JUDGMENT : ROBIN PHUKAN, J. 1. Heard Mr. S.K. Medhi, learned counsel for the applicant; Mr. L. Khiangte, learned counsel for the opposite party No. 1 and Ms. L.L. Fambawl, learned Additional Advocate General for the opposite party Nos. 2, 3 & 4. 2. This interlocutory application, under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, is preferred by the applicant, North East Frontier Railways for condonation of delay of 488 days in preferring an appeal, against the Judgment, Order and Decree dated 01.04.2022, passed by the learned Senior Civil Judge, Kolasib, Mizoram, in Damage Suit No. 06/2019. 3. It is to be noted here that vide impugned Judgment, Order and Decree dated 01.04.2022, the learned trial court had directed the applicant to pay compensation, for causing damages to the crops and excess area of the plaintiff’s land, measuring about 2.62 Hectares, which was taken and destructed by the N.F. Railway in excess of the originally acquired area of 0.40 Hectare, while constructing a railway line from Bairabi to Sairang. 4. The opposite party/respondent No. 1 has opposed the petition and filed written objection for condoning the delay. It is stated that while the Judgment, Order and Decree was passed on 01.04.2022, the period of limitation for filing an appeal expired on 30.06.2022, and there is delay of 490 days, as on 02.11.2023, and the same has not been explained sufficiently. It is further stated that while the applicant’s counsel had sent his legal opinion on 13.06.2022, the Law Officer of N.F. Railway furnished his opinion on 26.07.2022, and the time period between 13.06.2022 and 26.07.2022, is 43 days and the same left unexplained. It is also stated that the case file was handed over to the present Central Government Counsel (CGC) on 15.03.2023, while the Law Officer had already furnished his legal opinion on 26.07.2022, and for a period of 7 months, i.e. 230 days, from 26.07.2022 – 14.03.2023, the applicant did not take any positive action. It is also stated that while the CGC has informed the railway official to furnish the reason for delay, the same was provided to him on 12.10.2023, after lapse of about 7 months, i.e. 210 days from 15.03.2023, and there is no mention about what actions were taken by the railway official during these 7 months and therefore, it is contended to dismiss the petition. 5. 5. It is to be noted here that the applicant had filed additional affidavit. It is stated that Law Officer had finally furnished legal opinion on 26.07.2022, challenging the order dated 01.04.2022. It is further stated that the Central Government has vide Memorandum dated 01.02.2022, held that new cases of Central Government will be conducted by CGC and earlier one Mr. Ali Hussain was engaged to draft the appeal, but the present Dy. Solicitor General of India, Gauhati High Court has received the case file on 30.09.2022, and he had allotted the case to the present CGC on 10.11.2022, and thereafter, on 15.03.2023, the case file was handed over to the present CGC. It is also stated that the present CGC has misplaced the file in his chamber due to shifting to the new chamber and thereafter, it was traced out on last week of August, 2023 and thereafter, on 18.09.2023, the mother of the CGC suffered demise and he was unable to prepare the draft appeal till 02.10.2023, and while he was preparing the draft, he took about 10 days time and therefore, it is contended to allow the petition. 6. Mr. Medhi, learned counsel for the applicant submits that the Judgment, Order and Decree dated 01.04.2022, was passed by the learned Senior Civil Judge, Kolasib, Mizoram, in Damage Suit No. 06/2019 and thereafter, the engaged counsel of the applicant in the said Damage Suit No. 06/2019, had sent legal opinion to the N.F. Railway on 13.06.2022, stating that good grounds exist for preferring an appeal against the said Judgment, Order and Decree dated 01.04.2022. Thereafter, the law official of N.F. Railway furnished legal opinion on 26.07.2022 and on 15.03.2023, the case file was handed over to the CGC and thereafter, the CGC informed the railway official that the reason has to be provided to him to prepare the draft of delay condonation petition and the same was provided to the present CGC on 12.10.2023, and while preparing the draft appeal and the delay condonation petition, after going through the record and other related documents, it took about 10 days time by the CGC and again the same was sent for vetting which took again 10 days time to finalize the same and on account of aforesaid reasons the delay of 488 days occurred in filing this appeal before this Court. Mr. Mr. Medhi further submits that the delay is not intentional and sufficient causes have been shown and that the applicant has arguable point in merit of the appeal and therefore, it is contended to allow the petition. 6.1. Mr. Medhi has referred to the following case laws to strengthen his submission: (i) Sheo Raj Singh (Deceased) thorough LRs. & Ors. vs. Union of India & Anr. 2023 (0) AIR (SC) 5109 (ii) State of Assam & Others vs. Relief Families Welfare Service Society & Others, I.A. (Civil) No. 1243/2017 (iii) Engineering Project (India) Ltd. & Others vs. M/s J.A. brothers, I.A. (Civil) No. 1334/2020 (iv) Ramesh Kumar Puri vs. Dugar Marketing Pvt. Ltd. C.M. (M) 2030/2023 & C.M. APPL. No. 63774/2023 (v) State of Manipur & Ors. vs. Khumanlamam Nilaroton Singh, 2007 (3) GLT 650 7. On the other hand, Mr. L. Khiangte, learned counsel for the opposite party No. 1 submits that there was gross negligence on the part of the applicant and though an attempt has been made to explain the delay, yet, 14 months remain unexplained by the applicant and as the delay could not be explained properly, it is contended that the petition may be dismissed. Mr. Khiangte has also referred following case laws in support of his submission: (i) ICIC Lombard General Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. Rupnath Brahmachaudhury & Anr. 2017 (2) GLT 487 (ii) Post Master General and Ors. vs. Living Media India Limited and Another, (2012) 3 SCC 563 8. Having heard the submissions of learned counsel for both the parties, I have carefully gone through the petition as well as the documents placed on record and also perused the case laws referred by learned counsel for both the parties. 9. Before directing a discussion into the points referred by the learned counsel it would be in the interest of justice to go through the decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court in respect of condonation of delay presently holding the field so to deal with the issue with greater precision. 10. Hon’ble Supreme Court in Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag vs. Mst. 9. Before directing a discussion into the points referred by the learned counsel it would be in the interest of justice to go through the decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court in respect of condonation of delay presently holding the field so to deal with the issue with greater precision. 10. Hon’ble Supreme Court in Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag vs. Mst. Katiji, (1987) 2 SCC 107 , has observed as under: “The legislature has conferred the power to condone delay by enacting Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act of 1963 in order to enable the courts to do substantial justice to parties by disposing of matters on “merits.” The expression “sufficient cause” employed by the legislature is adequately elastic to enable the courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which subserves the ends of justice - that being the life purpose for the existence of the institution of courts. It is common knowledge that this Court has been making a justifiably liberal approach in matters instituted in this Court. But the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the hierarchy, and such a liberal approach is adopted on principle as it is realized that: 1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late. 2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties. 3. “Every day's delay must be explained” does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every second's delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner. 4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non deliberate delay. 5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk. 6. 5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk. 6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so. Making a justice-oriented approach from this perspective, there was sufficient cause for condoning the delay in the institution of the appeal. The fact that it was the “State” which was seeking condonation and not a private party was altogether irrelevant. The doctrine of equality before law demands that all litigants, including the State as a litigant, are accorded the same treatment and the law is administered in an even-handed manner. There is no warrant for according a step-motherly treatment when the “State” is the applicant praying for condonation of delay. In fact experience shows that on account of an impersonal machinery (no one in charge of the matter is directly hit or hurt by the judgment sought to be subjected to appeal) and the inherited bureaucratic methodology imbued with the note-making, file-pushing and passing-on-the-buck ethos, delay on its part is less difficult to understand though more difficult to approve. In any event, the State which represents the collective cause of the community does not deserve a litigant-non-grata status. The courts therefore have to be informed with the spirit and philosophy of the provision in the course of the interpretation of the expression “sufficient cause.” So also the same approach has to be evidenced in its application to matters at hand with the end in view to do even- handed justice on merits in preference to the approach which scuttles a decision on merits.” 11. Again in N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy, (1998) 7 SCC 123 , Hon’ble Supreme Court went a step further and made the following observations: “It is axiomatic that condonation of delay is a matter of discretion of the court. Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not say that such discretion can be exercised only if the delay is within a certain limit. Length of delay is no matter; acceptability of the explanation is the only criterion. Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not say that such discretion can be exercised only if the delay is within a certain limit. Length of delay is no matter; acceptability of the explanation is the only criterion. Sometimes delay of the shortest range may be un-condonable due to a want of acceptable explanation whereas in certain other cases, delay of a very long range can be condoned as the explanation thereof is satisfactory. Once the court accepts the explanation as sufficient, it is the result of positive exercise of discretion and normally the superior court should not disturb such finding, much less in revisional jurisdiction, unless the exercise of discretion was on wholly untenable grounds or arbitrary or perverse. But it is a different matter when the first court refuses to condone the delay. In such cases, the superior court would be free to consider the cause shown for the delay afresh and it is open to such superior court to come to its own finding even untrammelled by the conclusion of the lower court. Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics, but seek their remedy promptly. The object of providing a legal remedy is to repair the damage caused by reason of legal injury. The law of limitation fixes a lifespan for such legal remedy for the redress of the legal injury so suffered. Time is precious and wasted time would never revisit. During the efflux of time, newer causes would sprout up necessitating newer persons to seek legal remedy by approaching the courts. So a lifespan must be fixed for each remedy. Unending period for launching the remedy may lead to unending uncertainty and consequential anarchy. The law of limitation is thus founded on public policy. It is enshrined in the maxim interest reipublicae up sit finis litium (it is for the general welfare that a period be put to litigation). Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of the parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but seek their remedy promptly. The idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a legislatively fixed period of time. Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of the parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but seek their remedy promptly. The idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a legislatively fixed period of time. It must be remembered that in every case of delay, there can be some lapse on the part of the litigant concerned. That alone is not enough to turn down his plea and to shut the door against him. If the explanation does not smack of mala fides or it is not put forth as part of a dilatory strategy, the court must show utmost consideration to the suitor. But when there is reasonable ground to think that the delay was occasioned by the party deliberately to gain time, then the court should lean against acceptance of the explanation. While condoning the delay, the court should not forget the opposite party altogether. It must be borne in mind that he is a loser and he too would have incurred quite large litigation expenses. It would be a salutary guideline that when courts condone the delay due to laches on the part of the applicant, the court shall compensate the opposite party for his loss.” 12. In the case of Esha Bhattacharjee Vs. Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy reported in (supra) Hon’ble Supreme Court, referring to earlier authorities, broadly culled out the principles of condonation of delay as under: (i) There should be a liberal, pragmatic, justice-oriented, non-pedantic approach while dealing with an application for condonation of delay, for the courts are not supposed to legalise injustice but are obliged to remove injustice. (ii) The terms “sufficient cause” should be understood in their proper spirit, philosophy and purpose regard being had to the fact that these terms are basically elastic and are to be applied in proper perspective to the obtaining fact-situation. (iii) Substantial justice being paramount and pivotal the technical considerations should not be given undue and uncalled for emphasis. (iv) No presumption can be attached to deliberate causation of delay but, gross negligence on the part of the counsel or litigant is to be taken note of. (v) Lack of bona fides imputable to a party seeking condonation of delay is a significant and relevant fact. (iv) No presumption can be attached to deliberate causation of delay but, gross negligence on the part of the counsel or litigant is to be taken note of. (v) Lack of bona fides imputable to a party seeking condonation of delay is a significant and relevant fact. (vi) It is to be kept in mind that adherence to strict proof should not affect public justice and cause public mischief because the courts are required to be vigilant so that in the ultimate eventuate there is no real failure of justice. (vii) The concept of liberal approach has to encapsule the conception of reasonableness and it cannot be allowed a totally unfettered free play. (viii) There is a distinction between inordinate delay and a delay of short duration or few days, for to the former doctrine of prejudice is attracted whereas to the latter it may not be attracted. That apart, the first one warrants strict approach whereas the second calls for a liberal delineation. (ix) The conduct, behaviour and attitude of a party relating to its inaction or negligence are relevant factors to be taken into consideration. It is so as the fundamental principle is that the courts are required to weigh the scale of balance of justice in respect of both parties and the said principle cannot be given a total go by in the name of liberal approach. (x) If the explanation offered is concocted or the grounds urged in the application are fanciful, the courts should be vigilant not to expose the other side unnecessarily to face such a litigation. (xi) It is to be borne in mind that no one gets away with fraud, misrepresentation or interpolation by taking recourse to the technicalities of law of limitation. (xii) The entire gamut of facts are to be carefully scrutinized and the approach should be based on the paradigm of judicial discretion which is founded on objective reasoning and not on individual perception. (xiii) The State or a public body or an entity representing a collective cause should be given some acceptable latitude. 13. To the aforesaid principles, Hon’ble Supreme Court also added some more guidelines taking note of the present day scenario, in the said case. (xiii) The State or a public body or an entity representing a collective cause should be given some acceptable latitude. 13. To the aforesaid principles, Hon’ble Supreme Court also added some more guidelines taking note of the present day scenario, in the said case. They are: (a) An application for condonation of delay should be drafted with careful concern and not in a half hazard manner harbouring the notion that the courts are required to condone delay on the bedrock of the principle that adjudication of a lis on merits is seminal to justice dispensation system. (b) An application for condonation of delay should not be dealt with in a routine manner on the base of individual philosophy which is basically subjective. (c) Though no precise formula can be laid down regard being had to the concept of judicial discretion, yet a conscious effort for achieving consistency and collegiality of the adjudicatory system should be made as that is the ultimate institutional motto. (d) The increasing tendency to perceive delay as a non-serious matter and, hence, lackadaisical propensity can be exhibited in a non-challant manner requires to be curbed, of course, within legal parameters. 14. Again in the case of Pundlik Jalam Patil v. Executive Engineer, Jalgaon Medium Project, (2008) 17 SCC 448 , while dealing with the issue of condonation of delay Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under: “29. It needs no restatement at our hands that the object for fixing time-limit for litigation is based on public policy fixing a lifespan for legal remedy for the purpose of general welfare. They are meant to see that the parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but avail their legal remedies promptly. Salmond in his Jurisprudence states that the laws come to the assistance of the vigilant and not of the sleepy. 30. Public interest undoubtedly is a paramount consideration in exercising the courts' discretion wherever conferred upon it by the relevant statutes. Pursuing stale claims and multiplicity of proceedings in no manner subserves public interest. Prompt and timely payment of compensation to the landlosers facilitating their rehabilitation/ resettlement is equally an integral part of public policy. 30. Public interest undoubtedly is a paramount consideration in exercising the courts' discretion wherever conferred upon it by the relevant statutes. Pursuing stale claims and multiplicity of proceedings in no manner subserves public interest. Prompt and timely payment of compensation to the landlosers facilitating their rehabilitation/ resettlement is equally an integral part of public policy. Public interest demands that the State or the beneficiary of acquisition, as the case may be, should not be allowed to indulge in any act to unsettle the settled legal rights accrued in law by resorting to avoidable litigation unless the claimants are guilty of deriving benefit to which they are otherwise not entitled, in any fraudulent manner. One should not forget the basic fact that what is acquired is not the land but the livelihood of the landlosers. These public interest parameters ought to be kept in mind by the courts while exercising the discretion dealing with the application filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. Dragging the landlosers to courts of law years after the termination of legal proceedings would not serve any public interest. Settled rights cannot be lightly interfered with by condoning inordinate delay without there being any proper explanation of such delay on the ground of involvement of public revenue. It serves no public interest. 31. It is true that when the State and its instrumentalities are the applicants seeking condonation of delay they may be entitled to certain amount of latitude but the law of limitation is same for citizen and for governmental authorities. The Limitation Act does not provide for a different period to the Government in filing appeals or applications as such. It would be a different matter where the Government makes out a case where public interest was shown to have suffered owing to acts of fraud or collusion on the part of its officers or agents and where the officers were clearly at cross purposes with it. In a given case if any such facts are pleaded or proved they cannot be excluded from consideration and those factors may go into the judicial verdict. In the present case, no such facts are pleaded and proved though a feeble attempt by the learned counsel for the respondent was made to suggest collusion and fraud but without any basis. In a given case if any such facts are pleaded or proved they cannot be excluded from consideration and those factors may go into the judicial verdict. In the present case, no such facts are pleaded and proved though a feeble attempt by the learned counsel for the respondent was made to suggest collusion and fraud but without any basis. We cannot entertain the submission made across the Bar without there being any proper foundation in the pleadings.” 15. The legal proposition, which can be crystallized from the aforesaid decisions and discussion, is that courts are not supposed to legalize injustice, but are obliged to remove injustice. Therefore, liberal, pragmatic, justice-oriented, non- pedantic approach has to be adopted while dealing with an application for condonation of delay if ‘sufficient cause’ is being shown. The terms ‘sufficient cause’ should be understood in their proper spirit, philosophy and purpose and regard being had to the fact that these terms are basically elastic and are to be applied in proper perspective to the obtaining fact- situation. The paramount and pivotal consideration is substantial justice; the technical considerations should not be given undue and uncalled for emphasis. In respect of deliberate causation of delay the presumption is not available but, gross negligence on the part of the counsel or litigant is to be taken note of, besides lack of bona fides imputable to a party seeking condonation of delay, which is a significant and relevant fact. The courts should not adhere to strict proof, but required to be vigilant so that there is no real failure of justice. The approach of the court must be liberal but at the same time it must be reasonable also. In case of inordinate delay strict approach is required to be taken while in case of delay of short duration a liberal delineation is required. The fundamental principle, being weighing the scale of balance of justice in respect of both parties and the said principle cannot be given a total go by in the name of liberal approach. While condoning delay the conduct, behaviour and attitude of a party relating to its inaction or negligence are relevant factors to be taken into consideration. In the case of the explanation, being offered is concocted or the grounds urged in the application are fanciful, the courts should be vigilant not to expose the other side unnecessarily to face such litigation. While condoning delay the conduct, behaviour and attitude of a party relating to its inaction or negligence are relevant factors to be taken into consideration. In the case of the explanation, being offered is concocted or the grounds urged in the application are fanciful, the courts should be vigilant not to expose the other side unnecessarily to face such litigation. The entire gamuts of facts are to be carefully scrutinized and the approach should be based on the paradigm of judicial discretion which is founded on objective reasoning and not on individual perception. The State or a public body or an entity, representing a collective cause, should be given some acceptable latitude. But, the law of limitation is same for citizen and for governmental authorities. 16. Thus, having informed ourselves about the proposition of law presently holding the field in respect of condonation of delay, now an endeavour will be made how far the applicant has been able to explain the delay of 488 days in preferring the connected appeal. 17. It appears that the learned Senior Civil Judge, Kolasib, Mizoram has passed the Judgment, Order and Decree dated 01.04.2022, in Damage Suit No. 06/2019 and period of limitation for filing an appeal till 30.06.2022, but the same could not be filed and it was filed only on 02.11.2023, with some explanation for the delay. It further appears that earlier one Mr. Ali Hussain, engaged counsel for the railway was conducting the case and thereafter, the Central Government has issued a notification on 01.02.2022, where it has been held that the new cases of Central Government will be conducted by CGC and thereafter, the case file was handed over to the present CGC, Mr. Medhi and he received the file on 15.03.2023. It also appears that after 15.03.2023, the CGC has changed his chamber, on account of which the file was misplaced and traced out only in the last week of August, 2023. It also appears that on 18.09.2023, the mother of the present CGC suffered demise and on account of funeral and other related rituals of his mother, he could not prepare the draft till 02.10.2023, and thereafter, he took 10 days time to prepare the same and the same was sent for vetting which took again 10 days time. 18. The grounds so assigned for the delay, appear to be not at all satisfactory. 18. The grounds so assigned for the delay, appear to be not at all satisfactory. There was lapse on the part of the applicant in taking a decision to file an appeal and thereafter, handing over the file to the CGC. However, after handing over the file to the CGC, the learned CGC has misplaced the file and could not trace out the same and only in the last week of August, 2023 and thereafter, the mother of the present CGC suffered demise and on account of funeral and other related rituals of his mother, he could not prepare the draft till 02.10.2023. 19. It is to be noted here that the doctrine of equality before law demands that all litigants, including the State as a litigant, are to be accorded the same treatment and the law has to be administered in an even-handed manner, as held in the case of Mst. Katiji (supra). At the same time it has also to be noted here that being a government organization the applicant deserve some acceptable latitude. But, the applicant has failed to make out a cause where the public interest was shown to have suffered owing to acts of fraud or collusion on the part of its officers or agents. 20. It is to be noted here that the observation made by Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Pundlik Jalam Patil (supra) as discussed herein above, is very much relevant here in this case., where it has been categorically held that “one should not forget the basic fact that what is acquired is not the land, but the livelihood of the landlosers. These public interest parameters ought to be kept in mind by the courts while exercising the discretion dealing with the application filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. Dragging the landlosers to courts of law years after the termination of legal proceedings would not serve any public interest. Settled rights cannot be lightly interfered with by condoning inordinate delay without there being any proper explanation of such delay on the ground of involvement of public revenue. It serves no public interest.” 21. Thus, having carefully scrutinized the entire gamut of facts, this court is of the considered opinion that the delay of 488 days, which occurred here in filing the connected appeal, could not be explained properly by the applicant. It serves no public interest.” 21. Thus, having carefully scrutinized the entire gamut of facts, this court is of the considered opinion that the delay of 488 days, which occurred here in filing the connected appeal, could not be explained properly by the applicant. There is serious lapse on the part of the applicant and if the same is condoned, it would amount to putting a premium upon the lapses on the part of the applicant. Lack of bona-fides is writ large on the face of the record. 22. I have also gone through the case laws referred by Mr. Medhi, learned counsel for the applicant and I find that there is no quarrel at the bar regarding the proposition of law laid down in the said case. But, in view of the discussion and finding herein above, this court is of the view that the same would not advance his argument. Also I have gone through the decisions referred by Mr. Khiangte, the learned counsel for the opposite party No. 1 and the same undoubtedly, has strengthened his submission. But, discussions of all those cases are found to be not necessary for deciding the present application in view of the settled proposition of law as discussed herein above. 23. In the result, this Court finds no merit in this application. Accordingly, the I.A. and the connected appeal stand dismissed. The parties have to bear their own cost.