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2024 DIGILAW 1147 (ALL)

Ram Bhul v. State Of UP

2024-04-29

KSHITIJ SHAILENDRA, MANOJ KUMAR GUPTA

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JUDGMENT : Hon’ble Kshitij Shailendra, J. 1. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 2. Since both the aforesaid writ petitions involve common questions of fact and law, therefore, the same are being decided by a common judgment. For the sake of convenience, Writ-C No.11036 of 2024 (Ram Bhul Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and 3 others) is being treated as the leading case. 3. These two writ petitions have been filed assailing the identical orders dated 18.08.2002 whereby the Additional District Magistrate (Land Acquisition) Joint Organisation, Ghaziabad has rejected the applications filed by the petitioners under Section 28A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’) as barred by limitation and also for not being accompanied by certified copy of the order passed in reference proceedings under Section 18 of the Act. 4. The case of the petitioner of Writ-C No.11036 of 2024 (Ram Bhul Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and 3 others) is that his father was a recorded tenure holder of land covered by various Khasaras, details whereof have been mentioned in paragraph no.5 of the said writ petition. The case of petitioner of Writ-C No.11042 of 2024 (Ramdas Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and 3 others) is that his father was a recorded tenure holder of land covered by Khasra No.318 having area 0-16-5, Khasra No.609 having area 1-1-0 and Khasra No.319 having area 0-1-6, total area 1-18-11, situated at Village Harsaon, Pargana Dasna, Tehsil and District Ghaziabad. 5. The facts of the case, as noted from the leading writ petition, are that the State Government issued a notification dated 28.12.1963 under Section 4 of the Act, which was published in daily newspapers on 04.01.1964 declaring its intention to acquire the land situated in villages Raispur, Razapur and Sinhani for the purpose of development work to be carried by Central Public Works Department. The notification was followed by another notification dated 24.07.1965 under Section 6/17(1) of the Act. The possession of the land was taken by the Government on 09.03.1973 and an award was made under Section 11 of the Act by the Land Acquisition Officer, Ghaziabad on 22.09.1986 declaring compensation at the rate of Rs.1.90 per square yard. 6. Being aggrieved by the award, affected persons sought reference under Section 18 of the Act for enhancement of compensation. 6. Being aggrieved by the award, affected persons sought reference under Section 18 of the Act for enhancement of compensation. These were registered on the following number:- (1) Land Acquisition Reference (L.A.R.) No.25 of 1987 (Ran Singh and others Vs. State of U.P.) (2) Land Acquisition Reference (L.A.R.) No.26 of 1987 (Ganga Ram and others Vs. State of U.P.) (3) Land Acquisition Reference (L.A.R.) No.29 of 1987 (Nathan Singh and others Vs. State of U.P.) (4) Land Acquisition Reference (L.A.R.) No.27 of 1987 (Ram Kishan Vs. State of U.P.) (5) Land Acquisition Reference (L.A.R.) No.30 of 1987 (Khoob Singh and others Vs. State of U.P.) 7. The aforesaid land references were decided by the Additional District Judge, 5, Ghaziabad by common judgment dated 30.03.1991 whereby the compensation was enhanced from Rs.1.90 per square yard to Rs.8 per square yard and the claimants were held entitled for additional compensation, solatium as well as statutory interest. Against the order of reference court dated 30.03.1991, three land owners filed first appeals before this Court, description whereof is given below:- (1) First Appeal No.809 of 1993 (Ran Singh Vs. State of U.P.); (2) First Appeal Defective No.322 of 1992 (Converted as regular First Appeal No.388 of 2015) (Nathan Singh & others Vs. State of U.P.; and (3) First Appeal Defective No.248 of 1992, (Converted as regular First Appeal No.357 of 2016) (Ganga Ram and others Vs. State of U.P.). 8. It is further pleaded that the State Government also filed five first appeals before this Court against the same order dated 30.03.1991, as detailed below:- (1) First Appeal Defective No.612 of 1991 (Converted as regular First Appeal No.1140 of 2003) (State of Uttar Pradesh Vs. Ran Singh); (2) First Appeal Defective No.614 of 1991 (Converted as regular First Appeal No.1119 of 2003) (State of Uttar Pradesh Vs. Ram Kishan); (3) First Appeal Defective No.609 of 1991 (Converted as regular First Appeal No.1143 of 2003) (State of Uttar Pradesh Vs. Ran Khoob Singh) (4) First Appeal Defective No.613 of 1991 (Converted as regular First Appeal No.1104 of 2003) (State of Uttar Pradesh Vs. Natthan); and (5) First Appeal Defective No.611 of 1991 (Converted as regular First Appeal No.1138 of 2003) (State of Uttar Pradesh Vs. Ganga Ram). 9. Ran Khoob Singh) (4) First Appeal Defective No.613 of 1991 (Converted as regular First Appeal No.1104 of 2003) (State of Uttar Pradesh Vs. Natthan); and (5) First Appeal Defective No.611 of 1991 (Converted as regular First Appeal No.1138 of 2003) (State of Uttar Pradesh Vs. Ganga Ram). 9. The case of the petitioner is that he, being a poor villager, had no knowledge of the orders passed by the reference court and when he heard about the same in the village, he contacted his counsel on 05.07.1992, who suggested him to file an application under Section 28A of the Act. Consequently, the petitioner filed an application under Section 28A before the Special Land Acquisition Officer, Ghaziabad on 27.07.1992. 10. It appears that the Special Land Acquisition Officer passed an award on 16.08.1992 on applications moved by few landowners, other than the petitioner, u/s 28A, against which the Union of India filed writ petitions No.31447 of 1992, 31448 of 1992, 31449 of 1992 and 31450 of 1992 which were allowed by this Court by a common judgment dated 27.03.2003 observing that since the first appeals against the award dated 30.03.1991 were pending, the applications filed under Section 28A of the Act should have been kept pending till disposal of the appeals. Consequently, the award dated 16.08.1992 was quashed and it was observed that the applications filed under Section 28A of the Act would be kept pending by the Collector/ Land Acquisition Officer and would be decided in accordance with law after the decisions in the pending first appeals. 11. It is also pleaded in the writ petition that, in the meantime, First Appeal No.809 of 1993 (Ran Singh Vs. State of U.P.) was allowed on 10.01.2002 and this Court enhanced the compensation from Rs.8 per square yard to Rs.84 per square yard. Central Public Works Department filed a review application along with impleadment application in First Appeal No.809 of 1993 and State of Uttar Pradesh also carried the same judgment to the Supreme Court by filing SLP (Civil) No.5022 of 2004, which was dismissed on the ground of delay on 19.07.2004. The State of Uttar Pradesh filed a Review Application No.227 of 2005 before the Apex Court, which was also dismissed on 15.02.2005. The State of Uttar Pradesh filed a Review Application No.227 of 2005 before the Apex Court, which was also dismissed on 15.02.2005. Thereafter, by order dated 12.08.2009, the review application along with impleadment application filed by Central Public Works Department in First Appeal No.809 of 1993 was also rejected by this Court. The said department filed two Special Leave Petitions before the Supreme Court, being SLP (Civil) Nos.16202 and 16203 of 2010 against the aforesaid orders dated 10.01.2002 and 12.08.2009, however, the same were also dismissed by order dated 18.07.2011. Thereafter, First Appeal No.1140 of 2003 (State of Uttar Pradesh Vs. Ran Singh), First Appeal No.1119 of 2003 (State of Uttar Pradesh Vs. Ram Kishan) and First Appeal No.1143 of 2003 (State of Uttar Pradesh Vs. Ran Khoob Singh) filed by the State were also dismissed by this Court. 12. Learned counsel for the petitioner urges that rejection of his application as barred by limitation by the order impugned is not just and proper, inasmuch as, the Additional District Magistrate (Land Acquisition) Joint Organisation, Ghaziabad should have considered the effect of aforesaid proceedings coupled with the fact that there was a delay of only about one year and four months in filing the application under Section 28A from the date when the reference court had decided the references in the year 1991 and in view of the explanation furnished, the delay was liable to be condoned. 13. Per contra, learned Additional Solicitor General of India and Sri Rajiv Gupta, learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel submit that Section 28A of the Act provides three months limitation for filing the application and the said period would commence from the date of award of the court and since, admittedly, the petitioner filed the application beyond time, there is no illegality in the order impugned. 14. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties, we may first refer to the provisions under Section 28A of the Act, 1894, which reads as follows:- “28A. Re-determination of the amount of compensation on the basis of the award of the Court. 14. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties, we may first refer to the provisions under Section 28A of the Act, 1894, which reads as follows:- “28A. Re-determination of the amount of compensation on the basis of the award of the Court. -(1) where in an award under this part, the court allows to the applicant any amount of compensation in excess of the amount awarded by the collector under section 11, the persons interested in all the other land covered by the same notification under section 4, sub-section (1) and who are also aggrieved by the award of the Collector may, notwithstanding that they had not made an application to the Collector under section 18, by written application to the Collector within three months from the date of the award of the Court require that the amount of compensation payable to them may be re-determined on the basis of the amount of compensation awarded by the court: Provided that in computing the period of three months within which an application to the Collector shall be made under this sub-section, the day on which the award was pronounced and the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the award shall be excluded. (2) The Collector shall, on receipt of an application under subsection (1), conduct an inquiry after giving notice to all the persons interested and giving them a reasonable opportunity of being heard, and make an award determining the amount of compensation payable to the applicants. (3) Any person who has not accepted the award under subsection (2) may, by written application to the Collector, required that the matter be referred by the Collector for the determination of the Court and the provisions of sections 18 to 28 shall, so far as may be, apply to such reference as they apply to a reference under section 18.” 15. The language used in Section 28A is plain and simple and the period within which the person aggrieved by the award of the Collector may file a written application under the said provision, is three months from the date of the award of the court, i.e. the reference court, and it is only in that eventuality that the Collector is under obligation to re-determine the amount of compensation on the basis of decision of the reference court. There is no provision for condonation of delay under the Act, 1894 whereunder an applicant may justify belated filing of the application under section 28A. 16. The Supreme Court in Union of India & Ors. v. Mangatu Ram & Ors., (1997) 6 SCC 59 ; and Tota Ram v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. (1997) 6 SCC 280 dealt with the issue involved herein and held that as the Land Acquisition Collector is not a court and acts as a quasi judicial authority while making the award, the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 would not apply and, therefore, the application under Section 28A of the Act has to be filed within the period of limitation as prescribed therein. In the same judgment, the Supreme Court observed that law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes and that the Court has no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. The statutory provision may cause hardship or inconvenience to a particular party but the Court has no choice but to enforce it giving full effect to the same. The legal maxim "dura lex sed lex" which means "the law is hard but it is the law", stands attracted in such a situation and that inconvenience is not a decisive factor to be considered while interpreting a statute. It was further held that a result flowing from a statutory provision is never an evil and a Court has no power to ignore that provision to relieve what it considers a distress resulting from its operation. (See : Martin Burn Ltd. v. Corporation of Calcutta, AIR 1966 SC 529 ; and Rohitas Kumar & Ors. v. Om Prakash Sharma & Ors., (2012) 13 SCC 792 : AIR 2013 SC 30 ). The aforesaid judgments were further considered with affirmance in the case of Popat Bahiru Govardhane and others Vs. Special Land Acquisition Officer and another, (2013) 10 SCC 765 . 17. In State of Andhra Pradesh and another Vs. Marri Venkaiah and others, (2003) 7 SCC 280 , the Supreme Court observed that plain language of Section 28A would only mean that the period of limitation is three months from the date of the Award of the Court. Special Land Acquisition Officer and another, (2013) 10 SCC 765 . 17. In State of Andhra Pradesh and another Vs. Marri Venkaiah and others, (2003) 7 SCC 280 , the Supreme Court observed that plain language of Section 28A would only mean that the period of limitation is three months from the date of the Award of the Court. It is also provided that in computing the period of three months, the day on which the award was pronounced and the time requisite for obtaining the copy of the award is to be excluded. Hence, it is difficult to infer further exclusion of time on the ground of being unaware of the award of the reference court. 18. Once the legal position emerging out of the aforesaid precedents is clear that an application filed beyond the statutory period of three months cannot be entertained on merits, the court now deals with the other submission of learned counsel for the petitioner based upon the proceedings of first appeals preferred by the State as well as challenge made by the Union of India through writ petitions referred to in this judgment. 19. Learned counsel for the petitioner vehemently argued that since this Court, while deciding Writ Petition Nos.31447 of 1992, 31448 of 1992, 31449 of 1992 and 31450 of 1992 filed by Union of India, observed about pendency of first appeals against the award dated 30.03.1991 and while allowing the said writ petitions, this Court observed that the applications filed under Section 28A would be decided after decision in the first appeals, the application filed by the petitioner should have been decided on merits and could not be dismissed as barred by limitation. 20. This Court is not in a position to accept even the said submission for the reason that while deciding Writ Petition Nos.31447 of 1992, 31448 of 1992, 31449 of 1992 and 31450 of 1992, the observation made by this Court as regards applications under Section 28-A would be read in relation to those applications only which were filed by the concerned parties to the said lis in accordance with law and certainly well within the period of three months prescribed under the provision itself. This Court cannot read the order dated 27.03.2003 to infer that a person aggrieved by an award who does not file application within the statutory period would also be entitled for consideration of his claim under Section 28A on merits or that his application cannot be dismissed on the ground of limitation. This Court nowhere observed in the order dated 27.03.2003 that every application, whether maintainable or not, should be decided on merits, rather the observation, even in relation to pending applications, was for a decision "in accordance with law". 21. The law relating to starting point of limitation for making an application under Section 28-A of the Act is well settled to the effect that the said period would not commence from the date of the order of the appellate court but the starting point would be the date on which reference court had made its award. The redetermination can be claimed only in reference to an award passed by the "Court" under Part III of the Act, 1894 which comprises Sections 18 to 28A. The expression "Court" which has been referred under Section 28A is the Court as defined under Section 3(d) to mean "a principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction". It clearly goes to show that the award which is being referred to under Section 28A(1) is the award made by Reference Court alone. The application under Section 28A thus cannot be filed for redetermination of compensation on the basis of the award as made by the High Court in the first appeal. 22. In this regard we may refer to the judgment in the case of Babua Ram & Ors. Vs. State of UP & Anr. (1995) 2 SCC 689 , the relevant portion of which is being extracted below:- "19. The next question is as to when the period of limitation of three months begins to run under Section 28-A and whether successive awards made by civil court at different times in respect of the land covered by the same notification furnish separate causes of action for making applications under Section 28-A. Let us consider the meaning of the words "an award under this part" referred to in Section 28-A(1) which is Part III of the Act. The heading to that part begins by reference to court and its procedure. The heading to that part begins by reference to court and its procedure. The ''court' means a principal civil court of original jurisdiction or a special judicial officer appointed to perform the functions of the court under the Act as becomes clear as is noticed already. What are the matters to be considered in determining the compensation on a reference made to it under Section 18, is detailed in Section 23 while matters to be neglected in determining such compensation are indicated in Section 24. By operation of sub-section (2) of Section 26, the award made determining the amount of compensation shall be deemed to be a decree while the statement of the grounds of every such award is deemed to be the judgment, for the purpose of Code of Civil Procedure. The above perspectives from Part III make it clear that the award of the court is that of the civil court of original jurisdiction in that part. It is a decree for the purpose of an appeal under Section 54 which falls in Part VIII of the Act (Miscellaneous). The decree as defined in Section 2(2) CPC is the decree of the High Court, which shall be appealable to the Supreme Court under Articles 132, 133 and 136 read with Order 45 CPC. Hence, the award of the court referred to in sub-section (1) of Section 28-A is only the award of the civil court of original jurisdiction or of judicial officer performing the functions of such court under the Act on reference received by it under Section 18 and an award and decree pronounced under Section 26 of the Act. Since, the judgment and decree of the High Court under Section 54 or of this Court do not come in Part III of the Act, they stand excluded from an award envisaged under sub-section (1) of Section 28-A. The aggrieved interested person, therefore, is entitled to the right and remedy of making an application under Section 28-A for redetermination of compensation for his acquired land only on the basis of the award of the civil court or judicial officer which is a judgment and decree under Section 26 when such award grants compensation in excess of the amount awarded by the Collector under Section 11. When such an application is made in writing by the aggrieved person, notwithstanding the fact of his having received compensation under Section 31 without protest and of not availing the right and remedy of the reference under Section 18, the redetermination of the compensation under Section 28-A(1) is required to be done." 23. The aforementioned judgment was followed in the case of Union of India & Ors. Vs. Karnail Singh & Ors., (1995) 2 SCC 728 , and it was held that the limitation of three months for making an application for redetermination of compensation must be computed from the date of earliest award made by the Civil Court and not the judgment of the Appellate Court. 24. In Jose Antonio Cruz Dos R. Rodriguese & another. Vs. Land Acquisition Collector & another, (1996) 6 SCC 746 a three-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court held that the limitation of three months for making application for redetermination of compensation must be computed from the date of award of Reference Court on the basis of which redetermination is sought and not from the order of the Appellate Court dealing with the appeal against the award of the Reference Court. 25. The view that Section 28A does not apply to an order made by the High Court and that the claimant could seek redetermination of the compensation only on the basis of the award of the Reference Court and not the judgment of the High Court was reiterated in Bhagti (Smt.) (deceased) Vs. State of Haryana, (1997) 4 SCC 473 . It was further held that an application for redetermination of compensation that was filed within three months from the date of the judgment of the High Court but beyond the limitation from the date of the award of the Reference Court, was not maintainable. The observations made in this regard in the aforesaid judgment are being extracted below:- "6. Thus only those claimants who had failed to apply for a reference under Section 18 of the Act are conferred with the right to apply for redetermination under Section 28-A(1). The observations made in this regard in the aforesaid judgment are being extracted below:- "6. Thus only those claimants who had failed to apply for a reference under Section 18 of the Act are conferred with the right to apply for redetermination under Section 28-A(1). But all those who had not only sought a reference under Section 18 but had also filed an appeal in the High Court against the award made by the Reference Court are not entitled to avail of the remedy under Section 28-A. Equally, the right and remedy of redetermination would be available only when the Reference Court under Section 18 has enhanced the compensation in an award and decree under Section 26. Within three months from the date of the Reference Court excluding the time taken under the proviso, the applicant whose land was acquired under the same notification but who failed to avail of the remedy under Section 18, would be entitled to avail of the right and remedy under Section 28-A. The order and judgment of the High Court does not give such right. Thus, this Court held that Section 28-A does not apply to an order made by the High Court for redetermination of the compensation. Thus, we hold that the question of reference to the Constitution Bench does not arise. The claimants are not entitled to make an application for redetermination of compensation under Section 28-A(1) after the judgment of the High Court; nor are the claimants entitled to avail of that award which is more beneficial to the claimants, i.e., the High Court judgment." 26. The view taken in the judgment of Bhagti (supra) has been followed in a subsequent judgment in State of Orissa & Ors. Vs. Chitrasen Bhoi, (2009) 17 SCC 74 , and it was stated as follows:- 11. In Bhagti v. State of Haryana [ (1997) 4 SCC 473 ] this Court held that a claimant can seek redetermination of compensation on the basis of the award of the Reference Court and not the judgment of the High Court and further held that only those claimants who had failed to apply for a reference under Section 18 of the Act are conferred with the right to apply for redetermination under Section 28-A(1) of the Act. The same view has been reiterated in Union of India v. Bant Ram [ (1996) 4 SCC 537 ]." 27. The same view has been reiterated in Union of India v. Bant Ram [ (1996) 4 SCC 537 ]." 27. We may also refer to the judgments in Smt. Kamla Tomar Vs. State of UP & 2 Ors. 2017 (3) ADJ 659 and Dheer Singh & 3 Ors. Vs. State of UP & Ors., 2017 (3) ADJ 545 , wherein Coordinate Division Benches of this Court have taken the same view. 28. In view of the above discussion, the Court holds that rejection of the application filed by the petitioner as barred by limitation is perfectly in accordance with law. 29. No other point was argued. 30. The writ petition is devoid of merits and is, accordingly, dismissed.