Clause 25.2 gives no room for any doubt and dispute in our view. The same is crystal clear. If the decision of the Adjudicator is not acceptable to either party, the party may refer the decision to an Arbitrator within 28 days of the Adjudicator's decision. The decision of the Adjudicator will become final and binding if neither party refers the dispute to arbitration within 28 days. It is indisputable that two of the claims of the respondent were decided in its favour by the Adjudicator. The appellants did not approach the Arbitrator within 28 days as stipulated in Clause 25.2. Therefore, the decision of the Adjudicator regarding claims (m) and (n) became final and binding on the parties. It is indisputable that two of the claims of the respondent were decided in its favour by the Adjudicator. The appellants did not approach the Arbitrator within 28 days as stipulated in Clause 25.2. Therefore, the decision of the Adjudicator regarding claims (m) and (n) became final and binding on the parties. We do not find anything in the relevant clauses, supporting the argument of the appellants that the decision of the Adjudicator required affirmation by the Arbitrator. So also the provisions of the Clause do not give any room for disputing the decision of the Adjudicator after expiry of 28 days. There is no provision in the agreement enabling any party to reject the decisions of the Adjudicator unilaterally. Even if the appellants had a contention that reference for adjudication was beyond the time limit under Clause 24, the remedy of the appellants was to refer the matter for arbitration and challenge the decision of the Adjudicator on that ground. Having not chosen to refer the decision of the Adjudicator for arbitration, it is not open to the appellants to depict it as void and refuse to honour the same. Contention of the KSEBL that they confronted the decision of the Adjudicator in the statement filed before the Arbitral Tribunal is short of any merits. It was incumbent upon the KSEBL to challenge the decision independently or to raise a counter claim. 8. When the parties mutually agree to refer disputes that may arise between them for decision by a referee, decision by the referee shall bind the parties. Relying on the principles of “vicarious admission” ingrained in Section 20 of the Evidence Act, the Apex Court in Hirachand Kothari (Dead) by LRs v. State of Rajasthan and another, 1985 (Supp) SCC 17 held as follows: “7. Section 20 of the Evidence Act reads as follows: 20. Admissions by persons expressly referred to by party to suit-Statements made by persons to whom a party to the suit has expressly referred for information in reference to a matter in dispute are admissions. Section 20 is the second exception to the general rule laid down in Section 18. It deals with one class of vicarious admissions that demand of persons other than the parties. Section 20 is the second exception to the general rule laid down in Section 18. It deals with one class of vicarious admissions that demand of persons other than the parties. Where a party refers to a third person for some information or an opinion on a matter in dispute, the statements made by the third person are receivable as admissions against the person referring. The reason is that when a party refers to another person for a statement of his views, the party approves of his utterance in anticipation and adopts that as his own. The principle is the same as that of reference to arbitration. The reference may be by express words or by conduct, but in any case there must be a clear admission to refer and such admissions are generally conclusive.” 9. The same principle has been dealt with in the commentary to Evidence Act by Ratanlal and Dhirajlal as follows: “An admission by a person referred to by the party comes very near to the case of arbitration (STEPHEN DIG. 7th Edn. Note to Art. 19, p. 1789). If a reference is made over a disputed matter to a third person, not in the nature of a submission to arbitration, but rather as an aid to the settlement of the differences existing between the parties and to enable the parties themselves to effect a settlement on the information, in such cases the party is bound by the declaration of the person referred to in the same manner and to the same extent as if it was made by himself. A referee is deemed to be an arbitrator and his decision is an award. It may be noted here that under the Arbitration Act the parties to a dispute in a court of law may request the court to refer the dispute to an arbitrator. Apart from that, there may be a provision in the contract between two parties, to refer if any dispute arises, to arbitration. In such cases the arbitrator, after going through the evidence that may be placed before him, comes to a finding, If that happens in the proceedings before the court, the parties will have an opportunity to raise objections which have to be considered by the court, which will pass a decree either in terms or in modification of certain findings of the award. All that procedure will not be available if a reference is made to a third party for his opinion under this section. So it would not be proper to call the statement of the referee as an award.” 10. In Halsbury’s Laws of England (4th Edition, Vol. 17, Para 74) the selfsame rule has been expressed as extracted hereunder: “74. Admissions by referees - When a party agrees to be bound by what a third person says, or refers an opposite party to a third person for information or an opinion on a given subject, the third person's reply is admissible against the party so agreeing or referring and if the reference has been made by agreement it will be conclusive.” 11.Thus, when parties agree by a contract to refer disputes that may arise between them for opinion/resolution/adjudication by a third party who may be described as a referee/adjudicator, the opinion rendered or decision taken by the referee/adjudicator shall be binding on the parties in view of the principle of “vicarious admission”. It is not open to the parties to dishonour such a decision. Challenge to such decisions can be made as provided for in the contract and not otherwise. Purpose of incorporating dispute resolution clauses in contracts is to have a reciprocally agreed built-in mechanism for easy and swift resolution of disputes and the aforesaid cannot be permitted to be subjugated by any sides under normal circumstances. 12. We are of the view that the above said principles squarely apply to the facts of this case. Appellants and the respondent agreed to the dispute resolution mechanism as provided under Clause 25. Neither party can be permitted to wriggle out of the same. The decision of the Adjudicator regarding claims (m) and (n) binds the appellants as they did not chose to contest it by invoking the provision of the contract, i.e. by resorting to arbitration. Hence, we uphold the judgment of the learned Single Judge. Writ appeal is dismissed.