JUDGMENT : B. SYAMSUNDER, J. 1. The defendants in O.S. No. 628 of 2005 on the file of Principal Junior Civil Judge’s Court, Tadepalligudem are the appellants. The respondents are the plaintiffs in the suit. 2. The appellants and the respondents hereinafter referred to as defendants and plaintiffs as arrayed before the trial Court. 3. The plaintiffs instituted the suit against the defendants for recovery of promissory note debt with interest, amounting to Rs.85,000/- and costs. 4. The case of the plaintiffs in brief is that one late Mr. K. Gopala Krishna, and his son Mr. Sita Rama Rao (1st defendant) jointly borrowed a sum of Rs.50,000/- from late Mr. M. Arjuna, who is the husband of the 1st plaintiff and father of the plaintiff Nos.2 to 4 for their business purpose, agreeing to repay the same with interest at 24% per annum and executed a demand promissory note in favour of late Mr. M. Arjuna on 01.12.2002. The plaintiffs submit that the 2nd defendant is the scribe of promissory note, who is no other than one of sons of 1st executants late Mr. K. Gopala Krishna. It is also the contention of the plaintiffs that on 09.06.2005 Mr. M. Arjuna died intestate, leaving behind them as legal heirs, due to that they are entitled to recover suit debt. They also stated that one of the executants Mr. K. Gopala Krishna also died in December, 2004, leaving behind the defendants as legal heirs, due to that both the defendants are liable to pay the suit debt, out of the estate of the deceased-Mr. K. Gopala Krishna and the 1st defendant is personally liable for the suit amount. They submit that they demanded the defendants for repayment of promissory note debt and also issued registered notice dated 01.10.2005, which failed to receive by the defendants and they avoided to receive the same. Hence, the suit. 5. The defendants have filed written statement, resisting the claim of the plaintiffs. It is the contention of the defendants that their father Mr. K. Gopala Krishna originally borrowed a sum of Rs.35,000/- from the deceased-Mr. M. Arjuna and executed promissory note in the presence of attestors, scribed by the 2nd defendant. They have stated that when Mr. 5. The defendants have filed written statement, resisting the claim of the plaintiffs. It is the contention of the defendants that their father Mr. K. Gopala Krishna originally borrowed a sum of Rs.35,000/- from the deceased-Mr. M. Arjuna and executed promissory note in the presence of attestors, scribed by the 2nd defendant. They have stated that when Mr. M. Arjuna raised dispute before the elders and obtained another promissory note, i.e. suit promissory note for an amount of Rs.50,000/-, which also scribed by the 2nd defendant, but after one month of execution of suit promissory note, said Mr. M. Arjuna obtained the signature of the 1st defendant on the suit promissory note, but their father Mr. K. Gopala Krishna discharged the original debt of Rs.45,000/- with interest to Mr. M. Arjuna, who also returned the said promissory note, and not returned the suit promissory note, on the ground that it was misplaced. It is also the contention of the defendants that their father Mr. K. Gopala Krishna died on 03.05.2004, whereas Mr. M. Arjuna died on 09.06.2005, but after the death of Mr. M. Arjuna, the 1st plaintiff by colluding with other plaintiffs brought into existence suit promissory note and filed false suit against them, which is not supported by consideration. They also stated that the attestors were not present at the time of execution of suit promissory note and they are the relatives of the plaintiffs who signed afterwards. They have stated that their father Mr. K. Gopala Krishna also got one daughter by name K.Syamala Kumari, and the plaintiffs are not entitled to obtain a decree without obtaining any Succession Certificate from the Court. They pray to dismiss the suit. 6. The trial Court basing on the above pleadings, settled the following issues and additional issue: “1. Whether the deceased-Koduri Gopala Krishna (original borrower) discharged Rs.45,000/- with interest? 2. Whether the suit promissory note is true, valid and binding on the defendants? 3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for suit claim against the estate of the deceased-K. Gopala Krishna? 4. To what relief?” ADDITIONAL ISSUE: “Whether the suit is bad for non-joinder of necessary and proper parties?” 7. The parties went to trial. On behalf of the plaintiffs, the 2nd plaintiff was examined as PW-1, and got marked Exs.A1 to A3. 3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for suit claim against the estate of the deceased-K. Gopala Krishna? 4. To what relief?” ADDITIONAL ISSUE: “Whether the suit is bad for non-joinder of necessary and proper parties?” 7. The parties went to trial. On behalf of the plaintiffs, the 2nd plaintiff was examined as PW-1, and got marked Exs.A1 to A3. On behalf of the defendants, the 2nd defendant was examined as DW-1 and the 1st defendant was examined as DW-2, and got marked Ex.B1. 8. On appreciation of oral and documentary evidence, the trial Court decreed the suit as prayed for. 9. Aggrieved by the Judgment and Decree passed by the trial Court, the defendants presented A.S. No. 36 of 2009 on the file of Senior Civil Judge’s Court, Tadepalligudem, which was dismissed by the First Appellate Court, confirming the Judgment and Decree passed by the trial Court. 10. In these circumstances, the present Second Appeal is presented. 11. I have heard learned Counsel for the appellants/defendants Mr. D.V. Madhusudhan Rao as well as learned Counsel Ms. Nimmagadda Revathi, representing on behalf of Mr. Nimmagadda Satyanarayana, learned Counsel for the respondents/plaintiffs. 12. The learned Counsel for the appellants/defendants would submit that Ex.A1/suit promissory note is incomplete document under which the plaintiffs are not entitled to file a suit, which failed to consider by both Courts. He would further submit that the name of the 1st defendant was not shown in body of Ex.A1/suit promissory note, though his signature contains on revenue stamp, which was obtained afterwards, which not amounts to execution of promissory note. He argued that interpretation of document by both Courts is also form substantial question of law, and decree cannot be passed without obtaining Succession Certificate, which failed to consider by both Courts. He also filed a petition in I.A. No. 1 of 2023 to frame additional substantial question of law that “whether on a proper construction of Ex.A1 suit promissory note dated 01.12.2002 can any liability be fastened on defendant No. 1 in contravention of the recitals of Ex.A1?” and the same is allowed. He relied on following precedent law: (1) Santakumari and Others vs. Lakshmi Amma Janaki Amma (Dead) by LRs. and Others Judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court dated 10.08.2000, wherein it is held that construction of documents would be a substantial question of law is now a well settled proposition. He relied on following precedent law: (1) Santakumari and Others vs. Lakshmi Amma Janaki Amma (Dead) by LRs. and Others Judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court dated 10.08.2000, wherein it is held that construction of documents would be a substantial question of law is now a well settled proposition. (2) Veena Singh (Dead) through LRs. vs. The District Registrar and Another, 2022 Live Law (SC) 462, wherein it is held at Para Nos.49 and 57, which reads as under: “49. Adverting to the above decisions and to the views of the Calcutta (Mohima Chunder Dhur v. Jugul Kishore Bhutta Charji, ILR Volume VII Calcutta), Orissa (Smt. Uma Devi v. Narayan Nayak, 1984 SCC Online Ori 94) and Assam High Court (Bhutkani Nath v. Smt. Kamaleswari Nath, AIR 1972 Assam and Nagaland 15), the Single Judge of the Karnataka High Court in N.M. Ramachandraiah (supra) emphasized that the execution of the document does not mean merely signing it, but signing it after having understood its contents in their entirely: 15. Therefore, the law is well settled. Execution of a document does not mean merely signing, but signing by way of assent to the terms of the contract embodied in the document. Execution consists in signing a document written out and read over and understood, and does not consist of merely signing a name upon a blank sheet of paper. It is a solemn act of the executants who must own up the recitals in the instrument and there must be clear evidence that he put the signature after knowing the contents of document fully. To be executed, a document must be in existence; where there is no document in existence there cannot be execution. Mere proof or admission that a person’s signature appears on a document cannot by itself amount to execution of a document. Registration does not dispense with the necessity of proof of execution when the same is denied. Thus, execution of document is not mere signing of it. 57. The “execution” of a document does not stand admitted merely because a person admits to having signed the document. Such an interpretation accounts for circumstances where an individual signs a blank paper and it is later converted into a different document, or when an individual is made to sign a document without fully understanding its contents. 57. The “execution” of a document does not stand admitted merely because a person admits to having signed the document. Such an interpretation accounts for circumstances where an individual signs a blank paper and it is later converted into a different document, or when an individual is made to sign a document without fully understanding its contents. Adopting a contrary interpretation would unfairly put the burden upon the person denying execution to challenge the registration before a civil court or a writ court, since registration will have to be allowed once the signature has been admitted.” 3. Malar Finance Corporation Represented by its Managing Partner, Pandurangan vs. G. Rathinam and Others, 2001 MLJ (3) 753, wherein it is held at Para No. 36, which reads as under: “36. In the instant case, the defendants had admitted having affixed their signatures in a blank promissory note. The plaintiff was well within its powers to fill up the promissory note and on the basis of the completed promissory note, entitled to sue for recovery of money due under the note. The contrary view expressed by the Courts below cannot at all be sustained. Section 20 of the Act had not been brought to the notice of the Courts below.” 4. Duggineni Seshagiri Rao vs. Kothapalli Venkateswara Rao, 2001 (6) ALT 95 (DB), wherein it is explained an instrument to be a promissory note and also inchoate stamped instrument. 5. Sesharal Bajna vs. V.C. Subramanian, 1983 Law Suit (Mad) 245, wherein it is held that filling of date in promissory note afterwards, which amounts to material alteration.” He prays to allow the Appeal and dismiss the suit. 13. The learned Counsel for the respondents/plaintiffs would submit that the plaintiffs have obtained Succession Certificate after obtaining decree and simply because Succession Certificate is not produced, that itself is not a ground to dismiss the suit. She would further submit that there is no pleading by the appellants that Ex.A1 is incomplete document. She relied on following decision: 1. Vundavilli Venkataraju vs. Kora Laxman Rao and Others, AIR 2002 Orissa 214, wherein it is held at Para Nos.7 and 8, which reads as under: “7. Be that as it may, it appears that the question of maintainability was, in fact, raised in the suit and the learned trial Court has answered the same. She relied on following decision: 1. Vundavilli Venkataraju vs. Kora Laxman Rao and Others, AIR 2002 Orissa 214, wherein it is held at Para Nos.7 and 8, which reads as under: “7. Be that as it may, it appears that the question of maintainability was, in fact, raised in the suit and the learned trial Court has answered the same. I also find that all the materials necessary for effectual adjudication of inter se disputes are available on record. The only point which needs to be determined is as to whether a money suit for recovery of a debt can be filed by the legal heirs and successors as survivors of the deceased, or for maintaining such a suit succession certificate would be necessary. Parties were aware of the rival disputes and adduced evidence in the case. Thus, according to me, this is a case where the provisions of Order 41, Rule 23, C.P.C. shall be applicable and not Order 41, Rule 23, C.P.C. shall be applicable and not Order 41, Rule 23, C.P.C. inasmuch as the evidence on record was sufficient to enable the appellate Court to pronounce the judgment. Admittedly the pro-note was executed in the year 1980 and more than twenty-two years have elapsed in the meanwhile. Remanding the case once again to the trial Court for a de novo trial will not be in the interest of any of the parties. Power of remand should not be utilised as a matter of course and the same must be avoided when the appellate Court can make necessary enquiry which would save both time and expenses of litigation to some extent. This view of mine also finds support from a decision of this court reported in Udayanath Pani v. S.T.A. Orissa, (1994) 78 Cut LT 696 : AIR 1993 Ori 14 . 8. Needless to say, a succession certificate is a public document and the same if at all found to be necessary by any of the parties, can be adduced as an additional evidence in course of hearing of the appeal itself. Thus, setting aside the judgment and decree of the Court below and remanding the matter for a de novo trial will not meet the ends of justice. Thus, setting aside the judgment and decree of the Court below and remanding the matter for a de novo trial will not meet the ends of justice. For the aforesaid reasons, I have no hesitation to set aside the judgment passed by the lower appellate Court in Money Appeal No. 3/1 of 1985/87.” She prays to dismiss the Appeal.” 14. This Second Appeal was admitted at the first instance on the following substantial questions of law, which raised in the Ground No. 10 (1 to 5) of memorandum of appeal, which reads as under: “(1) Whether the confirming Decree and Judgment of both the Courts below are sustainable in the eye of law? (2) Whether the suit is maintainable in the absence of joinder of necessary parties? (3) Whether the Courts below are correct in appreciating the evidence both oral and documentary available on record? (4) Whether the respondents/plaintiffs established passing of consideration under Ex.A1? (5) Whether the Decree can be drafted under law in the suit unless Succession Certificate is filed under Section 372 of the Indian Succession Act as the creditor died prior to the filing of the suit and not during the pendency of the suit. Since Succession Certificate is a revenue to the State, both the Courts below ought to have taken oral submissions of the appellants/defendants at the time of arguments that a Decree cannot be passed/drafted in the suit unless Succession Certificate is obtained by the legal representatives of the creditors/i.e. respondents/plaintiffs?” 15. As per Section 100 of CPC, this Court can interfere with the Judgment of the Appellate Court, if it is satisfied that case involves a substantial question of law. 16. It is no doubt true that an inference of fact from the recitals or contents of document is a question of fact. But the legal effect of term of a document is a question of law. The construction of a document, involving application of any principle of law, is also a question of law. Therefore, when there is misconstruction of a document or wrong application of principle of law in constructing a document, which gives raise to question of law. 17. Both Courts gave concurrent findings with regard to execution of Ex.A1 by late Mr. K. Gopala Krishna and the 1st defendant and decreed the suit as prayed by the plaintiffs. The contention of the defendants is not total denial. 17. Both Courts gave concurrent findings with regard to execution of Ex.A1 by late Mr. K. Gopala Krishna and the 1st defendant and decreed the suit as prayed by the plaintiffs. The contention of the defendants is not total denial. They have pleaded that their father borrowed a sum of Rs.45,000/- from the father of PW-1 and executed Ex.B1/promissory note, which he discharged and thereafter at the instance of elders, late Mr. M. Arjuna also obtained suit promissory note from their father for Rs.50,000/- which also scribed by the 2nd defendant, who is also examined as DW-1, and wherein late Mr. M. Arjuna obtained the signature of the 1st defendant (DW-2) one month after signing in the promissory note by the father of the defendants. 18. As per Section 118 of Negotiable Instruments Act, once the signature in the promissory note admitted by DW-1 and DW-2, the presumption arises in favour of the plaintiffs and it is for the defendants to prove the circumstances under which they have stated in the written statement, which brought into existence of suit promissory note. The main contention of the learned Counsel for the appellants is that Ex.A1/suit promissory note is incomplete document, due to that it cannot be enforced. In order to make a document a promissory note, the following requisites are indicated in Section 4 of the Negotiable Instruments Act: (1) It must be in writing and signed by the maker. (2) It must contain an unconditional undertaking to pay a certain sum of money only and nothing more. (3) It must be payable on demand or at a fixed or determinable future time. (4) It must be payable to or to the order of a specified person or to the bearer. In addition to the above requirements the document must be one as to show the intention to make a promissory note. 19. Section 20 of the Negotiable Instruments Act deals with inchoate stamped instruments. (4) It must be payable to or to the order of a specified person or to the bearer. In addition to the above requirements the document must be one as to show the intention to make a promissory note. 19. Section 20 of the Negotiable Instruments Act deals with inchoate stamped instruments. It indicates that “where one person signs and delivers to another a paper stamped in accordance with the law relating to negotiable instruments then in force in India, and either wholly blank or having written thereon an incomplete negotiable instrument, he thereby gives prima facie authority to the holder thereof to make or complete, as the case may be, upon it a negotiable instrument, for any amount specified therein and not exceeding the amount covered by the stamp. The person so signing shall be liable upon such instrument, in the capacity in which he signed the same, to any holder in due course for such amount; provided that no person other than a holder in due course shall recover from the person delivering the instrument anything in excess of the amount intended by him to be paid thereunder.” Section 20 of the Negotiable Instruments Act explained by the Hon’ble Division Bench of this Court in Duggineni Seshagiri Rao decision supra, relied on by the learned Counsel for the appellants. 20. In the present case, another contention of the learned Counsel for the appellants is that body of Ex.A1/suit promissory note not contains the name of the 1st defendant though it contains the signature of the 1st defendant on revenue stamp, it amounts to incomplete document. In view of Section 20 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, there is no force in the argument of the learned Counsel for the appellants. Even otherwise, in the decision relied on by the learned Counsel for the appellants in Veena Sing case (2) referred supra, wherein it is explained what amounts to execution of a document, and while discussing Section 35 of Registration Act as contents of the document which is not Negotiable Instruments Act discussed by the Hon’ble Apex Court held that merely because a person admits his signature in the document does not amounts to execution and the Sub-Registrar can refuse to register the document if its contents have been denied by its executants. 21. 21. Admittedly, Ex.A1/suit promissory note is scribed by DW-1 (2nd defendant), who categorically deposed that he scribed Ex.A1, wherein the 1st defendant also signed on the revenue stamp as 2nd executants and put the date underneath his signature, and at that time he was also present. DW-2 (1st defendant) was also categorically admitted that he signed in Ex.A1/suit promissory note as 2nd executants, and he put the date underneath the signature as 01.12.2002, i.e. date of suit promissory note. Both the defendants have admitted in their evidence that they have not issued any legal notice to the plaintiffs or Mr. M. Arjuna for return of suit promissory note after alleged discharge of debt under Ex.B1. Even, Ex.B1 not contains any endorsement that amount which borrowed by Mr. K. Gopala Krishna has been discharged, which not having the signature of Mr. K. Gopala Krishna. 22. It is not the contention of the defendants that the 1st defendant has no knowledge about contents of Ex.A1/suit promissory note which he said to be signed after it was scribed by the 2nd defendant, who is no other than his younger brother, due to that it cannot be said that Ex.A1 is incomplete document, and once any negotiable instrument contains the signature of the executants on proper revenue stamp, it amounts to its execution and the ratio laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Veena Sing case referred supra relied on by the learned Counsel for the appellants is not applicable to the facts of the present case in view of Section 20 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. 23. Both Courts have considered the evidence of DW-1 and DW-2 that after the death of their father, all properties of their father were devolved on them, which they are enjoying, due to that a decree has been passed against the estate of late Mr. K. Gopala Krishna, which is in the hands of the defendants. It is not the contention of the defendants that their sister is also enjoying the estate of late Mr. K. Gopala Krishna, due to that it cannot be said that the suit is bad for non-joinder of necessary parties. 24. It is no doubt true that the defendants have taken a plea in their written statement itself that the plaintiffs are not entitled to obtain a decree without producing any Succession Certificate. K. Gopala Krishna, due to that it cannot be said that the suit is bad for non-joinder of necessary parties. 24. It is no doubt true that the defendants have taken a plea in their written statement itself that the plaintiffs are not entitled to obtain a decree without producing any Succession Certificate. Both Courts have failed to consider the said aspect, and the trial Court also not framed proper issue on that aspect and passed a decree, which confirmed by the First Appellate Court. As per Section 214 of the Indian Succession Act, which reads as under: “214. Proof of representative title a condition precedent to recovery through the Courts of debts from debtors of deceased persons: (1) No Court shall: (a) pass a decree against a debtor of a deceased person for payment of his debt to a person claiming on succession to be entitled to the effect of the deceased person or to any part thereof. (b) proceed, upon an application of a person claiming to be so entitled, to execute against such a debtor a decree or order for the payment of his debt, except on the production, by the person so claiming of: (i) a probate or letters of administration evidencing the grant to him of administration to the estate of the deceased. (ii) a, certificate granted under Section 31 or Section 32 of the Administrator General's Act, 1913, and having the debt mentioned, therein. (iii) a succession certificate granted under Part X and having the debt specified therein, or (iv) a certificate granted under Succession Certificate Act, 1889. (v) a certificate granted under Bombay Regulation No. VII of 1827 and, if granted after the first day of May, 1889, having the debt specified therein. (2) The word “debt” in sub-section (1) includes any debt except rent, revenue or profits payable in respect of land used for agricultural purpose.” 25. However, a money suit for recovery of debt should not be dismissed for non-production of Succession Certificate, but the Court should grant reasonable time to enable the party to produce it. The said aspect is not considered by both Courts. The trial Court passed the decree, which confirmed by the First Appellate Court. But a decree passed without production of Succession Certificate is not a nullity. The said aspect is not considered by both Courts. The trial Court passed the decree, which confirmed by the First Appellate Court. But a decree passed without production of Succession Certificate is not a nullity. In the present case, the contention of the learned Counsel for the respondents/plaintiffs that now the plaintiffs have obtained the Succession Certificate after passing of a decree, due to that it cannot be said that decree, which passed by the trial Court, confirmed by the First Appellate Court without producing the Succession Certificate is nullity. The plaintiffs can execute decree by producing the Succession Certificate before the execution Court, and on the ground that the plaintiffs not produced the Succession Certificate during pendency of the first appeal cannot be a ground to allow the appeal, when execution of the suit promissory note by late Mr. K. Gopala Krishna and the 1st defendant has proved by the plaintiffs, and when the defendants failed to prove their contention that the suit promissory note is not supported by consideration and brought into existence under the circumstances which they explained in their written statement. The respondents/plaintiffs shall produce the Succession Certificate before executing the decree against the appellants/defendants. 26. Basing on the material and evidence, both Courts have rightly appreciated the evidence and decreed the suit filed by the plaintiffs. 27. The substantial questions of law and additional substantial question of law framed are answered in favour of the respondents, against the appellants. 28. In the result, this Second Appeal is dismissed with an observation that the respondents/ plaintiffs are entitled to execute Decree after producing the Succession Certificate. In the circumstances of the case, both parties are directed to bear their own costs in the present Appeal. Consequently, all pending miscellaneous petitions, if any, shall stand closed. The Interim Orders granted earlier, if any, shall stand vacated.